R v Rhys Courtney

On 4 March 2026 in the Crown Court at Nottingham, the appellant (aged 22), following his earlier guilty plea to the count of causing serious injury by dangerous driving, contrary to section 1A of the Road Traffic Act 1998, was sentenced to a term of 18 months' imprisonment. With the leave of the single judge, he contends that the sentence was manifestly excessive and in particular that the term of imprisonment should have been suspended.

On the evening of 18 January 2025, on the A52 between Nottingham and Derby, a number of people met up with their vehicles to carry out unlawful competitive racing along the road. A large crowd of people had gathered in a lay-by to watch the racing. The prosecution case was not that the appellant had come to the scene in order to race, but that upon arrival at the scene he had joined in. In the course of this, he drove dangerously at speeds of at least 80 mph in a 70 mph speed limit, lost control and collided with the vehicle in front of him. The front seat passenger in that vehicle sustained a fractured collarbone. This required surgery under general anaesthetic and caused significant pain and restriction. She has been left with a permanent scar, which causes her particular distress. The driver suffered lesser physical injuries.

The appellant pleaded guilty on the basis of acceptance that he had been driving at speeds up to "the mid-80s" but that, in effect, he had accidentally become caught up in the problems caused by the racing. Following a Newton hearing the judge rejected this account. She concluded, with the benefit of footage that we have also seen, that the appellant had joined in the racing and had been doing so when the collision occurred. This was a high-speed chase on an ordinary road.

Turning to the relevant sentencing guideline, the judge found that the factor of racing or competitive driving against another vehicle placed culpability squarely in category A. The harm was in category 2. This produced a starting point of three years' imprisonment, and a category range of two to four years. The judge identified one aggravating factor, namely the presence of a passenger in the appellant's vehicle. She then observed that "in terms of mitigation, there is a lot". The judge noted in particular his age (21) at the time of the incident; the absence of previous convictions; the evidence of positive good character in his work record and otherwise; and the evidence of remorse set out in the pre-sentence report. The judge concluded that the appropriate sentence before credit for plea was two years' imprisonment. In the light of the result of the Newton hearing, the credit for plea was reduced from one-third to 25 per cent. This resulted in a term of 18 months' imprisonment.

The judge then considered whether the sentence could be suspended, which she described as "the really serious question in this case". By reference to the relevant sentencing guideline, she concluded that as guideline factors indicating that it may be appropriate to suspend the sentence there were a realistic prospect of rehabilitation and a low risk of re-offending. There was also personal mitigation which, if not "strong" within the guideline factor, was "close to that". The judge also took account of the state of the prison estate.

On the other side of the balance, the judge identified the factor that the seriousness of the offence meant that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate custody. She observed:

The first ground of appeal is that the sentence of 18 months' immediate custody was manifestly excessive in the circumstances of the case; and that the aims of sentencing could and should have been achieved by the imposition of a suspended sentence order.

As to the length of the sentence, Mr Andrew Thompson submits that culpability should have been placed within category B, or alternatively treated as falling between categories A and B; and that the judge placed too much weight on the factor of racing. All that said, Mr Thompson acknowledged that the pre-credit sentence of two years was at the bottom of the A2 category range.

As to suspension, Mr Thompson acknowledged that the single factor of the gravity of the offence in question may, in an appropriate case, outweigh the composite of several factors pointing towards suspension. However this was not such a case. The judge should have concluded that the balance fell in favour of suspension.

The second ground of appeal is that, in the event that this court were to shorten the length of the sentence or to suspend its operation, the ancillary order of disqualification from driving for a period of two years, with an extension period of nine months, would be manifestly excessive.

In our judgment, the judge was right to place the culpability in category A. That categorisation was in no way mechanistic, but properly reflected her finding following the Newton hearing that the appellant had been involved in racing or competitive driving against another vehicle. The pre-credit sentence of two years was fully merited.

We turn to the issue of suspension. As the judge rightly observed, this was the really serious question in the case. This was not an easy judgment to make; and the judge carried out a most careful assessment which took due account of the rival factors identified in the relevant sentencing guideline.

Like the judge, we acknowledge the force of the factors which indicated that it might be appropriate to suspend the sentence; and in particular the appellant's young age and positive good character. However, we see no good reason to interfere with the judge's conclusion that the gravity of this offending eclipsed those factors and required an immediate sentence of imprisonment. As the judge observed at the end of her remarks:

It follows that we reject the challenge to the length of the period of disqualification, which was entirely appropriate.

Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed.