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R v Steven Nolan

The Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Criminal Division) 31 March 2026 [2026] EWCA Crim 465
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Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCA Crim 465

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL DIVISION

ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT GUILDFORD

(HHJ DAVID PUGH) [45RM0714923]

CASE NO 202501320/B5

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand

London

WC2A 2LL

Tuesday 31 March 2026

Before:

LORD JUSTICE HOLGATE

MRS JUSTICE O’FARRELL

RECORDER OF NORWICH

(HER HONOUR JUDGE ALICE ROBINSON)

(Sitting as a Judge of the CACD)

REX

STEVEN NOLAN

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Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,

Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE

Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: [email protected] (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

_________

NON-COUNSEL APPLICATION

_________

JUDGMENT

MRS JUSTICE O'FARRELL:

1.

On 19 December 2024 in the Guildford Crown Court before His Honour Judge Pugh, the applicant, Steven Nolan, was convicted of stalking (count 1) and dangerous driving (count 3). He was acquitted of making a threat to kill (count 2).

2.

On 12 March 2025 the applicant was sentenced by the judge as follows:

a.

firstly, for stalking, involving fear of violence, contrary to section 4A(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, 26 months' imprisonment;

b.

secondly, for dangerous driving, 10 months' imprisonment concurrent;

a total of 26 months' imprisonment.

3.

The applicant renews his application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence, extensions of time for the application and for leave to introduce fresh evidence pursuant to section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.

4.

The material background facts are as follows.

5.

The applicant and the complainant were in a relationship for 8 years and had a 6-year-old daughter with whom the applicant had contact. It was common ground that the applicant had gone into the complainant's house on the night of 24/25 June 2023 and that he drove to their daughter's school on the morning of 26 June 2023. The circumstances and what took place were in dispute.

6.

The prosecution case was that the applicant caused the complainant to fear violence would be used against her when he entered her bedroom in the early hours of 25 June and by following and hitting her van deliberately on the morning of 26 June 2023.

7.

The complainant's evidence was that she was not living with the applicant at the date of the incidents. He had contact with their daughter but she would take her to a neutral place to be picked up. She described the applicant as unpredictable and during the week leading to the incident his behaviour included shouting, threatening her by phone, questioning her about her personal life and accusing her of having multiple men around the house.

8.

On the night of 25 to 26 June 2023 the complainant shared her small one-bedroom flat with her daughter and her sister; the complainant slept in the bed with her daughter and her sister slept in the lounge. The applicant did not have keys to the property and did not have permission to enter but on 25 June 2023 he entered through the bedroom’s old French doors. He told the complainant that he was there to find her alleged boyfriend. Having searched the flat he took her phone by force and went to the garden shed to go through it. The complainant asked him to leave multiple times but he refused. She was unable to call the police because the appellant had her phone. In the morning the appellant had left the property. The complainant reported the incident to police.

9.

The following day the complainant drove her daughter to school. The applicant arrived at the school in his Range Rover and drove into the side of the driver's side door of her van so that she could not get out. He went round to the passenger side of the van, the complainant put her daughter onto her lap but eventually unlocked the passenger door. He said that he wanted to talk to her. He tried to take away the phone that she was holding and took the car keys. Another mother came over to the van and took the complainant's daughter into school before telephoning the police.

10.

Two witnesses, a mother and a father with children at the school, gave evidence that the Range Rover was parked parallel to and blocking the van and so that the driver's door of the van could not be opened.

11.

The defence case was that the applicant was living at the complainant's house and that by entering the bedroom on 24/25 June 2023 there was no conduct which amounted to an offence. Likewise, no offence had been committed on 26 June, when he had pulled up alongside the complainant's van to get his phone that had been under the bed in the flat. There had been no collision.

12.

His account was that he had gone to the flat to collect his belongings and had entered through the front door using the key. He said he could not drive because he had had a drink so he went into the shed in the garden and he left in the early hours of the morning. On Monday the applicant had gone to the school as he needed to get his phone from the complainant. He had no recollection of hitting her vehicle and suggested she must have hit a post. He said that he had pulled up and lowered his window but got out of the car when the complainant did not lower her window to ask for his phone.

13.

There was CCTV footage of the incident at the school which the applicant accepted appeared to show that he had clipped her car.

14.

The issues for the jury on count 1 were whether: (i) the applicant had pursued a course of conduct which amounted to stalking; (ii) that conduct caused the complainant to fear (on at least two occasions) that violence would be used against her; and (iii) he knew or ought to have known that his course of conduct would cause her so to fear on each occasion.

