Lee Mavin v Karen Wyatt

This is an appeal against two orders of HHJ Melissa Clarke sitting in the Milton Keynes and Oxford County Court. Under the first order dated 16 April 2025 (“the contempt order”), the judge found the appellant, Mr Lee Mavin, in contempt of court on seven counts. Under the second order dated 25 June 2025 (“the sentencing order”), she sentenced him to 9 months’ imprisonment, to take effect immediately. Both orders were made in Mr Mavin’s absence. Although he has a right to appeal against the orders without first obtaining permission, the appeal notice was filed on 28 July 2025, some twelve weeks out of time in respect of the first order and twelve days out of time in respect of the second, and he therefore seeks an extension of time for filing the notice.

On 30 July, Nugee LJ stayed the committal order pending determination of the appeal.

Mr Mavin has not advanced any substantive grounds against the decision that he was in contempt of court, or against the sentence passed against him. The issues he raises in his five grounds are allegations of procedural irregularity.

At the conclusion of the appeal hearing, we informed the parties that (1) the appeal against the first order would be allowed in respect of two of the seven findings (counts 6 and 7); (2) we were reserving our judgment in respect of the remainder of the appeal, but (3) in the event that we dismissed the appeal against the five other counts in the contempt order we would in any event reconsider the sentence passed by the judge in the light of the appeal being allowed in respect of counts 6 and 7.

This judgment sets out my reasons for joining in the decision to allow the appeal in respect of counts 6 and 7 and my decision and reasons in respect of the rest of the appeal.

The findings of contempt arise out of what the judge found to be Mr Mavin’s fraudulent misuse of the debt respite scheme known as “Breathing Space”, established under the Debt Respite Scheme (Breathing Space Moratorium and Mental Health Crisis Moratorium) (England and Wales) Regulations 2020, made under section 7 of the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018. Under the scheme, a debtor living in England or Wales can get temporary protection from their creditors for up to 60 days while obtaining advice and formulating a plan to pay off their debts. If the debtor is receiving mental health crisis treatment, the protection lasts for the length of their treatment, plus another thirty days. During that period, no enforcement action can be taken against the debtor, the creditors cannot contact the debtor about the debts included in the scheme, and no interest or charges can be added to the debt.

The eligibility criteria for entering a breathing space moratorium include, under regulation 24(3)(g), that the debtor “is not subject to another breathing space moratorium and, if they have previously been subject to a breathing space moratorium, that moratorium ended more than 12 months before the date of the application.”

The respondent to this appeal (the claimant in the proceedings), is the proprietor and landlord of a property in Aylesbury. In September 2022, she let the property to Mr Mavin and a woman called Naomi Graham under an assured shorthold tenancy at a rent of £1,000 per calendar month.

The tenants failed to keep up with the rent and substantial arrears accrued. In early 2023, the respondent started proceedings to recover possession of the premises, naming Ms Graham as the first defendant and Mr Mavin as the second defendant. In April 2023, however, Mr Mavin entered a breathing space moratorium initiated by a debt advice provider and the possession proceedings were suspended.

On the expiry of the breathing space period, the proceedings resumed. On 25 September 2023, a possession order was granted, to take effect on 9 October 2023, together with an order for Mr Mavin and Ms Graham to pay rent arrears of £8,000 and the respondent’s costs assessed at £355. On 19 October, however, Ms Graham entered a breathing space moratorium for two months.

On 4 January 2024, after the expiry of that moratorium, a warrant of possession was issued and on 10 January 2024, the court issued a notice of appointment with the bailiff for execution of the warrant of possession, scheduled for 13 February 2024. Meanwhile, Mr Mavin filed an application to set aside the possession order. On 31 January 2024, that application was dismissed.

On 13 February 2024, Mr Mavin sent an email to the court giving details of another breathing space moratorium which he claimed to have entered and as a result the enforcement proceedings were halted. The respondent subsequently alleged (count 1), and the judge ultimately found, that the details included a false breathing space reference number provided by Mr Mavin knowing it was false and in order to stop the eviction, and that by doing so he unlawfully interfered with the due administration of justice.

On 23 April 2024, Mr Mavin entered a further breathing space moratorium with a different debt advice provider and deployed it to prevent a lawful eviction. The moratorium was cancelled a few weeks later when the provider discovered that he was ineligible. The respondent subsequently alleged (counts 2 and 3), and the judge found, that Mr Mavin had entered the breathing space, and deployed it, fraudulently to avoid lawful eviction, and that by doing so he prevented the eviction and therefore interfered with the due administration of justice.

