Natalia Nikolaevna Potanina v Vladimir Olegovich Potanin (Case Management)

I am concerned with a case management hearing in financial remedy proceedings between Natalia Nikolaevna Potanina (hereafter, by convention, “the wife”) and Vladimir Olegovich Potanin (hereafter, by convention, “the husband”). The wife was granted unconditional leave to proceed with her application under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (hereafter, “the 1984 Act”) by the Court of Appeal on 4 September 2025. The wife is represented by Charles Howard KC, Deepak Nagpal KC and Jennifer Palmer of counsel. The husband is represented by Rebecca Carew Pole KC and Rebecca Bailey-Harris, Ben Wooldridge and Jacob Turner of counsel (Mr Woodridge and Mr Turner did not appear at the hearing).

Prior to the hearing, the court indicated to the parties that it considered that the following issues arose for consideration at the case management hearing, in the following order. The court is grateful to leading and junior counsel for structuring their submissions accordingly:

i)

ii)

iii)

iv)

v)

vi)

vii)

viii)

In determining the case management issues between the parties, I have had the benefit of a court bundle and a supplementary court bundle, a bundle of authorities and helpful and comprehensive notes from leading and junior counsel. In light of the nature and extent of the case management issues arising between the parties, and the time estimate of one day given to the case management hearing, I reserved judgment on the disputed matters and now set out my reasons for making the case management directions I have determined are necessary to bring this matter to a timely resolution.

The background has been set out extensively in a number of judgments at a number of levels.

For the purposes of this judgment, it is necessary only to provide the central facts.

Both the wife and the husband were born in 1961 in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). They met at school and married in the USSR in 1983. Their marriage subsisted for 30 years. There remains a dispute regarding the date of the parties’ separation. The wife maintains that the parties did not separate until November 2013, when the husband issued divorce proceedings in what was, by then, the Russian Federation. The husband relies on the finding of the Russian court that the parties separated in 2007. The parties were divorced in Russia in February 2014. At the time of the divorce, both parties were 53 years of age and remained habitually resident in Russia.

During the course of the marriage, and following the collapse of the USSR, the husband accumulated what is, on any assessment, vast wealth. When the matter was before the Supreme Court in 2024, Lord Leggatt noted that the husband’s fortune was estimated, from published sources, to amount to US$20 billion (see Potanina v Potanin [2024] UKSC 3, [2024] AC 1063 at [13]). The greater part of the husband’s wealth comprises his beneficial interest in 30% of the shares in MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC. MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC is a Russian metals and mining company. It is the world’s largest producer of palladium and one of the world’s largest producers of nickel, platinum and copper. Publicly available information indicates that the market capitalisation of MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC as of February 2026 was some US$30 billion.

Following the pronouncement of the divorce in Russia in February 2014, the husband brought proceedings in Russia for division of the matrimonial property. It is accepted by both parties that under Russian law (as it was interpreted in this case) only the assets legally owned by the parties were included as matrimonial property, there being no concept of beneficial ownership under Russian law. Accordingly, whilst it is not disputed that the husband is the ultimate beneficial owner of the wealth accumulated during the marriage, including his beneficial interest in 30% of the shares in MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC, the vast majority of that wealth was not included by the Russian court when dividing the matrimonial property.

In the circumstances, within the proceedings for division of the matrimonial property in the legal ownership of the parties, the wife was awarded the equivalent of, on the wife’s case, US$ 41.5M and, on the husband’s case, US$ 84M. On either figure, the award made to the wife by the Russian court represented a fraction of what the wife’s award would have been had Russian law (as it was interpreted in this case) allowed for the inclusion as matrimonial property the assets beneficially owned by the husband. The wife contends that, in the circumstances, she received less than 1% of the wealth accrued by the parties during the course of the marriage. The wife has engaged in wider litigation, both in Russia and in other jurisdictions, in an effort to obtain half of the assets in the beneficial ownership of the husband. Those attempts have not met with success to date.

Up to the point of the parties’ divorce in Russia in February 2014, neither the wife nor the husband had any significant connection with the United Kingdom. In June 2014, however, the wife was granted a UK investor visa and, later in 2014, purchased a flat in London. The wife asserts that she has been based in London full time since 2017. At this hearing the wife asserted, through Mr Howard, that she is now not able to return to Russia.

