Mohammed Arif v John Baker & Ors

This is a race and religious discrimination claim under the Equality Act 2010 (‘EqA’) by the Claimant, a British Muslim of Pakistani family origin. He is a former Conservative Councillor in Walsall, who was deselected and expelled by the Walsall Conservative Party in 2016. His claim against the national Conservative Party (‘the national Party’) has settled and while his claim against the local Party continues, its Federation which existed during events from 2014 to 2018 has been dissolved. The local Walsall Conservative Party (‘the Walsall Party’) is now an unincorporated association represented here by its Defendant officers (‘the Defendants’), in particular Councillor Samra. Another central protagonist, Councillor Peter Washbrook, has also since sadly died in 2018. If a week is a long time in politics, as Harold Wilson once said, the events in this case can fairly be described as political ancient history.

However, I have unusually published this County Court judgment as there is a public interest in how political parties address internal issues of race and religion – as all major parties have experienced over recent years. The House of Lords gave guidance in Watt v Ahsan [2008] 2 WLR 17, which itself is relevant to the Claimant’s claims of race and religious direct discrimination as a British Muslim of Pakistani origin. As I will explain that is more nuanced than simplistic accusations of ‘Islamophobia’. Indeed, I discuss whether there can be less favourable treatment because of race or religion when others of the same race and religion are treated better. Also, no case I have found addresses victimisation in the context of political parties, or whether ‘re-posts’ on social media can be protected acts for victimisation. Given that gap in authority, should it be relevant, this judgment can be cited under the Citation Practice Direction.

The Claimant makes twenty-two separate allegations of direct race and/or religious discrimination and/or victimisation against the Walsall Party, although there is considerable overlap between them, so they can be grouped under five ‘Topics’:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

(v)

Watt established that claims for discrimination by political parties fell within what is now Part 7 EqA, relating to discrimination claims against ‘associations’. Therefore, the County Court has jurisdiction under s.114 EqA, rather than the Employment Tribunal as with discrimination claims at work. Under s.118(1) EqA, the time limit for a County Court claim is six months ‘starting with the date of the act to which the claim relates’. However, as I will explain, s.118(6)(a) EqA provides ‘conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period’. The Claimant says all the actions he alleges were one ‘continuing act’ by the Walsall Party and so that time only started to run from the ‘last act’: his re-expulsion by the Walsall Party communicated to him on 31st October 2018. The Walsall Party denies that and says with the exception of events in October 2018, the claim is out of time.

The Claimant originally presented this claim on 30th April 2019, exactly six months after his re-expulsion, although it was not technically issued by the Court until 13th May 2019 (although nothing turns on that extra delay within the Court). The Claim Form and Particulars of Claim were served on the Defendants (then the Walsall Federation and the national Conservative Party) on 17th July 2019. The Walsall Party served a Defence on 13 September 2019 and the national Party served a Defence on 12 September 2019. The Claimant replied to both. The claim was allocated to the Multi Track and following some agreed stays to explore Alternative Dispute Resolution (‘ADR’) which proved unsuccessful at that stage, in November 2020 at CCMC, directions were made to a trial planned for a trial window in mid-2022, largely because of delays due to COVID.

However, as I said, the national Party settled the Claimant’s claim, which had in essence been that it had failed properly to investigate his discrimination complaints against the Walsall Party. The settlement was approved in a consent order in January 2021 on terms there should be an investigation into the Claimant’s allegations against the Walsall Party by a fully independent specialist discrimination barrister. The national Party and the Claimant later agreed to instruct Aileen McColgan QC (now KC). However, the Walsall Party declined to participate in her investigation. She reported on 6th September 2021, upholding some of but not all of the Claimant’s complaints of discrimination and victimisation (‘The McColgan Report’). As I shall explain later, the McColgan Report is a very helpful source of evidence for my own findings of fact, however Ms McColgan KC’s conclusions are not binding on me.

The Claimant nevertheless maintained his claim against the Walsall Party which had been stayed pending the McColgan Report. In March 2022, the parties agreed further directions and exchanged their current witness statements in August 2022. The parties were unable to agree a trial date for a 12-day trial until October-November 2023. However, in September 2023, the Walsall Conservative Federation gave notice to dissolve itself, although this did not in fact happen until 2024, by which time the current Defendants as officers of the local Conservative Party unincorporated association were appointed as representative defendants.

The Claimant prepared amended Particulars of Claim on 25th June 2024, which set out 14 different ‘protected acts’ for the victimisation claims I need not set out at this stage; and 22 separate allegations of direct race and religious discrimination, or alternatively victimisation. In essence, those 22 allegations are follows:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

One cause of over a year’s delay in not listing this trial until November-December 2025 is that the parties did not appear to reflect on whether they still needed 12 days, which had been the original time estimate at the CCMC in November 2022, when the national Party was still a Defendant. However, at pre-trial review on 20th October 2025, the parties agreed the trial time-estimate could be reduced down to 8 days, from 26th November to 5th December 2025. The parties also agreed an assessor was unnecessary despite s.114(7) EqA and the trial should be listed before myself as an Equality-ticketed judge (indeed, a former fee-paid Employment Judge).

The parties agreed a List of Issues, which I amend slightly given discussions at the start of trial and indeed as they narrowed after the evidence and submissions:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

As I said, before turning to my findings of fact, given the time passed between the events in dispute and the present, it is first necessary to consider some of the difficult evidential issues which arise. In relation to documentary evidence, whilst I have a bundle of 1600 pages, there are significant gaps in the documentary record. For example, in Topic 1, there are no minutes (because I understand they are not taken) or outcome letter of the ‘approval meeting’ in September 2015; what at first sight appear to be minutes of the ‘selection meeting’ in March 2016 in Topic 2 is in fact a response by the Walsall Party to the Claimant’s complaint to the national Party; and there is also no letter after the ‘expulsion meeting’ in June 2016 in Topic 3, which is the subject of allegation 14. It is not clear what has happened to these documents, although the Claimant alleges fabrication of disciplinary evidence in Topics 3 and 4 (allegations 12 and 15) and there was concerning late disclosure of the re-expulsion meeting notes from October 2018 and an important email from Councillor Samra in August 2015 shortly before the approval meeting, as I discuss in relation to his evidence below. Yet the absence of some documents disadvantages the Defendants, as in October 2018 when the national Party upheld the Claimant’s expulsion appeal on a technicality the Walsall Party could not disprove after Cllr Washbrook’s death. He had previously been the Chairman of the Walsall Party from 2014-2017, was at the heart of the events under Topics 1, 2 3 and 4 until he died, yet I obviously do not know how he would have responded in evidence to the allegations against him (save for limited hearsay statements for the Claimant’s expulsion appeal before he died). That might have been raised had there been any application to extend time under s.118(1)(b) EqA as just and equitable for Topics 1, 2 3 and 4, but the Claimant does not make that application. Instead, his argument on time is they all form part of one ‘continuing act’ (or ‘conduct extending over a period’) ending with Topic 5 (which is plainly itself a ‘continuing act’, so in time).

Having said that, whilst the absence of key documents and Cllr Washbrook’s evidence at trial affects the inferences I can draw about why events happened from the primary facts of what happened (and so the burden of proof under s.136 EqA), there is less dispute over those primary facts of what actually happened. Indeed, Cllr Washbrook’s voice is heard loud and clear through the many letters and emails he wrote and what the Walsall Party minuted him as saying at meetings. Indeed, in my experience of discrimination cases over 25 years, he expressed himself more candidly than many would in such circumstances. Therefore, even if I am inhibited in making findings about Cllr Washbrook’s actions which are disputed (e.g. a comment to Cllr Bird about ‘the dogs of war’), I can analyse what he did and meant by what he wrote and was recorded as saying, in the light of all the other evidence I have. Consequently, whilst the burden of proving primary facts is on the Claimant on the balance of probabilities, I am certainly able to make all necessary findings of primary fact, (as I will do in the next section). After all, the McColgan Report made detailed factual findings which made up the majority of her report of over 100 pages. Indeed, as I discuss in a moment, I have more evidence than Ms McColgan KC, since I not only have the factual evidence she collected so assiduously, I also have the evidence of the Defendants and other witnesses for the Walsall Party who had declined to take part in her investigation. Nevertheless, especially against the detailed background of the McColgan Report, I hope to be able to focus a little more shortly my findings of fact relevant to the pleaded allegations of discrimination.

That leads on to the evidential status of the McColgan Report itself to my decision. Ms Reindorf KC for the Claimant suggested in her Skeleton Argument that, whilst the McColgan Report carefully analyses the inference evidence, I must go further and scrutinise all the primary facts and inference evidence myself. I certainly agree I must make my own findings of fact and draw my own inferences, but that still leaves the status of the McColgan Report itself, which Mr Beever for the Defendant says I should exercise caution about placing any reliance on. However, he accepted the McColgan Report was admissible (not least because it is in the bundle and there is no objection to it: CPR PD32 para.27.2), but pointed out the factual evidence gathered in it was hearsay, to which s.4 Civil Evidence Act 1995 applies:

This applies to statements of fact made by those whose accounts are recorded in the McColgan Report. Factual findings in past trials (unless creating an estoppel) are inadmissible in a later trial where the judge must make their own findings: Hollington v Hewthorn [1943] KB 587 (CA). However, that does not apply to conclusions by expert investigators, even if not instructed to give expert evidence to the Court within CPR 35: Rogers v Hoyle [2014] 3 WLR 148 (CA). It is now common for public authorities facing discrimination allegations to commission a report from an expert barrister like Ms McColgan KC. In my view, as she was not acting as a judicial fact-finder, but as a discrimination expert, her record of the factual accounts of those who spoke to her is admissible factual hearsay evidence whose weight depends on s.4 CEA: c.f. Rogers. But insofar as that factual hearsay comes from a person who did not give evidence before me (unlike the Claimant for example), their evidence is admissible but of less weight than if they had been cross-examined, in addition to the various other factors in s.4(2) CEA.

However, insofar as the McColgan Report contains opinion evidence, the position is rather different. There are two types of opinion evidence within it. Firstly, opinions expressed by those who contributed to Ms McColgan KC’s investigation but who have not been cross-examined are likely to be of very limited weight: c.f. BXB v Watch Tower [2020] 4 WLR 42 (HC) at [64]. Secondly, Ms McColgan’s own conclusions as to whether the Walsall Party discriminated are themselves only opinion evidence, just as the expert air accident investigators’ conclusions were held to be in a later trial concerning an aircraft crash in Rogers. Nevertheless, Ms McColgan’s conclusions on discrimination itself, which is the ‘ultimate issue’ I must decide for myself, cannot supplant my own conclusions: Kennedy v Cordia [2016] 1 WLR 597 (SC) at [49].

Indeed, in my own view Ms McColgan KC’s conclusions on discrimination cannot even be persuasive of my own conclusions (although I emphasise not at all through any lack of expertise or diligence on her part), but only because she did not have the benefit which I have had of hearing from the Defendants and their witnesses. Whilst Ms Reindorf suggested I could draw adverse inferences from the Defendants’ failure to participate in the McColgan Report, I disagree for three reasons. Firstly, it is true there are situations where the Court can draw adverse inferences from the absence of evidence (e.g. from failure to call a particular witness who can give relevant evidence: see Royal Mail v Efobi [2021] 1 WLR 3863 (SC) at [41]). But I am not aware of (and Ms Reindorf did not cite) any authority for adverse inferences (as opposed to costs sanctions) from a failure to arbitrate (which is akin to what the McColgan Report was), especially where it was not mandated by the Court (c.f. Churchill v Merthyr Tydfill CBC [2024] 1 WLR 3827 (CA)). Secondly, the furthest the EqA went in that direction (as did its predecessor statutes) was to enable adverse inferences to be drawn from an employer’s failure to answer a discrimination questionnaire under s.138 EqA, although that provision was repealed in 2014. In any event, Ms Reindorf’s submission sought to go far beyond s.138 questionnaires, which were a statutorily-sanctioned process to address the forensic obstacles in proving discrimination. By contrast, the McColgan Report was commissioned as part of a settlement between the Claimant and national Party to which the (then) Federation were not party and since then it has been replaced by the current representative Defendants who were not even parties to the litigation (as opposed to witnesses in it) at the time. Thirdly, as Lord Leggatt said in Efobi at [41] and [43], inferences are generally a matter of common sense, but the precise inference must be identified. In this case, the obvious inference to be drawn from the Defendants’ non-participation in the McColgan Report is not that they had discriminated and sought to conceal it, but simply that they contested the allegations and wished to ‘keep their powder dry’ for the Court trial. In my view, the McColgan Report’s conclusions (as opposed to the factual hearsay evidence) are only relevant insofar as they contextualise the witness evidence, as I shall explain below.

Turning to that witness evidence, Mr Beever reminded me of the analysis of Leggatt J (as he then was) in Gestmin v Credit Suisse [2013] EWHC 3560 at [16]-[22]:

There are many similar observations. In Simetra v Ikon [2019] 4 WLR 112 (CA) Males LJ emphasised the importance of contemporary documents at [48]-[49]:

However, Gestmin and Simetra were commercial cases with plentiful documents. That will not always be the case, as the Court of Appeal (Asplin LJ, Andrews LJ and Birss LJ) observed in Natwest v Bilta [2021] EWCA Civ 680 at [49]-[51]:

That observation in Natwest has obvious resonance in this case, given the gaps in the documentary record that I have already mentioned. Therefore, as acknowledged in Natwest, in this case I cannot adopt Leggatt J’s approach in Gestmin at [22].

Nevertheless, Leggatt J’s warnings in Gestmin at [16]-[21] about the fallibilities of recollection are particularly apposite in this case for three reasons:

(1)

(2)

(3)

Turning to my impressions of each witness, this last point was particularly evident with the Claimant’s evidence. I say immediately that he struck me as an honest witness, in particular on the central aspect of his political integrity – whether he campaigned for Labour against Mr Samra (as he then was) in the 2016 local election, having lost out to him as candidate. As I shall detail, the Claimant pointed to his reputation as a Conservative Councillor and his campaigning for Conservative colleagues (but not Mr Samra) in 2016. Moreover, at the hearing in October 2018, all three witnesses who attended said the Claimant had not said they should vote Labour. Having said that, it may well be during the election the Claimant privately shared his view with close friends and colleagues that he believed Mr Samra was anti-Muslim but that was not the real allegation he faced. Since then, the Claimant has built a narrative that Councillor Samra (as he became in May 2018) was his ambitious and manipulative ‘antagonist’ and the ‘eminence grise’ behind the Claimant’s downfall in 2016 as part of Mr Samra’s own bid to become a councillor. Faced with accusations he led a ‘Muslim clique’ in the Walsall Party, regrettably the Claimant’s narrative counter-alleged a ‘Sikh clique’ led by Cllr Samra, along with Mr Johal, Mr Gandham, Mr Sohal and others. Ms McColgan KC found that:

The Claimant’s witnesses, in particular Mr Barnard who chaired a public meeting about the cemetery in 2011, took up that narrative of Cllr Samra as anti-Muslim. Yet, the Claimant barely mentioned the cemetery incident in his statement and his oral evidence about it was contradicted by his own witness Councillor Bird who recalled the Claimant politically unwisely campaigning for the cemetery on faith grounds. In reality, the Claimant’s ‘Sikh v Muslim’ narrative, like many political narratives, was reductionist and obscured reality. I will find the Walsall Party was not divided on faith grounds until Islam was made an explicit issue by the Executive Committee’s response to a petition challenging them in 2014. Before then, the divide was between the ‘old guard’ of Cllr Bird, the Claimant and others in control of the Walsall Party before 2012; and the ‘new guard’ from 2012 of Cllr Washbrook, Mr Samra, Mr Letts, Mr Baker, Mr Sohal and Mr Gandham, but also latterly Muslim colleagues like Mr Rasab and Mr Ali. The documentary record has gaps, but it actually suggests the Claimant’s main antagonist and the driving force against him was Cllr Washbrook, whom the Claimant dismissively called Mr Samra’s ‘acolyte’. For all those reasons, I found the Claimant an honest witness, but not totally objective and self-reflexive, so treat his evidence with some caution.

In a very different way, one could also see the politician’s narrative with Councillor Bird, the Conservative Leader of Walsall Council. One would imagine the last thing a Council Leader would want to do is give evidence against his own colleagues, yet Cllr Bird seemed to approach his evidence in the same robust way as he would a boisterous Council meeting: we even had the occasional polished soundbite. Nevertheless, he clearly came to Court to tell the truth as he saw it, even if it did not always assist the Claimant (including over the cemetery issue). I am not sure I could describe his evidence as ‘impressive’ in the orthodox sense, but I have no doubt whatsoever that Cllr Bird’s evidence was reliable and straightforward.

However, just to show that there are different types of politician and Councillor, I would indeed describe the evidence for the Claimant of Councillor John Murray as impressive in the orthodox sense. Perhaps rather less concerned to present himself with his public persona than the Claimant and Cllr Bird, Cllr Murray was calm, clear and cogent in his evidence, even under searching questioning by Mr Beever. Asked in detail about the non-approval meeting in September 2015 which he chaired, Cllr Murray was entirely prepared to make concessions, but on the key points stood his ground convincingly and in detail. I entirely accept his evidence.

The Claimant’s witness Mr Barnard was plainly honest but only directly involved in the cemetery issue, where he chaired a public meeting called by the Claimant. Given the divisiveness of that meeting – and Cllr Samra’s personal challenge of the Claimant on behalf of those opposing the cemetery – his recollection has clearly changed over time and illustrates some of the difficulties with memory discussed. However, Mr Barnard was not directly involved in later events.

The Claimant’s other witness, Ms Akhtar, was even less involved in key events than Mr Bernard. She gave rather impressionistic evidence of a vague sense of antipathy due to her Muslim faith and one occasion in traditional dress from Cllr Samra, Mr Baker and others. But it is not easy to square with her appointment and invitation by them to re-stand as Secretary alongside Cllr Samra as Chairman. I accept that Ms Akhtar’s perspective is genuine, but there was no real solid evidence for it and I did not find her own evidence was particularly relevant to the issues before me.