On 26 April 2024, the respondent filed an application for contempt of court against Mr Mavin, supported by an affidavit, putting forward five allegations, namely putting forward false evidence to stop bailiffs from evicting him, interfering with the administration of justice by putting forward that evidence, and breach of the orders dated 25 September 2023, 31 January 2024 and the notice of appointment with the bailiff issued on 10 January 2024. In the event, in circumstances described below, the five allegations set out in the application filed on 26 April 2024 were not pursued.

On 16 May 2024, Mr Mavin again misrepresented to bailiffs that he had entered a breathing space and provided a false reference number. The respondent later alleged (count 4), and the judge found, that he had again acted in this way to avoid eviction and thereby unlawfully interfered with the due administration of justice.

On 25 July 2024, Mr Mavin and Ms Graham filed an application to suspend the warrant of possession. That application was listed for hearing on 29 July 2024, but in the event neither applicant attended court. Instead, Mr Mavin sent an email stating that he had entered a breathing space, giving a false reference number and attaching a print-out falsely purporting to be a gov.uk document as evidence in support. As a result, the hearing was adjourned, and the eviction suspended, until 2 October 2024. The respondent alleged (count 5), and the judge found, that Mr Mavin had used forgery, deception and misrepresentation to induce the court to suspend the eviction, and that by this conduct he unlawfully interfered with the due administration of justice.

On 23 September 2024, Mr Mavin filed an application seeking a further adjournment. By that stage, the arrears of rent amounted to £25,255. At the hearing on 2 October 2024, which was attended by Mr Mavin, Deputy District Judge Warriner refused the application to adjourn the hearing and, under the heading “Contempt”, made the following further orders:

On 15 October 2024, in compliance with those directions, the respondent filed an “amended affidavit” in support of the committal application, stating:

She set out five fresh grounds for seeking his committal, namely the five counts summarised in paragraphs 12 to 16 above.

On 20 November 2024, Mr Mavin again emailed the court and asserted that a breathing space application was being processed and would be confirmed by the end of the day and asking for the eviction to be suspended. The respondent subsequently claimed that these assertions were false and amounted to an unlawful interference with the due administration of justice. On the following day, 21 November 2024, Mr Mavin sent documents purporting to show that he had been placed in breathing space. The respondent subsequently claimed that the documents supplied were forgeries to support Mr Mavin’s false assertion that he had entered a breathing space moratorium with yet another provider. These further allegations formed counts 6 and 7 of the committal application ultimately considered by the judge in circumstances described below.

In the event, the application for suspension of the eviction was refused by District Judge Nutley on 21 November and Mr Mavin and Ms Graham were duly evicted.

On 16 December 2024, Mr Mavin applied by email to the court for an adjournment of the committal hearing listed the following day, stating that he was still seeking legal representation. District Judge Pittman ordered that the matter remain in the list “for directions only, so the Court can ensure that ensure that the Defendant is fully aware of his rights to legal advice and the actions required of him on this regard.” At the hearing on 17 December, which Mr Mavin did not attend, District Judge Pittman ordered that all further applications be reserved to HHJ Clarke “to ensure judicial continuity” and that the committal application be listed before her on a date to be advised. The order also stated that if Mr Mavin did not attend the hearing “a warrant could be issued for his arrest.” In addition, under the hearing “The 2nd Defendant’s rights”, the order stated:

The committal hearing was listed before HHJ Clarke on 9 April 2025. On 2 April 2025, Mr Mavin applied to adjourn the hearing. That application has not been included in the papers before us but at the hearing on 9 April the judge stated that the basis for the adjournment application had been that Mr Mavin had just found a solicitor “but they need adequate time to apply for the individual case contract and then go through the claimant’s bundle and put together my defence.” By an order made on 4 April, without a hearing, the judge dismissed the application to adjourn, stating that Mr Mavin “has had almost four months since the last hearing to seek to obtain legal advice” and that, the order having been made without a hearing, he “may request that it be stayed, varied or set aside at the start of the hearing on 9 April.”

Also on 4 April, the respondent’s solicitor, Mr Richards, filed a document, headed “Charges against Mr Lee Mavin”, setting out seven “counts” of contempt of court, namely the five included in the amended affidavit filed on 15 October 2024 and the two additional counts arising out of Mr Mavin’s conduct on 20 and 21 November 2024, summarised in paragraph 19 above. In respect of each count, the respondent asserted that “by engaging in the above conduct, [Mr Mavin] unlawfully interfered with the due administration of justice.”