On 8 October 2018, the wife issued an application under Part III of the 1984 Act for financial remedies following an overseas divorce. Relevant to certain of the case management questions that now arise for determination is the following description of the legislative scheme created by Part III of the 1984 Act contained in the judgment of Lord Leggat:

The extensive procedural history of the wife’s application under the 1984 Act is set out in the first instance decision of Cohen J (Potanin v Potanina [2019] EWHC 2956 (Fam), [2020] Fam 189), the decision of the Court of Appeal overturning the decision of Cohen J (Potanin v Potanina [2021] EWCA Civ 702, [2022] Fam 23), the decision of the Supreme Court overturning the decision of the Court of Appeal (Potanina v Potanin [2024] UKSC 3, [2024] AC 1063) and finally, the Supreme Court having remitted the matter to the Court of Appeal, the decision of the Court of Appeal overturning the first instance decision of Cohen J and granting the wife leave to bring an application under the 1984 Act (Potanina v Potanin [2025] EWCA Civ 1136, [2026] 2 WLR 352). Thus, the wife’s application under Part III of the 1984 Act has taken nearly 8 years to reach the permission stage.

The matter has now been allocated to me to determine the wife’s substantive application under the 1984 Act. Ultimately, the wife seeks an award from the English court capped at 50% of the value of: (i) the husband’s ultimate beneficial interest in 30% of the shares in MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC; (ii) the dividends paid on those shares since 2014; and (iii) a former matrimonial home in Russia known as “Autumn House”. Based on the market capitalisation of MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC as at February 2026, the value of the wife’s claim under the 1984 Act is in the region of US$5 billion.

Before turning to the determination of the case management issues in dispute before the court, three other matters of background require to be set out to provide the proper context.

First, on 29 June 2022, the husband became a designated person under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (hereafter “the 2019 Regulations”), which implement the Sanctions and Money Laundering Act 2018 (hereafter “the 2018 Act”). In addition to being sanctioned by the United Kingdom, the husband has also been sanctioned by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Ukraine and the United States of America. The wife has not been designated under the 2019 Regulations and has not been sanctioned in any other jurisdiction. The sanctions imposed on the husband by the United Kingdom include the following, which are applicable within the territory of the United Kingdom or in relation to United Kingdom subjects and legal entities registered in the United Kingdom, as well as in United Kingdom dependent territories:

i)

ii)

iii)

iv)

v)

The husband has been sanctioned as an individual who is not alleged to have committed any offence or otherwise engaged in wrongdoing. The husband relies on the description of sanctions of this nature given by the Supreme Court in Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs [2025] 3 WLR 346 at [1]:

The husband contends that a consequence of his having been designated as a sanctioned person under the 2019 Regulations has been the need to commence proceedings before the Arbitrazh Court of the City of Moscow pursuant to Articles 248.1 and 248.2 of the Russian Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code (as amended by Federal Law No.171-FZ from 19 June 2020). This court has before it a report on Russian law from Ms Olesya Petrol, a Russian lawyer specialising in Russian private law. The report was not prepared upon a joint instruction under Part 25 of the FPR 2010, but on the instruction of the husband, which course of action I deprecate. I determined, however, to admit it for the purposes of this hearing in circumstances where it assists the court with the question of the extent to which Russian law may impact on one or more of the case management directions the court may consider necessary. Ms Petrol describes the purpose of Article 248.1 of the Russian Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code as follows:

The husband has made an application to the Arbitrazh Court for an order preventing the wife from initiating and continuing proceedings in State courts and arbitral tribunals located outside the Russian Federation. The grounds on which the husband relies in support of that application include that the sanctions imposed on him by the United Kingdom place him in a manifestly unequal position in relation to the wife and create significant obstacles to his effective access to justice in the United Kingdom. He further argues that the proceedings to determine the wife’s Part III application are aimed at reviewing and circumventing the final and binding judgments of the Russian courts, which have already resolved the property disputes between the husband and the wife and which have already been enforced by the parties.

The second matter of background providing the proper context for this hearing is that on 7 December 2021 Francis J, to whom the proceedings were then allocated, made case management directions in this matter. Those case management directions were confirmed on 20 May 2022. They have not been the subject of an appeal. Those directions were also stayed on 20 May 2022 following the Supreme Court granting the husband permission to appeal. The wife now seeks to revive the case management directions confirmed by Francis J on 20 May 2022. The husband contends that his designation as a sanctioned person under the 2019 Regulations constitutes a fundamental change of circumstances that, if the court is not minded to adjourn the proceedings and continue to the stay, necessitates the discharge of the case management directions made by Francis J pursuant to FPR r.4.1(6) and or s.31F(6) of the 1984 Act.

