Valery Sawbridge, R (on the application of) v Leeds District Magistrates Court

On 24 September 2024 the Claimant was due to face trial before the Defendant Magistrates Court on three charges relating to his alleged conduct on 22 April 2023 and on 27 September 2023. The Claimant was not at court on that day. The Magistrates acceded to an application by the Interested Party (“the CPS”) to prove the case against the Claimant in his absence under the Magistrates Courts Act 1980, section 11. They found him guilty and sentenced him. By this claim the Claimant seeks judicial review of those decisions, and the quashing of his conviction and sentence. He remains aggrieved by his conviction and contends that it is affecting his job prospects.

The Claimant has represented himself throughout the criminal proceedings and these proceedings. Russian, not English, is his first language. He has proceeded using a combination of on-line translation tools and court interpreters. It is clear to me that he has done his best to advance his position before the Magistrates and this court. However, there are issues as to whether he has properly sought to exhaust the other potential remedies available to him, namely an appeal against his conviction to the Crown Court or an application to the Magistrates Court to re-open his conviction under the Magistrates Courts Act 1980, section 142. He has also issued multiple claims for judicial review as explained below.

The Defendant, as a court, has not participated in the proceedings. The Claimant initially sued the West Yorkshire Enforcement and Collection Centre as a Second Defendant. They are solely responsible for the enforcement of the financial penalties ordered against the Claimant on his conviction. Again, they have played no role in the proceedings. However, I have been greatly assisted by the concise and fair submissions from counsel on behalf of the CPS.

At around 8.15 pm on 22 April 2023, there was an incident between PC Baldwin of the West Yorkshire Police and the Claimant. PC Baldwin had followed the Claimant, who was driving his car into a Sainsburys supermarket car park in Wakefield.

There is a stark dispute of fact as to what happened between PC Baldwin and the Claimant and it is no part of this court’s role to seek to determine it.

It is sufficient for present purposes to record that on 23 April 2023 West Yorkshire police officers charged the Claimant with (i) using threatening or abusive words or behaviour within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress, contrary to section 5(1) of the Public Order Act 1986; and (ii) failing without reasonable excuse to cooperate with a preliminary drugs test, contrary to section 6(6) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.

On 23 May 2023, the Claimant attended Leeds Magistrates’ Court for the first hearing in the proceedings. The Claimant was not legally represented. He was not formally identified and did not enter a plea. The case was adjourned.

The CPS’s position is that the next hearing in the case was listed for 14 July 2023. The Claimant contends that he was never informed of this hearing date and that the Magistrates later accepted that this was the case. The case was adjourned again to 27 September 2023.

On 27 September 2023 the Claimant did not attend court. The Claimant indicates that he had not been made aware of this hearing either. On this occasion, a warrant without bail was issued for his arrest for failing to surrender.

On 4 October 2023 the Claimant attended court having been arrested and detained in custody. He was not legally represented. An interpreter was present via video link. The Claimant did not enter a plea and a not guilty plea was entered on his behalf. A trial date was fixed for 10 January 2024. The Claimant indicated to the Magistrates that he had already arranged to be abroad on that day but the date remained. The Claimant was informed that he would need to instruct his own legal representatives.

A Bail Notice dated 4 October 2023 indicates that the Claimant was released by the court on conditional bail to attend a trial listed for 10 January 2024. The sole bail condition imposed on the Claimant was to report to Normanton Police Station between 12 pm and 4 pm on 5 January 2024. The reason given for such a condition was “to ensure appearance”.

At some point in late November 2023 the Claimant received a “thick bundle of papers” from the CPS, none of which had been translated into Russian. It is not clear to me why the Claimant had not sought to instruct a solicitor, privately or through legal aid, if this was available to him, who would have been able to assist him in arranging such interpretation and given him advice as to next steps on the Magistrates Court.

On 9 January 2024, the Claimant filed a judicial review claim at the Administrative Court in London. The claim was given the case number AC-2024-LON-000091.