Mr Mavin did not attend the hearing on 9 April 2025. A transcript of the hearing has been prepared for the present appeal. At the start of the hearing, the judge referred to the application made on 2 April which she had refused. She then recited a number of further applications which Mr Mavin had made on the day before, and the morning of, the hearing. These included an application to attend the hearing via CVP, on the following grounds:

The judge said that she had reviewed that application but, as no medical evidence had been provided in support, she dismissed it. She then referred to a further application made by Mr Mavin shortly before the hearing, in which he renewed his application for an adjournment on the grounds that (a) he had never been offered an intermediary, stating that he suffered from PTSD and trauma which would affect his ability to participate; (b) he had never received a copy of the order made on 17 December 2024, and (c) his solicitor had not had time to prepare a defence and that the solicitors’ firm “do not have anyone free to attend a hearing today”.

The respondent’s solicitor, Mr Richards, then made submissions in which he recited some of the background, observed that Mr Mavin had “a habit of making these applications” and asked the judge to refuse this application. The judge responded:

After further discussion with Mr Richards, the judge decided to issue a bench warrant and made an order in the following terms:

On 13 April 2025, Mr Mavin filed an application in form N244 stating that he did not attend the committal hearing on 9 April 2025 because of “a mental health crisis”. On 14 April, Mr Mavin presented himself for arrest at a police station and was brought before HHJ Clarke. No transcript of that hearing has been prepared. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge made an order in the following terms:

On 15 April, Mr Mavin filed an application to adjourn the 16 April hearing in order to obtain evidence.

On 16 April, Mr Mavin attended the County Court at Oxford at 11am. The hearing was, however, delayed, and by the time it was called on at 2pm, he had left the court building. Shortly before the start of the hearing, he sent an email to the court office which he asked to be passed to the judge and which she read out at the start of the hearing:

After submissions from Mr Richards, the judge decided to proceed with the hearing and delivered a preliminary judgment setting out her reasons for taking that course. After summarising the case, she said:

The hearing continued. Mr Richards went through the seven grounds. In respect of the first five grounds, the judge made the findings summarised at paragraphs 12 to 16 above. In respect of counts six and seven, relating to Mr Mavin’s conduct on 20 and 21 November 2024 summarised at paragraph 17 above, she found that he had submitted a false statement that a breathing space application was being processed and submitted forged documents to induce the judge to suspend the eviction, and that in doing so he had sought unlawfully to interfere with the administration of justice. She therefore found him to be in contempt on all seven allegations and adjourned sentence to 2 May.

On 1 May, the day before the adjourned hearing, Mr Mavin filed an application for a further adjournment to obtain legal advice. The judge allowed this application and adjourned the hearing to 29 May.

On 28 May, the day before the hearing, Mr Mavin applied to the court again for an adjournment in order to obtain legal representation. He was informed by the court that the application would be considered at the hearing.

On 29 May, Mr Mavin emailed the court to say he was in hospital having had breathing difficulties, and had fallen and hit his head. Sentencing was adjourned to 12 June 2025. Mr Mavin was ordered to provide a discharge summary from hospital relating to his attendance.

On 8 June, Mr Mavin filed another application for an adjournment to seek legal advice. That application was initially refused by the judge on paper. At the hearing on 12 June, which Mr Mavin attended, he renewed the application for an adjournment and produced documentary evidence showing that he had contacted the Aylesbury Homeless Action Group (“AHAG”) who had liaised with Hillingdon Law to act for him. On that basis, the judge ordered “a final adjournment of the sentencing hearing to 11.30 am on 25 June 2025”.

The order of 12 June contained the following recitals:

In the event, Mr Mavin was neither present nor represented at the hearing on 25 June. On the morning of the hearing, he sent an email to the court stating that he was in an ambulance on his way to Stoke Mandeville Hospital. The hearing proceeded in his absence and the judge then delivered a sentencing judgment. She summarised the earlier findings of contempt, the history of the proceedings and the various occasions when Mr Mavin had failed to attend. She continued:

The judge then set out some legal principles derived from case law and Sentencing Council guidelines. She continued:

After summarising some of those issues, the judge continued:

Later that day, Mr Mavin applied by email for a stay of the sentencing order and suspension of the warrant of committal. On 27 June, that application was dismissed. Neither the application nor the order was included in the bundle before us. Recitals in a subsequent order summarised below (24 July 2025) recorded that in his application by email on 25 June Mr Mavin stated that he had a “legitimate medical emergency” which had prevented his attendance that morning. He stated that he had “collapsed … due to respiratory issues and blacked out whilst hitting my head” and that he had been taken to hospital by ambulance. He asserted that the discharge letter said that he was found to have a viral infection in his lungs. He also stated that he had been disabled since 2014, had a heart condition that affected his mobility and was also stress induced, and that he suffered from severe anxiety, PTSD and trauma. Recitals to the subsequent order also recorded that the order dated 27 June stated that “the discharge letter from Stoke Mandeville Hospital attached to the application … does not support [Mr Mavin’s] assertion that he had a viral chest infection and was too unwell to attend court.”