Finally by way of relevant background, the husband is also a party to commercial litigation currently ongoing in the King’s Bench Division in IPJSC United Company Rusal v Whiteleave Holdings Limited, Vladimir Potanin, Crispian Investments Limited and Roman Abramovich. The Commercial Court has handed down three case management judgments to date, two of which have been published (see [2025] EWHC 1995 (Comm) and [2026] EWHC 154 (Comm)). Of particular relevance to the decisions that now fall to be made by this court is the decision of Mr Nigel Cooper KC sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court in the third case management hearing in those proceedings published as [2026] EWHC 154 (Comm). All references below to the decision of the Commercial Court are references to that latter case management decision.

At that hearing, the Commercial Court was concerned with the obligations of the husband to provide disclosure of documents held by PJSC MMC Norilsk Nickel and certain subsidiaries of PJSC MMC Norilsk Nickel on the basis that he has both legal and/or practical control of such documents for the purposes of CPR PD 57AD. The Commercial Court determined that question “purely for the purposes of determining the extent of his disclosure obligations in this action” and made clear it was not “expressing any view on the question of whether Mr. Potanin (or Whiteleave) has control of NN or its subsidiaries for any other purpose including for the purposes of the claims or counterclaims made in this action or for the purposes of any sanctions or counter-sanctions legislation.” In reaching its determination, the Commercial Court also noted that:

Having had the benefit of expert evidence from two expert witnesses on Russian law, and in circumstances I address in more detail below, the Commercial Court concluded in IPJSC United Company Rusal v Whiteleave Holdings Limited, Vladimir Potanin, Crispian Investments Limited and Roman Abramovich at [61] that:

I am satisfied that these proceedings should not be adjourned generally with liberty to restore pending determination of proceedings commenced by the husband in the Russian Arbitrazh Court.

The husband contends that these proceedings should be adjourned pending the outcome of his application pursuant to Articles 248.1 and 248.2 of the Russian Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code for an order preventing the wife from initiating and continuing proceedings in state courts and arbitral tribunals located outside the Russian Federation. In short, his submission is that it would be premature for these proceedings to move towards determination when he has an outstanding application for an anti-suit injunction which, if successful, would prohibit the wife from pursuing her application in this jurisdiction.

The husband also relies more generally in support of his application for an adjournment on the impact of him having been sanctioned by the United Kingdom. In particular, the husband submits as follows:

i)

ii)

iii)

iv)

v)

vi)

vii)

Relying on the foregoing matters, the husband submits that for the court to proceed to hear the wife’s application under Part III whilst he remains a sanctioned individual would be to force him to litigate with “one hand tied behind his back” in circumstances where there is no immediate necessity to move to the next stage of the Part III proceedings.

The wife submits that although the timing of the husband’s application to adjourn is designed to imply a change of circumstances, Article 248.1 of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code was introduced two years before the husband was sanctioned on 29 June 2022. The wife points to the fact that at no point in the proceedings to date, including after the date he was sanctioned, has the husband referred to the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code limiting his ability to participate in these proceedings. The wife acknowledges the difficulty she may be placed in by the husband’s litigation in the Arbitrazh Court, including the potentially limited effectiveness of anti-anti-suit injunctions as discussed in Magomedov & others v PJSC Transneft & others [2024] EWHC 1176 (Comm), [2024] 4 WLR 48 and Google v Tsargrad [2025] EWHC 94 (Comm), [2026] 1 All ER (Comm) 75 should she choose to apply for one. However, the wife submits that where she satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of s.15 of the 1984 Act, and the leave test in s.13 of that Act, the Russian court cannot interfere with the jurisdiction of this court and its procedure on the basis of an order in personam against her, it being a matter for her whether and how she responds to any order made by the Arbitrazh Court in Russia, including making an application for an anti-anti-suit injunction.

The wife further submits that it is self-evident that the husband has been able to participate in these proceedings notwithstanding his designation as a sanctioned individual. She submits that this position is further reinforced by the fact that the husband is involved as a party to the proceedings in the King’s Bench Division, a matter listed for a 14-week trial commencing in April 2027. The wife further notes that there is nothing to prevent the husband participating in the proceedings remotely, as he has done at this hearing, if he is not able to attend hearings in person.

