R v Jason Broadstock

On 30 June 2025, in the Crown Court at Luton before His Honour Judge Geoffrey Payne, the appellant (then aged 31) was convicted of two offences: count 1, attempting to incite a child to engage in penetrative sexual activity; and count 2, attempting to engage in sexual communication with a child. On 5 September 2025, the judge sentenced the appellant to two years nine months' imprisonment on count 1 and imposed no separate penalty on count 2.

Having been convicted of an offence listed in Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the appellant was required to comply indefinitely with the provisions of Part 2 of the Act, namely notification requirements to the police.

The judge imposed a Sexual Harm Prevention Order without any limit as to duration. In summary, the order prohibits the appellant from using any device which can access the internet, unless he notifies the police, and it has the capacity to retain and display the history of internet use; he does not delete the history; and he makes the device available for inspection. He must not interfere with any risk management software installed on the device by the police or use any software for encryption or elimination of evidence. He must not have any device for the storing of digital images unless he notifies the police, makes the device available for inspection and does not delete images from the device. There are similar restrictions on the use of cloud storage, VPNs, internet chat forums, file sharing applications, email accounts and chat or messaging websites. The order prohibits or regulates the installation of digital operating systems, false IP addresses, aliases or anonymisation on the internet, private internet browsing options and using the internet to contact any child under 16.

The appellant appeals against sentence with the leave of the single judge, limited to the indefinite duration of the Sexual Harm Prevention Order. The appellant does not seek to renew his application for leave on any other ground of appeal.

In March and April 2021, the appellant engaged in sexualised conversation on the Kik platform with someone he thought was a 13-year-old girl named Olivia, but who was in fact an undercover police officer. The appellant had found her details on the KikFriender account, which contained "Olivia's" profile showing her as a 13 year old girl. The conversations started with a range of topics such as the subjects she was taking at school, the behaviour of her teachers and the food she liked. After a considerable period of time the appellant took the conversation in a sexual direction, speaking of urges and masturbation. After that he talked about oral sex, vaginal sex and his own masturbation activities (count 2). He then tried to get "Olivia" to masturbate herself and penetrate her vagina with her fingers (count 1).

The appellant was arrested and interviewed. He gave no comment in the first interview and in the second interview gave a prepared statement suggesting that he had found "Olivia's" profile from a Google search and thought that she was an adult who was role playing.

The appellant was born on 25 October 1993. He was of previous good character.

In a report dated 22 August 2025, Dr Ian Hamilton, a forensic psychologist, said at paragraph 32 that the appellant reported that his conversation with "Olivia" involved a roleplay chatroom. It was sexual, but he genuinely believe that he was speaking to an adult. However, the expert opined that if the appellant had instead thought that he was speaking to a child, it would be important for this to be explored with him to reduce his risk of re-offending. Denial does not increase risk, but it does make it difficult to work with a person and to explore fully factors which have contributed to or maintained a particular behaviour.

A pre-sentence report was prepared in August 2025. The appellant confirmed the account he had given at trial, namely that he had believed that he was communicating with an adult person acting out her own fantasy, although he said that he accepted the verdict of the jury. The appellant referred to the mental health issues he had before and at the time of his offending, including suicidal ideation. He said that he understood why the courts treat offences of this kind so seriously, and the serious harm that could be caused to a real child. The author said that the appellant could be suited to offending behaviour work. The appellant had ceased to use chat apps and rarely accessed pornography. He was aware of the requirements for monitoring his devices likely to be imposed by a Sexual Harm Prevention Order. He had learnt a difficult lesson and would never touch anything like the Kik platform again.

The author of the pre-sentence report considered that the escalation of the messaging in 2021 showed at that stage that the appellant presented a risk of serious harm to children. But he had no previous convictions. Police checks had not revealed other concerns, and his devices showed no interest in children. Furthermore by 2025, the author of the pre-sentence report said that the appellant presented as an individual who would engage with intervention to avoid future offending. He appeared genuine in his resolve better to understand his behaviour and to engage with that intervention. The appellant's risk of serious harm to children was medium, rather than high, and he poses a low risk to the public, known adults and staff.