On 9 July 2025, Mr Mavin filed an application to set aside the order, seeking to rely on what he asserted to be fresh evidence. On 24 July, that application was dismissed by Recorder Wood without a hearing. In addition to the recitals set out in the previous paragraph, the order made by the recorder recited that “none of the new evidence that was sent to the court with the application notice on 9 July is evidence that was not available to [Mr Mavin] or could not have been reasonably obtained by him by the time his application of 25 June 2025 was considered”. The order further recorded that Mr Mavin had not provided any grounds as to why the court was wrong (1) to make findings of contempt, or (2) to sentence him to 9 months’ imprisonment.

On 28 July 2025, Mr Mavin, then still acting in person, filed a notice of appeal against the orders of 16 April and 25 June, including an application for an extension of time for filing the notice.

On 30 July, Nugee LJ stayed the committal order pending determination of the appeal. On 12 August, Andrews LJ adjourned the application for an extension of time to a “rolled up” hearing with the committal appeal to follow if the extension were granted. She made a series of further case management directions, including listing the appeal in October 2025. She also ordered that, if Mr Mavin wished to seek the court’s permission to adduce fresh evidence, including medical evidence, he must make a formal application to do so by no later than 8 September 2025, together with a witness statement in support exhibiting the fresh evidence, identifying the issues to which it related, and explaining why it was not adduced before the judge.

On 8 September 2025, the respondent filed a witness statement in response to the appeal. On 23 September, Mr Mavin filed a witness statement with exhibits. Neither party had applied for permission to adduce fresh evidence, notwithstanding, in Mr Mavin’s case, the clear direction given by Andrews LJ in the order of 12 August. On 13 October, I made an order that if either party wished to rely on the statements filed without permission, they should file a notice of application to that effect which would be considered at the start of the appeal hearing, then listed for 28 October. On 20 October, Mr Mavin filed an application to adduce fresh evidence.

On 23 October 2025, Mr Mavin emailed the Civil Appeals Office asking for an adjournment. He asserted that he was awaiting a response from the office to requests for clarification, that he was “a disabled and vulnerable litigant in person, with ongoing mental health difficulties (PTSD and anxiety disorder)” and that proceeding without clarity on those issues would place him at a serious disadvantage and risk procedural unfairness. The court responded that the application for an adjournment would be considered at the start of the hearing. On 27 October, the day before the hearing, Mr Mavin emailed the court asking for permission to attend via video link. He said that, over the previous week, his PTSD symptoms had worsened as a result of not receiving responses to his requests for directions from the court and that attending the hearing in person would pose a serious risk to his mental health and “could trigger a crisis episode”. The application was refused but the court informed Mr Mavin that it would consider any request for reasonable adjustments to facilitate his participation at the hearing.

At 10.10 hrs on the morning of 28 October, Mr Mavin sent another email to the Civil Appeals Office stating that he was at Stoke Mandeville Hospital “in a severe mental health crisis” and unable to attend the hearing. After hearing submissions from the respondent’s advocate, the Court adjourned the hearing to a date to be fixed and gave the following directions:

On 10 November, Mr Mavin filed the following documents:

On 3 December 2025, having concluded that the documents did not comply with the directions given on 28 October, this Court made an order (1) re-listing the adjourned appeal and application for an extension of time to file the appeal notice, and the application to adduce further evidence, for hearing on 16 December 2025, (2) directing Mr Mavin to attend the hearing in person, and (3) directing him to file and serve a document setting out his proposals for reasonable adjustments to enable him to participate at the hearing, to be prepared in consultation with his outreach worker.

On 8 December, Mr Mavin sent a further email to the court asking for an adjournment of the hearing listed on 16 December, putting forward two reasons. First, he said that, having tried but failed to obtain legal representation from firms named in the email, he had on 24 November submitted an application to Advocate who had replied that they would be unable to assist on 16 December and required at least three weeks to determine whether a litigant was eligible for assistance. Secondly, Mr Mavin reiterated his contention that he was unable to attend the hearing in person because of his various medical conditions, and made a further application for reasonable adjustments. The application for an adjournment was refused, as were two further applications for an adjournment sent the following day and an application sent on 13 December for permission to attend by video link. The Court reiterated that it would consider any request made for reasonable adjustments to facilitate Mr Mavin’s participation at the hearing.