With respect to the question of the impact on these proceedings of an application by the husband to the Arbitrazh Court under Article 248.1 of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code, the following aspects of the expert report of Ms Petrol are pertinent:

i)

ii)

iii)

iv)

v)

In the foregoing context, Ms Petrol opines that a Russian court is likely to find that the dispute being considered by the English court in these proceedings under Part III of the 1984 Act falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of Russian court, either as a result of direct application of Article 248.1(1) of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code or by way of analogy pursuant to Article 1(4) of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code.

Whilst the wife contends that the husband’s application under Article 248.1(1) of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code is advanced on grounds that are erroneous and that the application is vexatious, those are matters exclusively for the Russian Arbitrazh Court, based on that court’s interpretation of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code.

However, for the purposes of considering the husband’s adjournment application, it is tolerably clear that the outcome of the husband’s application to the Arbitrazh Court is dependent on that court, or a Russian court of general jurisdiction, being satisfied that Article 248.1(1) applies to proceedings of the type that this court is seised of, namely financial remedy proceedings between private individuals following divorce. Whilst Ms Petrol opines that a Russian court is likely to find that the dispute being considered by the English court falls into the exclusive jurisdiction of Russian courts, reading Ms Petrol’s expert opinion as a whole I am satisfied that that outcome is far from inevitable. This is particularly so in circumstances where the description of the Russian judicial system in Ms Petrol’s report characterises commercial (arbitrazh) courts as follows:

Following the case management hearing, the court was sent further documentation that indicates the Arbitrazh Court of the City of Moscow conducted a hearing on the husband’s application on 26 February 2026. The Arbitrazh Court accepted the application as having been filed in compliance with Articles 125 and 126 of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code, directed that the matter be heard in closed session and directed a preliminary hearing on 26 March 2026. However, on the face of the documents, the question of whether Article 248.1 applies to foreign proceedings of the type that this court is seised appears to remain a live one. It would also appear that the Arbitrazh Court made no substantive interim order. This court was subsequently informed that a substantive hearing has been listed for 4 May 2026.

In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the fact of the husband’s current application to the Arbitrazh Court is not a reason to adjourn these proceedings generally. Whilst the question of leave has been heavily contested, the English court’s jurisdiction to hear an application under the 1984 Act has never been disputed. The wife’s application under Part III of the 1984 Act was issued as long ago as 8 October 2018. On a broad assessment, some £14M in costs have already been incurred by the parties and the application has only reached the stage of leave having been granted. There is an urgent need for this matter to be determined.

In these circumstances, the fact that the Arbitrazh Court may consider that Article 248.1 of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code applies to foreign proceedings of the type that this court is seised and, if it does, may make an order preventing the wife from initiating and continuing proceedings in a court located outside the Russian Federation, I am satisfied that this is not a reason to delay the determination of the wife’s application still further. If the Arbitrazh Court does grant substantive relief, it might be necessary for this court consider whether a stay of the English proceedings should be granted consequent upon any anti-suit injunction made by the Arbitrazh Court and/or any application made to this court by the wife for an anti-anti-suit injunction, having regard to the principles applicable in this jurisdiction (see The Eleftheria [1969] 1 Lloyd's Rep 237 at 94, Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP and others v Deutsche Bank AG and Deutsche Bank Securities Inc [2009] EWCA Civ 725, [2010] 1 WLR 1023 at 56 and Croda Europe Ltd v Agform Ltd [2025] EWHC 2462 (Comm) at [21]). Until that time, however, I am satisfied that this court should continue to case manage these proceedings towards a timely resolution.

I am further satisfied that there is no force in the husband’s submission that his status as an individual sanctioned under the 2019 Regulations prevents him from participating effectively in these proceedings.

I accept the wife’s submission that the husband’s contention that he is unable to participate, and is prejudiced, in the proceedings is undermined by the facts. The husband has, self-evidently, been able to participate in these proceedings, up to and including a successful appeal to the United Kingdom Supreme Court, notwithstanding his designation as a sanctioned individual from 29 June 2022. I further accept that the husband’s contended inability to participate in these proceedings as a sanctioned individual is undermined by the fact that the husband is actively involved as a party to proceedings in the King’s Bench Division. As he has done at this hearing, the husband is able to participate in these proceedings remotely if he is not able to attend hearings in person by reason of his sanctioned status.

In the circumstances, the husband’s application to adjourn these proceedings generally is refused. The court will therefore proceed to make case management directions to enable the matter to proceed as expeditiously as possible to a final hearing.

I am further satisfied that the court should not direct a split hearing of the issues that fall to be determined in this application.

