R v Stevan Newton

On 16 April 2025, in the Crown Court at Newcastle Upon Tyne, the applicant Stevan Newton, following pleas of guilty, was sentenced by Mr Recorder Herrmann as follows:

The applicant renews his application for leave to appeal against the sentence imposed in respect of count 1, in a non-counsel application, following refusal by the single judge.

The material facts are as follows. On 7 December 2024, at around 11.40 pm, police officers received numerous calls from members of the public who had been at the Duke of York Public House in Wallsend, Noth Tyneside. The initial report stated that a number of people were rubbing their eyes and being sick both inside and outside the premises. The complainant, Layton Dryden had been out that evening drinking with friends and had been intoxicated. He did not have a good recollection of events, but remembered running out of the pub screaming in pain with his face burning. He had been squirted in the face with what appears to be ammonia based on a very strong smell of ammonia. His girlfriend described Mr Dryden shouting "my eyes, my eyes". His eyes were red and streaming. He was vomiting, was shivering and was very cold.

CCTV footage of the corridor leading to the men's toilets showed the applicant squirting a substance believed to be ammonia towards three males, including Mr Dryden. The substance made contact with them and left a puddle of liquid on the floor. The strong smell and the effects of the substance caused many others in the pub irritation to their eyes and retching. They could be seen on the CCTV footage covering their faces as they hurried outside. There were around 50 people in the pub when the substance was thrown.

Mr Dryden was taken to hospital where he was treated for burns to his eyes and his cheeks, and his eyes were flushed and washed. He suffered a small, inflamed patch on his cheek but no skin loss, and he did not require further treatment.

The applicant was identified as the offender and police officers attended his address on 11 December to arrest him. The applicant tried to get away from police officers and a chase ensued. Police officers attempted to taser the applicant, but when the taser failed to work a police officer drew a baton and the applicant was arrested.

After his arrest the applicant was found to be in possession of 6.8 grams of cocaine (the subject of count 3) and 1.8 kilograms of cannabis (the subject of count 4). The offences were committed whilst the applicant was on bail.

Mr Dryden did not provide a victim personal statement. However, Mr Andrew Adams, the director and licensee of the public house, provided a business impact statement, which included the following:

The applicant was aged 32 at sentence. He had 33 convictions for 61 offences, spanning from 18 May 2007 to 14 October 2021. His relevant convictions include offences against the person, public disorder offences, attacks on emergency workers and being in possession of offensive weapons, which include a plank of wood, knives and an air gun.

The author of the pre-sentence report assessed the applicant as posing a high risk of causing physical and psychological harm to the public.

When sentencing, the Recorder used the sentencing guideline for causing grievous bodily harm with intent, contrary to section 18 of the 1861 Act, by analogy. He stated that if this were a section 18 offence, it would be a culpability A case on the basis that it was either planned to the extent at least that the applicant carried the ammonia as a weapon, and it was premeditated; alternatively, it was a revenge attack. In any event, the corrosive substance is regarded as a highly dangerous weapon equivalent.

The Recorder accepted the Crown's case that the offence fell into category 3 harm – the lowest category of harm for section 18 in the guideline. The Recorder found that the injuries caused amounted to grievous bodily harm, but in the bottom category.

A culpability A category 3 harm case has a starting point of five years' custody, with a range of four to seven years.

The aggravating factors included: the applicant's relevant previous convictions; the public location of the offence; the influence of alcohol and cocaine on the applicant when carrying out the attack; and the fact that he committed the offence whilst on bail.

As mitigation the Recorder took into account the applicant's difficult upbringing. He considered that after a trial the sentence would have been one of six years' imprisonment (72 months). Credit of 25 per cent was given for the guilty plea, which reduced the sentence to one of 54 months' imprisonment (four and a half years).

The Recorder agreed with the assessment of risk noted in the pre-sentence report. He found that the applicant posed a significant risk to the public of causing serious harm by the commission of further specified offences. He considered that the only way the public could be properly protected was by the imposition of an extended sentence. On that basis he imposed an extended sentence of seven years, comprising a custodial element of four and a half years and an extended licence period of two and a half years.