At the hearing on 16 December 2025, Mr Mavin attended in person. In the event, he said very little, other than to repeat in a faltering voice words to the effect that his medical condition was affecting his ability to concentrate, process questions and communicate. He failed to answer a number of questions put to him by the Court. It was not possible to determine whether he was unable to communicate or simply choosing not to do so. After hearing submissions on behalf of the respondent, the Court agreed to adjourn the hearing to allow Mr Mavin one final opportunity to obtain legal representation. Under the order made following the hearing, Advocate was invited to arrange for legal representation for Mr Mavin, or alternatively refer him for legal representation. The Court further ordered that, provided he was legally represented at the adjourned hearing, Mr Mavin could attend the hearing via video link.

Through Advocate, Adam Tear of Scott-Moncrieff and Associates and Christopher Jacobs of Counsel were duly instructed to represent Mr Mavin. This Court is very grateful to all for their assistance. On 14 January 2026, Mr Mavin was granted legal aid to be represented on the appeal. On 5 February 2026, following an application from Mr Mavin’s solicitor, I made an order amending the timetable for filing documents, including transcripts of the hearings in the court below, which had been requested but were not yet available. At the Master’s direction, a further application on behalf of Mr Mavin for leave to adduce fresh evidence was adjourned to the appeal hearing.

Five grounds of appeal were put forward in the appeal notice:

Before considering the merits of the appeal, there are a number of preliminary applications made on behalf of Mr Mavin which must be addressed. The first is the application to extend time for filing the appeal notice, which also encompassed the second ground of appeal. The second is an application to adduce fresh evidence. The third, which was made by Mr Jacobs in the course of the hearing before us, is an application to amend the grounds of appeal.

I deal first with the application to extend time. The appeal notice ought to have been filed twenty-one days after the decision under appeal. In this case it was filed twelve days after the expiry of the period in respect of the sentencing order and twelve weeks after the expiry of the period in respect of the findings of contempt. The Denton principles for granting relief from sanctions apply to applications for an extension of time for appealing against orders for committal for contempt of court: Yaxley-Lennon v Solicitor-General [2025] EWCA Civ 476 paragraph 24. CPR rule 81.8(7) provides that “the court shall inform the defendant of the right to appeal without permission, the time limit for appealing and the court before which any appeal must be brought.” Mr Jacobs pointed out that neither the order dated 16 April 2025 nor the warrant of committal dated 25 June 2025 contain information about the right to appeal. Mr Mavin was, of course, not present on either occasion. Mr Jacobs added that the order dated 16 April was drawn on the General Form of Judgment or Order and not on the standard form N603 prescribed for an order on determination of proceedings for contempt of court, which contains information in compliance with rule 81.8(7). In his appeal notice, Mr Mavin said that he had only been made aware of his right to appeal on reading the order made by Recorder Wood on 24 July and that he then immediately started the appeal process, filing his appeal notice four days later. Mr Jacobs submitted that the fact that Mr Mavin made an attempt to set aside the order is evidence that he wanted to challenge it but was unaware of his right to appeal. As soon as he was informed about the right, he filed the appeal notice.

The fact that there was a failure to comply with the obligation to inform him of his right to appeal, coupled with the prompt action taken after receiving the order of 24 July informing him of the right, and the fact that Mr Mavin’s liberty is at stake, persuade me that the application to extend time should be granted.

Next, I consider the application to rely on fresh evidence on the appeal. In fact, there are two applications. The first was made in December 2025 when Mr Mavin was still acting in person. The second was made by his representatives prior to this hearing. Under CPR 52.11(2):

Prior to the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules, the requirements for the admission of fresh evidence on appeal were expressed in the form of three criteria identified by Denning LJ in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489:

In the first application, Mr Mavin said:

The evidence on which Mr Mavin sought to rely was appended to the application.