Turning to the Defendants’ witnesses, by contrast, Mr Sandeep Sohal was involved in many of the key events, including the non-approval of the Claimant in Autumn 2015, his expulsion in June 2016 and re-expulsion in October 2028, albeit not perhaps as a leading player. Nevertheless, as their first witness, the Defendants rather ‘sent ahead Mr Sohal into the forensic minefield’ to try to disarm and explain some of Cllr Washbrook’s occasionally remarkable correspondence and actions. Whilst it is well-established that a witness’ ‘demeanour’ can be an unreliable guide, in fairness to Mr Sohal, his attempt to reconcile his evident loyalty to the Peter Washbrook he knew and respected, with some of the stronger comments in his letters, was clearly at times uncomfortable for Mr Sohal. Nevertheless, he was honest – and realistic – enough to accept that Cllr Washbrook’s views did include racial considerations at times, which had in part set the agenda for some of the decisions about the Claimant, whilst emphasising what he saw as Cllr Washbrook’s honourable motives. In short, Mr Sohal struck me as a man of principle, but also one led by a strong sense of loyalty to his more experienced colleagues and as guided by them. For those entirely human reasons, I found Mr Sohal an honest but not an independent or objective witness, so I treat his evidence with caution.

Mr Letts is a Defendant, was Treasurer of the Federation and has been a member of the Walsall Party since the 1990s. He was similarly respectful towards Cllr Washbrook, whom he pointed out in the past had a good relationship with Muslim people, even if the way Mr Letts put it may raise contemporary eyebrows, it was clear what he meant. Nevertheless, Mr Letts saw no difficulty with Cllr Washbrook calling the 2014 expelled petitioners a ‘Pakistani Islamic group’ and Mr Letts agreed with Cllr Washbrook it was trying to take over the Federation and to undo all they had done. Mr Letts also defended Cllr Washbrook’s questions to the Claimant at the non-approval meeting in September 2015, including those about his stance on Palestine and Kashmir even though Mr Letts agreed they were linked to the Claimant’s faith and national origin. But Mr Letts was clearly uncomfortable with how anonymous statements had been obtained alleging the Claimant had campaigned for Labour in the election in May 2016 which led to the Claimant’s expulsion. Mr Letts accepted there was a difference between the names of the witnesses he had met and those attributed to the anonymous witnesses. Mr Letts wisely did not vote in 2016 although he did in 2018, to which I return at the end of the judgment. I found Mr Letts honest but again fiercely loyal to Cllr Washbrook and close to Cllr Samra.

Mr Baker, another Defendant, presented differently between his oral evidence and his statement. In the latter, he said he was part of the decision to expel the Claimant in June 2016, but the note of the meeting (which I accept is accurate) said he was absent. But in oral evidence, Mr Baker was clear and cogent that he always voted without any thought to race or religious issues, which to him were ‘immaterial’ (including Ms Akhtar wearing traditional dress). Indeed, late-disclosed minutes from the 2018 re-expulsion showed him exercising an independent mind, as one would expect from a former Magistrate. However, I return to his role in that meeting at the end of the judgment. I do not accept Mr Baker lied in his statement. I find he trusted other Defendants, most obviously the lead Defendant Mr Samra, to compile his statement and did not check it properly. Therefore, I can attach no real weight to his statement, but I found his (limited) oral evidence clear as to his own thoughts.

Mr Gandham was a more recent member of the Walsall Party from 2011 and executive from 2014, who organised the selection meeting in March 2016. When pressed why he had arranged it at the Samra Club owned by the father of Cllr Samra: a candidate; Mr Gandham fairly pointed out he had asked for a postal vote, but the national Party had insisted on a meeting which he had to arrange at very short notice and the Samra Club was the only available option, but he trusted external Party staff to run the meeting properly. On the other hand, Mr Gandham was clearly fiercely loyal to Cllr Washbrook and Cllr Samra and saw nothing wrong when he participated in the petition expulsions in 2014 and the Claimant’s non-approval appeal in 2015. He attended but did not vote at the Claimant’s expulsion in June 2016, but there is no record of him reporting hearing the Claimant had been campaigning against Cllr Samra. However, with the 2018 re-expulsion, Mr Gandham thought since the Claimant did not attend, he could not dispute the allegations, even though Mr Baker (and to a lesser extent, Mr Letts) took a more independent approach to the addition of new charges relating to social media. My impression was Mr Gandham greatly respected and deferred to both Cllr Washbrook and Cllr Samra and in all those processes essentially followed their lead rather than making his own mind up about the issues. Like Mr Sohal, I found Mr Gandham honest but not independent, so once again, I treat his evidence cautiously.

Councillor Rasab is a British Muslim whose heritage is from Kashmir, like the Claimant, but he gave evidence for the Defendants seeking to show a different side to the Federation. Cllr Rasab has an interesting political background - he previously was a member of the Labour Party, but was close to Conservative Councillor Bealby (as was the Claimant and Mr Samra). Mr Rasab (as he was) joined the Federation in 2014 and campaigned for Mr Samra in 2016, when he says he heard local Muslims say the Claimant had told them not to vote for Cllr Samra because he was racist (i.e. anti-Muslim), which Mr Rasab reported to Cllr Washbrook. However, Mr Rasab was not one of the witnesses in the 2016 disciplinary process (although was in the 2017-2018 appeal, during which he suggested he had no ambition to become a Councillor). Mr Rasab described a close relationship with Cllr Washbrook, who while dying in 2018 encouraged Mr Rasab to stand as a Councillor to replace him, that Mr Rasab did, after approval by a committee led by Mr Samra. Mr Rasab was then elected in 2018 (as was Cllr Samra). He sat on the Claimant’s re-expulsion panel in October 2018 and became Chairman of the Federation in 2020. Again, Cllr Rasab stuck me as an honest witness, albeit one fiercely loyal to – and very trusting of – both Cllr Samra and Cllr Washbrook. My impression is that, like Mr Gandham and Mr Sohal, Cllr Rasab essentially followed their lead rather than exercising independent judgment, so I similarly treat his evidence with caution.

The authorship of the statements to the disciplinary investigation of the (initially) three witnesses ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ who reported in June 2016 that the Claimant had campaigned against Mr Samra in the May 2016 election is very much in dispute and less straightforward to resolve. As I have mentioned, Mr Letts’ recollection is not clear, Cllr Samra says he was only involved as a witness at the time (although I analyse that below) and in the absence of Cllr Washbrook, it is difficult to piece together. In particular, there is a difference in how I approach this evidence (i) in finding myself whether the Claimant campaigned against Mr Samra (particularly relevant to remedy if his claims succeed); as against (ii) whether individuals within the Federation genuinely believed the Claimant had campaigned against Mr Samra (relevant to their mental processes and so to discrimination and victimisation).

The first 2016 witness before me was Mr Ilyas Ahmed. He campaigned in 2016 for Mr Samra and says that most likely in May 2016, he gave Cllr Washbrook and Mr Letts his own statement. It recorded that whilst out canvassing, repeated Muslim voters told Mr Ahmed the Claimant and Mr Azam (I understand the father of Cllr Azam de-selected in 2013 and expelled in 2014) had asked them not to vote for Mr Samra because he was ‘racist’ (i.e. anti-Muslim) and to vote for Labour instead. Mr Ahmed appears not to have attended the hearing in June 2016 and did not attend in October 2018. Before me, Mr Ahmed accepted in 2016 he had not himself heard the Claimant either criticise Mr Samra or request anyone to vote Labour, only reported conversations (i.e. hearsay), from unidentified voters, although he did recall it was during the April 2016 election campaign, not the March selection campaign where Mr Samra and the Claimant both stood. But he was less clear how he knew which one of those the voters meant. So, I can only place limited weight myself on his hearsay evidence, but I accept he reported what he genuinely thought voters were telling him ‘on the doorstep’. However, Mr Ahmed was also unclear about how he came forward to report this, but the obvious (and I find actual) person who encouraged him was Mr Samra, whom I will find below, was more involved in the disciplinary process than he cared to admit in his Court witness statement.

The other 2016 witness before me was Mr Arshad Mahmood, who was a thoroughly unsatisfactory witness: appearing to be making up his evidence as he went along. I can accept from Mr Ahmed’s evidence Mr Mahmood (and his friend Mr Mehboob Matloob whom I shall discuss in a moment) were with Mr Ahmed when he met Cllr Washbrook and Mr Letts in May 2016. Whilst Mr Matloob gave a statement (said to be ‘A’) to the disciplinary hearing in June 2016 as well as a (named) statement to the Claimant’s appeal in 2017 and the re-expulsion hearing in October 2018, Mr Mahmood did not give a statement in 2016. But in his 2017 statement (also used in 2018), he reported campaigning for Mr Samra in 2016 and – like Mr Ahmed - hearing on the doorstep the Claimant was campaigning against Mr Samra. He added he had a meeting with the Claimant to act as a go-between with Mr Samra, but the Claimant criticised them for supporting Mr Samra who was a racist. However, in his Court statement, Mr Mahmood did not mention these meetings (or indeed hearing even reports the Claimant was asking voters to vote Labour). Yet in cross-examination, Mr Mahmood was determined to do everything he could to vilify the Claimant, irrespective of whether it was relevant to the question he was asked (when allowing Ms Reindorf to get a word in edgeways), or indeed had mentioned in his disciplinary or Court statements. For example, Mr Mahmood for the first time suggested the Claimant had shouted at a community member for letting Mr Samra attend to speak at a mosque (which in fact Mr Samra was permitted to do, despite the mosque having an association with the Claimant). But when Mr Mahmood was presented with evidence that the supposed victim of the Claimant’s ire in fact supported his appeal in 2017 as did the mosque, Mr Mahmood suggested Mr Azam senior (who was also expelled in 2016) must have pressurised them. In short, I found Mr Mahmood a totally unreliable witness whose evidence I entirely reject. Far from supporting the Defendants’ case, given that one of the few things he said aligning with any reliable evidence was that he was among those who met Cllr Washbrook and Mr Letts in May 2016, his involvement at that time raises real questions about how the three of them came to that meeting and how their statements were prepared.

This leads on to Mr Mehboob Matloob, who did not give evidence to me, but gave statements in 2016 and 2017, not only in similar terms to Mr Ahmed, but also claiming the Claimant told him personally not to support Mr Samra as he was racist. (Mehboob Matloob has a similar name with another more peripheral witness in the 2018 process Arkheil Mehboob about whom I heard little). From the unchallenged statement of the Claimant’s solicitor Mr Clough, the Claimant told Mr Matloob on Monday 17th November 2025 that both Mr Matloob and Mr Mahmood wanted to withdraw their statements (although only Mr Mahmood was being called as a witness). Whilst Mr Mahmood simply declined, Mr Matloob spoke to Mr Clough and told him he wanted to withdraw his disciplinary statements in 2016 and 2017, although he did not say they were inaccurate, but simply he did not want to be involved. However, on 24th November, Mr Matloob rescinded that. In those circumstances, particularly given the close relationship between Mr Matloob and Mr Mahmood, who was a thoroughly unreliable witness, I do not consider I can attach any weight under s.4 CEA to Mr Matloob’s evidence in my own findings, However, I remind myself there was no evidence of such concerns about the evidence of Mr Matloob before the disciplinary panels in 2016 and 2018. (One of the members of the 2016 panel expelling the Claimant was Mr Shahzad Ali who gave a Court statement but did not attend to give evidence, so I attach limited weight to it, although I return to Mr Ali’s role briefly in that important decision).

The final witness was Cllr Samra, portrayed by the Claimant as his main antagonist. Whilst I consider that minimises the role of Cllr Washbrook, since his death Cllr Samra (who has a law degree) has undoubtedly been the leading figure for the Defendants. As Ms Reindorf noted, there was a common error in the statements of Cllr Samra and Mr Letts, Mr Gandham, Mr Baker and Mr Sohal who all said none of the members expelled in October 2014 ‘gave any reasons why they signed the petition’ when the minutes show four plainly did (even if they were rejected). This and other matters (e.g. I find that Cllr Samra as lead Defendant had some involvement in Mr Baker’s inaccurate statement) suggest a Lady Bracknell-like pattern: not just co-ordination of statements, but of thought processes. This is partly why I have found the Defendants’ witnesses followed the lead of Cllr Washbrook and latterly of Cllr Samra. As he is still a sitting Councillor, I stress I find Cllr Samra was honest, but honesty is not the same as reliability. Even making full allowances for his physical discomfort due to health (for which I gave breaks), I did not find Cllr Samra’s evidence reliable and reject it unless corroborated by reliable evidence:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Given those limitations in the oral evidence of the witnesses, the caution required with the factual hearsay evidence in the McColgan Report; and the gaps in the documentary record, in making my findings of fact after such a long passage of time, I must proceed carefully. Nevertheless, even in very complicated fact-finding exercises, there is still a way forward. Merely by way of example, in the very different context of fact-finding at a re-trial after a previous judgment had been set aside for fraud, in Takhar v Gracefield [2026] 4 WLR 12 (Ch) at [79]-[90], I adopted a ‘holistic approach’ of layering-up different types of evidence. It seems to me a similar approach is warranted here, albeit perhaps not quite as complicated (I was then making findings of fact not only about original events, but the conduct of the earlier litigation itself). I would summarise it in this case as having five steps:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Walsall is a town on the northern edge of the West Midlands conurbation with Birmingham to its south and Wolverhampton to its west. Like the rest of the West Midlands, Walsall is very ethnically diverse: in the 2011 census, 15% identified their ethnicity as ‘Asian British’ rising to almost 19% in the 2021 census

. The same statistics show a rise in the population describing their faith as Muslim from c.8% to c.11% over that decade. Until boundary changes in 2024, there were three Parliamentary constituencies: Walsall North, Walsall South and Aldridge-Brownhills; and a total of 20 Council seats. Walsall South was the most diverse and from 2010-2024, it had seven wards in the Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council: Bentley and Darlaston North, Darlaston South, Paddock, Palfrey, Pheasey Park Farm, Pleck and the ward which includes Walsall town centre together with some deprived areas: St Matthew's.

In the 2011 census, 22% of St Matthews ward was Asian British (religion was not recorded). In the 2021 census, nearly 33% were Asian British with 25% describing their faith as Muslim (and 6.5% as Sikh).

. Therefore, Muslim voters are a significant group in St Matthews. The ward has three councillors on Walsall Council. In 2004, the Claimant became one of three Conservative Councillors and from 2006, the seats were on three-yearly rotation with one seat being contested each year. The Conservatives won in 2006, 2007, 2008 (the Claimant) and 2010 (Cllr Imran Azam who has a role in this story). However, in 2011, the third Conservative Councillor lost his seat to Labour. While the Claimant held on to his seat from Labour in 2012, it was only by 3% of the vote.

The Claimant is Muslim and was born in Pakistan in 1958. Like so many others in our multicultural society, his father came to the UK in the 1960s and in 1971 the Claimant and the rest of his family joined him. The Claimant became a British Citizen aged 18 in 1975. He was a Computer Software Consultant for many years for large companies and from 1997 and 2003 owned a recruitment and consultancy agency. However, since then his career has been primarily political. He had joined the Conservative Party and its Walsall association in 1991 with the support of Councillor Beilby, who also encouraged Mr Samra to join, as indeed did the Claimant. He first became a Councillor for St Matthews Ward in 2004, was a Cabinet Member for several years using his IT and procurement expertise and sat on the Crime Commissioner Panel, Police Authority and Pension Fund Board. He chaired working groups for the Council in Walsall and undertook community work.

During the 2000s, the original three local Conservative Associations of Aldrige and Brownhills, Walsall North and Walsall South underwent reorganisation, with the latter two Walsall Associations merging into a Federation, based on a Conservative Central Office model constitution. Its officers comprised a Chairman, two Deputy Chairmen (one political, one membership), Treasurer, one officer for each of the two constituencies and up to four additional officers. Each officer was elected at an AGM, stood for a three-year term but could be re-appointed for another year. They all sat on an Executive Committee along with a President and representatives of each ward and sub-committee. Below were local ward branches which if constituted with 20 members (as St Matthews was), could select their own Council candidates.

By 2010, most if not all the members of the Executive Committee were Councillors, including the Claimant. Whilst he saw no difficulty with their leadership at this time I accept the more common view within the Federation was that it was mismanaged and nepotistic, with the Executive Committee appointing only their allies. Mr Baker vividly described how the Conservatives were losing seats and some Councillors even ‘crossed the floor’ to Labour, leading to a shambolic AGM in 2010, when the Midlands Regional Director, Ms Carys Parry, agreed with Mr Baker action was needed. She and Robert Ashman the Midlands Field Director intervened in Walsall.

As I mentioned, in 2010, Imran Azam, a local Muslim of Pakistani origin like the Claimant, was successfully elected as a Councillor alongside him in St Matthews. Whilst it was suggested this infuriated Mr Samra who had been promised he could stand, Mr Samra pointed out that he never stood for branch selection in St Matthews as he was selected for another ward, Willenhall South. To illustrate the culture then, adjoining that was Willenhall North where the daughter of Councillor McKracken (another Executive Committee ally of the Claimant) was standing for branch selection and her husband was also standing for selection in St Matthews. Yet Cllr McCracken in 2010 then unusually stood against a fellow Conservative Councillor Sanders in Paddock Ward (where Mr Letts is a member), around the same time as the Executive Committee intervened in Paddock Ward for selecting a different candidate (who lived outside the area) than their nominee, Zahid Ali. Whilst the Claimant is not suggested to have been involved to any real extent in these various political machinations and apparent nepotism, he was part of the ‘old guard’ Executive Committee which was increasingly seen as dysfunctional as a result.

All this turmoil led in 2011 to the national Party putting the Federation into ‘Assisted Status’, suspending the Federation and appointing an ‘Action Team’ to run it. This was led by Mr Murray as Chairman and Mr Richards as Secretary, both from Aldridge-Brownhills (which had not joined the Federation); and from Walsall, Cllr Imran Azam, Bob Bernard, Bridget Benton, Peter Hancox, Gurmeet Sohal and Marion Letts, along with Mr Baker, Mr Letts, Mr Samra, Mr Gandham and another recent 2011 recruit to the Walsall Party, Lt Col Peter Washbrook.

