A Local Authority v The Mother & Ors

This judgment concerns H a young girl aged around 18 months. Her parents are Ms M and Mr F. The intervenor is Ms I, a friend of the mother.

This judgment is in two parts, dealing separately with the issues of fact-finding and welfare. The intervenor played no part in the welfare matters and she was discharged as an intervenor by the court, by agreement of all parties, at the beginning of day five prior to her oral evidence. She will not receive a copy of this judgment but her advocate Mr Allen should, so that he can ensure that she is aware of the outcome and that she was wholly exonerated. This of course is relevant to her own personal situation, as Children’s Services are involved with her own children due to this matter (and prior history).

I have not set out all the evidence which I have read, heard, and seen but have highlighted particularly relevant matters. Nevertheless, all evidence has been considered and taken into account. The bundle and supplemental bundle amounted to almost 3000 pages.

This judgment is structured as follows:

The application before the court is the Local Authority’s application for a care order which was issued on 7 June 2025.

This is a combined finding of fact and welfare hearing with the Court tasked with determining whether H has suffered non-accidental/inflicted injuries and if so, then to determine the perpetrator of the injuries if possible. Depending upon my findings (if any), I then consider the welfare of H and decide where she should live.

Ms M was not known to the Local Authority prior to these proceedings. She has issues in respect of her mental health, struggling with depression for “as long as she can remember” and has a diagnosis of ADHD and emotionally unstable personality disorder. She has previously self-harmed and experienced abuse in a previous romantic relationship, reporting that this male had gone so far as to threaten to stab her.

Mr F was known to children’s services as a child due to concerns around allegations of sexual abuse committed by his father, domestic abuse between his parents, mental health issues and parental alcohol abuse. He has reported an extremely traumatic childhood - his stepfather would regularly beat him and his mother would then force him to cover up those assaults. At the age of 12 years old, Mr F witnessed his stepfather attempting suicide by slicing his own throat in front of him. He has a longstanding history of substance misuse, smoking cannabis from around the age of 13 years and ultimately going on to use harder, more addictive substances. He is also dependent on alcohol and between 2021 and May 2025 he had a total of 16 hospital admissions related to his alcohol consumption or withdrawal. In 2024 he completed a detoxification programme but has continued to drink. He advised that at one time he would drink up to 20 pints a day, although reported that this had significantly reduced.

Mr F has a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder, emotionally unstable personality disorder, manic anxiety, clinical depression, obsessive compulsive disorder and has a history of overdoses. He is on the waiting list to be assessed for ADHD. He has struggled to manage his emotions since childhood, regularly being excluded from school due to fighting with other pupils. He has spoken about experiencing paranoia as part of his symptoms and will self-harm and use illicit substances to try and manage his poor mental health. Despite the raft of complex issues, his engagement with mental health services is poor.

H was placed, as an unborn, on a Child in Need plan on 27 March 2024 due to concerns about domestic violence between the parents. They later denied the incidents which led to this. The assessment also highlighted significant concerns around Ms M being homeless, both parents’ drug misuse and Mr F’s ongoing mental health issues. Further information about issues of concern were set out in the written opening filed by the Local Authority including Mr F assaulting and threatening his uncle.

Following H’s birth, the parents reported that Mr F was not living in the family home although he would visit and spend time with his daughter. Ms M was clear that she would not allow him into the home if she detected any signs that he was under the influence or if he had been drinking at all. Both parents engaged well with the health visitor and other professionals around parenting and routines and H was seen to be thriving in their care, with lots of emotional warmth being noted and all her basic care needs being met.

On 17 March 2025, following H’s birth the Local Authority updated their assessment, concluding that Ms M was a protective factor. She had secured a home for herself and baby and there was wider family support available to them, and although concerns continued about Mr F’s ongoing substance misuse and mental health it was deemed that both parents had good insight into those issues and were able to recognise when H needed to be prioritised. Ms M had stated that she had ended her relationship with Mr F after discovering that he was consuming cocaine and was therefore not allowing any unsupervised contact, only seeing H only in the community. In addition, Mr F was engaging positively with mental health services and was compliant with his medication, therefore, the Local Authority closed the case. Sadly it became clear that the true situation at home for H was extremely risky, surrounded by drug and alcohol misuse and neglect and that the parents had been deceiving the social workers and their own families.

On [a date] local CCTV in [name] town centre showed Mr F and his friend taking part in a drug deal. Officers traced him to the [name] pub and he and his friend were arrested on suspicion of supplying heroin (heroin and other drug dealing paraphernalia having been found in a bag that had been placed on H’s pram). Ms M was present in the pub with H and her friend Ms I and her own child. The police officer reported that Ms M had potentially attempted to hide/move the bag of drugs from view.

Mr F was released from custody and immediately returned to Ms M’s flat. The following day H presented at the hospital with a significant head injury and it transpired that the parents had been concealing significant information from professionals and that Ms M in particular had been dishonest about the risks H was being exposed to prior to her admission.

On 24 May 2025, from around 3pm, H was being cared for by the maternal grandmother. She had collected H from Ms M’s flat along with maternal aunt and taken her back to her own house. Others were also present at various times when H was at the property. That evening at around 7pm, whilst bathing and washing H’s hair the maternal grandmother noticed one side of her head felt “squishy”. She has described in her statement that she “had a soft lump in her head which was squidgy in texture”. She called Ms M who could not explain the lump and took H straight to [name] hospital, collecting Ms M on the way and arriving at 7.56pm. The maternal grandmother reported that H had presented normally throughout the afternoon – happy, playful and feeding and walking in her walking chair.