The “medical records” cited in (a) consisted only of a medical report dated 8 March 2024. It is clear from the transcripts of the hearing on 9 April 2025 and of the judgment delivered on 25 June 2025 (both quoted above) that the report was produced to the judge. It is therefore not fresh evidence. The “ambulance and hospital records” cited in (b) seems to be a single sheet confirming that Mr Mavin was at hospital on 25 June between 8am and 2pm. It does not contain any evidence of any treatment provided. In my view it does not comply with the guidance as to the medical evidence required to explain non-attendance at court given in Levy v Ellis-Carr [2012] EWHC 63 (Ch) and approved by this Court in Bruce v Wychavon District Council [2023] EWCA Civ 1389, para 36. I would therefore refuse to admit it on this appeal. The document cited under (c) is the email sent to the court shortly before 2pm on 16 April 2025 which was before the judge at the hearing and is thus not “fresh evidence”. The documents produced under (d) fall into two categories. The first is a note made by Mr Mavin on 29 September 2025 of a telephone call he made on 12 February 2024 about a pending breathing space application. Mr Mavin has not provided any explanation as to why the contents of this note could not have been produced before the hearing on 16 April 2025. The second is an exchange of emails on 20 November 2024 and 12 December 2024 concerning Mr Mavin’s application for breathing space in November 2024. This material, which relates to counts 6 and 7, is, in my view, potentially admissible as fresh evidence. But as for reasons set out below, we have concluded that as the judge’s findings on those counts cannot stand, it is unnecessary to admit it.

The second application to admit fresh evidence was made by Mr Mavin’s legal representatives shortly before the hearing. It consists of three statements: (1) a statement signed by Mr Mavin dated 9 February 2026; (2) a statement signed by Lucy Scott-Moncrieff, the managing director of the solicitors’ firm now representing Mr Mavin on this appeal, dated 30 January 2026; and (3) a statement from Benjamin Goodearl, a paralegal employed by the firm, dated 17 February 2026.

The statement by Mr Mavin concerns committal counts 6 and 7. In my view it satisfies the Ladd v Marshall criteria and should be admitted.

The statements by Ms Scott-Moncrieff and Mr Goodearl testify to the shortage of solicitors willing to represent litigants in committal proceedings. Ms Scott-Moncrieff addresses the issue in general terms, whereas Mr Goodearl gives an account of the specific difficulties in Mr Mavin’s local area. Their evidence is certainly credible and this Court is aware of the problems to which Ms Scott-Moncrieff refers. For reasons set out below, however, I do not consider that their evidence would probably have had an important influence on the result of the case.

The third preliminary application is to amend the grounds of appeal. As noted above, the five grounds were drafted at a point when Mr Mavin was acting in person. Following the late instruction of his legal representatives, the focus of the argument changed, in particular in respect of ground 4. In the course of the appeal hearing, it became clear that the arguments which Mr Jacobs was pursuing were not sufficiently covered in the grounds drafted by his client. We therefore agreed to his application to amend ground 4 by the addition of the following:

Having considered all the preliminary applications, I turn to the substantive appeal.

Mr Jacobs submitted, first, that the addition of counts 6 and 7 relating to Mr Mavin’s actions on 20 and 21 November 2024, was unfair. There was nothing to indicate that the respondent made any application to amend or add to the grounds on which she was seeking Mr Mavin’s committal, nor was there any evidence that Mr Mavin had been served with such an application or otherwise expressly notified of the proposed two new counts. Mr Jacobs submitted that the extra counts had been added by the respondent without any procedural step being taken at all. In his statement dated 9 February 2026, which I would admit as fresh evidence, Mr Mavin says that at the date of the hearings on 16 April and 25 June 2025 he was not aware that counts 6 and 7 were being advanced or treated as separate contempt charges. There was nothing in the transcript of the hearing on 16 April 2024 to demonstrate that the judge’s attention was drawn to the fact that two counts had been added after service of the affidavit dated 15 October 2024 without notice being given to Mr Mavin. Furthermore, there was no evidence before the court to support the two additional counts which post-dated that affidavit.

In support of these submissions, Mr Jacobs cited the decision of this Court in Inplayer Limited v Thorogood [2014] EWCA Civ 1511, in which it was held that a committal was procedurally unfair inter alia because the respondent had not been informed at any time before judgment of a number of alleged contempts which the judge had found proved. In response to a submission that the procedural unfairness would not have affected the outcome, Jackson LJ said (at paragraph 39):      

Mr Jacobs further submitted that the court failed to make any or any reasonable adjustments to accommodate Mr Mavin’s known vulnerabilities. It is said that he has long-standing, formally diagnosed, conditions – PTSD, anxiety, and a heart condition – all of which substantially affected his capacity to participate in court proceedings under stress without adjustments. He was under the care of his local mental health crisis team. The court was made aware of these health issues in advance of the hearings and provided with medical evidence to support Mr Mavin’s assertions. Despite that, the court not only refused an adjournment of both the hearing on 16 April and 25 June but also failed to make reasonable adjustments to allow Mr Mavin to participate at the hearings, for example by arranging for Mr Mavin to attend the hearings remotely.