Lt Col Washbrook (originally known as Hryhoruk) was born in Canada but emigrated to the UK aged 15 and joined the Army, where he served for 38 years and worked his way up to Lieutenant Colonel. He had also been a President of Courts Martials and Boards of Enquiry. In a statement for the disciplinary appeal before he sadly died in May 2018, Cllr Washbrook (as he had become) responded to what he called the Claimant’s ‘repeated accusations of Islamophobia, racial discrimination and bias’. He said he served alongside officers from many countries, including in Brunei alongside Muslim officers. Indeed, Mr Rasab, a Muslim himself, spoke warmly of Cllr Washbrook. Given what follows, I should make clear that I do not find he was ‘anti-Muslim’ in the sense of unthinkingly ‘Islamophobic’. As I shall explain, religious and racial issues played a more complex role. I do not doubt that in 2014, Lt Col Washbrook, as a relatively recent arrival in the Walsall Party with huge organisational experience, was considered the ideal choice to become the first Chairman of the re-launched Federation when it came out of Assisted Status in March 2014. Mr Samra was appointed as Deputy Chairman (Membership), Mr Gandham Deputy Chairman (Political) and Mr Letts Treasurer, with Mr Baker President of the Federation, as I said, not involved day-to-day.

Whilst the Walsall Party was still led by the Action Team in 2013, there were two incidents which seeded some of the conflict it experienced later under Lt Col Washbrook’s leadership as Chairman in 2014 (he became a Councillor for Paddock Ward in 2015). The first was a controversy which first erupted in early 2013 over plans for a cemetery in St Matthews Ward. As I explained, the McColgan Report placed real significance on this as the start of conflict between the Claimant and Mr Samra and the ‘weaponisation’ of the former’s faith by the latter and fellow Sikhs. With the benefit of the evidence of (now) Cllr Samra which Ms McColgan KC did not have, but also rather different evidence under cross-examination than she had from the Claimant, Mr Barnard and Cllr Bird, I agree the ‘cemetery incident’ is important, but for slightly different reasons: namely the start of antipathy between the Claimant and Mr Samra which they both saw in religious terms. It is a good example of how memory can be distorted and why contemporary documents matter.

We have two key contemporary documents from early 2013: a press report and an anti-cemetery campaign flyer by Mr Samra and his (Sikh) colleague Mr Johal. The press report recorded that a developer (who was in fact Muslim) had applied for planning permission for a cemetery and the Claimant as Councillor had arranged a public meeting due to opposition to it led by Mr Samra relating to concerns about traffic, flooding and the impact on the Green Belt. The flyer Mr Samra and Mr Johal co-wrote afterwards raised the same issues. There was no reference to faith at all. Yet Mr Barnard remembered the meeting was unpleasant with personal accusations led by Mr Samra and Mr Johal, against the Claimant and his colleague, Councillor Imran Azam (on the Council planning committee). However, as the Claimant accepted, this was influenced by the fact that in the past, both he and Mr Azam had ward surgeries in premises linked to the cemetery developer. Whilst they properly stopped those when the planning application came in, this obviously fuelled a (misplaced) accusation of corruption at the meeting. Mr Barnard told Ms McColgan KC this was the focus of attacks at the meeting and any racial agenda was ‘covert’. Yet in evidence to me Mr Barnard suggested this was attacked as a ‘Muslim cemetery’, which had not been what he had told Ms McColgan KC in 2021, but had been what Mr Azam had alleged and she accepted. Moreover, whilst the Claimant told me that he campaigned against the cemetery, not only is his statement silent on this issue, that is not clear from the press report at the time; Mr Azam told Ms McColgan KC the Claimant had told him he would stay neutral; and Cllr Bird distinctly recalled the Claimant had campaigned in favour of the cemetery as a ‘Muslim cemetery’ which prompted Cllr Bird to warn him it was a ‘dangerous game’ electorally given local opposition. Whilst the cemetery planning application was refused, the incident cemented an antipathy between the Claimant and Mr Samra: the Claimant left believing Mr Samra was anti-Muslim; and Mr Samra left starting to believe the Claimant had a Muslim ‘sectarian’ agenda.

The Claimant’s suspicions of Mr Samra’s ‘Sikh agenda’ were only aggravated by the second incident in 2013: the de-selection of Cllr Azam in St Matthews in November and selection for the 2014 elections of Mr Johal, the Sikh party member who campaigned against the cemetery alongside Mr Samra, despite St Matthews having a far greater Muslim than Sikh electorate. However, whilst the Claimant was concerned at this development, Cllr Azam became personally convinced Mr Samra, Mr Johal, Mr Gandham and others were pursuing a Sikh vs Muslim agenda. As the McColgan Report says, the Action Team rejected his complaint where he alleged:

The ‘Petition Controversy’ as I shall call it, had five (overlapping) stages: (i) the unprecedentedly fast increase in members joining the Federation in an unorthodox way, overwhelmingly from the local Muslim community; (ii) a petition signed by 77 members (including many of the new ones but also former Cllr Azam) calling for a vote of no confidence in the Executive Committee; (iii) the expulsion of the members who had signed the petition by that Committee; (iv) the appeal of the expelled members which the Claimant supported; and (v) the national Party overturning the expulsions and directing Mr Samra be removed from office; and the reaction of both him and Lt Col Washbrook to the national Party’s decision. Each of those aspects needs separate analysis, before drawing together the threads.

However, before descending into the detail of those sub-issues, it is helpful to step back and give some national (and Midlands) context to what happened with the ‘Trojan Horse Affair’. As is well-known, in Spring 2014, a letter was leaked to the press suggesting a ‘plot’ by a group associated with the Salafist tradition of Islam to take over management of schools in Birmingham and elsewhere. The Department of Education commissioned reports and OFSTED-led inspections anticipating many disciplinary prosecutions for teachers, although it has been reported that few were prosecuted, of those still fewer successfully and disciplinary sanctions of some were later overturned: e.g. Anwar v NCT [2016] EWHC 2507 (Admin). It is not for me to comment on what the truth of the ‘Trojan Horse Affair’ truly was, but it is highly relevant to this case that the national furore was at its height during 2014.

This febrile political atmosphere in 2014 perhaps explains the response of the Walsall Party Executive Committee to an unprecedented sudden increase in membership whom they assumed were Muslim. Mr Letts as Treasurer recalled in July 2014, he received a financial statement from Conservative Central Office showing around 130 new members of the Walsall Party who had not joined locally (or paid them the £25 fee) but online via the national Party. A meeting on 15th July 2014 noted the increase in membership, some of whom Mr Samra noted were not even on the electoral register and he was tasked with investigation. An email from the national Party in August 2014 suggested many new members even with different postal addresses had used the same email address. Carys Parry also told them only two credit cards were used. She later told Ms McColgan KC that it seemed like ‘entryism’, or as Mr Letts put it, a ‘takeover’. She told the Executive to ‘welcome’ the new members but ask them to verify their membership. I accept Ms Parry and the Executive were right to be concerned about this sudden and unorthodox new influx of members. Cllr Samra recalled Lt Col Washbrook 'did a full audit of these members and the majority were from Muslim/Pakistani backgrounds’. In evidence, Cllr Samra accepted he had helped with that ‘audit’, though could not say any other criteria were included save faith/ethnicity which they assumed from the names. He insisted that was reasonable, even though he accepted the names only did not show they were Muslim as such; or even if so, were of Bengali or Indian national origin.

In any event, the Executive Committee’s concerns were dramatically amplified when on 28th August 2014, Lt Col Washbrook received a petition of 77 members calling for an Extraordinary General Meeting (sufficient under Federation Rules):

On the statistics I have, in the 2012 local elections (just before Assisted Status) with one Councillor place in each of the 20 wards up for election, Labour had received c.45% of the vote and 9 seats, the Conservatives c.34% of the vote and 7 seats, with the Liberal Democrats in third place with 7.4% and 2 seats (with the other two to Independents). By contrast in 2014 with 19 seats contested, whilst Labour ended up still with 9 seats and the Conservatives 7 (although Lt Col Washbrook was not elected), UKIP gained 3 seats on c.27% of the vote to the Conservatives’ 31%, with Labour gaining from the Conservatives in two seats, including St Matthews where Mr Johal lost, having replaced Cllr Imran Azam deselected in 2013. Indeed, he and another Mr Azam from the same address (I find his father, later expelled alongside the Claimant) signed the petition. Indeed, they had the most obvious motive to create the petition. Yet Imran Azam told the expulsion meeting in October:

Both Imran Azam and his father were not new members and I have not been told what proportion of the 77 petitioners were the c.130 new members. It certainly appears that most of the petitioners have names which could have been Pakistani or Bengali family names, but the agenda related to the leadership of the Walsall Party. Notably, the Claimant did not sign the petition; and whilst there was plenty of rumour he was behind it, there is no evidence he was involved and I find he was not

Lt Col Washbrook and the rest of the Executive, who had only been in place a few months since March 2014, obviously saw this petition as an existential threat. As Mr Letts explained, in 2014 the Action Team had spent two years significantly improving the Federation, which had just come out of Assisted Status and appointed a new Executive. But suddenly they were faced with the ‘imposition’ of 130 new members and a few months later, a petition trying to unseat the new Executive. However, Lt Col Washbrook’s concerns went further in a letter of 31st August 2014 to Alan Mabbutt, the national Party Director of Organisation. He wrote that:

In a similar letter to the Secretary to the national Party Board Stephen Phillips on 12th October 2014, after the petitioners had been expelled, Lt Col Washbrook said:

Therefore, it is crucially important to this whole case to appreciate that there were (at least) two streams of thought about the petition within the Executive:

(1)

(2)

On 18th September 2014, the Executive discussed the new members and petitioners and noted several petitioners had told them they were not members of the party and only one of 64 responded to letters inviting them to validate their membership. The minutes do not refer to race or religion. Indeed, Lt Col Washbrook was determined there should be a hearing to decide whether to expel and the rules be strictly followed and any members of the Executive who felt conflicted should not vote. The meeting was arranged for the 2nd October 2014 and attended by Carys Parry and chaired by Maggie Punyer, the Midlands Regional Chair. The invite said:

Given (i) this was expressed as a conclusion more than an allegation; (ii) the letter said it would be the Executive under challenge (albeit under an independent Chair) who would decide it; and (iii) the date given was the 1st October 2014, it is surprising any petitioners at all attended the meeting on 2nd October 2014. Yet three did, including former-Councillor Imran Azam as I said, who was expelled by majority with three Executive members not voting. Mr Matloob Hussain told the Executive on 2nd October 2014 he signed the petition but did not see the covering letter:

Despite that explanation, Mr Hussain was also expelled by a majority of the Executive. So was Mr Hakin Ali who said he had signed the petition because he was concerned at the loss of the Council and de-selection of existing councillors (probably Cllr Imran Azam in St Matthews, who was replaced by Mr Johal who lost the seat to Labour). Mr Ali said he did not know who signed the petition and that he would not have said if he had. He was duly expelled unanimously. Others who had written into the meeting explaining their reasons for signing the petition were also expelled, along with the 67 petitioners who were members but did not respond.

Yet as I said, the Defendants’ witnesses made the common error of saying the attendees gave no reason for signing the petition, which is plainly wrong. It also suggests Executive ‘groupthink’ at the ‘mass expulsion meeting’, as I shall call it. Whilst I accept Mr Baker voted without thought to race or religion, Lt Col Washbrook openly framed the issue in those terms and Mr Letts and Mr Sohal candidly admitted the Executive knew of his views. Whilst not endorsing them all, Mr Letts accepted he also saw the petitioners as a ’Pakistani Islamic Group’. Mr Sohal defended Lt Col Washbrook’s essential view, if not how it was expressed. Mr Gandham clearly respected Lt Col Washbrook and there is no suggestion in the notes he exercised any independent judgment, I find he followed his lead as well.

Mr Gandham did stress the Executive had sought external advice from the regional Party and national Party. Yet he accepted both Carys Parry and Maggie Punyer had told the McColgan Report that they advised the Executive strongly against expelling the petitioners as a group rather than on an individual case-by-case basis, but he disputed that was true. Certainly, Maggie Punyer objected to the conclusions of the Mort Report which overturned the expulsions, although I have no evidence that Carys Parry did. However, even if the regional officers supported the expulsions (along similar lines to Mr Baker, with no ‘racial-religious framing’), I accept Cllr Bird’s evidence the national Party did not advise the Executive to expel the petitioners as a group. That would also be contrary to the findings of the Mort Report. Simon Mort was Chairman of the national Party’s Disciplinary Committee (and also signed off its guidelines for expulsions to which I return). Around mid-October 2014, he was commissioned by the national Party Chair Lord Feldman to carry out an investigation, which was significantly delayed by the 2015 General Election, so Mr Mort and his colleagues only visited Walsall in June 2015 (as Mrs Punyer later complained) and sent out their report on 15th July 2015.

The Mort Report’s conclusions and recommendations were unflinching:

One of the people spoken to by the Mort team (although not mentioned in its Report) was the Claimant, who clearly supported the petitioners’ appeal. Nevertheless, I have no evidence whether the petitioners complained of Islamophobia or that the Claimant did so on their behalf. His statement is silent on this point, focusing instead on his email to Alan Mabbutt to inform him the Federation had organised selection meetings in St Matthews and Paddock wards and deselected his ally Barbara McCracken; and that his support for a local Parliamentary candidate was conditional on the national Party promising to investigate the mass expulsions. However, the Claimant does not say he told the Mort Report he felt the expulsions were influenced by race or religion, nor that the appeals were on this basis; and Mr Beever wisely did not ask him about this, simply to confirm that the Mort Report made no reference to it (or indeed to him). I return to this when discussing the Claimant’s ‘protected acts’ for the purposes of his victimisation claim.

However, Ms Punyer was not the only person unhappy with the Mort Report. Cllr Washbrook (as he had become for the Conservative safe seat of Paddock ward in the 2015 May elections) wrote to Mr Semple, Chair of the National Convention on 13th August 2015, asking him to set aside the Mort Report, saying (my italics):

Therefore, Cllr Washbrook was unrepentant that the petition was a ‘sectarian Trojan Horse attempt to take control of the Executive’ of a group sharing ‘the affiliation of being of Pakistani Islamic heritage’ (albeit despite previous letters, he claimed that was not a factor in the expulsions) and he explicitly saw the Claimant as its leader.

Similarly, Mr Samra blamed the Claimant for his removal as Deputy Chairman (Membership) by the Mort Report and on 25th August 2015 emailed Stephen Phillips at the national Party, which is quoted in the McColgan Report, but not disclosed to the Court, as I noted above. I find this was a deliberate non-disclosure by Mr Samra who was seeking to conceal what he had said at the time. In the email, having referred to the ‘Muslim cemetery’ issue, Mr Samra said the Claimant was:

So, Mr Samra sought to present the Claimant as corrupt, but also ‘sectarian’ and ‘supporting a narrow section of the Pakistani population’ which may resonate with those voters, but drive others towards UKIP. Moreover, to highlight the Claimant’s ‘sectarian agenda’, Mr Samra referred to ‘Walsall being a hotspot of terrorist activity’ and appeared to link that to a march in London relating to Kashmir, which was raised as a live issue within the Claimant a month later at the approval meeting.

Indeed, I move on from ‘the petition controversy’ to the first pleaded complaints in Topic 1: the Claimant’s non-approval as a Conservative candidate on 28th September 2015 and the rejection of his appeal on 22nd October 2015. The pleas of Cllr Washbrook and Mr Samra were to of no avail – the national Party did not set aside the Mort Report and 75 of the 77 expelled members (2 having resigned) were re-instated to the Walsall Party and Mr Samra was removed as Deputy Chairman (Membership) with his role being transferred to the regional Party (much to Ms Punyer’s frustration). However, the Walsall Party Executive co-opted Mr Samra as Secretary. The Claimant and his allies, including de-selected Councillors Imran Azam and Barbara McCracken, as well as Mr Barnard and Cllr Bird, wrote to Lord Feldman to express their concern on 17th September 2015, although there is no suggestion the Walsall Party Executive were aware of this letter.

Nevertheless, the Claimant (and Cllr Bird) clearly did not anticipate what Cllr Washbrook would do at the upcoming selection meeting on 28th September 2025. There are no notes for this meeting, chaired by Cllr Murray from Aldridge who explained that is the convention, but I broadly accept his account of that meeting in his statement, from which I quote with some interpolations from other evidence:

Mr Murray was so concerned, he emailed Mrs Punyer and others shortly afterwards:

I accept that some of Mr Murray’s language in his statement is a little florid: e.g. ‘turning on him like a pack of wolves’, since he accepted as Chairman he had agreed in advance the three additional questions for the Claimant if he denied anything embarrassing to the Party – which he had done to allow him to address them. Cllr Murray also accepted the Federation rules had been technically complied with. Cllr Bird also accepted he had previously sprung embarrassing material on a candidate if they denied anything embarrassing to disclose. Whilst no such questions were asked of any of the other five candidates, in fact as the Claimant accepted, they were legitimate candidates who had either previously been elected councillors (Mushtaq Ahmed), had councillors as referees (Mohammed Yasin, Akbar Ali and Glyn Marston), or Executive member support (Zulfiqar Ali). There is no evidence any of them had anything embarrassing to disclose, although crucially nor that any were associated with the 2014 petition. The Claimant also accepted Mushtaq Ahmed, Mohammed Yasin, Akbar Ali and Zulfiqar Ali were all Muslims of Pakistani origin like himself. I reject any insinuation they were compliant ‘Muslim stooges’ only approved to cover up his non-approval (as Zulfiqar Ali would show in 2016). Walsall’s Muslim community were a key part of the electorate and I accept for most of the committee, the four other Muslim candidates were approved on merit, even if as Cllr Murray said, some had more merit than others. Their approval will be a very important consideration when I examine later if there was discrimination.