This claim raised a series of procedural and human rights challenges to the Magistrates Court proceedings. The Claimant challenged the bail condition imposed on him on 4 October 2023, the Defendant’s decision to enter a plea on his behalf, the lack of translation of documentation for him, the lack of free legal assistance to assist him and the fixing of a trial date which it was known he could not attend due to being out of the country.

The Claimant sought urgent consideration and interim relief because the trial was due to take place the following day, in a manner which he said would be unfair. It appears that no order was made on that application by the Administrative Court, because during the day of 9 January 2024, the Magistrates vacated the 10 January 2024 trial date and new trial date was set for 19 April 2024. The urgent element of the Claimant’s application had therefore fallen away.

On 29 January 2024 the CPS filed an Acknowledgment of Service and Summary Grounds, resisting claim AC-2024-LON-000091. Under CPR PD 54C, Administrative Court claims should be commenced in the court for the region with which the claim has the “closest connection”. The Claimant had issued AC-2024-LON-000091 in London because he said that he had an ongoing complaint against the judiciary and court staff of the High Court in Leeds, and it was therefore necessary in order to avoid bias or a conflict of interest that his claim was adjudicated on outside Yorkshire.

The court could find no such records of this complaint, although the Claimant had provided a complaint number and the relevant dates on which it had been submitted. For the reasons given in a judgment handed down on 26 March 2024 (see [2024] EWHC 694 (Admin)), Fordham J ordered that the claim be transferred to Leeds. At [4], he said that he could see no basis for any conclusion or objectively justified perception that judges sitting in the Administrative Court in Leeds could not deal properly, justly or appropriately with the Claimant’s claim and that the same applied to court staff. On transfer to Leeds the claim was given the new claim number of AC-2024-LDS-000073.

On 18 April 2024, the Claimant filed a second judicial review claim at the Administrative Court in London. The claim was given the case number AC-2024-LON-001320.

This claim raised further procedural and human rights challenges to the Magistrates Court proceedings. The Claimant challenged the alleged failure by the Magistrates Court to respond to his application dated 9 January 2024 for remote hearing, the decision to impose a retrospective bail condition on him and the service on him by the CPS of video evidence in a format that he said was inaccessible.

Again, the Claimant sought urgent consideration and interim relief because the trial was due to take place the following day. The application came before Lang J during 18 April 2024. She adjourned the trial listed for 19 April 2024 “until the determination of the Claimant’s claims for judicial review: AC-2024-LDS-000073 and AC-2024-LON-001320”. She did so on the basis that:

In light of Lang J’s order, on 19 April 2024, the Defendant adjourned the trial listed for that day.

Lang J transferred claim AC-2024-LON-001320 to Leeds and ordered that it be joined with AC-2024-LDS-000073. On transfer to Leeds claim AC-2024-LON-001320 was given the new claim number of AC-2024-LDS-000083.

On 8 August 2024, HHJ Saffman sitting as a Judge of the High Court made two orders: in AC-2024-LDS-000073, he refused the Claimant permission on the papers; and in AC-2024-LDS-000083, he ordered the Claimant to provide further particulars of his claim in the form of a witness statement, after provision of which the case would be re-referred to a Judge for a decision on permission. These orders were sent to the parties on, respectively, 13 and 15 August 2024. They were also sent to the Magistrates Court by the Administrative Court on these dates.

On 20 August 2024, the Claimant filed a Form 86B to renew his claim for permission in AC-2024-LDS-000073 at an oral hearing. On 29 August 2024, the Claimant filed a witness statement in purported compliance with HHJ Saffman’s order in AC-2024-LDS-000083.

As far as the Defendant and the CPS were concerned, the Claimant’s trial was due to take place before the Magistrates Court on 24 September 2024. In addition to the two charges referred to at [6] above the Claimant had also been charged with an offence under the Bail Act 1976, relating to his failure to surrender to bail on 27 September 2023.

The Claimant did not attend court on 24 September 2024.