In those circumstances, Mr Jacobs submitted that it was wrong of the judge to proceed with the hearing on 16 April. Mr Mavin had attended in the morning but left court for reasons fully explained in an email which he sent to the court before the case was ultimately called on at 2pm. Given what was known about Mr Mavin, the judge ought not to have proceeded in his absence. Similarly on the morning of 25 June 2025, Mr Mavin was taken to hospital by ambulance due to a respiratory emergency. The court was notified that morning prior to the hearing and a discharge letter was submitted shortly afterwards. Despite this, the judge proceeded to sentence Mr Mavin in his absence. Mr Jacobs submitted that both occasions there was a legitimate reason for Mr Mavin’s non-attendance and that the judge’s decision to proceed in his absence was prejudicial and unfair.

In the alternative, Mr Jacobs submitted that, given what was known about Mr Mavin’s vulnerabilities, the appropriate course for the court to take on 16 April and 25 June 2025 was to issue a bench warrant. He relied on the observations of Rimer J in Phonographic Performance Ltd v Inch [2002] All E R (D) 253 and of HHJ Birss QC (as he then was) in Westwood v Knight [2012] EWPCC 14 at paragraphs 148-9. Procedural fairness required that Mr Mavin should have a reasonable opportunity to be heard and the judge ought to have taken all reasonable steps to ensure that Mr Mavin was allowed that opportunity.

It was further argued that, as a litigant in person with recognised and proven heath conditions and vulnerabilities, Mr Mavin ought to have been provided with more support to enable him to participate and defend himself. The judge was well aware that Mr Mavin had been actively seeking legal representation, but at the hearing on 16 April wrongly took issue with his failure to obtain it. She should have recognised that there is a dearth of legal aid solicitors who practice in the field of contempt cases. In support of this last argument, Mr Mavin’s representatives sought this Court’s leave to adduce evidence from his solicitor to the effect that defendants to contempt applications face obstacles in obtaining representation. Mr Jacobs cited the observations in this Court in Brown v LB Haringey [2015] EWCA Civ 483 1 WLR 542 (McCombe LJ at paragraph 44) and in Re O (Committal): Legal Representation [2019] EWCA Civ 1721 4 WLR 140 (Peter Jackson LJ at paragraph 2). In the latter case, Peter Jackson LJ said:

In the course of the hearing, it became clear that the respondent had no answer to the submissions made by Mr Jacobs in respect of counts 6 and 7. There was no proper application to amend the allegations of contempt which had been served pursuant to DDJ Warriner’s order. No evidence was filed in support of the further allegations relating to 20 and 21 November 2024. Mr Mavin was given no notice of them. The judge was unaware of these omissions. It is clear from the transcript of the hearing on 16 April that Mr Richards did not draw her attention to them.

At the conclusion of the hearing, we therefore informed the parties that the appeal would be allowed in respect of counts 6 and 7.

I have concluded, however, that the appeal in respect of counts 1 to 5 of the contempt order must be dismissed. Having regard to the history of the proceedings, I find the judge was entitled to take the course she did on both 16 April and 25 June and that there was no procedural irregularity on either occasion which rendered the outcome unfair.

On 9 April, the judge had decided not to proceed in Mr Mavin’s absence but instead issued a bench warrant. That was duly executed with the result that Mr Mavin was brought before the judge on 14 April. She had then released him with a warning that if he did not attend the hearing two days later she would proceed in his absence. Mr Mavin duly attended on 16 April but then left court without informing anyone that he was doing so. In those circumstances, the judge was entitled to conclude on 16 April that it would be wrong to adjourn again and issue another bench warrant. In reaching that decision, the judge took into account all that she knew about his health and vulnerabilities. I infer that this included not only what she had read but also what she had learned at the hearing two days earlier after he was arrested when she had had what she described as a “good conversation” with him.

A court dealing with a committal application is under an obligation to ensure that the defendant is aware of his right to legal representation and allowed a fair opportunity to obtain it. In this case, it is clear that Mr Mavin was aware of his right to representation. The judge found, as recorded in the order of 9 April, that he had been served with a copy of the order dated 17 December 2024. That order contained a full description of Mr Mavin’s rights, including a right to legal representation, a right to time to prepare, and a right to remain silent. On 2 April 2025, Mr Mavin had applied for an adjournment of the hearing on 9 April on the grounds that, although he had found a solicitor, he needed more time to prepare. The judge rejected that application without a hearing, stating in the order that Mr Mavin “has had almost four months since the last hearing to seek to obtain legal advice”. She added, however, that, as the order had been made without a hearing, Mr Mavin could apply to set it aside at the hearing on 9 April. Mr Mavin did not attend that hearing, but renewed his application to adjourn, in part because his solicitor had not had sufficient time to prepare “and did not have anyone free to attend a hearing”. The judge rejected that application, noting that although Mr Mavin had told her in his application on 2 April that he had found representation, no solicitor had come on the record. By issuing a bench warrant, however, the judge was effectively allowing more time for preparation. In the event, no solicitor came on the record or attended the hearing on 16 April.