Examination of H revealed a 4x4cm boggy swelling around 2cm above H’s left ear. A CT scan revealed a left sided parietal skull fracture with a small subdural haematoma. None of the explanations put forward by Ms M as to the possible cause of the injury were deemed likely by the medical professionals, who considered that the head injury was more likely inflicted and attributable to either blunt force trauma or H being dropped from a significant height. When Ms M was advised of the injury by the medical professionals she presented as extremely upset, vomiting and hyperventilating.

H was placed under Police Powers of Protection and Ms M and Mr F agreed for H to be accommodated under Section 20 on 29 May 2025, she was placed with her paternal great aunt and uncle following her release from hospital. She was made subject to an Interim Care Order on 20 June 2025 and has remained in this placement to date. The placement was initially approved under regulation 24 and following a positive connected carers assessment they were approved formally at fostering panel as kinship carers for H in September 2025.

Whilst Ms I’s background is not directly relevant for the purposes of understanding H’s experiences within her family home, it is noteworthy that she too has had previous Local Authority involvement. On [a date] 2019 her son, S, was admitted to hospital with a head injury, having been found unresponsive, blue around the lips and not breathing in his cot. S had sustained brain damage as a result of his respiration being impaired and an inadequate supply of oxygen getting to his brain. On 12 November 2020 McDonald J. made a raft of findings relating to Ms I and her then partner and the poor parenting that had been received by their children. He made findings that S had been overlaid by one or other of his parents, that both parents were aware of the circumstances and cause of S’s impaired respiration and had failed to disclose the same and that both had sought to collude to conceal the circumstances of S’s injury from those investigating the case of the injury including the medical staff, the police and the court. A copy of the judgment was provided in the bundle. S now has a new child in her care and her life is significantly different.

This case has been allocated to HHJ Hesford throughout and has benefitted from judicial continuity. This hearing took place as an attended hearing over 6 days including submissions. Ms Holt for the Local Authority provided a very useful Written Opening, Chronology and Law Summary which have been of considerable assistance.

I had the opportunity of seeing the parents and the intervenor give evidence in the witness box, over three days for Ms M and one day for Mr F, and to form my own opinions about their evidence and credibility. It was extremely useful to do so. Alongside the medical evidence, their evidence was crucial for me in coming to my decisions. In view of the particular relevance of this to my decisions I have of course considered “Lucas” and all other relevant law throughout.

Ms M’s cognitive functioning was assessed by Dr. Allen on 14 July 2025. He concluded that she is a woman of low-average cognitive ability, with full scale IQ in the range 82-90, placing her at the 18th percentile and within the low average range. Her verbal comprehension and working memory fell within the average range. He provided several steps the court could take to enhance her capacity to provide accurate oral evidence.

No intermediaries were required for any party.

Ground Rules were established at the hearing on 10 March 2026 and the order set out the ground rules for the parents and intervenor which were applied throughout this hearing. They are attached at the end of this judgment as an appendix.

The Local Authority initially sought findings against Ms M, Mr F or Ms I in relation to the injuries, including a failure to protect or to seek medical attention but ultimately they no longer sought findings against Ms I. In the full threshold, the Local Authority sought additional “welfare” findings against Ms M and Mr F. I will deal with the issues of findings concerning the injuries and the whole threshold separately. Their plan was for H to remain with her current carers under a Special Guardianship Order (SGO), with a Child in Need plan for 6 months.

Ms M accepted the medical evidence but denied causing any of the injuries. She sought for H to be rehabilitated to her care or if not to her care, then ideally to the care of [other relatives] and if not them, to the current carers but not under an SGO. During the hearing, her position changed, whereby she no longer sought to challenge the placement and the making of an SGO in favour of the current carers. She still sought additional and progressive contact and the making of a Supervision Order (SO).

Mr F accepted the medical evidence but denied causing any of the injuries. He initially sought for H to be rehabilitated to Ms M’s care or for her to remain with the current carers. He attended late on the first day of the hearing. Thereafter he filed a statement agreeing with the plans of the Local Authority.

The intervenor Ms I denied inflicting or any knowledge of the injuries.

The Guardian agreed with the plans of the Local Authority and agreed that a Supervision Order was necessary.

The Local Authority sought findings concerning injuries as set out in the Final Threshold.

None of the medical evidence was challenged. It is accepted and established. The court was assisted by two experts – Dr Fionnan Williams, Paediatric Neuroradiologist and Dr Jonathan Cardwell, Consultant Paediatrician. I will set out the summary from the written opening prepared by the Local Authority:

Dr Cardwell in his response to additional questions opined that:

In addition to the medical evidence, the Local Authority relied on the balance of evidence in the bundle including the police evidence and their own social work evidence and assessments.

I heard submissions and I have carefully considered these when coming to my conclusions and writing this judgment even if I do not specifically address all points made. Very briefly they state the following:

The Local Authority invited me to find that they had proven their case in respect of all of the findings sought and that either Ms M or Mr F were the perpetrator of the injuries, although the evidence could lead to a conclusion that it was the mother. The cause was either recklessness or a loss of control but not malicious or premeditated. They both knew who the perpetrator was and they had closed ranks. A supervision order was not necessary, a Child in Need plan was sufficient. Contact would be monthly, supervised and ultimately be decided by the Special Guardians.

Ms M’s case remained that she was not responsible for the injuries, it must therefore be Mr F. There were various reasons for her numerous lies including her admittedly shameful drug fuelled lifestyle. She wanted additional contact, her mother to be able to supervise contact and the support of a Supervision Order to support this.

Mr F again denied being responsible for the injuries and accepted his personal issues including drugs, alcohol, memory issues and lies. He accepted monthly contact and was neutral as to the need for a SO.

The Guardian focussed on the quite horrendous lived experiences of H, with the parents’ drug and alcohol abuse, appalling home conditions and their lies, especially Ms M who had very little credibility. She agreed with the Local Authority submissions that it was possible for the court to draw a conclusion that Ms M was responsible but neither parent had assisted the court and they had colluded. A Supervision Order was necessary due to the very significant risks posed by the parents and the extent of their lies and manipulations which had been hidden.