During the hearing before me on 23 April 2026, the Claimant suggested that he had never been told he had to attend on 24 September 2024. I drew to his attention the notice extending his bail from 18 April 2024 until 24 September 2024, requiring him to surrender for his trial at 10.00 am on that day, which was appended to the Defendant’s Acknowledgment of Service. He provided evidence suggesting that the Defendant had not served this on him when serving the Acknowledgment of Service.

The Claimant addressed this issue further in a detailed witness statement provided after the 23 April 2026 hearing. He reiterated that he had not received this notice either from the Magistrates Court in 2024, or when the Acknowledgment of Service was served in 2025. He pointed to the earlier occasion on 27 July 2023 another occasion when the Magistrates Court had failed to inform him of a hearing; and another occasion when they had failed to serve a document on him in these proceedings, namely the 6 March 2026 email referred to at [56] below. More generally, he made the point, and I consider that there is force in this, that had he known of the 24 September 2024 trial date, he would have attended to ensure the trial did not go ahead in light of Lang J’s order.

The Claimant not having attended the trial, the CPS made an application to prove the offences in his absence. This was granted. The case was presented and the Claimant was found guilty on all three charges. He was sentenced in his absence to a £440 fine and licence endorsement with four penalty points for the charge of failure to provide a specimen; and a £220 fine for the bail offence. No separate penalty was imposed on the public order offence. He was also ordered to pay a contribution to prosecution costs of £200 and a victim surcharge order of £264.

On 10 January 2025, the Claimant filed this judicial review claim, his third. This time he filed it at the Administrative Court in Manchester. The court staff recorded that they had issued it “on insistence” of the Claimant despite the fact that they had advised him it should be filed in Leeds. The claim was given the case number AC-2025-MAN-000007.

This claim took issue with what had happened in the Magistrates Court on 24 September 2024. Shortly after that date, the Claimant had received two letters which had been generated as a result of his trial. The first was headed “Notice of Financial Penalty”. It informed him of the two fines that had been imposed as well as the victim surcharge and the costs order that had been made, indicating that he had to pay a total of £1,124 by 22 October 2024. The second informed him of the endorsement of his driving licence with four points.

Neither of these letters referred to the fact that the case had been proved against the Claimant in his absence or that he had been found guilty. Because no further penalty had been imposed on the section 5 offence, there was no mention of this offence in the documentation. The Claimant was plainly confused and concerned as to what had happened on 24 September 2024. He could not understand why financial penalties had been imposed on him when he had not had a trial at which he had presented his case.

His grounds in AC-2025-MAN-000007 were therefore initially advanced on the basis that the Claimant had not been convicted at all. He now accepts that he had been convicted, albeit in his absence. The thrust of this claim is that it was procedurally unfair for the case to have proceeded on 24 September 2024 given Lang J’s order, and because the judicial review proceedings in AC-2024-LDS-000073 and AC-2024-LDS-000083 had not yet been finally determined.

On 24 January 2025 a minded to transfer order was made by a court lawyer in accordance with the process set out in the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2025 (“the Guide”) at paragraph 7.7.5. This was not opposed and the case was transferred to Leeds.

On transfer to Leeds claim AC-2025-MAN-000007 was given the new claim number of AC-2025-LDS-000018.

On 3 February 2025 the CPS filed an Acknowledgment of Service and Summary Grounds, resisting claim AC-2025-LDS-000018. This made the point that the Claimant had not properly sought to exhaust the other potential remedies available to him.

On 7 February 2025, HHJ Jackson sitting as a Judge of the High Court refused permission on AC-2025-LDS-000018 on the basis that the Claimant had alternative remedies available to him. This order was sent to the parties on 27 February 2025.

On the same day, HHJ Jackson made orders (i) addressing various further issues that had arisen in AC-2024-LDS-000073, and ordering that the Claimant’s renewed application for permission was listed for hearing; and (ii) finding that AC-2024-LDS-000083 had been automatically struck out on the basis of the Claimant’s failure to serve his witness statement dated 29 August 2024 on the Defendant and the CPS, as HHJ Saffman had directed.

On 6 March 2025, the Claimant filed a Form 86B to renew his claim for permission in AC-2025-LDS-000018 at an oral hearing; and an application notice seeking to set aside HHJ Jackson’s strike out order in AC-2024-LDS-000083. He argued that he had in fact complied with HHJ Saffman’s order.