Leave having been granted to the wife under s.13 of the 1984 Act by the Court of Appeal, ss.16 to 18 of the 1984 Act provide, as at the time the wife’s application was issued and prior to the United Kingdom leaving the European Union, as follows (subsections 16(3) and (4) were repealed after the United Kingdom left the European Union by Schedule 1(1) para.13(3)(b) and (c) of the Jurisdiction and Judgments (Family) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019):

The husband contends that s.16 and s.18 of the 1984 Act constitute a distinct two-stage process. First, a determination of whether in all the circumstances an order is “appropriate”, and the dismissal of the claim if it is not. Second, if the court is satisfied that it is appropriate to make an order then, having regard to all the circumstances and in particular those matters set out in s.25(2)(a)-(h) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, a determination of what orders should be made. Accordingly, the husband contends that this court should order a split hearing whereby:

i)

ii)

The wife resists this course of action and submits that all of the elements of her application should be determined by the court at a single hearing. The wife relies in support of her submission on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Zimin v Zimina [2017] EWCA 1429, [2018] 1 FCR 164 at [98], in which the court stated that:

As the husband concedes, I am bound by the decision in Zimin v Zimina. However, in circumstances where the foregoing statement of principle was obiter dicta (the point in issue before the Court of Appeal being whether it was appropriate for a lump sum order to have been made), and where that statement of principle was expressed in terms of the approach that “should” be adopted and not the approach that “must” be adopted, it is appropriate to consider the competing arguments of the parties in a little more detail.

The husband concedes that “in virtually every case” the court should consider the s.16 factors alongside the s.18 factors of the 1984 Act when determining an application for which leave has been given under s.13. The husband contends, however, that this case is “extreme on its facts” and has a number of “overwhelmingly magnetic features” which, if accepted by the court, would lead inexorably to the conclusion that it is not “appropriate” for the court to make an order. Accordingly, and consonant with the overriding objective, the husband submits that the matter should be listed for a what he terms a “section 16 hearing”.

The “magnetic features” on which the husband relies as being relevant to the question of whether it is “appropriate” for the purposes of s.16 of the 1984 Act for the court to make any order are based largely on the report of Ms Petrol, and are as follows:

i)

ii)

iii)

iv)

v)

By way of response, the wife resists the husband’s characterisation of this case as “extreme on its facts” by reason of his sanctioned status. The wife points to the question of making financial orders against a ‘designated person’ being at the heart of the issues in R v R [2015] EWCA Civ 796, [2016] Fam. 153 (albeit concerning a different sanctions regime).

The wife further points to the fact that this is the first time in this litigation that the husband has sought a split hearing, contending it is a yet further tactic to delay the proceedings. The wife submits that the issue of a split hearing was not raised before Francis J, nor did Francis J indicate that such an approach was appropriate in this case. This notwithstanding that many of the factors relied on by the husband were extant in 2022. The wife further reminds the court that the judgment of Cobb LJ in the Court of Appeal made no mention of a split hearing having given leave and remitted the matter. Rather, Cobb LJ proceeded at [114] on the basis that all the circumstances fell to be considered together at a single hearing, having noted at [9(viii)] that s.16 of the 1984 Act has “an obvious mutual interplay with section 18” in light of the observations made in Agbaje at [71]. The wife submits that, in the foregoing context, the application made by the husband under Art 248.1 of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code cannot legitimately form part of a justification for directing a course specifically deprecated by the Court of Appeal in Zimin v Zimina.

As to a licence from the United Kingdom government, the wife submits that the OFSI Scheme exists, that the wife has not yet applied for a licence (in circumstances where no details can yet be given as to what she is seeking to be licenced) and that, accordingly, there is no reason to think that the wife would not be able to receive a licence in order to have paid to her any award the court may make in these proceedings. The wife points to the fact that the legislation governing the sanctions regime does not have as its purposes the frustration of orders made by the English court so as to deprive a spouse of that which the court has held to be their lawful entitlement.

Finally, the wife argues that, in circumstances where the version of s.16 of the 1984 Act in force prior to the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union governs the wife’s claim, it is not possible to dismiss her needs claim under s.16 of the 1984 Act. The wife relies on the following conclusions of Cobb LJ in the Court of Appeal at [101], it being uncontroversial that by the time of her application in November 2019 the wife was habitually resident in England and Wales:

In the circumstances, the wife submits that there would be no point in this case in having a split hearing when there will need to be a final hearing on her needs claim in any event, which cannot be dismissed for want of it being appropriate under s.16 of the 1984 Act.