The legal framework resolving the schedule of findings sought is now well settled and I will set out a summary here. All has been applied.

The core principles are summarised by Baker J (as he then was) in Re JS [2012] EWHC 1370 (Fam) and approved in many cases since.

In Lancashire County Council v C, M and F (Children; Fact Finding Hearing) [2014] EWFC 3, Jackson J, after citing Baker J above, added this:

These comments are particularly relevant in this matter where the parents’ and intervenor’s evidence and credibility are of great pertinence.

In Re A (Children) (Pool of Perpetrators) [2022] EWCA Civ 1348, King LJ re-emphasised that judges should apply the simple balance of probability standard when determining whether it is possible to identify a perpetrator from a list of those who could be responsible. In coming to a conclusion each person should be considered individually by reference to all of the evidence. Glosses such as 'straining' to identify a perpetrator should be avoided. The unvarnished test is clear: “following a consideration of all the available evidence and applying the simple balance of probabilities, a judge either can, or cannot, identify a perpetrator. If he or she cannot do so, then, in accordance with Re B (2019), he or she should consider whether there is a real possibility that each individual on the list inflicted the injury in question.”

In Y, V and B (Fact-Finding: Perpetrator) [2024] EWCA Civ 1034, Lord Justice Baker stated the legal principles to be applied when considering whether a perpetrator or pool of perpetrators can be identified. Having considered the authorities which explain how the attributability condition is S31(2) can be met by a pool finding, he stated this:

Paragraph 11 of Lord Baker’s judgment summaries the recent guidance on how a judge should approach the task of identifying whether someone is in the pool of perpetrators. That guidance had been given by Peter Jackson LJ in Re B (Children; Uncertain Perpetrator) [2019] EWCA Civ 575. At paragraph 46 of Re B, Peter Jackson LJ explained the purpose of the concept of the pool in these terms:

Then at paragraph 49, Peter Jackson LJ gave the following guidance:

Finally, Lord Justice Baker reminded us in Re Y, V and B that Peter Jackson LJ in Re B added these further observations:

In Re A (A Child) [2020] EWCA Civ 1230, the limitation of oral evidence was once again highlighted and the courts warned to assess all the evidence in a manner suited to the case before it, and not to inappropriately elevate one kind of evidence over another.

In Re H-C (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 136 the Court of Appeal reminded judges in family cases of the proper approach to witnesses who tell lies as originally set out in R v Lucas [1981] QB 720. There are many reasons for this which do not denote guilt, for example, fear, shame, loyalty, panic and distress. An innocent person may lie to bolster their case. A lie should never be considered as direct proof of guilt. In criminal proceedings, to be capable of amounting to corroboration a lie must be deliberate, relate to a material issue and be motivated by a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth. The same principle applies here. This point was emphasized again in Re A, B and C (Children) [2021] EWCA Civ 451.

In Re L-W (Children) [2019] EWCA Civ 159 the Court of Appeal overturned a finding of failure to protect, where it had not been shown that on the particular facts of that case, a person should have identified a risk to the child. Lady Justice King stated:-

Such findings when made in respect of a carer are of the utmost importance when it comes to assessments and future welfare considerations. A finding of failing to protect can lead a Court to conclude that the children's best interests will not be served by remaining with, or returning to, the care of that parent, even though that parent may have been wholly exonerated from having caused any physical injuries.

Any court conducting a Finding of Fact Hearing should be alert to the danger of such a serious finding becoming 'a bolt on' to the central issue of perpetration or of falling into the trap of assuming too easily that, if a person was living in the same household as the perpetrator, such a finding is almost inevitable. As Aikens LJ observed in Re J, "nearly all parents will be imperfect in some way or another". Many households operate under considerable stress and men go to prison for serious crimes, including crimes of violence, and are allowed to return home by their longsuffering partners upon their release. That does not mean that for that reason alone, that parent has failed to protect her children in allowing her errant partner home, unless, by reason of one of the facts connected with his offending, or some other relevant behaviour on his part, those children are put at risk of suffering significant harm. Similar points were made in G-L-T (Children) [2019] EWCA Civ 717.

I have also considered the recent case of Hayden J, Lancashire County Council v M, F, A & J [2023] EWHC 3097 where the judge found the father to be the perpetrator contrary to the submissions of the Local Authority and the Guardian after considering propensity. Hayden J addressed in detail the issue of propensity evidence and criminal matters at paragraphs 37 to 42 and in family matters from paragraphs 43 to 51. Mr Justice Hayden underlined the duty on judges to draw on the totality of a wide canvas of evidence and, where that evidence permits, to identify the perpetrator of significant harm. He reminded us that this evaluation is carried out on the balance of probabilities (nothing more, nothing less) and, while this builds in a risk of error, lawyers and judges should not shirk that obligation out of an abundance of caution. The wide canvas of evidence invariably includes a variety of evidence, including hearsay and evidence of propensity to cause harm. Drawing together that evidence and properly drawing inferences from it assists in building a picture of the family’s life at the point at which significant harm is caused. Identifying the perpetrator avoids tainting the non-perpetrator parent while also providing the foundations for constructive and safe strategies for a child’s future care.

The case of Re O and N (Minors) (Care: Preliminary Hearing); In re B (Minors) (Children) (Non-Accidental Injury) [2003] UKHL 18 is of course also relevant to the welfare stage if I am unable to identify the perpetrator. H would remain considered at risk even if the actual perpetrator could not be identified and my views would still be relevant in considering the welfare stage of proceedings.