All three of the Claimant’s claims were listed for hearing on 11 November 2025. This hearing was adjourned on the Claimant’s application and re-listed for 20 January 2026 before me.

Very shortly before the hearing on 20 January 2026 the Claimant filed a bundle and skeleton argument. In this, he contended for the first time that he had in fact sought to pursue both the appeal and section 142 routes. He appended documentation to support his position, including correspondence with both the Magistrates and Crown Courts. He also advanced a series of legal propositions, again for the first time, to the effect that the existence of these remedies did not preclude him obtaining permission or indeed relief in a judicial review claim.

Although the CPS were unable to make proper inquiries as to what had happened with any appeal or section 142 application, given the late service of this material, they were content for the hearing to proceed.

At the end of the hearing on 20 January 2026, I granted the Claimant permission on AC-2025-LDS-000018. He agreed to withdraw AC-2024-LDS-000073 and his application to reinstate AC-2024-LDS-000083 on the basis that those claims had now become academic: this as because if a fresh trial was ordered in the Magistrates Court Was a result of the Claimant succeeding in AC-2025-LDS-000018, then the procedural issues he had complained of in AC-2024-LDS-000073 and AC-2024-LDS-000083 could be addressed in the fresh trial. I also made directions for the provision of further information by the Defendant about the appeal and section 142 issues.

The Magistrates Courts Act 1980, section 11 provides in material part as follows:

Section 142 provides in material part that:

Under section 108:

The Criminal Procedure Rules 2025, part 34, make further provision for appeals from the Magistrates Court to the Crown Court. The standard appeal form includes wording at the top of the first page indicating to individuals that they may not need to appeal and should consider the section 142 remedy.

The issues that require resolution are as follows:

I address them in turn.

In serving its Acknowledgment of Service, the Defendant did not provide any information about what had happened on 24 September 2024, but simply provided the bail notice referred to at [27] above. It would have been of assistance to have had, for example, a record of the Magistrates’ reasons for proceeding in the Claimant’s absence.

However, the prosecutor’s note of the hearing records the following:

“Lay bench” in the above note reflects that the Magistrates bench consisted of non-legally qualified magistrates, assisted by a legal adviser.

“DNA unrep” indicates that the Claimant had not attended the trial and that he was not represented.

The CPS have explained that “taken from court 8” reflects that the case had been transferred between courtrooms at the Magistrates Court shortly before the hearing. It was not clear why the transfer had occurred, but this is a regular practice in the Magistrates Court: cases are often moved to ensure the lists of cases are dealt with on the day and to avoid adjournments. The result is that often the Magistrates Court legal adviser and prosecutor will receive the file with little notice and have limited time to review the papers before the case is dealt with.

The CPS highlighted there was no reference in the prosecutor’s note of the 24 September 2024 hearing to the existence of Lang J’s order. They therefore suggested in their Summary Grounds that it could be inferred that the Magistrates’ decision to permit the prosecutor to prove the case in the Claimant’s absence was made without knowledge of the existence of Lang J’s order. As the CPS observed at [27] of the Summary Grounds, it appeared “implausible that the court’s legal adviser and prosecutor would continue in the knowledge that such a relevant High Court order existed”.

Further information has now been provided by the Magistrates Court, in compliance with my 20 January 2026 directions, by an email dated 6 March 2026 from the Acting Senior Legal Manager for the Court. It would have been preferable if this evidence had been provided in a witness statement supported by a statement of truth, but in fairness my directions did not specifically require that. I am therefore content to take it into account in determining this claim. In essence, the email presented a very different position to that set out in [55] above. It said the following:

The order referred to was the order HHJ Saffman made on 8 August 2024 in AC-2024-LDS-000073 referred to at [23] above.

The 6 March 2026 email summarised at [56] above makes clear that in deciding to proceed in the Claimant’s absence, the Magistrates knew of Lang J’s order; and knew something of the judicial review proceedings.