Nonetheless, as a matter of primary fact, none of the approved candidates were sitting councillors like the Claimant and I accept the evidence of Cllr Murray and Cllr Bird that it was extremely rare for a sitting councillor not to be approved. Moreover, I also find on the balance of probabilities that Cllr Washbrook’s questions of the Claimant were not simply pre-planned, they were a deliberate attempt to discredit him and prevent his approval. After all, only a month earlier, Cllr Washbrook described the Claimant (in fact I find incorrectly) as the leader of the ‘Trojan Horse’ group trying to unseat the Executive, led by Cllr Washbrook. Likewise, also a month earlier Mr Samra (who was not present at the approval meeting) had similarly complained to the national Party about the Claimant’s agenda, including ‘sponsoring a meeting at Walsall Council to co-ordinate a campaign and march in London in support of Kashmir’. It is no coincidence that Cllr Washbrook asked at the meeting what I will call ‘the Kashmir question’:

However, as Cllr Bird said, the Kashmir issue was a significant one for the Pakistani -origin community in Walsall and a humanitarian issue which every candidate in St Matthews supported and he had himself. The same was true of ‘the Gaza question’:

In 2025-26 this is now a political issue on an even greater scale than it was in 2014. Mr Letts and Mr Sohal stressed that a Councillor must represent the whole ward, not just one community in it, which is of course true. Nevertheless, I accept the evidence of the Claimant and Cllr Bird that they saw them as humanitarian stances crossing party and religious lines, as the Claimant was specifically quoted as saying. None of the other candidates (Muslim or not) were asked about their stance. However, ‘the Cannabis question’ was specific to the Claimant. It related to the prosecution in 2010 of the Claimants’ tenants who were using premises he let to them to cultivate and store cannabis on a commercial scale. Nevertheless, as the Claimant and Cllr Bird said, in fact the Claimant had called the Police himself, the prosecution had been widely publicised in the local media and the Claimant since stood as a Councillor and still been elected. It was clearly ‘old news’, which was the conclusion Cllr Murray reached despite being previously unaware of it. Along with Cllr Bird, the Claimant understandably objected to all these questions. Mr Letts, Mr Baker and Mr Sohal all said he was ‘confrontational’ (although the questions were clearly confrontational) which was a factor for the panel in refusing his approval: voting with Cllr Washbrook as they did with all candidates.

I find on the balance of probabilities that (unbeknownst to the rest of the Approvals Committee, including Mr Baker, Mr Letts and Mr Sohal), this was precisely what Cllr Washbrook wanted to achieve. Whilst he clearly had an animus against the Claimant because he perceived him to be the leader of the ‘Pakistani Islamic clique’ that tried to oust the Executive, as he said in August 2015, the Claimant was not ‘charged’ as he did not sign the petition and ‘members of his group’ (as Cllr Washbrook put it) did not implicate him. So, Cllr Washbrook knew he could not confront the Claimant about the petition itself. Instead, I find on the balance of probabilities that in seeking to discredit him, Cllr Washbrook not only asked ‘the Cannabis question’ which he knew was ‘old news’. He also asked questions intended to ‘frame’ (in many senses of the word) the Claimant as having a ‘sectarian political agenda’. ‘The Gaza question’ deliberately challenged the Claimant’s publicly-quoted stance that issue ‘crossed party and religious lines’. Moreover, ‘the Kashmir question’ presented the Claimant as sectarian in a ‘Pakistan vs India’ sense, just as Mr Samra had presented him in August as ‘supporting a narrow section of the Pakistani population’ in his email he deliberately failed to disclose. I do not go so far as to say the two of them ‘hatched a plan’ together, but Mr Samra’s view of the Claimant clearly aligned with that of Cllr Washbrook and it is notable Mr Sohal thought Mr Samra was not present at the approval meeting as he and the Claimant had ‘bad blood’. Yet I accept Mr Sohal, Mr Baker and Mr Letts did not share the same animus as Cllr Washbrook and Mr Samra. These factual findings are important to the discrimination claim as I discuss later. I find the reason why Cllrs Murray and Bird thought Cllr Washbrook’s questioning of the Claimant was a ‘stitch up’ is that this is precisely what Cllr Washbrook intended.

The Claimant was dismayed at his non-approval and on 14th October 2015 wrote to Cllr Washbrook to appeal, which struck a delicate balance between putting forward his clear allegations and aggravating Cllr Washbrook further. He responded in detail to the three questions in the way I have already summarised. He also pointed out the Procedure for the Selection of Local Government Candidates gave them ‘preferential treatment for their current seat, but not automatic reselection’. The Claimant (rightly) suggested there was a clear bias against him, adding (my italics):

The Claimant’s appeal against non-approval was arranged for 22nd October 2015 to be chaired by an external Party official – the Area Deputy Chairman Mrs Boulter. The minutes show her determination to limit the appeal to the correctness of the procedure followed on 28th September 2015, stopping Cllr Bird exploring the legitimacy of the three questions which he had objected to Cllr Washbrook asking. There is rather an irony in Mrs Boulter’s zealous insistence on process, given that it is to my mind extremely surprising that the Walsall Party’s rules permitted people involved in the original decision under appeal to vote on the appeal against it, including Cllr Washbrook, Mr Letts and Mr Baker. They were also joined on the appeal by Mr Gandham and Mr Ali; and surprisingly by Mr Samra, despite his intention to stand against the Claimant. He said that given the focus was procedure and he had not sat on the original panel, he saw no conflict of interest. I find on the balance of probabilities that he deliberately ignored his plain conflict of interest in order to ensure the Claimant was not approved so that he could stand instead. Again, I must consider later whether that was discrimination or victimisation. At the approval appeal hearing itself, the Claimant and Cllr Bird objected to the composition of the panel, but were overruled on the advice of Ms Parry by Mrs Boulter. The Claimant had a 5-minute address which Cllr Washbrook then answered in the same time. Cllr Murray than addressed the meeting and accepted that there had been other occasions where pre-planned questions had been asked. Cllr Murray said that he had allowed Cllr Washbrook to ask his questions to allow the Claimant to answer, although in answer to Cllr Bird’s question, Cllr Murray agreed this was the first time there had been such a departure from set questions, although Mr Letts pointed out Cllr Bird had asked such ‘ambush’ questions in the past. Mrs Boulter repeatedly intervened to insist they simply look at the process. Despite that, both the Claimant and Cllr Bird tried to make the point how unusual these questions were, but once again Mrs Boulter objected. Mr Samra asked Cllr Murray if he considered the meeting had been conducted correctly and the minutes record that Cllr Murray said it had. However, given his email at the time, I accept Cllr Murray actually said it had been conducted within the technical rules and he went no further than that. When the Claimant argued (as I find, correctly at least for Cllr Washbrook) the approval meeting had been predetermined, once again Mrs Boulter intervened to focus on procedure, even though he had raised a procedural fairness complaint, namely the absence of ‘preferential treatment’ for sitting councillors in the procedures. Nevertheless, the appeal was dismissed unanimously as Cllr Washbrook and Mr Samra each always intended that it would be.

Whilst the Claimant had no technical right of appeal against that decision, unsurprisingly he suspected the approval appeal was as much pre-determined as the original decision, as I find it was, certainly by Cllr Washbrook and Mr Samra. On 9th November 2015, the Claimant raised a complaint to the national Party which I do not have, although the McColgan Report summarised it in these terms:

This led to a report by Marcus Booth and Caroline Roberts of the national Party (‘the Roberts-Booth Report’) which summarised the Claimant’s email like this:

As I discuss later, Mr Beever rightly accepted the Claimant’s complaint was a ‘protected act’ under s.27 EqA for the purposes of his victimisation claims. Moreover, the Walsall Party were plainly aware of this, as was Cllr Washbrook, Mr Sohal, Mr Baker, Mr Letts and others including the Claimant were all interviewed by Mr Roberts and Ms Booth on 12th January 2016 and Mr Samra emailed them days later (although in his evidence, he suggested he was not involved at all).

Indeed, as noted in the McColgan Report, on 16th December 2015, Cllr Washbrook objected to the investigation, including the allegations of discrimination, saying:

However, as I have explained, far from the October approval appeal ‘addressing and rejecting the allegations of prejudice and racial bias’, it did not explore them at all. Indeed, Mrs Boulter tried to shut down the Claimant’s attempts even to criticise the questions. Nevertheless, this shows Cllr Washbrook saw the Claimant’s appeal to him on 14th October as ‘unfounded allegations of prejudice and racial bias’. Moreover, the timing of the Roberts-Booth investigation caused the Walsall Party some difficulty, since as again noted in the McColgan Report, on 4th January 2016, Alan Mabbutt from the national Party instructed Cllr Washbrook not to proceed with the St Matthews branch meeting on 12th January, or the Federation’s AGM on the 20th January. Cllr Washbrook, as he was to make a habit of doing, ignored these instructions and proceeded with the AGM, but not the St Matthew’s ward meeting and selection. On 20th January 2016, he explained his decision to Mr Mabbutt:

At that AGM later that day on 20th January, Cllr Washbrook was re-elected as Federation Chairman, Mr Samra as Deputy Chairman (Political) and Mr Gandham as Deputy Chairman (Membership) respectively, with Mr Sohal and Mr Shazhad Ali as Vice Chairman, Mr Letts as Treasurer; and Cllrs Follows and Martin as North and South Walsall Conservative representatives respectively. In an email to Mr Mabbutt which could have done little to placate the latter’s sense of irritation at being disobeyed, Cllr Washbrook described it as a ‘very successful AGM where the only discordant note was the Claimant raising the issue of the expelled members’.

Unbeknownst to the those at the AGM, on 18th January 2016, the Roberts-Booth Report had sent to the national Party its report upholding the Claimant’s appeal on lack of natural justice, but not on grounds of discrimination. The report concluded:

Of course, there was no evidence available to the Roberts-Booth team, as there has been to myself, that the questions were a deliberate ambush by Cllr Washbrook. Yet even without that, the Report observed that ‘the open wording of the questions presented was such that they could potentially have been perceived to have been asked with a religious agenda in mind (although the Panel do not believe religion was the motivation)’. I will have to reach my own view about the latter later. Accordingly, this was the second time in the space of less than a year that the Claimant’s first support for an appeal and now personal appeal to the national Party had led to it overturning the Walsall Party’s decision-making. If Cllr Washbrook and Mr Samra considered the Claimant their mutual enemy before the Roberts-Booth report, that can only have been reinforced by its decision to recommend the Claimant’s application for candidacy re-approval be reconsidered independently. That recommendation was adopted by the national Party on 25th January 2016:

Cllr Washbrook responded on 19th February 2016 to that request for an update in detail. It is only necessary for me now to quote Cllr Washbrook’s closing paragraph:

Once again, this underlines Cllr Washbrook’s evident anger about the Claimant’s complaints of discrimination, although of course he will have noted the Roberts-Booth report had not upheld them, which doubtless reinforced Cllr Washbrook’s view those complaints were ‘malicious and false’. But despite what he had said to Mr Mabbutt before the AGM, Cllr Washbrook did not resign as Chairman.

Nevertheless, by late January 2016, the May 2016 local elections were coming up fast, with the deadline for selected candidates to enter in early April 2016. On 18th February 2016, the independent panel approved the Claimant as a Conservative candidate, that was ratified by the national Party on 1st March, which resolved that:

Mr Samra had previously been approved to stand as the prospective candidate. He resolved to stand against the Claimant as he had said he would back in August 2015.

As the Branch Chair for St Matthew’s ward (as well as the newly- if controversially - elected Federation Deputy Chairman (Membership)), it fell to Mr Gandham to organise that selection process. He recommended a postal vote because of the contentiousness and the pressure of time, but the national Party insisted on a selection vote at a public meeting. On 16th March 2016, Mr Gandham emailed Mr Mabbutt with evident frustration at the national Party’s stance, saying:

Nevertheless, the invitation letters for the 30th March meeting went out to members on 20th March. On 22nd March, Mr Philips emailed Mr Mabbutt ruling out a postal vote as ‘open to abuse and we don’t trust Walsall’. They instructed Robert Ashman, the Field Director for the Midlands, to have two officers supervise the meeting:

Councillor Bird agreed and suggested he ‘certainly would prefer a neutral venue’.

However, the venue found by Mr Gandham was the ‘Samra Club’, owned by Mr Samra’s father and used many times over the years for Walsall Party functions, although presumably never before for a contentious selection contest between a sitting Councillor challenged by a rival whose father owned the venue sharing their name. In evidence, Mr Gandham was pressed about why he had selected the Samra Club. He pointed out that because of the pressure of time between the national Party’s re-approval of the Claimant as a candidate at the start of March 2016 and the deadline for candidates to stand in the election only just over a month later on 7th April, he had asked the national Party for permission to use a postal vote, but they had refused. Mr Gandham said in evidence that he had investigated and there was no other venue of the same capacity and which was ‘free’. Of course, that term is ambiguous: the Claimant’s solicitors’ note was that Mr Gandham said ‘free of charge’, but my own note is that he simply said ‘free’. In context, I understood him to mean ‘free’ in the sense of ‘available’, which given the short notice he had been given, I find plausible despite other difficulties with Mr Gandham’s evidence which I have mentioned. To my mind, the crucial point is that Mr Gandham’s contemporaneous email, even after he had found the Samra Club, still pressed for a postal vote; and despite the Claimant’s suspicions I do not accept that Mr Gandham did so to fix the vote in some way. If Mr Gandham had chosen The Samra Club simply to favour Mr Samra, he would not have continued to press for a postal vote which would have been more neutral. I therefore find on the balance of probabilities that Mr Gandham chose the Samra Club principally because he was instructed to arrange an attended meeting – against his better judgment – and The Samra Club was the only available venue. In short, I accept Mr Gandham’s evidence that he had to organise a contentious meeting in a large venue with very little notice by the end of March, had tried to find a different venue than the Samra Club but none were available, but he expected the regional Party staff to run the meeting properly.

On 30th March 2016, the selection meeting took place at the Samra Club. As I said, the apparent minutes of that are the Walsall Party’s response to the Claimant’s complaint. I am also cautious of Carys Parry’s (hearsay) evidence in the McColgan Report given her previous involvement. But there is hearsay evidence in the McColgan Report from Robert Ashman (not previously involved) who attended:

Moreover, back in April 2016, in response to the Claimant’s then wide-ranging complaints about the meeting, Robert Ashman had told Mr Mabbutt in an email:

I accept Mr Ashman’s account, not least as the Claimant’s allegations relating to the selection meeting itself have narrowed since to voter impersonation, although the only instance given is a lady called Diane Walker. On 7th April, she wrote to Lord Feldman the Chair of the national Party (witnessed by the Claimant) saying that whilst she had been recorded as voting at the meeting on 30th March, she had been on holiday at the time. However, she did not speak to the national Party when it tried to contact her. Like Ms McColgan KC, I cannot place much reliance on Ms Walker’s untested hearsay evidence. Indeed, given that Mr Samra won by a margin of at least 12 votes, Ms Walker alone made no difference. Indeed, even assuming there was voter impersonation of Mrs Walker, or possibly of a few others (for which there is no solid evidence for such a serious allegation), there is simply no evidence about who was responsible: certainly not that it was at Mr Samra’s instigation (who could not even ensure his own mother could get in first time around), as opposed to by one of his over-enthusiastic supporters without his knowledge). Similarly, it is equally possible that over-enthusiastic supporters of the Claimant, especially in the light of his allegations to the Roberts-Booth investigation, without his knowledge campaigned for him and against Mr Samra by alleging that he was racist, to which I return. Be all of that as it may, Mr Samra won the selection by at least 12 votes.

I turn to perhaps the most contentious and complex topic: the 2016 election and expulsion of the Claimant. The Defendants contend – as they found in expelling the Claimant – that he had secretly campaigned against Mr Samra during the campaign in April 2016 for the election on 5th May – indeed even encouraged people to vote Labour. The Defendants invite me to make my own findings on the balance of probabilities about this issue for the purpose of contributory fault. But the Claimant accuses the Defendants – in particular Mr Samra – of fabricating evidence against him to exclude him, which given Cllr Samra is now a sitting Councillor, is an extremely serious allegation with ramifications for his future political career.

Nevertheless, as I have said, in relation to a discrimination claim which is focussed on the subjective motivations of the Defendants and their fellow decision-makers, I must not only reach my own conclusions on the balance of probabilities on the evidence I have about the conduct of the election campaign and the preparation of the disciplinary case; but also make findings about what the decision-makers genuinely believed at the time on the evidence they had in front of them. I will differentiate those findings in three parts: my own findings about the election campaign; my own findings about preparation of the disciplinary case; and my findings about the expulsion decision. However, I start with brief reflections about the evidence on this topic, picking up from my reflections on the evidence earlier.

Returning to the five steps I take to the evidence, I first have the burden of proof. Technically, the Defendant bears the burden for my own findings of fact about what actually happened in the election campaign for contributory fault. However, it is so closely linked to the allegation of evidence fabrication, which is unquestionably on the Claimant, that I nevertheless place the burden on him on the balance of probabilities to prove what happened in the election campaign, even though that involves proving a negative to an extent. Next, I bear in mind the agreed and incontrovertible evidence, which is unfortunately thinner on the ground on this topic than on the others, but includes matters such as the broad timeline, result of the election and what the Claimant accepts about the disciplinary process (e.g. that he was invited to view the disciplinary statements and also to a disciplinary hearing). Next there are the contemporary documents, which are all contested, but to very different degrees. At one end are the minutes of the hearing on 30th June 2016, taken by Mr Richards from Aldridge Branch, although as the Claimant was not there, he does not agree them (and Mr Richards minuted the approval appeal in October 2015, not entirely accurately about what Cllr Murray said). At the other end, there are the disciplinary statements from Mr Samra and three anonymous statements the Claimant claims were fabricated, particularly one supposedly by a Mr Moz Khan (who later disavowed giving any ‘statement’). There are also later disciplinary statements on the appeal from Mr Samra, Mr Ilyas Ahmed, Mr Mehboob Matloob, Mr Arshad Mahmood, Mr Akheil Mehboob and Mr (now Cllr) Rasab. Next, there is hearsay evidence from the national Party in the McColgan Report and from others in support of the Claimant’s appeal. Finally, there is live evidence from Mr Ahmed, Mr Mahmood and Cllr Rasab, but also from Mr Samra and Mr Gandham; and on procedure from Mr Letts, who also gave evidence about the hearing with Mr Sohal, who actually voted. Last but obviously not least there is the evidence of the Claimant. My findings are based on all this and indeed the whole of the evidence.