Finally in relation to issues of fact finding there are many allegations in the very detailed schedule In this regard, I have also had in mind the recent appeal decision in Re K and G (Care Proceedings: Fact-Finding) [2025] EWCA Civ 910 which addressed the fact that whilst in some fact-finding hearings, judges structured their judgment in line with a Local Authority's threshold document that set out the findings it sought, they were not obliged to do so. Provided the judge in a fact-finding hearing ensured that the parties had a fair hearing and delivered a judgment covering the ground within the known parameters of the case, it did not matter that the structure of the judgment departed from the threshold document.

The evidence in this case reveals a deeply troubling period in the life of a very young child, whose care was entrusted to two adults living what can only be described as chaotic, disordered and drug-dominated lives. The court has had the benefit of written evidence from a range of sources, extensive medical and other records, police interviews, text messages, expert reports, and the oral testimony of the parents and independent witnesses. I have read, watched and heard all the evidence, and I remind myself at the outset that the legal burden remains unchanged: the court must identify the perpetrator of H’s injuries, if it can, applying the balance of probabilities.

The medical evidence itself is clear and accepted by all parties. The injuries sustained by H were inflicted, not accidental. The question is no longer how she was injured but by whom, and what conclusions the court can come to based upon the evidence and what it reveals about the behaviour and credibility of the adults responsible for her care.

In undertaking that exercise, I remind myself of the guidance in Lucas: lies are not, in themselves, evidence of guilt, but they may be capable of supporting adverse findings where there is material showing that the lie was deliberate and motivated by a consciousness of wrongdoing. At the same time, the court must avoid the simplistic assumption that a lying witness lies about everything; equally, a witness who lies repeatedly about central matters invites careful scrutiny. It is against that legal and evidential framework that this case must be considered.

The first and essential step is to identify those who had the opportunity to cause the injury. The medical evidence does not permit a narrowing of the relevant timeframe beyond approximately ten days. The number of adults within that window is therefore necessarily limited.

The evidence is unequivocal that only the parents had ongoing, repeated and sufficient opportunity to cause injury. The intervenor had only a brief and discrete period of contact with H during which she cared for her in the evening while Ms M used drugs in the kitchen and toilet. Her interaction was short, closely contemporaneous with Ms M’s presence, and she credibly described the child as “fine” and showing no concerning signs. Ms M herself accepted that Ms I had only a limited opportunity, that she saw and heard nothing of concern, and Mr F did not implicate her at all. I am satisfied that Ms I should be excluded from the pool as agreed by all parties.

That leaves Ms M and Mr F- two adults whose lives during the relevant period were marked by mental health difficulties, instability, substance misuse, dishonesty, and interpersonal volatility. Each presents a markedly different profile, and each gave evidence that calls for detailed examination. I will address certain particular areas of this evidence but these examples are only a small part of the bigger picture.

When following the chronology through the text messages, police records, drug test results, and the parents’ oral testimony, a picture emerges of a household characterised substance-driven behaviour and disorganisation. Ms M was, by her own admission, using cocaine frequently during the period when she was the primary carer for H, with Mr F when he was present. She accepted that she asked a friend to lie on her behalf; she accepted that she had not been open and honest about domestic abuse; she accepted in oral evidence that her first reaction when confronted with something uncomfortable was to lie. Mr F, for his part, acknowledged heavy and longstanding substance abuse, psychotic episodes, and a pattern of violent incidents that he struggled to fully recall. H herself was fractious and teething, sometimes difficult to console and Ms M’s messages show her to be struggling and resentful at times.

Against this background, the court must consider the whole evidential picture, knowing that truthfulness from the parents was sadly in short supply and that memory, whether through impairment or convenience, was unreliable.

Before delving into the detail of Ms M’s evidence, it is necessary to observe that her relationship with the truth was not merely strained; it was profoundly compromised. Her evidence, both written and oral, reads as an evolving narrative shifting in response to challenge, confrontation, and the emergence of contradictory evidence. When I was contemplating this judgment, I realised that if I addressed all of the parents’ contradictions and variations in evidence, this would be an inordinately lengthy evidence and analysis section of my judgment. In the circumstances I have chosen as examples, some of the most pertinent and striking parts to address in detail. Nevertheless all have all been considered and taken into account.

Ms M filed four statements, none of which are consistent with one another or with her oral evidence. She occasionally acknowledged lying to professionals, but usually only when cornered. She lied about her drug use even when faced with recent drug test results. She lied about domestic abuse and the nature of the relationship with Mr F until inconsistencies surfaced or it perhaps suited her to make such allegations. She lied about her ongoing and frequent contact with Mr F until her text messages contradicted her. She lied about who had care of H, inventing increasingly elaborate stories to shift attention away from herself and to involve others. On her own account, lying was her first instinct.

This pattern of dishonesty was not occasional, incidental or peripheral. It was sustained and strategic. It extended to fabricating events, rehearsing false accounts with others, and embellishing invented detail further each time she repeated it. Her evidence must therefore be approached with considerable caution.

One of the most striking examples of Ms M's dishonesty is her shocking, inappropriate and selfish manipulation of her friend, Ms X. This was not a hastily conceived lie born out of panic. It was not merely “silly” as her own mother seemed to believe. It was an elaborate, deliberately and specifically constructed fiction and she was perfectly happy to sacrifice her friend for her own needs.

Ms M asked Ms X to lie and say she had been caring for H when the baby “fell off the bed.” Ms M even drafted what Ms X should tell professionals, down to the detail of the sequence of events. She emphasised that Ms X’s role was to help her “make sure it wasn’t me” to professionals:

This wholly unacceptable lie was told consistently to medics and the police not only at the hospital but later in a police interview, even after the lie had unravelled when Ms X retracted her statement. Even when confronted with the truth, Ms M did not then retract or correct her account but initially denied making the call at all. She then became agitated, ultimately switching to a “no comment” interview. Days later, she still repeated the lie to the social worker. She still claimed in evidence that the lie was only to prevent her own mother finding out about her involvement with Mr F and that Ms X was only required to lie to the maternal grandmother, but in my judgment this was further dishonesty.