However, what appears to have happened is that the Magistrates were misled by their legal adviser who was, as Mr Lee for the CPS said in [29] of his Skeleton Argument, “under the mistaken impression [that] the judicial review proceedings were concluded”. The mistake was in two respects.

First, HHJ Saffman’s order dated 8 August 2024 did not finally determine claim AC-2024-LDS-000073. All it did was refuse the Claimant permission on the papers. Under CPR 54.12(3), the Claimant had the right to request that the decision on permission be reconsidered at a hearing. In fact, during the 23 April 2026 hearing the Claimant provided email correspondence suggesting that on 20 August 2024 he had emailed the Magistrates Court the notice of renewal referred to at [24] above, such that they were aware that he had sought to exercise his right under CPR 54.12(3). In any event, it was wrong for the legal adviser to conclude that HHJ Saffman’s 8 August 2024 order meant that claim AC-2024-LDS-000073 had been determined and to advise the Magistrates of the same.

Second, Lang J’s order made clear that the Claimant had a second judicial review claim outstanding. This was the claim that became claim AC-2024-LDS-000083. The 6 March 2026 email referred to at [56] above does not refer to the second claim at all. Accordingly, it appears that on 24 September 2024, the Magistrates did not have any evidence before them about this second claim, even though they had been sent a copy of HHJ Saffman’s 8 August 2024 order by the Administrative Court: see [23] above. They could not, therefore, have been satisfied that claim AC-2024-LDS-000083 had been finally determined. In fact, it had not been: on 29 August 2024, the Claimant had filed a witness statement in purported compliance with HHJ Saffman’s 8 August 2024 order (see [24] above) but this had not yet been reviewed by a judge. Accordingly, claim AC-2024-LDS-000083 also remained live before the Administrative Court.

I do not consider that the Magistrates were acting in bad faith or vindictively towards the Claimant as he contends. There is simply no evidence of this nor any reasonable basis for inferring such conduct by them. Rather, the obvious conclusion and the one I reach is that the Magistrates were inadvertently misled by their legal adviser: he or she wrongly thought HHJ Saffman’s order meant that claim AC-2024-LDS-000073 had concluded and failed to enquire about the status of AC-2024-LDS-000083, or indeed notice that Lang J’s order referred to a second claim.

It also appears highly unlikely that the solicitor representing the CPS had any knowledge at all of Lang J’s order or the progress of the judicial review proceedings: as an officer of the court they would have had to take particular care to ensure that the order was complied with. Mr Lee explained that the solicitor in court on 24 September 2024 was not the reviewing lawyer on this case who might have had some knowledge of the background, but someone attending at court on that day to prosecute for the CPS who would not necessarily have had any prior dealings with the case. Having been instructed at the last minute (see [54] above), it seems more likely, as Mr Lee contended, that they were focussing on what evidence to call if the application to proceed in the Claimant’s absence was granted.

However, Lang J’s order, which was still effective on 24 September 2024, dictated that fairness required that the Claimant’s trial in the Magistrates Court did not take place until both his judicial review challenges had been determined. That was not the case.

Accordingly, the Magistrates erred in concluding that it was “in the interests of justice” to proceed in the Claimant’s absence for the purposes of section 11(1)(b): rather, it was contrary to the interests of justice to do so. The decision to proceed was vitiated by a mistaken understanding of the law and facts provided to them by their legal adviser; it was procedurally improper; and it was unfair. It was therefore unlawful.

For those reasons, Issue (1) is resolved in the Claimant’s favour.

As noted at [2] above, the Claimant had open to him two alternative remedies, namely an appeal against his conviction to the Crown Court or an application to the Magistrates Court to re-open his conviction under the Magistrates Courts Act 1980, section 142. While I was not persuaded that the existence of these alternative remedies justified a refusal of permission, the question that now arises is the extent to which the existence of either justifies a refusal of relief to the Claimant, such relief always being a matter of the court’s discretion.