Having considered the competing arguments, and having regard to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Zimin v Zimina, I am satisfied that it is not appropriate to direct a split hearing in this case. The rationale for the approach taken in Zimin v Zimina is clear on the face of the statute.The need to consider “all of the circumstances” in deciding whether an order is appropriate explains why the concept of a split hearing has been rejected as an approach, as explained by Lord Collins in Agbaje v Agbaje [2010] UKSC 10, [2010] 1 AC 628 at [71]:

In the circumstances, and for the reasons I have set out, I decline to direct a split hearing of the wife’s application in this case.

I am satisfied that the stay on the directions made by Francis J on 20 May 2022 should be lifted and that those directions now must be complied with. The directions comprise the following:

i)

ii)

iii)

iv)

v)

The husband contended that the question of the precise nature and extent of his disclosure obligations in this case should be adjourned to a further hearing to be listed after a “Stage 1” hearing or at a further directions hearing. Pending that hearing, the husband submitted that he should not be required to make any financial disclosure that would put him in breach of what have been termed “the Russian Confidentiality Rules”.

However, in circumstances where the court declined to direct a split hearing and has the benefit of the expert report secured by the husband from Ms Petrol, the question of the impact of the Russian Confidentiality Rules, and thus the nature and extent of the husband’s disclosure obligations, can be dealt with at this hearing.

The husband seeks to discharge the directions made by Francis J on 20 May 2022 that require him to provide disclosure by way of completing any part of Form E or Abbreviated Form E and Capital Schedule. The husband relies on the report of Ms Petrol as establishing a number of adverse consequences for him of the Russian Confidentiality Rules in the event that he is compelled by this court to provide disclosure in these proceedings. The husband submits that his sanctioned status, his private and public profile in Russia and the impact of the wider sanctions in place against him and entities in which he has an interest argue against ordering him to make disclosure. Further, the husband contends that disclosure is unnecessary in this case in circumstances where it is clear on the evidence that, as Francis J put it in May 2022, he can afford to meet the wife’s claims on “whatever basis she may put them”.

In the foregoing context, the husband relies on the following aspects of Ms Petrol’s expert report on Russian law:

i)

ii)

iii)

iv)

v)

vi)

The wife seeks disclosure in the terms ordered by Francis J, which she reminds the court was not the subject of an appeal and which this court has only limited powers to revisit. The wife contends that she simply seeks to reinstate directions that were found to be proportionate having regard to the issues in the case, as already adjudicated on by Francis J. The wife submits that nothing in the report of Ms Petrol prevents the husband from making the very limited disclosure directed by Francis J, particularly in circumstances where:

i)

ii)

iii)

iv)

v)

vi)

vii)

As the husband recognises, in circumstances where he is requesting the discharge of the order of Francis J, he must be able to demonstrate one or more of the matters neatly encapsulated by Mostyn J in Thum v Thum [2019] EWFC 25, [2019] 2 FLR 546 at [36]:

In Various Claimants v Standard Chartered PLC the Court of Appeal reviewed the law and held as follows, citing the judgment of Gross LJ in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury:

The general restrictions on disclosure under Russian law subsisted at the time Francis J made his order. The “material change of circumstances since the order was made” now relied on by the husband to seek the discharge the directions of Francis J is, therefore, the fact of his having been sanctioned. In this context, and having regard to the authorities dealing with the extent to which a breach of foreign law allows a party to avoid disclosure, in order to make good his assertion of a material change of circumstances, the husband must be able to demonstrate that disclosure of relevant information by way of completing any part of Form E or Abbreviated Form E and Capital Schedule is likely to be a breach of Russian law and, that being so, that he is at a real risk, meaning an actual risk, of the penalties set out in Ms Petrol’s report being imposed. Namely, the imposition of an administrative fine on individuals in the amount of five thousand to ten thousand Rubles, on officials from forty thousand to fifty thousand Rubles, or disqualification for up to three years, and on legal entities from one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand Rubles, except in cases where disclosure of such information entails criminal liability. I am not satisfied that the husband can so demonstrate.