This episode is important because it demonstrates Ms M’s willingness to manufacture an entire alternative reality, to recruit others to sustain it, and to adapt it in response to challenge. She had even acted out a shouting telephone call to Ms X at the hospital, such were the lengths she was prepared to go. It is evidence not merely of dishonesty but of deliberate manipulation and selfishness, it is of very significant concern.

Throughout her statements and oral evidence, Ms M referred to a range of H’s behaviours said to account for minor bumps: H was described as throwing herself, banging her head, wedging it in the cot, flipping in the cot, falling and hitting her head, and “bumping her head about 20 times.” None of these accounts is medically plausible as a cause of the injuries. The casual way in which they were offered, and the minimisation inherent in them, reveal both an attempt at retrospective justification and an inability or unwillingness to recognise danger as well as an inability to keep H safe. Indeed, none of these alleged incidents concerned her enough to seek any medical treatment at any stage.

This looseness with the truth, coupled with a tendency to offer multiple incompatible narratives, fundamentally undermines the reliability of anything she says about the timing, severity or cause of the injuries. Ms M’s evidence, when assessed in its full extent, reveals a consistent pattern of deflection, minimisation, obfuscation and fabrication. It is necessary to trace this pattern not simply to criticise her but to understand the evidential landscape: her lies were not background noise. They were intimately connected to the core issues of the case, and they provide important insight into Ms M’s knowledge and behaviour around the time of the injury.

Her presentation of events changed regularly, sometimes subtly, sometimes dramatically. She gave four statements, each different in material respects, and her oral evidence diverged again. She accepted certain threshold facts when cornered, yet almost in the same breath insisted she had been honest “throughout.” The contradictions were not small or peripheral; they were about drug use, domestic abuse, contact with Mr F, the presence of injuries, her knowledge of injuries, and the circumstances of H’s care.

In many respects, Ms M’s evidence gives the impression of a woman attempting to outrun the truth, altering it whenever necessary, reshaping it whenever challenged, and expanding her stories to accommodate the latest emerging fact. This is well illustrated by her accounts of the parents’ relationship and domestic abuse. In earlier statements she downplayed or denied Mr F’s involvement with her and alleged abuse; later she recalled “plenty” of incidents including very late and unevidenced allegations of controlling and coercive behaviour. The timing of this shift - after she had been confronted with contradictory evidence - speaks for itself.

A similar pattern is seen in her evidence about drug use. She initially denied cocaine use, only to later accept that she had used it as a coping mechanism and had taken it on 22 May 2025 and other dates while caring for H. The very recent test results showed the presence of cocaine and cocaethylene from August 2025 to February 2026 at medium levels, inconsistent with her narrative of only sporadic or historic use in November/December 2025. The level rose in February. This would be concerning in any case; it is especially so given the frequency, quantity and persistence indicated by her drug tests. That she chose to challenge only those results unhelpful to her case underscores the selective nature of her honesty.

Perhaps the most telling illustration of Ms M’s shifting evidence concerns the alleged “falls.” She initially claimed there had been no falls of concern before the grandmother discovered the swelling late on 24 May 2025. However as the case progressed, she began to produce her catalogue of minor incidents: flipping in the cot, banging her head, wedging her head in a corner, falling but not hitting the floor, each offered hesitantly and vaguely, as if testing whether any might be accepted as a plausible explanation.

These incidents were never reported at the time, never raised with or even mentioned to medical professionals, never found concerning enough to seek advice, and most importantly, were not capable of causing the injuries diagnosed. The medical evidence is clear on that point. Ms M’s shifting narrative reveals several things: a willingness to latch onto any explanation that might shift attention, a failure to appreciate risk, a lack of insight into the gravity of the situation and additionally neglectful parenting.

Ms M’s behaviour while giving evidence also requires some comment. Though demeanour is not a basis for findings in itself, it may be relevant when considered alongside drug use, stressors, the timing of her last ingestion, and the wider behavioural pattern and inconsistencies. She began her evidence calm, confident and seemingly very thoroughly prepared. Within an hour, this had changed dramatically. She exhibited unfocused rocking, rolling eyes, glazed expression, inability to sit still, and sudden shifts between lucidity and disconnection. All advocates, also the Guardian, observed this dramatic change and the hearing had to be adjourned because she became unfit to continue. She later attributed this to hunger, nerves and ADHD medication. This explanation, however, must be seen in the context of DNA Legal results showing active cocaine ingestion leading up to and including February 2026 and her history of drug use as a “coping mechanism” during periods of stress. In context, her presentation during evidence is consistent with the unstable, unpredictable and chaotic life revealed in the evidence.

To be clear: I do not conclude that she was under the influence at court; that is not for this court to determine. But the episode, when considered in the full evidential context, is part of the broader picture of instability, impaired judgment and impaired reliability. It is not possible or appropriate for the court to diagnose drug use at a hearing, but behaviour consistent with stimulant intoxication, juxtaposed with a history of minimised and concealed cocaine consumption, forms an important contextual thread in understanding the reliability of her evidence.

One of the most significant and crucial pieces of evidence in this case, because it is both contemporaneous and spontaneous, is the Snapchat message Ms M sent to Ms I when (seeking attention and attempting further diversion) on the way to hospital:

The importance of this message cannot be overstated. It directly contradicts Ms M’s case that she knew and saw nothing amiss on 24 May 2025. This message sits in stark contradiction to Ms M’s central claim, repeated throughout these proceedings, that she saw no injury until her own mother noticed a swelling later that evening. The maternal grandmother’s evidence was consistent, credible and clear: she saw no swelling until she bathed H in the evening, and she was the one who insisted they go to hospital immediately not Ms M as she claimed.