In his sentencing remarks, the judge said that he was going to impose a Sexual Harm Prevention Order. He summarised the requirements that it would include. He explained that it would be an offence to breach the order without reasonable excuse.

After passing sentence, the judge replied to a question from counsel by adding that the Sexual Harm Prevention Order would be indefinite. He gave no reasons for imposing an order of indefinite duration.

We are grateful to Miss Wood for her written and oral submissions. The appellant has not sought to renew his application for leave in relation to the first ground of appeal challenging the imposition of a sentence of immediate custody. The sole ground of appeal is as follows:

Where the court has power to impose a Sexual Harm Prevention Order, it may make such an order only if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for the purpose of, inter alia, protecting the public or members of the public from sexual harm from the offender. Such harm includes physical or psychological harm caused by the offender committing one or more offences listed in Schedule 3 to the 2003 Act (see sections 344 and 346 of the Sentencing Act 2020).

The court must be satisfied that the prohibitions are necessary, not oppressive, and are proportionate in relation to the particular facts and circumstances of the case. An order should not be made for an indefinite period, unless the court is satisfied of the need for that. It should not be indefinite without careful consideration, or as a mere default option. Where an indefinite order is made, the court should give reasons as to why it is considered necessary, unless this is obvious: see R v Sokolowski [2017] EWCA Crim 1903; [2018] 4 WLR 126, at [5].

Because the custodial sentence exceeded 30 months, the notification requirements had to be of an indefinite duration: see section 82 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. But it did not follow that the duration of the Sexual Harm Prevention Order had to be the same as the period of the notification requirements: see R v Smith (Steven) [2011] EWCA Crim 1772; [2012] 1 WLR 1316, at [17]; and Sokolowski at [5].

The prosecution is obliged before the sentencing hearing to serve a draft of the order with its proposed requirements. The draft should indicate the proposed duration, or at least flag the question of duration for consideration: see rule 31.3(5) of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2025, and R v McLellan [2017] EWCA Crim 1464; [2018] 1 WLR 2969, at [26].

In the present case the prosecution did not produce a note for sentencing. Instead, it agreed with the note produced by the defence. However, that note did not address the making of a Sexual Harm Prevention Order, no doubt because at that stage the draft order had not yet been produced by the prosecution for consideration.

There appears to have been no discussion of duration during the submissions on sentence. the subject was raised for the first time after the order had been pronounced at the end of the hearing, when counsel asked for the duration to be specified. The judge instantly responded that it would be indefinite. No submissions were invited by the judge. Nor was there any attempt to argue the point at that stage in order that the matter be properly ventilated at first instance, rather than on appeal. The judge did not give any reasons for making the order indefinite as to duration, as he ought to have done. It could not have been said that the reasons were obvious; far from it.

Because these matters were not addressed in the Crown Court, we must apply the relevant principles. In the circumstances of this particular case we conclude that there was no justification for the order to have been made to run indefinitely. Four years passed between the offending and the sentencing hearing, during which there was no further offending, nor any suggestion of troubling behaviour. The author of the pre-sentence report explained that the appellant would respond to intervention designed to reduce the risk of further offending. Although Dr Hill referred to potential difficulties, ultimately he did not take a different position. Given the lack of any evidence of any inappropriate interest in children, other than the index offences, it was, in our judgment, clearly disproportionate to impose the order for an indefinite duration. The appropriate period should have been ten years.

For these reasons, we quash the Sexual Harm Prevention Order made on 5 September 2025 and substitute an order in the same terms, save that the order will be expressed to remain in force until 5 September 2035, instead of "until further order".

Accordingly, and to that extent only, this appeal against sentence is allowed.