The Claimant is accused of not only telling voters not to vote for Mr Samra because he was a racist, but to vote Labour. Only Mr Mahmood gave live evidence that he had heard the Claimant say that and I entirely reject Mr Mahmood’s evidence for the reasons given earlier: he did not say that in his statement and indeed appeared to be making up his live evidence as he went along. All the other evidence that the Claimant campaigned against Mr Samra and/or for Labour is entirely hearsay. It is either hearsay from Mr Mehboob Matloob about a conversation he claimed with the Claimant which I reject and can place no reliance on given his closeness to Mr Mahmood; the fact Mr Matloob purported to withdraw his statement then changed his mind shortly before trial; and the fact that he has not attended trial to be cross-examined. Or there is hearsay evidence from live witnesses who say they heard voters ‘on the doorstep’ say the Claimant had campaigned against Mr Samra and for Labour: (now) Cllr Samra, Mr Rasab, Mr Gandham and Mr Ahmed. As hearsay evidence, this must be evaluated applying the criteria in s.4(2) Civil Evidence Act 1995. On one hand the evidence is by live witnesses who made contemporary statements to similar effect (except Mr Gandham). But on the other, these Defendant witnesses have a motive to misrepresent what happened and I have found some collaboration in their statements. Even if what they say accurately reflects what voters told them, it involves multiple hearsay where it is extremely difficult to evaluate its weight. To my mind, it is striking the Defendants have not called a single actual voter to come to Court and say they heard the Claimant say these things. Moreover, as I have said, the circumstances of the making of the original disciplinary statements is concerning. Mr Mahmood – a thoroughly unreliable witness - was present at the meeting between himself, Mr Ahmed and Mr Matloob with Cllr Washbrook and Mr Letts, but he did not apparently make a statement at the time. Yet Mr Khan was not present, yet was said to have made a statement he later denied. I shall have to consider in a moment whether any of the original disciplinary statements were fabricated and if so by who, but certainly these statements raise serious questions about their reliability and authenticity, which in turn undermines the weight of the ‘live hearsay evidence’ about voter allegations from all the Defendants’ witnesses.

As against that, the Claimant was insistent he had not campaigned against Mr Samra and for Labour and gave to my mind three compelling reasons why he would not have done so; and I find on the balance of probabilities that he did not do so. Firstly, the Claimant pointed to his election letter to St Matthews Ward on 10th April 2016:

It is simply not credible that the Claimant would send out leaflets in St Matthews heavily criticising Labour for hypocrisy then go round door-to-door campaigning for Labour. Secondly, the Claimant supported Conservative candidates in other wards, including Cllr Martin who sat on the Executive and was re-elected in Paddock Ward and Zulfiqar Ali, approved when the Claimant was not in September 2015. After the election, on 23rd June 2016, Mr Ali (who was not elected) wrote:

This underpins what I found earlier that Mr Ali was not just a ‘Muslim Stooge’ loyal to Mr Samra approved on 28th September 2015 to cover his tracks, when Mr Ali was firstly critical of the Executive and Mr Samra; and secondly said that Labour supporters were responsible for spreading false rumours about the Claimant. Again, it is not credible that the Claimant would campaign for Labour in St Matthews, but for the Conservatives in other wards. Thirdly, there is the simple point the Claimant made in cross-examination that he had been de-selected but was still approved, expected Mr Samra to lose the election (which he did by 7% of the vote), when the Claimant could then re-stand in St Matthews the next time. In those circumstances, it would have been ‘politically suicidal’ to campaign against Mr Samra and for Labour. It is much more likely the Claimant focussed on other wards, leaving the coordination of ‘Muslim support’ for Mr Samra in St Matthews to others. Indeed, there is contemporaneous evidence of this (again hearsay as the witnesses were not called, but more reliable than the Defendants’). In June 2016, Mr Chaudray and Mr Munir wrote letters of support for the Claimant (at least one mentioned by Cllr Rasab albeit inconsistently with those letters) to the effect that the Claimant was aware and agreeable to them having discussions with Mr Samra to co-ordinate support, but nothing came of it. Clearly, plenty of other Muslim members of the Walsall Party were politically active in St Matthews Ward during the election. Indeed, one – Mr Azam – was also expelled for campaigning against Mr Samra. To my mind, that is the key to what I find actually happened, as I shall now explain.

It is beyond doubt the Claimant was incensed by Mr Samra’s selection on 30th March 2016 and believed that he had been the victim of discrimination. As the McColgan Report noted, on 4th April 2016, the Claimant emailed Lord Feldman complaining of corruption at the selection meeting and he had been deselected due to Islamophobia saying ‘what other reason is there to deselect a loyal, hard-working across the ward councillor ?’ The Claimant made various complaints (which he has not pursued before me) of irregularities at the meeting. Moreover, Mr Samra had won the vote and the Claimant already saw him as the ‘eminence grise’ behind what was now starting to feel like a campaign against him within the Walsall Party (which I can understand, given Cllr Washbrook’s conduct). More simplistically, the Claimant had come to see Mr Samra as anti-Muslim since the cemetery incident. Therefore, I have no doubt in my mind that - privately to close friends and colleagues such as Mr Imran Azam and his father - the Claimant had accused Mr Samra of Islamophobia in engineering his deselection. That is hardly far-fetched when he maintains that allegation and pursues it in public at Court a decade later. Nevertheless, whilst he could not bring himself to campaign for Mr Samra, as I have explained, the Claimant rolled up his sleeves and began campaigning hard in other wards for other Conservative candidates like Mr Ali and Cllr Martin; and indeed, he occasionally publicly attacked Labour in St Matthews with his election flyer.

Moreover, the balance of the evidence suggests the Mr Samra was offered support in St Matthews by supporters of the Claimant, which is inconsistent with him campaigning against Mr Samra. The Claimant’s friends Mr Mohammed Munir and Mr Chaudry had discussions with Mr Rasab and Mr Mahmood about support for Mr Samra. Assuming it is the same Mr Mohammed Munir, I do not accept their evidence that he told them the Claimant had instructed him not to help Mr Samra, since that is inconsistent with Mr Munir’s letter and was not squarely alleged against the Claimant at the time. If it was Mr Chaudhary Munir as Mr Rasab says and he was a different person, what Mr Rasab was told is still inconsistent with what the Claimant said to Mr Mohammed Munir and Mr Chaudry and I find their contemporary accounts more reliable than Mr Rasab’s recollection after a decade, especially as he did not make a statement until a year later for the appeal. In any event, Mr Rasab himself accepts Mr Chaudry was prepared to offer support despite being a ‘good friend’ of the Claimant, albeit on terms which Mr Samra did not accept. Mr Samra said as much in his own disciplinary statement at the time, albeit without naming Mr Chaudry. I do not accept Mr Chaudry would even have offered to help in the first place if the Claimant had instructed supporters not to help. Likewise, as confirmed by letters of support on the Claimant’s appeal in 2017, there was another offer of help to Mr Samra in St Matthews by the Mount Street Mosque in St Matthews, where the Claimant had regularly attended for over a decade and where Mohammed Azam (Imran Azam’s father) was a trustee. Nevertheless, the Mosque’s Vice-President Mr Mushtaq Ahmed agreed with his colleagues that Mr Samra could address the mosque at Friday prayers on 22nd April. Even leaving aside Mr Ahmed’s allegation that he was pressurised by Mr Samra and Mr Rasab to give a statement against the Claimant in 2016 which they denied, the fact the Claimant did not try to prevent Mr Samra addressing his own mosque is once again inconsistent with the Claimant campaigning against Mr Samra in St Matthews. In short, the Claimant’s denial of doing so is corroborated by contemporary evidence.

Therefore, I find on balance of probabilities the Claimant did not campaign for Labour, against Mr Samra or accuse him of racism to voters. But whilst I cannot make detailed findings about this and can only infer it from the evidence, it is entirely possible other members of the Walsall Party were secretly campaigning against Mr Samra. The Claimant was later expelled alongside Mr Mohammed Azam, father of Mr Imran Azam, the Councillor de-selected in 2013. Indeed, they had as much of a motive as the Claimant to suspect Mr Samra of Islamophobia, since they both signed the petition and Mr Samra supported their expulsion in 2014, but they were re-admitted by the Mort Report in 2015. I do not make a positive finding that Mr Mohammed Azam campaigned against Mr Samra. Yet the evidence relied on by the Defendants all alleges that he was involved. Moreover, Mr Ahmed also referred to a former Councillor who tried to persuade him not to help Mr Samra, who was not the Claimant, although the identity of this person is very unclear.

Whether or not there was a ‘whispering campaign’ by some members of the Walsall Party against Mr Samra accusing him of racism and dissuading Muslim voters from supporting him, certainly I do find on balance of probabilities that rumours started flying round the local community to this effect. I find this was nothing to do with the Claimant, although as Mr Zulfiqar Ali pointed out, it was in Labour’s interests to stoke up this controversy as well, although I make no finding its campaign team did so. I find that gossip about Mr Samra spread through the Muslim community in St Matthews. As Ms Reindorf said, it is also easy to see through (for want of a less racialised phrase) ‘Chinese whispers’ how that could have led to voters mixing up what had been said by supporters of the Claimant in March during the selection campaign with April in the election campaign. All this explains why I accept on balance of probabilities that some voters told Mr Samra and his supporters, including Mr Ahmed, Mr Rasab and Mr Gandham, that the Claimant and Mr Azam thought Mr Samra was racist and did not want them to vote for him, or even did want them to vote Labour. However, I repeat I also find on balance of probabilities – indeed I am satisfied so that I am sure – that the Claimant did not do as alleged.

Nevertheless, those rumours were swirling around during the election campaign and Mr Samra complained to Cllr Washbrook, who told Cllr Bird to speak to the Claimant. He denied it and had Cllr Bird witness his postal vote for Mr Samra. The Claimant on 29th April emailed Mr Mabbutt and Mr Philips at the national Party to inform them of this and that he had deflected press enquiries about de-selection:

Moreover, the Claimant said he also met Mr Mahmood (Mr Matloob and Mr Ahmed did not attend) to try and clear up misunderstanding. However, this did not placate Mr Samra who lost the seat to Labour on 5th May 2016 (which meant the loss of Conservative control of Walsall Council), even though he polled more in St Matthews than the Claimant had done in 2012 and Mr Johal had done in 2014 (if not as much as in 2015 where the Conservative vote rose dramatically in Walsall generally). I naturally defer to the local political expertise of the Walsall Party, but I would have thought that was a risk it must have known it was taking when de-selecting a sitting councillor in a marginal seat a month before a local election.

One of the mysteries of this case is how the disciplinary process actually started. I am conscious of course we do not have the direct evidence of Cllr Washbrook, Nevertheless, before his death in May 2018, he made a written statement to the appeal which has been admitted as a hearsay statement. He said that at the end of April 2016, Mr Samra made a complaint, he passed it to Cllr Bird (which prompted the Claimant’s email to the national Party of 29th April). Then Cllr Washbrook said:

In an email to Lord Feldman on 7th June 2016 (discussed below), Cllr Washbrook named those four individuals as Mehboob Matloob, Arshad Mahmood, Ilyas Ahmed and Waheed Rasab. However, in his Court witness statement, Mr Letts said the four he met at the Royal Hotel named themselves as Matloob Mehboob, Arshad Hussain, Ilyas Ahmed and Moz Khan. Whilst I accept the first three were Mehboob Matloob, Arshad Mahmood and Ilyas Ahmed, I also accept Mr Ahmed honestly only remembered three of them at the hotel. Whilst Mr Rasab accepted he may have been there (to which I return), he certainly did not give a statement at the time. Nor did Arshad Mahmood – one of the few things he told me in evidence which is correct. Moreover, as Mr Ahmed confirmed (and Mr Letts fairly conceded may be right), Mr Moz Khan was also not at the hotel meeting. Perhaps he was canvassing in Bentley and Darlaston North where he stood as the Conservative candidate in that election. Yet Mr Khan’s name is attributed to ‘Statement C’ at the disciplinary hearing, without any explanation of how his statement came to be produced. This together with Mr Khan later claiming he never made a statement, leads the Claimant to allege that ‘Statement C’ was fabricated.

I come to Mr Khan and Statement C in a moment, but there is of course one person ideally placed to provide disciplinary statements to Cllr Washbrook from his own campaign team, including Mehboob Matloob, Ilyas Ahmed and Arshad Mahmood: Mr Samra himself. Yet in his Court witness statement, Mr Samra said:

However, I find it totally implausible that three (or four) of Mr Samra’s campaign team just happened to come forward as a group after the election without his knowledge or encouragement when he had complained about the Claimant before the election. It was obvious in Mr Mahmood’s evidence how he deferred to Mr Samra and I do not accept he acted independently. I find the same is true of Mr Ahmed and Mr Matloob. Indeed, Mr Rasab said he and Mr Samra grew up together. I find Mr Samra encouraged them and put them all in touch with Cllr Washbrook.

In any event, whether Mr Samra was involved in the preparation of the witnesses’ original disciplinary statements, there were other serious issues with them:

(1)

(2)

(3)

However, the combined effect of paras.51.12 and 30 of the Particulars of Claim, paragraph 29 of the Defence and paragraph 9 of the Reply are that the Claimant did plead ‘fabrication’ with ‘Statement C’ in the disciplinary, attributed to Moz Khan:

Yet Mr Moz Khan was the 2016 (and 2015) candidate in Bentley. In 2018, he said:

Moreover, Mr Khan spoke to Ms McColgan KC, who recorded that:

In an unguarded moment in evidence, Mr Samra suggested Mr Khan had said his disciplinary statement had been drafted by his daughter, which is a surprising detail to know for someone who ‘had no involvement other than providing a statement’.

As I have detailed at paragraphs 46, 56, 59, 66, 69-70 and 74, the Claimant and Mr Samra had been rivals since the cemetery incident in 2013-2014 and their mutual antipathy only hardened over the ‘Petition Controversy’, the Mort Report, the approval appeal, the Claimant’s further discrimination complaint, the Roberts-Booth Report, the selection meeting, then finally the election campaign which Mr Samra now thought he had lost because of the Claimant. By the time he did lose, I find on balance of probabilities Mr Samra had come to hate the Claimant. Nevertheless, despite that and though Mr Samra was an unreliable witness, I cannot find on the balance of probabilities find Mr Samra fabricated Statement C:

(1)

(2)

(3)

Nevertheless, it shows how central Mr Samra was to the disciplinary investigation, despite his denials. Indeed, I note Cllr Washbrook said at the 30th June hearing:

This suggests four men came to the Royal Hotel; but also Mr Samra (the official candidate) was there or at least involved. Mr Ahmed did not mention a fourth man, but if there was, it may have been Mr Rasab, who accepted he could have been and who was named as present by Cllr Washbrook in his June 2016 email. Mr Samra’s involvement, shows that he was central to the process, not just a witness. After all, Mr Samra (i) was the candidate who had lost and who blamed the Claimant for it; (ii) had complained during the election campaign (as Cllr Washbrook mentioned at the expulsion hearing); (iii) his campaigners were Mr Ahmed, Mr Mahmood and Mr Matloob who came forward after the election; (iv) as did Mr Samra’s old friend and ‘right-hand man’ Mr Rasab; and (v) Mr Samra was clearly involved in obtaining Mr Khan’s statement. Indeed, I find on the balance of probabilities that Mr Samra played a central role in instigating the disciplinary process, which I find that he took as a chance finally to oust the Claimant, whom he blamed not only for campaigning against him during the 2016 election, but for undermining him even before that with the Mort and Roberts-Booth Reports and the chaotic March 2016 selection meeting.

Having said that, I find from the start of June 2016, Cllr Washbrook took over the ‘prosecution’ of the disciplinary process against the Claimant and Mr Mohammed Azam. Indeed, Cllr Washbrook wrote to the Claimant on 2nd June (my italics):

As I have italicised, this disciplinary invite suggested that officers (i.e. himself and Mr Letts) had investigated (i.e. the discussions at the Royal Hotel) and determined the Claimant had campaigned against Mr Samra. Whilst Mr Samra suggested this was a slip, I remind myself Cllr Washbrook stressed in a later statement that he had served as a President of Courts Martials and Boards of Enquiry. I do not accept the word ‘determined’ was a slip: it was a fact: Cllr Washbrook and Mr Letts had indeed ‘determined’ the Claimant had done this but gave him ‘an opportunity to be heard’.

In response, on 6th June 2016 the Claimant complained to Lord Feldman, the Chair of the Party alleging ‘the Party had condoned Islamophobia in Walsall’. Lord Feldman emailed Cllr Washbrook asking him to pause the disciplinary process until there had been an external investigation by an external Panel:

However, just as he had with the AGM in January 2016, Cllr Washbrook declined in the email of 7th June to which I have already referred. He explained that:

Having analysed the election statistics and Mr Samra’s hard campaign, he summarised the disciplinary case and named the four witnesses. He then added:

Whatever else one makes of Cllr Washbrook, he was not craven to authority.

The same day, 7th June 2016, the Claimant also emailed Lord Feldman alleging that he was ‘once again being victimised and will undoubtedly be expelled’. Despite that, initially on 17th June, the Claimant told Cllr Washbrook he would attend the hearing despite the fact he knew it was proceeding against national Party advice and he alleged Walsall Party officers (he did not specifically accuse Cllr Washbrook but it was obvious) ‘had already predetermined this so there can only be one outcome’. The Claimant also prepared statements in support, some of which I have already mentioned, like Mr Zulfiqar Ali’s. However, Cllr Washbrook then told the Claimant he could not have a copy of the statements, even as anonymised (which he claimed he did because the witnesses said they had been pressured, although only one – (‘A’ Mr Matloob) suggested that). Instead, the Claimant was told he could view the anonymous statements, which must have been on or after 27th June, which is the last date of the statements provided: only three days before the disciplinary hearing. As the national Party later found, this breached Rule 3.6 Sch.7A of the Constitution:

Unhappy at those conditions, the Claimant declined to attend the hearing.