Most significantly, it aligns squarely with the medical explanation that the swelling would develop “over minutes to hours” following the injury. Ms M’s assertion that she simply “lies a lot” when confronted with this inconsistency does not diminish its weight. In fact, it heightens the significance of her earlier statement, which bears the hallmarks of candour, a spontaneous message to a friend, sent on the trip to hospital and before professional involvement and scrutiny had been engaged. She may have been unaware of the full significance of the injuries. This message strongly suggests that Ms M had seen or been aware of the injuries earlier in the day and before her own mother felt the lump. It also attempts to involve the grandmother in the factual matrix as having been the one noticing the lump in the morning not the evening, which is clearly not true.

This message therefore cannot be dismissed as incidental dishonesty. It is a direct statement, contemporaneous with events, which suggests earlier knowledge of the specific injuries suffered by H. It is impossible to reconcile Ms M’s later account with this earlier one. It is particularly notable and relevant that Ms M does not simply mention a bump or injury, but rather specifically a “big fluid lump” which is exactly what the medics at the hospital record and then Dr Cardwell describes in detail some months thereafter. The timing of a recent injury “discovered” early on 24 May falls squarely within that envisaged by Dr Cardwell’s expert opinion and follows an evening/ night where Mr F had been released from custody, having been deprived of both prescribed and illicit drugs for almost two days, Ms M was desperately seeking cocaine, Mr F actively denying taking the same (which I reject) and the flat was in such a significant state of disarray, including broken items and bottles, the following day, that it needed to be tidied before the police attended.

A further emergent pattern in Ms M’s evidence is her repeated attempts to draw additional individuals into the pool of potential perpetrators.

We have already seen this with the false accusations against Ms X and the involvement of her own mother. The same approach appears in her interactions with Ms I. She messaged others suggesting that Ms I had been alone with H during the critical period, creating the impression of opportunity where none existed. I consider that this was another clear attempt to divert attention away from herself and to create confusion around the timeline.

This conduct is revealing. It is not merely the act of someone unsure; it is the act of someone attempting to cast doubt, to obscure, to muddy the waters deliberately and to potentially blame others. In my judgment, these attempts to widen the pool add to the weight of evidence that Ms M was actively seeking to deflect responsibility.

When considering Ms M’s evidence it is clear that her lies were often unusually elaborate. They were not impulsive or ill-thought-out. They often included extraneous detail designed to lend credibility or to set the stage, a common trait when people are telling lies. When describing the fabricated fall to the police, for example, she included even the detail of what she bought at the shop and where she kept her phone. She also added emotional flourishes - anger, indignation, frustration - intended to bolster her false narrative and engender sympathy.

She also invented self-serving explanations, such as suggesting that during the [name] pub incident she was merely, and co-incidentally at the exact same time, “trying to get something, like wipes” when suspected of hiding the bag of heroin. Her capacity for invention, particularly when confronted with professional suspicion, is a striking feature of this case.

What this demonstrates is not simply a person who just lies reactively (which she also does) but a person who engages in carefully constructed deceit: deceit which is planned, detailed, and sustained. Her own mother accepted that she had always told lies and exaggerated.

The cumulative effect of Ms M’s dishonesty, inconsistency and manipulation is profound. Her evidence is so compromised that, save where independently corroborated, it cannot be relied upon. This is not due to cognitive difficulty or confusion; it is due to deliberate, sustained falsification of material facts. As was accurately stated by counsel for the Guardian, she is both “egocentric” and “a consummate liar.” The evidence supports the court’s finding that she is, in truth, a compulsive liar.

Her willingness to involve innocent individuals in her false narratives, to embroider her accounts with detail, to adapt her story each time she was challenged, and to maintain lies even in the face of incontrovertible evidence leaves her evidence in tatters.

Mr F’s evidence stands in contrast to that of Ms M. He is not a reliable historian, but nor is he a calculated manipulator of fact in the same way. His dishonesty is real, sometimes significant, but it is generally clumsy, inconsistent, and reflective of a life marked by chronic addiction, poor mental health, and a tendency to minimise or avoid difficult truths rather than to construct elaborate fictions. Mr F was a tragic character, it was clear that life for him has been extremely harsh and challenging and to his credit he accepts this and many of his shortcomings. He showed very clear and obvious pain, upset and concern for H in contrast to Ms M who appeared a colder and more unemotional person whilst giving evidence. Mr F was often upset and almost inconsolable, his overwhelming love for H and his wish for a better future for her than himself were honest and clear.

He accepted, both in his written and oral evidence, that his memory is poor owing to extensive drug use, addiction and mental health difficulties. He acknowledged that he sometimes experienced psychotic episodes during which he would remember nothing afterwards. This does not excuse his dishonesty, but it does contextualise it. Most of his untruths have the flavour of someone attempting to shield himself from criticism without fully grasping the implications of what he is saying.

Mr F denied owning the drugs in the bag he was arrested with at the pub and denied being either a violent person or domestically abusive. Yet his own admissions and the evidence of incidents paint a very different picture. On 17 June 2025 he threatened to “kick and smash” a pub staff member’s head in and spat at them. On 31 May 2025 he was arrested for threatening to kill Ms M and her mother. He appeared to have no recollection of these events, attributing his behaviour to periods when he had “completely lost it.”

Mr F’s temper - when fuelled by substance abuse or mental instability - was not theoretical. On 2 February 2026 he threatened to stab another resident, armed with a broken pool cue. The CCTV footage and photograph corroborate the reality of his violent outbursts. His ability to “walk away” from trouble, which he claimed, is not supported by the evidence.