15.

The issues for the jury on count 3 were whether the applicant drove deliberately into the complainant's van and whether he drove dangerously.

Grounds of appeal against conviction

16.

The renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction raises the following grounds which it is said rendered the trial unfair and made the convictions unsafe:

1.

The judge failed to explain or adequately explain the court processes to the applicant (a litigant in person) at every stage of the case, causing him unfair prejudice and severely hampering his ability to mount a defence.

2.

The prosecution failed to serve the case papers on the applicant in a timely manner severely hampering his ability to properly prepare his defence and for trial such that he was not able to adequately represent himself.

3.

The prosecution breached its disclosure duties in accordance with the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and did not serve the unused material upon the applicant.

4.

There was ineffective assistance of counsel. The section 36 advocate did not consult properly with the applicant or follow his instructions, frustrating the applicant in his ability to properly put forward his defence.

5.

The judge did not make adequate allowance for the fact that the applicant was a litigant in person. He unreasonably restrained the applicant from adducing evidence and calling witnesses in his defence.

6.

The applicant felt excluded and alienated from the proceedings. Key concepts were not explained to him. Witnesses were allowed to leave without being cross-examined and a hostile environment was created wherein even the section 36 advocate was hostile towards him. He felt under extreme pressure and was afraid to challenge the restrictions placed upon him and his defence.

17.

For the avoidance of doubt, we confirm that in addition to the grounds of appeal against conviction and sentence we have read the applicant's letters and other materials sent to the court following the Single Judge's refusal of leave and which summarise his additional arguments.

18.

Further, like the Single Judge (Jacobs J), we have read the full transcript of the proceedings when considering the grounds of appeal. We do not repeat the careful and detailed reasons given by the Single Judge when refusing leave to appeal but summarise the key points as follows.

19.

The applicant had ample opportunity to prepare and obtain legal representation for the trial; he was present in court at the PTPH on 21 August 2023, when the trial date of 16 December 2024 was fixed and, at the pre-trial review on 10 December 2024, when he was given a written guide for unrepresented defendants. The applicant was not served with the prosecution papers until December 2024 but he did not notify anyone that no papers had been received until the pre-trial review hearing. The prosecution served the full bundle including the unused material on the applicant on 10 December 2024.

20.

This was not a long or complicated case. When asked by the Judge, the applicant stated that he was content to proceed without legal representation. Far from being excluded or alienated the transcript demonstrates that the Judge showed great patience and courtesy to the applicant, explaining the process and assisting the applicant through the trial. The Judge listened to the applicant's arguments and questions during the trial and gave him opportunities to consider additional evidence that he might want to adduce. The section 36 advocate appointed took time to discuss the case with the applicant and made proper challenges to the witnesses in cross-examination.

21.

The Judge was entitled to exclude bad character or other evidence that was not relevant to any matter in dispute. It was made clear to the applicant that he could rely on additional evidence from his mother and other witnesses but he decided not to call them. The grounds do not articulate any particular part of his defence case that he was not permitted to advance so as to render the trial unfair.

22.

The applicant now seeks to rely on fresh evidence, namely additional witness statements from Marie Nolan (his mother), Abbey Kingston, Mohammed Kayani, Annie Stevens and Martin Nolan.

23.

Section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 provides that:

"(1)

For the purposes of an appeal, or an application for leave to appeal, under this Part of this Act the Court of Appeal may, if they think it necessary or expedient in the interests of justice—

c)

receive any evidence which was not adduced in the proceedings from which the appeal lies."

24.

Section 23(2) sets out the following particular considerations to which the court should have regard in deciding whether to admit such evidence:

"(a)

whether the evidence appears to the Court to be capable of belief;

(b)

whether it appears to the Court that the evidence may afford any ground for allowing the appeal;

(c)

whether the evidence would have been admissible in the proceedings from which the appeal lies on an issue which is the subject of the appeal; and

(d)

whether there is a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence in those proceedings."

25.

An appeal based on fresh evidence is no different from an appeal on any other ground, in that the ultimate question is still whether the conviction is unsafe: R v Pendleton [2001] UKHL 66; R v Pabon [2018] EWCA Crim 420 at [60] to [64]).

26.