The hearing duly proceeded under the chairmanship of Mr Livingstone, from Burton-on-Trent Conservative Association, as minuted by Mr Richards from Aldridge. The Claimant was not present at the hearing and so cannot contest the detailed minutes endorsed by Mr Sohal who voted to expel. So, despite a slight issue with Mr Richards’ minutes of the approval appeal in October 2015, I find his minutes of the expulsion hearing on 30th June 2016 were fair and accurate. I do not doubt Mr Richards made very sure his minutes were as accurate as possible, since although it was not his decision to proceed, Mr Richards faithfully recorded in those minutes not only the instruction of Lord Feldman to pause the disciplinary, but also Mr Phillips’ email after Cllr Washbrook’s refusal to do so on 15th June saying that:

Indeed, despite his witness statement saying to the contrary, this is the one meeting which Mr Baker chose not to attend. Mr Letts attended but understandably did not vote, although his wife Mrs Letts did so. Moreover, after Mr Hancox – in that meeting as later a dissenting voice – questioned the status of Mr Gandham and another Executive member Mrs Benton, they decided they would not vote either. Therefore, the only witness from whom I heard live evidence who participated in the decision to expel was Mr Sohal. However, I also have the statement of Mr Shazad Ali, who unsuccessfully applied to be a candidate in 2016, who concurred with the decision and identifies himself as a practising Muslim, although Mr Ali did not attend trial, so I can attach less weight to his evidence than I can to Mr Sohal’s. As the minutes do not record all those who voted, according to Mr Harry Gandham’s statement, the other members of the panel who voted were: Mr Livingston as the independent Chair from Burton Association, Mr Richards as minute-taker, then from the Federation: Mr Sohal, Mr Ali, Mr Mushtaq Ahmed, Mr Jas Johal, Mr Hernake Singh, Mrs Marion Letts, Mrs Gurjeet Kaur and Cllr Rose Martin, for whom the Claimant had campaigned in the 2016 election. However, the notes also refer to Mr N Gandham and Mr P Hancox as being present. Indeed, at the start of the meeting as I said, Mr Hancox both queried the right of some to vote; and raised whether the hearing should proceed given the national Party’s stance, but it did after he accepted Cllr Washbrook’s point that the Walsall Party had the right to proceed and Lord Feldman had not suggested that it did not. (Cllr Washbrook’s email of 7th June was not read or summarised) Cllr Washbrook then addressed the meeting and read out the disciplinary statements, rather than calling witnesses.

Cllr Washbrook then gave the panel some background to the investigation, referring to Mr Samra’s complaint, the discussion with Mr Bird and the meeting at the Royal Hotel with Mr Letts, which I have already quoted as having referred to the four individuals ‘and the official candidate’ – i.e. Mr Samra. However, I have found it was him – not them – who ‘came forward on the eve of the election’. None of them suggest they did so before it. Cllr Washbrook then read ‘Statement A’ (now identified as that Mr Mehboob Matloob who did refer to being pressurised not to give evidence and of hearing the Claimant call Mr Samra racist, as well as hearing voters report he told them to vote Labour). Then Cllr Washbrook read ’Statement B’ (now identified as that of Mr Ilyas Ahmed, which reported hearing voters rather than the Claimant himself saying he had called Mr Samra racist and to vote Labour). Then Cllr Washbrook read ‘Statement C’ (which I have found reflected what Mr Khan had told Mr Samra, but which he did not approve). Finally, Cllr Washbrook read ‘Statement D’ which was openly identified as being by Mr Samra, which both gave Mr Samra’s account of the demands of the Claimant’s friend Mr Chaudhry for the price of his support; and Mr Samra’s own account of being told by voters (but not the Claimant) that he was campaigning against Mr Samra. Mr Samra also asserted that residents feared retribution so were not willing to come forward. However, he did not explain that to me, beyond Cllr Washbrook’s comment at the meeting after reading the statements that others had come forward anonymously (possibly he meant Mr Mahmood and Mr Rasab, although Mr Rasab did not suggest he had felt pressurised) and that Cllr Washbrook had spoken to a voter personally who said the Claimant and Mr Azam had encouraged him to vote Labour. Of course, I have expressed my concerns already about the reliability of these disciplinary statements, but in the Claimant’s absence there was no challenge to or questioning of them before the decision-making panel at the meeting. Then Cllr Washbrook finally turned to his summing up, which I quote in full:

I have italicised ‘the Party’ to stress Cllr Washbrook did not say ‘Mr Samra’, rather:

Certainly, I accept the reference to ‘they’ (i.e. the Claimant and Mr Azam) ‘damaging the image of the Conservative Party in the community’ is a reference to the March 2016 election during which Cllr Washbrook alleged the Claimant and Mr Azam called Mr Samra anti-Muslim and racist: the disciplinary charge was that they had campaigned against him and made derogatory comments about him. Yet here Cllr Washbrook suggests they ‘portrayed the Party as anti-Muslim and racist’, when it was not alleged the Claimant and Mr Azam had said that about the Walsall Party, only Mr Samra. Of course, one reading of this is simply that Cllr Washbrook was referring to the allegations that by alleging that Mr Samra was racist, the Claimant was ‘portraying the Party’ as racist. But what Cllr Washbrook said must be put in context. As I said, he disobeyed national Party instructions to pause the disciplinary only a fortnight earlier by saying to Lord Feldman, among other things:

As noted at paragraph 70, in February 2016, Cllr Washbrook objected to the national Party’s actions implementing the Roberts-Booth Report, referring to:

As noted at paragraph 68, in December 2015, he had objected to that investigation:

Therefore, another interpretation of what Cllr Washbrook meant by ‘portraying the Party as racist’ is a reference to the Claimant’s discrimination complaints. I leave out of account his further explicit references in 2017 to the Claimant’s allegations of discrimination on his appeal against the expulsion on 30th June 2016.

As Cllr Washbrook is sadly no longer with us to be asked, I should be cautious in differentiating what he thought and what he meant. There may also be a difference between what he meant and what the Panel understood him as meaning. I find on balance of probabilities that Cllr Washbrook was determined to expel the Claimant from the Walsall Party, not simply because of the disciplinary allegations, but also because of the Claimant’s past discrimination complaints to the national Party (and their consequences for the Walsall Party), which is why to Lord Feldman on 7th June, Cllr Washbrook had put the disciplinary allegations against the Claimant in the context of his previous discrimination complaints. Likewise, I find Cllr Washbrook in summing-up had partly in mind those complaints when referring to the Claimant ‘portraying the Party as being anti-Muslim and racist’. Nevertheless, he was primarily thinking of – and I accept on balance of probabilities would have been understood as referring only to – the allegations about calling Mr Samra racist.

In any event, the disciplinary panel on 30th June 2016 did not consist of the key Walsall Executive members involved throughout, except Mr Sohal; and there is no evidence any of the others knew of the Claimant’s discrimination complaints, at least until the reference was made to Cllr Washbrook’s June correspondence with the national Party where he mentioned it. Mr Livingston, the Chair of the meeting, discouraged consideration of any other factors than the evidence:

Accordingly, a vote was taken and the panel confirmed they would expel the Claimant and Mr Azam. It is not recorded by what margin the decision was made or whether anyone dissented or abstained, though I assume Mr Hancox did so. One of the complaints the Claimant makes is that the letter confirming the decision gave no reasons. I do not have the letter, although the national Party Guidelines standard letter simply states the motion to expel had been upheld and there was a right of appeal and did not require reasons to be given. In any event, the Claimant appealed.

Whilst this subject occupied not only two years in time, but 14 pages of the McColgan Report, the only pleaded allegation relating to the appeal is 15: ‘Relying on fabricated evidence at the appeal hearings on 9 November 2017 and 13 September 2018’. As I have explained at paragraph 89, the complaint in para.51.12 about use of fabricated evidence at the June 2016 disciplinary was limited to ‘Statement C’ and Moz Khan. The effect of paras.51.15 and 36 Particulars of Claim and paragraphs 29 and 38.15 of the Defence and 11 of the Reply appears to be of similar effect – limited to Statement C, which I have found was not ‘fabricated’ by Mr Samra, but was used by him though not approved by Mr Khan. So, I can take my findings on Topic 4 much more shortly, bearing in mind the limited issue.

The Claimant issued his appeal on 23rd September 2016. It raised eight grounds. Firstly, that the expulsion was pre-determined and planned by Cllr Washbrook and Mr Samra. Secondly, that there was a breach of natural justice because of the redaction of the disciplinary statements. Thirdly, the hearing proceeded against national Party advice. Fourthly, the previous AGM had also been held against Party advice and so the Executive who voted on expulsion was unconstitutional. Fifthly, Cllr Bird had been instructed not to attend the hearing (in fact he told me he did not attend as there was no point). Sixthly, Cllr Washbrook only read out the statements, rather than providing copies for the panel to review. Seventhly, the Claimant alleged that Mr Matloob’s statement was biased. Eighth, the Claimant contended that part of his team worked with Mr Samra in the election campaign and that he could easily have stopped them but did not (as I have found). The only aspect which raised race and/or religion were observations that: the Executive and St Matthews Branch were perceived by some Muslims to have an ‘anti-Muslim agenda’ (although he did not say that he shared that perception. Nevertheless, it was clearer in his conclusion:

Nevertheless, the Claimant’s allegation was put more squarely by his solicitors in a letter of 4th November 2016 to Cllr Washbrook who stated explicitly that:

It appears this was re-sent on or around 3rd January 2017 and on 10th January 2017, Cllr Washbrook emailed Stephen Philips of the national Party saying:

In an undated statement noted at p.162 of the McColgan Report, Cllr Washbrook said:

The appeal took over a year to come on for a hearing on 9th November 2017. In the meantime, the Claimant remained expelled and Mr Samra was appointed as Chairman of the Walsall Party at the end of Cllr Washbrook’s three-year term in April 2017. According to a note of an Executive meeting in October 2017, there was a discussion with Cllr Bird about reducing the Claimant’s expulsion to 2 years, which the Claimant refused. I find this was simply because he wanted to clear his name. I need not go into the other details of that which are not pursued.

For that appeal in November 2017, Cllr Washbrook assembled statements, I find including the one he prepared quoted as it was in the McColgan Report. There were also new statements from Mr Samra, Mr Rasab, Mr Baker, Mr and Mrs Letts (which referred to previous complaints) and others. Most relevantly, it included ‘Mr Khan’s statement’ unanonymised, with a new statement from Mr Ahmed in November 2017, which was similar to his original ‘Statement B’, except he added he felt intimidated (but he did not say so in evidence) and from Mr Matloob. But in his original ‘Statement A’, he had claimed he had a ‘lengthy conversation’ with the Claimant when the latter called Mr Samra a racist. But in his appeal statement, Mr Matloob said the Claimant had told him that ‘on many occasions’. But I have found the Claimant did not meet Mr Matloob, only Mr Arshad Mahmood. So, I reject Mr Matloob’s account, but again I cannot find on the balance of probabilities that Mr Samra knew Mr Matloob’s account of meeting the Claimant was untrue. There are some WhatsApp messages between Mr Matloob and the Claimant from 11th May 2016 – after the election – although Mr Matloob accepts they did not meet at that time. Nevertheless, they would have lent some credibility to his contention that he did meet the Claimant, even though I have rejected it on all the evidence. Certainly, I cannot say that Mr Samra knew Mr Matloob’s evidence was ‘fabricated’. It is more likely Mr Matloob was telling Mr Samra what he wanted to hear to bolster the disciplinary case against the Claimant.

While the Claimant accepts he met Arshad Mahmood during the campaign to clear things up, he denies Mr Mahmood’s appeal statement of 21st October 2017:

I have explained why I reject Mr Mahmood’s evidence in Court and found him an entirely unreliable witness making up his account as he went along. I am also satisfied Mr Mahmood fabricated part of this account – in particular the alleged conversation with the Claimant where he called Mr Samra a racist in front of Mr Mahmood. Notably, he did not mention this in his trial statement and whilst he began rehearsing this story in evidence, it was riddled with inconsistencies and I reject it. Indeed, I only accept the Claimant even met Mr Mahmood in 2016 as the Claimant says that he did to ‘clear up misunderstandings’. However, given I accept Mr Mahmood did meet the Claimant and it is not suggested by anyone that Mr Samra was there, unreliable witness or not, Mr Samra cannot be expected to know what was and was not said. Therefore, I cannot find (especially given the seriousness of the allegation) that Mr Samra knowingly deployed fabricated evidence by Mr Mahmood. Again, I suspect Mr Mahmood was trying to tell Mr Samra what he wanted to hear and to bolster the case against the Claimant.

On 9th November 2017 the national Party panel heard the Claimant’s appeal and Cllr Washbrook’s response, but adjourned the appeal because of late submission of evidence (including from the Claimant) and encouraged the parties to resolve the situation amicably (despite the fact Cllr Bird had already tried and failed). Unfortunately, the death of the panel Chair in January 2018 and then Cllr Washbrook delayed the resumed hearing until September 2018. In the meantime, I accept Cllr Washbrook – who knew he was terminally ill - stood down as a Councillor in Paddock ward, encouraging Mr Rasab to stand. That explains why Mr Rasab did so despite previously saying that the appeal hearing he had no plans to do so. Far from being sinister as the Claimant and Ms Akhtar suggested, this illustrates the point that Cllr Washbrook was not simply an unreconstituted bigot and Islamophobe. However, that does not mean he was not influenced by the Claimant’s Muslim faith and Pakistani origin or his complaints of discrimination, and I reach conclusions about that below. Cllr Washbrook died in May 2018.

At the resumed hearing on 13th September 2018, Mr Samra who had taken over from Cllr Washbrook in April 2017 as Chairman of the Federation presented the case for it in response to the Claimant’s appeal. This no longer included ‘Mr Khan’s statement’ who had objected to its inclusion in July 2018. But Mr Samra was taken by surprise by the new appeal panel taking a new point:

This could be fairly described as allowing the Claimant’s appeal on a technicality.

I turn to the last of the topics: the Claimant’s ‘re-expulsion’ from the Federation on 24th October 2018, confirmed by letter on 31st October 2018. The parties described it variously as a resolution to refuse or suspend membership. But its practical effect was unquestionably intended (I consider why in my conclusions) to pre-empt the national Party’s resolution allowing the Claimant’s appeal on a technicality and restoring his membership of the Federation and Party. Indeed, only a fortnight after the appeal hearing on 13th September at the Executive meeting on 3rd October, Cllr Samra (as he had become in May 2018) explained that the Appeal Panel had told them it would be recommending the Claimant’s expulsion be set aside on the technicality about witness statements and added:

So, the motion the Executive passed was not to ‘refuse or suspend membership’, but to ‘initiate proceedings against Mr Arif again to ensure that Sch.7 is adhered to and documented’: a reference to the requirement for suspension or expulsion. I shall refer to this in shorthand to avoid confusion as a ‘re-expulsion’.

However, the invite to the disciplinary hearing sent by Mr Samra to the Claimant on 8th October 2018 framed the decision as to determine ‘the suspension of his membership of the Conservative Party’, which was a different proposal:

I have italicised the disciplinary charge cut and pasted from the disciplinary invite letter in June 2016, but unlike the 2016 invite letter, the 2018 disciplinary invite enclosed the evidence against the Claimant relating to 2016 not anonymised and did not contain the original disciplinary statements (including ‘Statement C’). Instead, the letter enclosed the disciplinary statements prepared for the Claimant’s appeal which I have already discussed from Mr Matloob dated 21st October 2017 (which I have found misleading), Mr Mahmood dated 21st October 2017 (which I also found misleading) and the statements of Mr Ahmed (which I have not). It also included a peripheral statement from a colleague of the three other witnesses Mr Akheil Mehboob which discussed that group’s support for the Claimant in November 2015 and a comment that he heard him call Mr Samra a racist, which is entirely undated and unspecified and which I reject. Whilst I have found the Claimant privately expressed this to some close friends and colleagues, I find that he did not express it to people who campaigned for Mr Samra.

The other enclosure with the disciplinary invite, new in October 2018, were the Claimant’s social media posts (in fact all ‘re-tweets’ of others’ posts) from May 2017 to August 2018. It suffices to quote the titles which I number and date:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

After the Claimant received the disciplinary invitation, on 12th October 2018, his solicitors sent to the Walsall Party a copy of their letter to the national Party:

The sense of déjà vu with the 2016 disciplinary process was heightened by an unsuccessful attempt by the national Party to dissuade the Walsall Party from proceeding with the disciplinary. On 16th October, Mr Philips wrote to Mr Samra:

However, like Cllr Washbrook in 2016, Cllr Samra declined on the same day, saying that the finding of the appeal panel on a technicality ‘did not answer’ the serious allegations that the Federation had made against the Claimant. He added:

This email, the disciplinary letter and Executive meeting show Mr Samra was determined to have another hearing to correct the technical failing overturned on appeal. I must decide later whether this amounted to discrimination and/or victimisation. Whilst Mr Samra’s response to Mr Phillips is more veiled than Cllr Washbrook’s refusal to Lord Feldman to pause the original disciplinary in June 2016, similar themes are present. For example, Mr Samra stated the disciplinary should not await the formal appeal outcome, ‘to protect its integrity and with the knowledge of the board's decision….act now before any legal proceedings are issued’. Mr Samra also had evident irritation with the Claimant ‘bringing every issue to CCHQ’. Of course, many of the ‘matters that the Claimant had brought to CCHQ’ had been complaints of discrimination, in response to his non-approval in 2015 and in his appeal against expulsion in 2016; and indeed, the solicitors’ letter threatening a discrimination claim in November 2016.