In relation to drug use, Mr F was less evasive than Ms M but still minimised at times, such as after his release from custody. He denied knowingly using heroin, appeared in denial about his withdrawal symptoms, and generally understated the some of the problems associated with his substance use.

Yet, unlike Ms M, he did not exhibit the same level of intricate planning in his untruths. Rather, he regularly claimed to not remember events at all, or provided partial, muddled accounts that shifted each time he was confronted with inconsistencies. This is best illustrated by the differences between his first and second statements. His second statement, also filed many months late and explained on the basis of “improved memory”, was materially different from the first. Neither statement can be treated as contemporaneous or dependable.

He admitted that he would have lied if it meant H would not be removed from Ms M. He admitted to tidying the flat before professionals or police arrived, removing bottles, smashed glass and plates, conduct entirely consistent with concealment. He admitted that he had no explanation for why he did not contact Ms M or the hospital for several hours after learning of the injury. His explanations—that he had no money or phone, that he needed to “clear his head,” that he was “coming to terms” with the situation ring hollow. His avoidance suggests knowledge, discomfort, avoidance and an unwillingness to confront or assist professionals while the circumstances of the injury were being examined.

Mr F also failed to ask any questions at all about H’s condition, a striking omission for a parent learning of a serious head injury. This, too, supports the inference that he already knew more than he claimed and wished to distance himself from what was unfolding.

His claim that Ms M was under the influence of drugs and alcohol when H was injured is also revealing. He mentioned this at the hospital discharge meeting in November 2025, implying knowledge of the circumstances even then, despite claiming elsewhere that he knew nothing. Whether this reflects collusion, recollection, or an attempt to deflect blame is difficult to determine, but the inconsistency is telling.

Taken as a whole, Mr F’s evidence lacks coherence but is not wholly devoid of sincerity. He demonstrated visible distressed when speaking of H and appeared, at times, genuinely remorseful about the life he had been leading. But remorse does not equate to reliability. His narrative is simply too inconsistent, too incomplete, and too heavily marred by avoidance to be relied upon without corroboration.

Ms I:

Her demeanour was steady and thoughtful. She did not overreach her evidence. She accepted limitations in her knowledge and resisted being drawn into speculation. Her evidence was particularly persuasive in light of her own history with public law proceedings: she understood the seriousness of these events and approached her evidence accordingly. She bore no resentment despite being wrongly implicated by the mother. Her explanation of Ms M’s attempts to suggest she had sole care of the child on 24 May was both compelling and credible and is accepted by the court as is the balance of her evidence. She was impressive.

Maternal Grandmother:

The evidence in this case paints a portrait of two parents living in crisis, whose chaotic and substance-driven existence created conditions ripe for accident, neglect or impulsive harm. Both had opportunity to injure H during the relevant ten-day period. Neither provided a coherent or reliable narrative of events. Ms M, in particular, provided a kaleidoscope of false accounts, each adjusted to meet the challenges posed by the evidence. Mr F, meanwhile, provided incomplete, inconsistent and often self-serving accounts, punctuated by significant gaps in memory and marked avoidance.

Despite the troubling weight of evidence pointing towards Ms M - her lies, her behaviour, her early knowledge - I cannot, on the balance of probabilities, identify her as the perpetrator. Likewise, Mr F’s opportunity, behaviour, avoidance, and instability leave open the real possibility that he may have been involved.

The evidence does not allow me to exclude either parent. Nor does it allow me to positively identify one. The pool therefore remains two: the mother and the father.

I make the following specific findings, recording that the Local Authority have satisfied the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities:

The law that I must apply is contained in the Children Act 1989 (the Act), and H’s welfare are my paramount consideration. Under Section 31 of the Act, there is a threshold which the Local Authority must pass before the court can make the sort of order that it seeks, being a final care order that effectively removes H from the care and control of her parents. That threshold is that a court may only make a care order or a supervision order if it is satisfied that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm and that the harm or likelihood of harm is attributable to the care given to the child or likely to be given to her if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to her.

That threshold under Section 31 is passed in this case based on the facts which I have found regarding the injury. The making of a Special Guardianship Order is no longer opposed by Ms M, and Mr F now agrees with the Local Authority’s plans. The outstanding issues were whether there should be a Supervision Order and the level of contact. Despite this agreement, since this matter was contested by Ms M until towards the end of this hearing, with her still being clear that she did not agree with the proposed contact arrangements and was possibly still seeking rehabilitation at some point in the future, I consider it important that I should fully review the welfare position and not simply record the agreement, so a detailed analysis can be available in the future. Further, there is not an agreed threshold so I need to address that and make appropriate findings.

I start very clearly from the position that, wherever possible, children should be brought up by their natural parents and if not, by other members of their family. The state should not interfere in family life so as to separate children from their families unless it has been demonstrated to be both necessary and proportionate and that no other less radical form of order would achieve the essential aim of promoting their welfare. Although there is no plan for adoption of H, I have regard to all the relevant case law and in particular paragraphs 26-28 of Re B-S (citing Re B) which I summarise as follows:

In reaching my decisions as to the Special Guardianship Order, Supervision Order and contact I have considered that H’s welfare throughout her life is my paramount consideration and also the need to make the least interventionist order possible. I must consider the Article 8 rights of the adults and the child as any decision I make today will inevitably involve an interference with the right to respect to family life. I am very conscious that any orders I go on to make must be in accordance with law, necessary for the protection of the child’s rights and be proportionate.

I am also conscious that I must have in mind the general principle that any delay in determining the question is likely to prejudice the welfare of children.

Within Section 1 of the Act there is a checklist of factors which provides the final source of guidance for the court, regarding features to be considered when the court weighs up what order it should make in respect of the children. I will address the relevant facts which help me undertake that balancing exercise.