The additional witness statements prepared on behalf of the applicant address historical or peripheral matters concerning the relationship between the complainant and the applicant. They do not provide any direct evidence regarding the incidents the subject of the counts before the jury. If admitted, they would not afford any ground for allowing the appeal. In any event, the witnesses state that they were not asked to provide witness statements or to give evidence at the trial. There is no reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence in the criminal proceedings. For those reasons the renewed application to admit fresh evidence is refused.

27.

We cannot improve on the Single Judge's general reasons for refusing leave to appeal against conviction:

"The relevant question is whether it is arguable that your conviction on 2 counts on the indictment was unsafe. I have read the entire transcript of the trial where you were an unrepresented defendant. The judge’s conduct of the trial was, in my view, exemplary. Where appropriate, he explained the trial process as it went along. Quite properly, he sought to focus the trial on the relatively straightforward issues which the jury needed to consider: namely, the events in the early hours of 25 June 2023 at the complainant’s home, and the events on the morning of 26 June 2023 at your daughter’s school. You gave some evidence at some length, and this included a fair amount of evidence which was not focused on those events at all. The judge did not stop you giving that evidence. You were then fairly cross-examined on your account.

There was nothing in the transcript which suggests any bias or unfairness on the part of the judge at all. His legal directions were concise and appropriate, and his summing-up of the facts to the jury was fair and balanced. The jury clearly understood the need to consider each charge against you separately, and you were acquitted on one count (threat to kill). They did not, therefore, decide to convict you without due consideration (also reflected in the majority verdict on the dangerous driving charge).

Ultimately, the jury had to decide – as far as the events of 25 June 2023 – between your account and that of the complainant, who made a prompt complaint to the police. In relation to the events at the school on 26 June, the jury had evidence which was additional to that of the complainant: there was some CCTV evidence, evidence from 2 independent witnesses, and your acceptance in evidence that it looked as though you had indeed 'clipped her car' (transcript 138) and that your driving was not that of a careful and competent driver. Ultimately, the jury’s verdict reflects the fact that they did not accept your account in relation to these two counts. On the basis of the transcript of the trial, and the evidence before the jury, it is not at all difficult to understand why that was the jury’s conclusion. The case against you was very strong."

We agree, and refuse the renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction.

Appeal against sentence

28.

The applicant renews his application for leave to appeal against sentence on the ground that it was wrong in principle for the judge to impose an immediate custodial sentence. A community sentence with robust risk management could and should have been imposed as indicated in the pre-sentence report.

Sentencing

29.

The judge found that count 1 (stalking) was high culpability B, based on the applicant's conduct intended to maximise fear or distress and harm category 2, based on distress caused to the victim which was towards the top of category 2 but not so serious as to justify category 1. A category B2 offence gives a starting point of 36 weeks' custody with a range of 12 weeks to 18 months.

30.

Count 3 (dangerous driving) was a high culpability A based on a deliberate decision to ignore the rules of the road and disregard the risks of danger to the victim and her daughter and harm category 1, based on damage caused to the complainant's vehicle. A category A1 offence has a starting point of 18 months' custody with a range of 1 year to 2 years.

31.

A conventional approach was taken by the Judge. He treated the stalking offence as the lead offence, uplifted to reflect the overall offending. The sentence imposed for the dangerous driving offence was then made concurrent to reflect the principle of totality.

32.

Aggravating factors were the applicant's previous relevant convictions, including conspiracy to commit robbery and dangerous driving. Additionally, the offending occurred in a domestic context and in front of the applicant's daughter. In mitigation, the applicant was self-employed and others depended on the business for employment. He suffers from anxiety and panic attacks, although the Judge found that they did not reduce culpability and there was little, if any, remorse.

33.

The Judge considered that balancing the above factors the appropriate sentence for the stalking offence to reflect overall criminality was 26 months' imprisonment. A concurrent sentence of 10 months' imprisonment was imposed in respect of the dangerous driving.

34.

We concur with the decision of the Single Judge that there is no arguable error in principle in the Judge's imposition of an immediate custodial sentence. Contrary to the submissions made by the applicant, the pre-sentence report did not recommend a community sentence. Indeed, although it stated that the risk posed by the applicant could be managed in the community, it also stated that custody was a solid and viable sentencing option. The Judge expressly recognised the impact of a custodial sentence on the applicant's business and his family including his children. Notwithstanding that recognition the Judge was entitled to determine that the seriousness of the offending required him to fix the sentence at 26 months, a level at which it could not be suspended.

35.

For the above reasons, the renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence, to admit fresh evidence and for extensions of time are refused.

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