Likewise, the Claimant took the same stance as in 2016 and again declined to attend the hearing on 24th October 2018. It was chaired by Mr Sheath from Aldridge Brownhills and minuted once again by Mr Richards and the local panel comprised Cllr Rasab, Cllr Statham, Mr Baker (as President), Mr (Harry) Gandham, Mr Hancox, Mr Letts, Mrs Statham, Mr Sharpe, Mr Purewal, Mr Sohal and Mrs Flora. On this occasion, the only one who did not vote was Mr Samra who presented the disciplinary case. The first stage to the hearing was once again to debate whether to proceed in the light of the national Party’s request. Once again, it was Mr Hancox who raised concerns, referring specifically to the Claimant’s solicitors’ letter of 12th October, which was read out along with the disciplinary invitation letter. The panel (except Mr Hancox who warned them of legal action) voted against adjourning the disciplinary charge until the Claimant re-applied for membership. Mr Samra then proceeded to call the disciplinary witnesses to give live evidence (except Mr Ahmed who was absent). Mr Matloob, Mr Mahmood and Mr Mehboob all gave the accounts in their statements, albeit all confirmed they had not heard the Claimant suggesting to vote Labour (but had heard him say not to vote for Mr Samra). Notably, despite the apparent peripheral nature of Mr Mehboob’s statement, Mr Gandham asked him whether he thought the Claimant was racist towards Mr Samra: not one of the disciplinary charges. Mr Baker and Mr Letts did not question the witnesses about 2016, but both voiced concerns about the social media allegations. Mr Letts agreed with Mr Hancox it was a ‘separate issue’ and the notes then record:

As I said when reviewing Mr Samra’s evidence towards the start of the judgment, it was these notes that he failed to disclose until the last day of evidence. I find that was not accidental as he claimed, but because of passages beneficial to the Claimant, such as Mr Baker’s comments about the social media allegations; the disciplinary witnesses all confirming they had not heard the Claimant say to vote Labour (one of the disciplinary charges) and Mr Hancox’s objections, particularly given the solicitor’s letter threatening a claim for discrimination and victimisation.

Mr Sheath proposed separate votes, by a majority, the panel upheld both the original 2016 allegations and the social media ones. Mr Sheath recorded that was in line with the Party Constitution Sch.7[A] para 3.5 namely:

There followed a debate about the length of the Claimant’s ‘refusal of membership’: Mr Baker proposing indefinitely, supported by Mr Sohal; whilst Mr Hancox pressed for a time-limited expulsion of 5 years for the 2016 campaign charge and 3 years concurrently for the social media, totalling 5 years, then adopted. I consider later whether that was either discrimination or victimisation.

However, in Mr Samra’s letter to the Claimant of 31st October 2018 confirming the expulsion decision, he did not mention the length of the expulsion, saying that the panel had decided against deferring the charges until the Claimant re-applied:

Mr Samra informed the Claimant that he had 14 days to appeal to the national Party. In fact the Claimant did not see that letter until after that had expired because he had been on holiday until 12th November 2018. In the meantime, the national Party Board had formally allowed the Claimant’s appeal on 5th November and the national Party still consider the Claimant to be a member of it. However, the Walsall Party and the Defendants stand by their decision of 24th October 2018 that he was not a member of the Walsall Federation and remains excluded from the current Walsall Conservative Association. The Claimant argues that is a ‘continuing act’, albeit he did issue this claim on 30th April 2019. I have detailed the course of the proceedings already and that therefore concludes my findings of fact. I turn now to the law.

I am fortunate to have two Counsel with huge expertise in discrimination law - for the Claimant, Ms Reindorf and for the Defendants, Mr Beever – as this case, quite aside from its political sensitivity, raises some difficult questions of discrimination law, which I shall need to go into in some detail.

I start with one of Ms Reindorf’s own cases Watt v Ahsan [2008] 2 WLR 17 (HL). The Lords held that in selecting local councillors, a political party selecting councillors was not a ‘qualifying body’ under s.12 Race Relations Act 1976 (‘RRA’), replaced along with other discrimination legislation by the Equality Act 2010 (‘EqA’) and now s.53 EqA in Part 5: Work, within the jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal. Instead, the Lords in Watt held a political party was an ‘association’ under s.25 RRA within the jurisdiction of the County Court (but the Labour Party had not appealed the jurisdiction decision, so was ‘issue estopped’).

s.25 RRA has been broadly repeated in s.101 within Part 7 EqA ‘Associations’:

For political parties, this is qualified by s.104 EqA: a ‘positive discrimination’ exception for ‘selection arrangements’ to reduce inequality in representation in elections (including local elections) by proportionate means and in the case of sex, by short-listing (until 2030 – s.105). However, the exception from the EqA for ‘single protected characteristic associations’ in p.1 Sch.16 does not apply to political parties. Save in those limited ways, ordinary discrimination law applies.

In this case, s.101 EqA raises five technical issues (only one of which remained contested in submissions) I briefly relate to the allegations which I repeat for ease:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

The first technical issue is the relevant ‘association’ and whether the Defendants ‘stand in the shoes’ of the Federation dissolved in 2024. But Mr Beever accepted that internal constitutional change did not change any accrued liability to the Claimant under s.101 EqA. What I call ‘the Walsall Party’ is essentially the same group of people, albeit it changed legal nature in 2024 from a Federation to an ‘unincorporated association’. Both are ‘associations’ under s.107(2) EqA:

A political party is typically an ‘unincorporated association’ in law, as an association of people banded together by a contract for a non-business purpose which is not ‘incorporated as a company’, but the national party may be separate from the local party: Unionist Central Office v Burrell [1982] 1 WLR 522 (CA). The rules of the national or local party form a contract between its members from time to time: Evangelou v McNicol [2016] EWCA Civ 817 (concerning the national Labour Party’s Rules). It is the members, rather than the association itself, which are liable for torts by their ‘agents’ under that association contract, including association officers (as discussed next): Chitty on Contracts (2025) p.13-065. Therefore, the 2024 constitutional changes from the ‘Federation’ (which was simply a more complex association spanning three previous local associations) to a simpler unincorporated association did not affect any (if there are any) accrued legal liabilities subsisting at the time of the claim in April 2019 under Part 7 EqA. Any liabilities did not evaporate simply because the internal constitutional arrangements changed. However, as the Walsall Party is an unincorporated association, it has no separate legal personality, so in litigation it needs ‘representative defendants’, which are here Mr Baker, Mr Letts and Mr Samra. In effect under CPR 19.8, they represent the interests of all the members of the association who may be liable (Chitty p.13-066). Accordingly, they and the other members from time to time are liable for any discrimination that ‘the association’ committed. As I summarised it in the list of issues at paragraph 10, the Defendants do ‘stand in the shoes’ of the Federation; as principals for any proved discrimination committed by their ‘agents’ under the EqA.

That leads on to the issue of agency: which human beings here are ‘agents’ ? In a case under Part 5 EqA, an employer will have employees for which it can be liable under s.109(1) EqA. Indeed, that would include (e.g. bar) staff employed by an unincorporated association. However, there will also be officers of the association who are not employees, like Mr Baker, Mr Letts and Cllr Samra and until 2018, Cllr Washbrook. It is not disputed an association is liable for the acts and omissions of its officers under the principles of agency under s.109(2) EqA, which differs from an employer’s liability for its employees under s.109(1) EqA:

An employer’s liability for discrimination by one employee to another (e.g. sexual harassment) turns on whether it was ‘in the course of employment’ under s.109(1) EqA: a statutory form of vicarious liability, as held for its predecessor in Waters v CPM [1997] IRLR 589 (CA), but there is also a ‘reasonable steps’ defence under s.109(4) EqA. By contrast, there is no such defence for principals: their liability for its agents depends solely whether the agent’s act falls within their ‘authority’ under s.109(2), irrespective of the principal’s knowledge or approval under s.109(3) EqA. As Elias LJ said of the predecessor of s.109(2) EqA, s.32(2) RRA in Ministry of Defence v Kemeh [2014] IRLR 377 (CA):

Therefore, in Kemeh, the MoD was not liable for a racist comment to a soldier by the employee of the MoD’s independent contractor, who was not its ‘agent’ at common law and therefore was not its agent under s.32(2) RRA (but were liable for a racial remark by a fellow soldier as an employee). By contrast, the EAT in Anderson v CAE [2024] IRLR 465 held a Tribunal had confused ‘agency’ on Kemeh principles with ‘vicarious liability’ in holding medical examiners of employees were not their employer’s ‘agents’. EAT Judge Tayler said at [29]:

If the principal is liable for the agent’s act so is the agent personally s.110(1) EqA. Here it is not disputed all allegations save 12 and 15 (fabrication of evidence on the expulsion and the appeal, which I consider later), if discriminatory, were acts or omissions of the Walsall Party’s officers acting as its agents with its authority.

The third technical issue is whether the Claimant remained a ‘member’ of the association under s.101 EqA in respect of all the allegations. That is not disputed for allegations 1-14 (i.e. Topics 1-3) up to the Claimant’s purported expulsion in June 2016. There was an issue whether by the time of allegations 15-22 (i.e. Topics 4 and 5), from late 2016 to October 2018, the Claimant was no longer a ‘member’ under s.101 EqA. However, rightly Mr Beever did not press this issue:

(1)

(2)

(3)

Fourthly, all the allegations are said to amount to have ‘subjected the Claimant to a detriment’ under s.101(2)(d) EqA. A ‘detriment’ in the employment context was described in Shamoon v Chief Constable RUC [2003] IRLR 285 (HL). At [33]-[35], Lord Hope said that ‘a detriment exists if a reasonable worker would or might take the view the treatment was in all the circumstances to his detriment or disadvantage’ and that whilst an unjustified sense of grievance is not enough, there need not be a physical or economic consequence to amount to a detriment. In the context of an association, I would read that as a ‘reasonable member’. It is not really disputed all the alleged acts would if proved constitute a ‘detriment’, but I shall briefly consider that point for each allegation as I consider them.

The final – and contested - issue is time limits, on which I give my conclusion later. As I said earlier, the time limit for a discrimination claim in the County Court is six months. The claim was presented on 30th April 2019, exactly six months after the ‘re-expulsion decision’ sent on 31st October 2018, which is the subject of allegation 21, so strictly all allegations before that from 28th September 2015 to 24th October 2018 are out of time. However, s.118 EqA states:

As I said at paras 11-12, there is no application to extend time under s.118(1)(b), so the issue is (in jargon) whether all or any of allegations 1 – 20 form part of a ‘continuing act’ with allegation 21 under s.118(6) EqA.

Mr Beever accepts the whole of Topic 5 is one ‘continuing act’ so is in time, but he disputes Topics 1-4 are so. Ms Reindorf argues this was a ‘paradigm’ continuing act: one discriminatory campaign to force out the Claimant from Autumn 2015 to Autumn 2018. In Hendricks v CPM [2003] IRLR 96 (CA), Mummery LJ in an appeal against a preliminary decision on whether there was a ‘continuing act’ (as opposed to a ‘just and equitable’ extension) discouraged ‘continuing act’ cases being dealt with as a preliminary issue and observed they are better dealt with at trial (with robust case management to ensure the issues are kept within reasonable bounds, as I have tried to do) so that, as he said at [48]:

This is why I decide whether there is a ‘continuing act’ at the end of the judgment.

In Hendricks, Mummery LJ also said at [51[ ‘acts extending over a period’ were not limited to cases of a policy, rule, scheme, regime or practice, adding at [52]:

In Anderson at [41]-[42], EAT Judge Tayler re-iterated earlier comments that ‘conduct extending over a period’ can involve different types of prohibited conduct (e.g. a mixture of harassment and direct discrimination). However, it would be less likely if the acts relate to different protected characteristics and different prohibited conduct, although even then there is no absolute bar. In short, the more disparate the treatment, the more difficult to establish a ‘continuing act’.

As I have already said, the EqA in 2010 brought together the variety of equality legislation into one statute. Decided under the RRA, Watt was concerned with direct discrimination ‘on racial grounds’ as s.1(1)(a) RRA then stated. s.3(1) provided ‘racial grounds’ means colour, race, nationality, or ethnic or national origins. It obviously did not include religion. As I mention later, in Watt, Mr Ahsan was an aspiring councillor and like the Claimant here, a Muslim man of Pakistani origin. The Employment Tribunal found (and the Lords agreed) that, he had been discriminated against ‘on racial grounds’ by the Labour Party, who did not select him due to concerns about councillors from the Pakistani-origin community in a ward in Birmingham. Echoing s.3(1) RRA, s.9 EqA now states:

‘Ethnic or national origins’ relates to descent from national or ethnic origins, as Lord Philips said in R(E) v JFS [2010] IRLR 136 (SC) at [33], in holding that ostensibly religious selection criteria in a Jewish Free School in fact adopted a definition of ‘Jewish’ that was based on ethnic descent through the maternal line.

This shows there may be overlap between ‘ethnic origins’ and ‘religion’, since as discussed in R(E), Jews are an ethnic group as well as a religion, as are Sikhs, as decided in Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] IRLR 209 (HL). This was critical at that time as discrimination on grounds of religion was not prohibited. This was why Watt – concerning events in the late 1990s - focussed on Mr Ahsan’s Pakistani ‘national origins’, not his Muslim faith, as Muslims are not a racial or ethnic group. Discrimination on grounds of religion and belief was addressed in the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, but that was limited to the Employment field (so not relevant to the education discrimination claim in R(E)). That changed too with the Equality Act in 2010. s.10 EqA now states:

Being Muslim obviously falls within s.9(1) EqA, but there is debate about ‘belief’ in s.9(2). In Higgs v Farmor’s School [2025] IRLR 368 (CA) (another of Ms Reindorf’s cases), in upholding a claim of an employee dismissed for expressing her Christian ‘gender-critical’ views, Underhill LJ held discrimination based on belief itself could not be justified, but it could be if a proportionate response under Art.9 ECHR to its objectionable ‘manifestation’, observing at [54]-[55]:

Finally, given the Claimant focuses on Cllr Washbrook’s belief he led a ‘Pakistani Islamic clique’, Ms Reindorf mentioned s.14 EqA, which is not yet in force, but I discuss it briefly as it is relevant to the approach I take to direct discrimination:

The purpose and context of s.14 was discussed in an interesting 2012 article by Allan Roberts of Guildhall Chambers ‘Tricky Issues under the Equality Act 2010’. s.14 was a response to Bahl v Law Society [2004] IRLR 799 (CA) at [137] where the Court of Appeal criticised an Employment Tribunal for not dealing with sex and race discrimination separately, but simply focussing on discrimination as a ‘black woman’. Mr Roberts noted preparatory materials for the Equality Bill distinguishing between ‘Additive Discrimination’ (when one person experiences discrimination in two unrelated ways) and ‘Intersectional Discrimination’:

s.14 EqA was clearly intended to adopt a model of ‘intersectional discrimination’ which is the academic phrase, though the section heading is simpler: ‘Combined discrimination: dual characteristics’. The Explanatory Note to s.14 says:

It gave an example of a black woman passed over for promotion because of a discriminatory stereotype about black women held by the employer who instead promoted both a white woman and black man. But as Mr Roberts says, the next Government announced that s.14 would not be implemented and it remains so. Indeed, EU Law also takes a cautious approach to ‘intersectional discrimination’: the CJEU in Parris v Trinity College [2017] IRLR 173 said at [81]-[82] that discrimination can be based on multiple characteristics, but where there was no discrimination on either characteristic separately, there was no discrimination based on them in combination. Instead, the CJEU is starting to recognise discrimination within protected groups eg. between different Christian Churches (Cresco v Achatzi [2019] IRLR 380); or between different disabled employees (VL v Zspital [2021] IRLR 330), although discrimination by political parties is not within the Employment field (Watt) so not EU Law either. As Ms Reindorf accepted the direct discrimination claims here must be analysed distinctly as said in Bahl: as race discrimination claims and separate religious discrimination claims (but both could succeed on the same point), not under s.14, but s.13 EqA.

‘Single-characteristic direct discrimination’ is governed by s.13(1) EqA:

The simplicity of expression of this provision belies complexity in its application. There can be complexity about into which Part of the EqA a claim falls as in Watt, or about the scope of ‘protected characteristics’ as in R(E) and Bahl. However, much of the complexity in direct discrimination derives from its comparisons. ‘Less favourable treatment’ is not the same as unreasonable treatment as Lord Browne-Wilkinson said in Zafar v Glasgow CC [1998] IRLR 36 (HL) at [11]:

But likewise, ‘more favourable treatment’ of ‘the others’ need not mean treating them reasonably. In Balgobin v THLBC [1987] IRLR 401 (EAT), women harassed by a man continued working with him as their employer’s investigation was inconclusive. But this was not ‘on the ground of their sex’ under s.1 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (‘SDA’) (before sexual harassment was a distinct claim). Moreover, the comparator man was not one treated well but one harassed.

The comparative exercise required by s.13(1) EqA is elaborated by s.23(1) EqA:

In Shamoon v Chief Constable RUC [2003] IRLR 285 (HL), Lord Rodger said:

Lord Rodger gave examples of disciplining a woman but not a man in similar circumstances, but also allowing mitigation for him not her. However, at [132], he said ‘circumstances’ were not what a reasonable person (or the Court) thought relevant, as that would fall into the fallacy corrected in Zafar. At [140], he said the ‘comparator’ is the person in the same circumstances save the protected characteristic – actual, or if that is not an actual comparator, a hypothetical one. This distinction was explained by Lord Hoffmann at [36]-[37] of Watt:

The same applies under s.13 EqA: Leicester CC v Parmar [2025] IRLR 782 (CA) at [87], where Laing LJ said the comparison exercise is a matter of fact and degree: see also Hewage v Grampian Health [2012] IRLR 870 (SC) at [22].