In her judgment on that date, in giving her reasons for continuing with the hearing on 16 April, the judge said that “the court has really bent over backwards to try and assist Mr Mavin in giving him every opportunity to obtain legal advice”. I agree.

Having made the findings of contempt, the judge then properly adjourned the case and listed it for a sentencing hearing sixteen days later on 2 May. On the day before the adjourned hearing, Mr Mavin filed a further application for a further adjournment on the grounds that he was trying to obtain legal advice. The judge allowed this application and adjourned the hearing for a further four weeks, until 29 May. On that day, Mr Mavin emailed the court to say he was in hospital. The judge adjourned sentencing for a further two weeks, to 12 June. Four days before the hearing, Mr Mavin emailed again seeking another adjournment so he could obtain legal advice. The judge initially refused that application on paper. At the start of the hearing on 12 June, which Mr Mavin attended, he gave the judge details of the legal representatives he had consulted via a homeless charity. The judge went so far as to speak to the charity to confirm what Mr Mavin had told her. On that basis, she agreed to what was described in the court order as a “final adjournment” of the sentencing hearing for thirteen days, but again warned Mr Mavin that if he did not attend, she would proceed in his absence.

On 25 June, Mr Mavin again failed to attend, sending an email stating that he was in hospital and that he had been in contact with a solicitor on 21 June. In her judgment, the judge said she could not understand why he had not been in contact with the solicitor before that date, given what had been said at the hearing on 12 June. She therefore decided to pass sentence in his absence. It would have been open to the judge on 25 June to issue a bench warrant so that Mr Mavin could be brought before the court when sentence was passed. Given the history of the proceedings, however, I do not consider that she was obliged to do so. The sentencing hearing had already been adjourned three times. On the third occasion, the judge again warned Mr Mavin, who was present, that if he did not attend, she would sentence him in his absence. When he failed to attend, she proceeded to take that course.

In her judgment, the judge observed that she had been trying to sentence him since 2 May and that she had “little to no confidence” that if she adjourned again he would attend and be legally represented. She made those observations having been involved with this case for several months, conducted a number of hearings, and met Mr Mavin on two occasions. She had previously recorded, in the order of 9 April 2025, that Mr Mavin had “indulged in a pattern of very late applications to adjourn, or to suspend warrants, without good reason for the lateness”. That pattern had continued after the contempt hearing. In those circumstances, I find that the judge was perfectly entitled to conclude that Mr Mavin had been given a fair opportunity to obtain legal representation. There is no basis on which this Court could say that the judge was wrong to proceed to sentence him on 25 June 2025.

Although it seems that Mr Mavin had some difficulty locating a solicitor, the fact is that he found a solicitor who was willing to represent him before the contempt hearing and a (different) solicitor to represent him at the sentencing hearing in June. In each case, there was a period of about two weeks between the date on which Mr Mavin spoke to the solicitor and the hearing. The evidence given by Ms Scott-Moncrieff and Mr Goodearl as to the paucity of solicitors’ firms willing to act in this type of case, whilst plainly credible, would have had no impact on the judge’s decision on each occasion to proceed with the hearing.

For those reasons, whilst allowing the appeal against counts 6 and 7 in the contempt order, I dismiss the appeal against counts 1 to 5.

I also reject the argument on Mr Mavin’s behalf that the sentencing hearing was unfair. But the procedural irregularity that has led me to set aside counts 6 and 7 also infects the judge’s sentencing decision. The fact that he must be sentenced now for five, as opposed to seven, contempts, and the fact that the period over which the contempts for which he falls to be sentenced was five months (February to July 2024) as opposed to the nine months (February to November 2024) which contributed to the judge’s decision not to suspend the sentence, persuade me that the sentencing exercise must be carried out again.

I would therefore set aside the sentence of nine months’ immediate imprisonment passed on 25 June 2025.

In the course of the hearing, we canvassed with the parties the course to be followed if we came to this decision. It would be open to us to remit the matter to the judge. We concluded, however, that we would be in an equally good position to determine the sentence. The parties agreed, and we therefore gave directions for the preparation of a medical report and a further statement from Mr Mavin to assist us in the event that the appeal against counts 1 to 5 was dismissed.

The matter will therefore be listed before us on another occasion when we will determine the appropriate sentence.

I agree.