It is not for the court to look for a better placement for a child; social engineering is not permitted. In YC v United Kingdom [2012] 55 EHRR 967 it was said: “Family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and… everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, where appropriate, to ‘rebuild’ the family. It is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his upbringing.”

I am invited by the Local Authority, supported by the Guardian, and conceded by the parents to make a Special Guardianship Order in favour of the maternal aunt and uncle. I have considered the useful guidance in Re P-S (Children) [2018] EWCA Civ 1407. The law as to Special Guardianship is set out in Section 14A of the Children Act 1989. I give credit to Ms M for finally recognising that she is unable to care for her child but it is important that she should appreciate that on the basis of all of the evidence which I have seen and the findings which I have made, I would not have approved a plan of rehabilitation to her in any event, nor would I have made a final care order. If H was made subject to a full care order, she would remain a looked after a child. H is only approximately eighteen months old, and a plan of long-term foster care would require her to have ongoing professional involvement until she is eighteen. This is a long time to be subjected to professional scrutiny. H ideally needs permanency and a forever family of her own. Given the findings which I have made in relation to the injury, ongoing drug use and welfare issues as well as my very poor impression of Ms M, there is no prospect of any rehabilitation within any suitable timescale for H

I will firstly address the threshold findings as sought by the Local Authority. Mr F failed to respond to the threshold until December 2025 despite being ordered to do so. His one statement with response to threshold predates the final schedule of findings. I make the following specific findings, based upon the whole of the evidence and recording that the Local Authority have satisfied the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities:

ALLEGATIONS 10 – 11:

ALLEGATIONS 12 – 16:

ALLEGATIONS 17 – 20:

ALLEGATION 21:

I will now consider H’s welfare and her best interests.

Her needs; physical, emotional, educational are essentially those of any other child of her age, having regard to her age and characteristics. She needs attention to be paid to her physical and emotional health, she needs to be protected from harm, she needs to have opportunities to socialise and learn, and commitment from her carers to provide her with what she needs for the whole of her childhood.

Given the injuries H suffered in the care of her mother and father she is at risk of suffering further physical harm. Without an adequate explanation, and in view of their both remaining in the pool, failing to be honest and assist the court, failing to seek treatment and their collusion, she would remain at risk

The order which is sought in relation to H is a profound order which would result in the loss for her of a chance to be brought up by her own mother or father at this time. To make such an order I must be satisfied that it is both necessary and proportionate to the gravity of the harm which H would suffer if I do not. I have to be satisfied that all avenues have been explored to allow her to be cared for by her mother or father, including with the provision of appropriate services. A placement remaining with her present relative carer with whom she has lived since May 2025 is in my judgment the only available and suitable option for H. She will have the benefit of remaining within her family long term which is a great positive. She will have regular contact with her parents.

Where I disagree with the Local Authority is in relation to the need for a Supervision Order. This is sought by Ms M and the guardian. In considering the appropriate legal framework for H’s future care, I remind myself that a Special Guardianship Order is intended to provide a secure and enduring arrangement in which the special guardian exercises an enhanced degree of parental responsibility without the need for continuing state intervention. An SGO made alone therefore reflects the court’s confidence that the carers can meet the child’s needs safely and independently, with any necessary support being provided on a voluntary basis. The addition of a Supervision Order, by contrast, introduces an element of ongoing oversight by the Local Authority and is only justified where there are specific, identifiable matters requiring short-term monitoring or structured assistance that cannot adequately be addressed through informal support. An SGO combined with a SO should remain exceptional: it must be proportionate, time-limited, and grounded in clear evidence that the placement - while safe - is still developing and requires temporary professional involvement. Where such necessity is not established, the permanence and autonomy inherent in an SGO are best preserved by allowing the order to stand alone.

Having determined that a Special Guardianship Order in favour of the current carers is both necessary and proportionate to secure H’s long-term welfare, I must consider whether an SGO alone is sufficient to safeguard her immediate and ongoing needs, or whether the addition of a time-limited Supervision Order is required.

In this case, for the following reasons, I am satisfied that a Supervision Order is not merely desirable but necessary and that this is an exceptional case.

CONCLUSION

Contact with Ms M and Mr F is regularly taking place, supervised by the Local Authority. Ms M’s contact is presently 3 times each week for 2.5 hours. Mr F’s contact has been inconsistent. The Local Authority propose that this should change to monthly following a reduction plan, supervised by the Local Authority until wider family members can take over responsibility. Ms M initially sought for the contact to continue at a high level. This was, in my judgment, wholly unrealistic. The plan is not for H to be placed with her carers with a view for reconciliation to Ms M at some unspecified point in the future. If I approve the plans for H, and I do, then this is to be her final placement for the rest of her childhood. She needs to be aware that this is her permanent home, to invest in the same and to be allowed to settle. There needs to be a balance between maintaining her relationships with her birth parents and her need to settle and develop meaningful and natural relationships with her primary carers, and to not be tied down to a restrictive timetable of visits. A continuation of contact at anything like the level during proceedings would be counter productive for H and would unsettle her.

The Guardian agrees with the plans for contact to be monthly. The Local Authority and then the special guardians will be able to make suitable arrangements for contact as H grows and her needs change and such decisions would ultimately then be left in their hands. I accept that monthly contact is the appropriate level to balance her time, relationships and need for security and routine. Any change can be dealt with by agreement in the future at the discretion of the Special Guardians.

I record that the Threshold is crossed and make a Special Guardianship Order to the current carers approving the plans for living arrangements and contact. I make a Supervision Order for 12 months, not for the reasons Ms M truly seeks, being to support the development of her contact, but rather to protect H and her carers against both of these parents. I do not make any contact order. It is not necessary.