In Shamoon at [7]-[10] Lord Nicholls discussed s.1(1) SDA and s.1(1)(a) RRA as a matter of language naturally broke down into two stages: (i) whether there was less favourable treatment’ than a statutory comparator; and (ii) whether that was ‘on the ground of her sex’ or ‘on racial grounds’, that he called ‘the reason why question’. However, famously (to discrimination lawyers, at least), he also said at [11]-[12] that depending on the circumstances of the case, that judges:

Lord Nicholls had previously also pellucidly explained the ‘reason why question’ in Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [1999] IRLR 572 (HL), to which I shall return, as it was actually a case about victimisation under s.2(1) RRA. However, in finding that victimisation did not require conscious motivation to respond to a ‘protected act’, Lord Nicholls explained the meaning of ‘on racial grounds’ in the context of direct discrimination under s.1(1)(a) RRA at [13]-[19]:

In Higgs at [46], Underhill LJ said that Nagarajan was the start of a line of cases, including R(E), which explored the ‘causative link’ in the statutory phrases ‘on the ground of her sex’, ‘on racial grounds’ etc; and now in the EqA ‘because’, which had been interpreted similarly. Indeed, the Explanatory Note to s.13 stated that having ‘because’ rather than ‘ground’ ‘did not change the legal meaning..but is designed to make it more accessible to the ordinary user’. Rather than the noun ‘cause’ I will use Lord Nicholls’ noun in Shamoon: ‘reason’. This discriminatory ‘reason’ has been explored in various ways, five of which are relevant to this case.

Firstly, as Underhill LJ added in Higgs at [46] in some cases that reason is inherent in the act complained of’, which he called ‘criterion cases’ citing R(E). In that case Lady Hale said at [62]-[65] it was what Lord Nicholls in Nagarajan at [13] called an ‘obvious case’ not requiring analysis of mental processes, since in R(E) the selection criteria applied were clear, the only issue was whether they were ‘religious’ (so not unlawful under the RRA) or ‘racial’ (as held they were):

In For Women v Scottish Ministers [2025] IRLR 537 (SC), the Court said at [257]

Secondly, even in the more common case where the real issue is the alleged discriminator’s ‘mental processes’, as Lord Nicholls put it in Nagarajan, it may be their ‘mental processes’ explicitly related to a protected characteristic in some way. This could be a perception about it, or a factor associated with it, as Ladies Rose and Simler and Lord Hodge for the Court said in For Women at [249]:

For example, in English, the majority of the Court of Appeal held it was also harassment ‘on the ground of sexual orientation’ where someone was tormented with ‘homophobic mockery’ even though it was known that he was not gay.

Thirdly, the factor in the discriminator’s mental processes related to someone’s protected characteristic could be more insidious, like a subconscious stereotype, (c.f. Nagarajan at [17]). In Higgs at [172], Underhill LJ endorsed submissions that stereotypes can be discriminatory even if likely to be true (citing R(European Roma Rights) v Prague Immigration Officer [2005] IRLR 115 (HL)), the example being assuming those who believe homosexuality is a religious sin must have an animus towards gay people: it may well be true, but it is a stereotype to assume all do. As Lord Nicholls said in Nagarajan at [14], if someone discriminates on the grounds of (what is now called) a protected characteristic, it does not matter why they do so, or even that their intention may be benign. Similarly, it can also be discriminatory to be influenced by others’ stereotypes, as Lord Hoffmann said in Watt. He disagreed with the view that the Labour Party’s decision not to select Mr Ahsan because he was of Pakistani origin (due to the risk voters would associate him with other Pakistani-origin councillors accused of fraud) could be a ‘legitimate rather than an illegitimate perception’. Lord Hoffmann observed:

Fourthly, as Underhill LJ said in CLFIS v Reynolds [2015] IRLR 562 (CA), ‘the reason’ for treatment may not all be within mental processes of one person. He first summarised the usual Nagarajan approach at [11]:

Applying that to cases where multiple people are involved, Underhill LJ referred to a less-cited part of Nagarajan: where at [20]-[24], Lord Nicholls had discussed s.4(1) RRA - ‘the arrangements he makes for the purposes of who should be offered employment’ (similar to s.101(1)(a) EqA). Lord Nicholls had found the person who ‘makes the arrangements’ (e.g. arranges interviews) does not have to be the same as the person who discriminates (eg. not selecting someone):

Conversely, in Reynolds, as a result of representations made by X and Y (which were covertly age discriminatory), Z who was not personally significantly influenced by the claimant’s age, dismissed her. Underhill LJ found it was not a ‘joint decision-making case’ at [33] but was a ‘tainted information’ case at [34]:

Finally, ‘the reason for treatment’ may not be a protected characteristic, but some legitimately separable feature. It was discussed by Underhill LJ in Higgs at [57]:

I will come back to this principle on victimisation, to which I now turn.

Victimisation is actionable under s.101(5) and (6) EqA and defined by s.27 EqA:

(1)

(2)

(3)

A ‘protected act’ under s.27(2) EqA makes victimisation rather different from direct discrimination. Its focus is not the complainant’s protected characteristics, but what they say or do (provided under s.27(3) it is honestly said or done and not for an ulterior motive: Saad v Southampton NHS [2018] IRLR 1007 (EAT)). But only certain things which are said or done are ‘protected’ under s.27(2), as explained by EAT Judge Clark in National Probation v Kirby [2006] IRLR 508:

The main ‘protected act’ raised in this case (as in most cases) is (d) ‘making an allegation (whether or not express) A or another person has contravened this Act’. s.4(1)(d) SDA was very similar and in Waters v CPM (where a female police officer reported she was raped by an off-duty colleague), Waite LJ said at [86]:

In Durrani v Ealing LBC (2013), EAT President Langstaff said an allegation of ‘discrimination’ an employee had clarified simply meant ‘unfair treatment’ did not fall within (d). He explained the scope of (d) at [22]:

Applying that test, the complaint should be read in context as it would be understood by the recipient: Kokomane v Boots [2025] UKEAT 38 at [23]-[24].

The word ‘because’ for victimisation in s.27(1) EqA has a similar meaning as for direct discrimination in s.13 EqA. Indeed, Nagarajan I quoted at length, was a victimisation case where an interviewer victimised a job applicant who claimed discrimination because they were ‘consciously or subconsciously influenced’ by that. Lord Nicholls endorsed that approach for direct discrimination as well as victimisation, stressing the test at [19] focussed on whether the prohibited ground had a ‘significant influence on the outcome’. Lord Nicholls therefore held ‘victimisation’ could be subconscious not just conscious, as he explained at [18]:

In Khan at [29] Lord Nicholls explained why his approach in Nagarajan was subjective and not the same as traditional objective ‘but for’ causation:

Nagarajan, Khan and Deer ([12]) assume a ‘reason’ requires either knowledge of or belief in the protected act. Two other aspects of ‘because’ have been debated.

Firstly, sometimes a defendant subjects someone who had done a protected act not ‘because’ of the ‘protected act’ itself, but ‘some feature of it which can properly be treated as separable’, as Underhill J (when EAT President) put it in Martin v Devonshires Solicitors [2011] ICR 352 at [22]. In Martin an employee made a series of good faith but baseless allegations of sex discrimination when suffering from a psychotic illness and was dismissed. But it was held this was not because of the complaints as such, but because she would continue make baseless complaints and it would be impossible to work with her. Underhill P said at [22]:

In Page v Lord Chancellor [2021] IRLR 377 (CA), Underhill LJ (as he had become) similarly held where a Magistrate had in a television interview alleged his Christian views against same-sex adoption had led to his being sanctioned and this interview led to a further sanction, whilst the interview was a protected act, the second sanction was not ‘because’ of that protected act as such, but rather his public expression of it in an unsanctioned interview. Underhill LJ repeated at [55]:

Whilst not analysed in these terms, a related example is an employee dismissed because her complaint the managers were a ‘little Sikh club that only looked after Sikhs’ that they interpreted as itself racist: Woods v Pasab [2013] IRLR 305 (CA). The ‘separability principle’ has been applied in other areas such as manifestation of belief in Higgs at [57] quoted above; and closely-related to victimisation, in whistleblowing. In Kong v Gulf Bank [2022] IRLR 854 (CA), it was held an employee had been dismissed not for making protected disclosures, but because she raised issues in a challenging way. Simler LJ (as she then was) said at [57]:

Secondly though, another judicial attempt to keep victimisation within reasonable bounds using ‘because’ did not persist. In Khan, the employer refused to give a reference to an employee who was bringing a race discrimination claim explicitly to protect its position in those proceedings, which put them in a dilemma if it was victimisation. Lord Hoffmann’s solution at [60], anticipating the ‘separability principle’, was the ‘reason’ for the refusal was not ‘bringing proceedings’ within s.4(1) SDA (basically the same as s.27(2)(a) EqA), but ‘continuing’ them. But the other Lords preferred to adopt an earlier case holding such a refusal was not ‘by reason’ of the protected act, at least if ‘honest and reasonable’. The difficulties were discussed in St Helens MBC v Derbyshire [2007] IRLR 540 (HL), where the Court of Appeal had applied Khan to hold a letter to other employees warning of wider consequences of an Equal Pay claim to pressure those who had refused to settle it, was not ‘by reason’ of the claim because it was ‘honest and reasonable’. The Lords disagreed with that on the facts, but also disagreed that Khan had articulated any ‘honest and reasonable defence’. As Lord Neuberger said at [65]:

However, in Derbyshire, Lord Neuberger at [68] found a solution in the approach to ‘detriment’ taken by Lord Hope for direct discrimination in Shamoon. Indeed, in Derbyshire itself Lord Hope himself said at [27]:

There was a ‘detriment’ on this basis in the ‘pressure letter’ in Derbyshire. But there was not in one of the series of victimisation claims in Deer, where the former employer facing them refused on legal advice to provide documents under the Data Protection Act 1998, which Elias LJ accepted at [52] was honest and reasonable and so not a detriment. However, for the earlier claims, he held whilst ‘an unjustified sense of grievance’ cannot itself amount to a detriment, inadequate investigation of a protected act allegation can do, even if it does not affect the result. Elias LJ accepted submissions at [41] and [48] that:

So, a ‘detriment’ can be the process that was followed because of a protected act, not just the ‘outcome’ of that process. That is an important distinction in this case.

s.136 EqA states the burden of proof for all claims under the Act including victimisation (although I will focus on the cases relating to direct discrimination):

To understand how s.136 EqA works, it is necessary to understand its legislative history. It is the third version of a shifting burden of proof Employment Tribunals developed for direct discrimination under the individual-characteristic legislation like the SDA and RRA, as Lord Browne-Wilkinson (like Lady Simler, Elias LJ and Underhill LJ, a former EAT President) explained in Zafar at [16]:

(1)

(2)

The still-relevant Igen guidelines (incorporating elements of King) state:

So, Guidelines (1)-(9) relate to ‘the first stage’ with the burden of proof on the claimant, while Guidelines (10)-(13) relate to the ‘second stage’ on the defendant. However, in Igen at [24] the Court said it was permissible at the first stage to take into account evidence from the defendant, which was clarified in Madarassy at [57] to mean all evidence save the statutorily-excluded ‘explanation’.

At the first stage, Courts have rejected several arguments that statutory changes lowered claimants’ burden of proof. In Igen at [28], the Court held ‘facts from which the tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation that the respondent has committed…discrimination’ did not mean ‘could have committed’. In Madarassy at [52]-[56] (endorsed in Efobi at [46]) Mummery LJ (another former EAT President) said a claimant need not prove a ‘conclusive case’ but still had to prove a prima facie case to shift the burden of proof, so a difference in treatment and a difference in characteristic without more were not enough for direct discrimination (or victimisation: Manchester Police v Bailey [2017] EWCA Civ 425 at [14]). In Madarassy, Mummery LJ added at [71]:

In Efobi at [23], Lord Leggatt clarified the last part I have italicised meant the first stage could include facts indicating treatment was not on a prohibited ground, as the employer’s explanation is statutorily-excluded at the first stage. Lord Leggatt did not give an example, but the fact (as opposed to the explanation) that someone of the same protected characteristics was more favourably treated seems an important fact which should be taken into account at the first stage.

The main focus of debate at the first stage has been the meaning of ‘in the absence of an adequate explanation’ under the previous provisions and ‘in the absence of any other explanation’ in s.136 EqA. In Igen at [22]-[23], the Court articulated the position they summarised in Guideline (6). However, in Madarassy at [77], Mummery LJ explained this should not be misunderstood as requiring a presumption at the first stage that there was an ‘inadequate explanation’ which formed part of the ‘prima facie case’ itself. As Lord Hope said in Hewage at [31]:

For example, in Efobi at [39]-[47], Lord Leggatt agreed with Elias LJ in the Court of Appeal that a defendant’s failure to call decision-makers could in principle be the subject of an adverse inference, but not at the first stage, because it was ‘the absence of an explanation’: it would be relevant to the defendant’s ability to discharge the burden at the second stage. In Efobi at [28]-[29] Lord Leggatt explained it was misunderstandings of these principles that led to the simpler language of ‘any other explanation’ in s.136 EqA but it did not change the law substantively and still required the claimant to prove a prima facie case. At [22], he also endorsed the analysis of ‘explanation’ by Elias J (as he then was, when President of the EAT) in Laing v Manchester CC [2006] IRLR 748 at [60]:

In short, s.136(2) EqA still means what the previous provisions meant at the first stage. As confirmed by Laing LJ in Parmar at [101] endorsing Madarassy at [56], the burden only shifts if an inference of discrimination ‘could properly be drawn’, not just the inferences that ‘might be drawn’. There must be a prima facie case.

More significant changes from King have been noted at the second stage if the burden of proof shifts to the defendant. As explained, under the King guidelines approved in Zafar, this was a rule of inferences. However, that unquestionably changed to a formal ‘shifting legal burden of proof’ with the amendments to the SDA and RRA, as Mummery LJ emphasised in Madarassy at [60]:

Mummery LJ in Madarassy at [80]-[84] noted that in Laing at [74], Elias P had suggested with hypothetical comparators, it may be helpful to go straight to the second stage, but it was not an error of law to follow the usual two stages. Igen Guidelines (10)-(13) on the nature of the defendant’s burden have not been the subject of much debate and speak for themselves, save for the Court of Appeal’s observation in Igen that its adjustment at [36] from a defendant proving ‘no significant influence’ of a protected characteristic to ‘no discrimination whatsoever’ was not itself a significant change, as the Court said at [37]:

Finally, in this case there is particular relevance in this observation by Lord Hope in Hewage (re-iterated by Lord Leggatt in Efobi at [38]):

I also bear in mind the guidance in Talbot v Costain [2017] ICR D11 (EAT) by HHJ Shanks, including that in my findings of fact and inferences I may properly draw, I should take into account all the evidence in particular relating to alleged discriminators (and the reliability and credibility of the evidence if they give it).

I turn finally to my conclusions, which will incorporate the expert submissions of Ms Reindorf and Mr Beever. I will consider first the legal relevance of the Petition Controversy, as Ms Reindorf submits it influenced everything that then followed. I then turn to my conclusions on direct discrimination and victimisation topic-by-topic and finally to remedies. I stress that all my conclusions take into account all relevant evidence and findings of fact, even if not specifically referenced in my conclusions, given this judgment is already very (and doubtless over-) long.

I have made findings of fact about the Petition Controversy at paragraphs 47-59. There is no direct discrimination or victimisation complaint about it as such, but the Claimant contends that his evidence to the Mort Report investigation in June-July 2015 is a ‘protected act’. I certainly accept if the Claimant supported allegations of discrimination made by the expelled members, that would be a protected act under s.27(2)(b)-(d) EqA, as in Kirby. But this case is more like Durrani: there was no protected act at this stage. As I said at paragraph 57, I have no evidence the petitioners complained of Islamophobia or the Claimant did so for them. He has pleaded that his information to the Mort Report was a protected act in his Particulars at para 61.1, but he did not say how in his evidence. Indeed, I have also considered whether Cllr Washbrook believed the Claimant had made a protected act under s.27(1)(b) EqA, but I cannot infer that either. Unlike Cllr Washbrook’s later letters to the national Party on 16th December 2015 (quoted at paragraph 68 above), 19th February 2016 (quoted at paragraph 70 above), 10th January 2017 and his undated statement for the Claimant’s appeal against expulsion in 2017 both quoted at paragraph 97), in Cllr Washbrook’s letter to the national Party of 13th August 2015, he does not suggest he understood or believed the Claimant had alleged discrimination (or supported the petitioners’ allegation of it) to the Mort Report. Rather than referring to a complaint of discrimination, Cllr Washbrook alleged the Claimant was the leader of a ‘sectarian Trojan Horse’ ‘Pakistani Islamic group’ which had ‘attempted to take control of the Executive’:

As Ms Reindorf said, this must be read in the context of other things Cllr Washbrook had already said in letters to the national Party, for example as quoted at paragraph 51, in response to the petition on 28th August 2014, Cllr Washbrook wrote to Mr Mabbutt in the national Party on 31st August 2014 saying (my italics)

Likewise, to the national Party on 12th October after the expulsions, he wrote:

I must be cautious as Cllr Washbrook is sadly no longer with us to explain what he meant. For example, Ms Reindorf seized on something Mr Letts said in evidence about the Muslim membership, but in context it is clear he meant no more than that. However, I do not have that context with Cllr Washbrook. I remind myself that he had worked previously in his military career with Muslim colleagues and had good relations with some Muslim colleagues in the Federation, in particular Cllr Rasab. Moreover, of course Cllr Washbrook and his colleagues approved four Muslim candidates of Pakistani origin on 28th September 2015. I entirely accept Cllr Washbrook was not ‘Islamophobic’ in a simplistic sense. But these Muslim colleagues were not part of what he called a ‘Pakistani Muslim Group’. This was not an isolated phrase but one he used repeatedly, along with ‘Trojan Horse’. As I said at paragraph 48, that was not an allusion to Homer as Mr Samra disingenuously suggested, but to the 2014-15 ‘Trojan Horse Controversy’ about Salafist Muslim groups in schools: then unquestionably a faith-related issue.

So, with due caution given Cllr Washbrook is not here to explain, not just from his isolated words but I find his consistent views, rather than relying on the burden of proof which he is not here to rebut, I find positively on balance of probabilities that:

(1)

(2)

(3)

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242.

243.

244.

245.

246.

247.

248.

249.

250.

251.

252.

253.

254.

255.

256.

257.

258.

259.

260.

261.

262.

263.

264.

265.

266.

267.

268.

269.

270.

271.

272.

273.

274.

275.

276.

277.

278.

279.

280.

281.

22.

282.

283.

284.

285.