Whilst the husband contends that to complete any part of Form E or Abbreviated Form E and Capital Schedule as ordered by Francis J will or may place him in breach of the counter-sanction provisions of the Russian Federation, notwithstanding his sanctioned status the Commercial Court in this jurisdiction has found that the husband is able to provide disclosure of documents held by PJSC MMC Norilsk Nickel and certain subsidiaries. The Commercial Court was satisfied in IPJSC United Company Rusal v Whiteleave Holdings Limited, Vladimir Potanin, Crispian Investments Limited and Roman Abramovich that there is no general principle under Russian law that it is not in a company’s interest for the CEO to search for and disclose company documents to defend claims made against them, the judge noting that the expert in those proceedings had cited examples of Russian cases in which a director had been able to use company documents to defend divorce proceedings. In any event, there is no evidence before the court on which to make a finding that the husband is at an actual risk of prosecution and/or penalty were he to remain obligated to provide the disclosure directed by Francis J in the order of 20 May 2022.

In the foregoing circumstances, I am not satisfied that the husband has demonstrated a “material change of circumstances since the order was made” such as to justify the variation or discharge of Francis J’s case management order of 20 May 2022.

Accordingly, where the disclosure ordered by Francis J remains proportionate to the issues that fall for determination in this case, and necessary to determine those issues, I am satisfied that the stay on that order should now be lifted and the directions set out in the order of 20 May 2022, for disclosure by way of completing any part of Form E or Abbreviated Form E and Capital Schedule, questionnaires and other First Appointment documents, and further hearings through to a final hearing, should now be complied with under a revised case management timetable towards final hearing.

The husband secured a report from Ms Petrol unilaterally. The court has admitted that report at this hearing to inform the question of the husband’s adjournment application. The wife now submits that she should be permitted to adduce her own expert evidence in response, the wife rejecting a number of contentions made by Ms Petrol. The husband submits that if the parties are not able to agree the contents of Ms Petrol’s report, the court should direct a jointly instructed expert report on Russian law.

Having regard to the issues touched on in this judgment, it is clear that it will be necessary in this case for the court to give permission for expert evidence dealing with matters of Russian law to determine the substantive application under Part III of the 1984 Act. Neither party sought to argue against this proposition, the question centring on whether permission should be given to the husband to rely on Ms Petrol’s report, with the wife securing her own report, or whether a jointly instructed expert report should be directed. Given the current dispute between the parties as to the position under Russian law, and likely central role arguments as to the effect of Russian law are likely to have at the final hearing, I am satisfied that any expert report on Russian law should be a joint report secured in accordance with the relevant rules of court.

As to the nature and scope of the questions to be posed to the jointly-instructed expert, given the limited amount of time afforded to the wife prior to this hearing to digest the legal issues raised by Ms Petrol, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to defer directions with respect to expert evidence to the First Appointment, informed by a properly constituted Part 25 application in accordance with the FPR.

It is only possible to make limited directions at this stage in relation to any licence application by the wife to the OFSI.

There is no evidence before the court that the wife is able to make a prospective licence application to the OFSI licensing her, in principle, to receive any money or property that may be awarded by this court in the financial remedy proceedings. In any event, I am sceptical that the OFSI would be prepared to grant a licence in such terms without knowing the amount / value of any financial award. In the circumstances, I do not consider it possible at this stage of the proceedings to give detailed directions concerning any licence application to be made by the wife to permit the payment to her of the substantive award she seeks pursuant to a court order to be made in these proceedings.

The court would, however, be assisted by knowing at this stage (a) what steps are required to apply for a licence from the OFSI, (b) what information is required by the OFSI in support of any licence application and (c) the timescales for the determination of any licence application. I intend to direct that the wife files and serves her narrative account of the steps she has taken to apply to the OFSI for a licence for payment of a costs award and that the information specified at (a) to (c) should be included in so far as it is available to the wife from the OFSI.

It is my intention also to direct that both the wife and the husband disclose their communications with OFSI to date and thereafter on a rolling basis. However, as part of the process of submitting corrections to the draft judgment, the husband raised the possibility that, were that disclosure to include correspondence in respect of the provision of legal services to him and the payment of his legal fees, such disclosure may raise issues of privilege and regulatory issues where the licence for the receipt of fees is that of his instructing solicitors. The wife disputes that this raises an issue. In the circumstances, at present the direction will encompass the disclose their communications with OFSI to date and thereafter on a rolling basis save for correspondence in respect of the provision of legal services to the husband. The court will consider any competing submissions on the latter at the first appointment.

I am not prepared to dispense with a Financial Dispute Resolution appointment in this case.