There are four proposed grounds of appeal as follows:

We have the benefit of the Advice and Perfected Grounds of Mr McNicholas of counsel, who acted for the applicant in the court below. Mr McNicholas submitted that in his sentencing remarks the Recorder stated that he had no hesitation in finding that the injuries sustained by Mr Dryden amounted to grievous bodily harm, but did not explain the basis on which the injury fell within the definition of grievous bodily harm, rather than of actual bodily harm. Actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm both have well established definitions: in the case of the former, harm which is calculated to interfere with the health or comfort of the victim and which is more than merely transient or trifling; and in the case of the latter, harm which is really serious. Bearing in mind the mildness and size of the burn, the limited (both in scope and time) medical intervention, and the lack of any medium or long-term impact, this injury falls squarely within the definition of actual bodily harm. Mr Dryden did not return to hospital for further treatment, nor did he choose to provide a victim personal statement after otherwise supporting the prosecution. It is said that the court can properly infer from these facts that the impact upon Mr Dryden was minimal. Alternatively, the court cannot conclude, so that it is sure, that the impact was anything other than minimal – again, save for the initial temporary symptoms.

Mr McNicholas endeavoured to rely on the level of charge for the alternate offence that was count 2, which charged an assault occasioning actual bodily harm. But we note that count 2 was an alternative, lesser offence. In the light of the guilty plea to the more serious offence under section 29, this does not assist.

It was said on behalf of the applicant that whilst the case of R v Ardic [2019] EWCA Crim 1836, was cited to justify the application for the section 18 guideline, the facts as explained by the Crown in opening did not suggest that the injuries sustained, or the level of impact would otherwise meet the definition of grievous bodily harm. Accordingly, it was submitted that the Recorder erred in finding that the offending amounted to grievous bodily harm, and that once this error had been made, it became highly likely that the sentence imposed would be manifestly excessive.

There is no sentencing guideline for the offence of applying or throwing a corrosive fluid with intent, contrary to section 29 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. In such circumstances a useful starting point is the guidance in the overarching principles of the general sentencing guideline, which indicates that to arrive at a provisional sentence, the court should take account of the following, if they apply:

When considering definitive guidelines for analogous offences, the court must apply them carefully, making adjustments for any differences in the statutory maximum sentence and in the elements of the offence. This will not be a merely arithmetical exercise. Where possible, the court should follow the stepped approach of sentencing guidelines to arrive at the sentence.

Although not strictly applicable, the sentencing guideline for causing grievous bodily harm with intent, contrary to section 18 of the 1861 Act, allows a court to consider factors which bear on the seriousness of the section 29 offending. The maximum sentence is the same under each section, namely life imprisonment: see R v Adric and Others at [53]. This can be contrasted with the maximum sentence for assault under section 47 of the 1861 Act, where the maximum sentence is five years' imprisonment.

Having regard to the guideline for section 18 offences, it was agreed that the offending would be high culpability A, given the use of a corrosive substance, which is a highly dangerous weapon equivalent. The issue before us is whether the Recorder was wrong to use the lowest harm category 3, which is "all other cases" of really serious harm or wounding, based on the relatively mild injuries inflicted on Mr Dryden.

Returning to the general guideline: overarching principles, it is clear that harm is not limited to the actual harm caused, but extends to harm which the offence is intended to cause, or might foreseeably have caused. In this case it is important to note that the section 18 guideline has built into it an intention to cause harm as an essential element of the offence. Therefore, the court must be careful to avoid double counting for intended harm. But that is not a factor when considering the likelihood or extent of potential harm associated with the section 29 offence, which explicitly provides that actual harm is not a necessary element of the offence.

As observed by Fulford LJ, VP in Attorney General's Reference (R v Rouf) [2022] EWCA Crim 63, at [37]:

We agree with that observation. Although each case will turn on its own facts, and of course it is necessary to consider the extent of any injury inflicted, the great risk of causing serious harm to a number of people by using a corrosive substance as a weapon in a public place must be considered a very significant factor relevant to such an attack.

The throwing of a corrosive substance at innocent members of the public in a pub was a nasty offence. The offence under section 29 of the 1861 Act involves an intention to burn, maim, disfigure or disable the person, or to inflict grievous bodily harm, whether or not any injury is actuary inflicted.

In this case there was material harm caused to Mr Dryden. The absence of a victim personal statement from him should not be taken to indicate the absence of harm. Further, there were at least two other victims of the direct attack captured on CCTV, and there were a number of others who fled the pub in fear and distress. The potential harm that might foreseeably have been caused was very high indeed. In those circumstances, the use of category 3 by analogy was a reasonable and appropriate reference for the Recorder to adopt.

The use of a category 3A offence as a reference gave a starting point of five years' custody, with a range of four to seven years. Against that starting point, the custodial element of four and a half years, after 25 per cent credit for the guilty plea, could not be described as excessive.

It is not disputed that the circumstances of the offending, the history of the applicant's convictions and the contents of the pre-sentence report justified the Recorder's finding that the applicant posed a serious risk to the public, which entitled him to find dangerousness.

For the above reasons we do not consider that the sentence is wrong in principle or in law. Accordingly, the renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.