The order of Francis J dated 20 May 2022 directed that an FDR appointment before Moor J on 3 November 2022 remain listed. Pursuant to FPR 2010 r.9.15(4) the court must, at a First Directions Appointment, direct that the case be referred to an FDR appointment. The only circumstances where this mandatory requirement is excused is (a) where the first appointment or part of it has been treated as an FDR appointment and the FDR appointment has been effective; or (b) there are exceptional reasons which make an FDR appointment inappropriate. In the context of the terms of FPR 2010 r.9.15(4), Peel J held as follows in GH v GH [2024] EWHC 2547 (Fam), [2024] 4 WLR 90 regarding the importance of the FDR:

It is clear that the parties are far apart in terms of their positions. Neither party has to date made an open offer. The wife expressed frank scepticism as to the husband’s willingness to negotiate and, in the circumstances, questioned the point of an FDR in this case. The husband submitted that it is in the interests of justice to endeavour to avoid a 15-day final hearing in this matter and submitted that an FDR should be directed in this matter.

As Peel J noted, independent of the chances of a case being resolved through the process of an FDR, there is merit in enabling the parties to hear a robust and independent evaluation of the likely outcome of their dispute, and of the risks of continued litigation, in terms of costs, uncertainty, delay and the emotional toll of continued litigation. This is no less true in complex and seemingly intractable cases such as this one. In these circumstances, and where it remains hard to envisage any situation in which it is appropriate to dispense with an FDR, I am satisfied that this case does not come close to the type of exceptional circumstances that might justify such a course. In the circumstances, the court intends to make provision for an FDR, either court-facilitated or private, in this case.

Whilst this hearing has, in effect, acted as a ‘first appointment’ following the matter being remitted by the Court of Appeal, in light of the need to determine the question of expert evidence on Russian law, to consider the disclosure provided pursuant to the directions set out in the order of 20 May 2022 and to deal with directions for the FDR, I am satisfied that a further directions hearing will be required in this matter ahead of the case being listed for an FDR.

Having regard to the length of these proceedings, which commenced some 8 years ago, it is essential that this matter is now listed for final hearing of the wife’s application, not least to provide the parties with a fixed date against which to ensure that the matter is ready for trial, but also to ensure that these very long running proceedings are now finally brought to a close. In the circumstances, I propose to list the final hearing before me with a time estimate of 15 days in November 2026. A pre-hearing review will also be listed ahead of that final hearing.

There is an obligation on parties under FPR r.27.3 to attend hearings. With respect to the arrangements for the attendance at future hearings of the husband, the reality is set by the travel ban prohibiting the husband entering or staying in the United Kingdom, pursuant to s.4 of the 2018 Act. Any steps to alter that reality are unlikely to be commensurate with the aim of this court to resolve these proceedings in November. In the circumstances, I propose to permit the husband to attend future hearings remotely.

At the hearing, there was no suggestion by the husband that he is unable to give evidence in these proceedings from Russia by way of video link should this become necessary at the final hearing. However, as part of the process of submitting corrections to the draft judgment, those representing the husband properly drew the attention of the court to the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal in Potanin v Charity Commission for England & Wales [2026] UKFTT 271 (GRC), handed down two days after the case management hearing. That decision judgment records at paragraph [77] that the husband was refused permission to give oral evidence by video link from Russia.

It is clear from the judgment of the Tribunal that the issue of the ability of the husband to give evidence by video link from Russia arose in the context the decision in Agbabiaka (evidence from abroad, Nare guidance) Nigeria [2021] UKUT 286 (IAC) and the (then applicable) Guidance Note from the President of Tribunals on taking evidence from overseas. There was no suggestion in Agbabiaka that it was a decision intended to prescribe practice in the family court and the considerations in family cases may be said to be different to those pertaining in civil cases (see Newcastle CC v JK [2025] EWHC 1767 (Fam) at [110] to [123]). However, I did not hear detailed submissions on the ability of the husband to give evidence from Russia in financial remedy proceedings and I forebear from reaching any conclusions on this point. In so far as it remains in issue, it will need to be dealt with in argument at the first appointment. I will direct the husband to indicate ahead of the first appointment whether he is willing and able to give evidence by video link should that course become necessary at any final hearing, including the arrangements that have been put in place (if any) for him to give evidence at the forthcoming trial in the King’s Bench Division in IPJSC United Company Rusal v Whiteleave Holdings Limited, Vladimir Potanin, Crispian Investments Limited and Roman Abramovich.

In conclusion, I am satisfied that the following case management orders and directions should now be made:

i)

ii)

iii)

iv)

v)

vi)

vii)

viii)

ix)

x)

xi)

I will invite leading and junior counsel to draft an order accordingly for my approval.