The suitable alternative remedy principle was explained by Sales LJ (as he then was) in R (Glencore Energy UK Ltd) v HMRC [2017] EWCA Civ 1716, [2017] 4 WLR 213 thus:

The Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2025 at paragraph 6.3.3 distils the principle in this way:

As explained at [46] above, the Claimant has the right to appeal his conviction and sentence to the Crown Court under the Magistrates Court At 1980, section 108.

The evidence before this court now confirms that he tried to do so.

On 25 December 2024 he sent a 30-page document entitled “appeal to Crown Court” to Bradford Crown Court. The Claimant had completed the correct form for such an appeal under Crim PR 34.3. In the grounds he attached to the form, he contended that he had not been properly convicted and complained about the sentence he had been given. He provided various documents including Lang J’s order. The CPS cannot find any documentation to show the Claimant served his application to appeal against conviction on the CPS as he should have done.

Be that as it may, on 30 December 2024 Bradford Crown Court forwarded the appeal to Leeds Crown Court. On 4 January 2025 the Claimant made a separate attempt to lodge his appeal by sending it directly to Leeds Crown Court. On 6 January 2025 Leeds Crown Court forwarded the email including the Claimant’s appeal to Leeds Magistrates Court, copying him in, and saying as follows:

At [12] of his witness statement dated 16 February 2026 the Claimant contends that thereafter nothing happened with his appeal to the Crown Court: he indicates he does not remember receiving any further response from either the Magistrates Court or the Crown Court about it.

However, in the 6 March 2026 email, the Acting Senior Legal Manager for the Magistrates Court reported that the Crown Court has said that it had written to the Claimant on 16 January 2025 but had “had no response since then so no appeal case has been created”. The email quoted what the Crown Court had apparently said to the Claimant in the 16 January 2025 correspondence, as follows:

I struggle to understand the content of the 16 January 2025 communication because the Claimant had set out his reasons for seeking an extension of time to appeal at page 2 of the appeal form. It is also not clear to me whether the Claimant accepts receiving the 16 January 2025 communication and whether he accepts he did not reply to it.

In light of the evidence set out at [70]-[76] above, it is clear that the Claimant sought to exercise his right to appeal to the Crown Court but that there has been no judicial determination on the merits of his appeal, perhaps because the Claimant did not respond to the Crown Court’s 16 January 2025 communication or otherwise seek to progress his appeal.

However, the Claimant quite rightly relies on caselaw to the effect that the existence of the right of appeal to the Crown Court should not ordinarily weigh against the grant of relief in judicial review proceedings; and indeed that judicial review is a more appropriate remedy for the sort of procedural unfairness alleged by the Claimant than such an appeal.

The key case is Rowlands v Hereford Magistrates Court [1997] EWHC Admin 119, [1997] 2 Cr App 340. At [3]-[4], the Divisional Court observed that where the complaint is that the magistrates made an error of fact or mixed fact and law, the “ordinary” avenue of appeal for a defendant is an appeal to the Crown Court; and where the complaint is that the magistrates made an error of law or acted in excess of their jurisdiction, the defendant should appeal by way of case stated.

At [22], having reviewed the caselaw, including R v Wandsworth Justices ex parte Read [1942] 1 KB 281 and Rigby v Woodward [1957] 1 WLR 250, the Court concluded that where the defendant alleges unfairness, bias or procedural irregularity by the magistrates, they should apply for judicial review. To preclude the defendant from applying for judicial review because of the right of appeal to the Crown Court would be to:

At [23], the Court sounded two notes of caution, namely that (i) “immaterial and minor deviations from best practice” would not have the effect of vitiating the proceedings in the magistrates’ court; and the High Court “should be respectful of discretionary decisions of magistrates’ courts as of all other courts”; and (ii) the decision whether or not to grant relief by way of judicial review is “always, in the end, a discretionary one” and “[many factors may properly influence the exercise of discretion”.

In Taylor on Criminal Appeals (Third Edition, 2022) at paragraph 1-12, the writer confirms that “[w]here there is a hearing and the defence were simply denied the opportunity of being heard in breach of natural justice, an application for judicial review and a quashing order would be most appropriate”, citing Read (see [80] above).

The caselaw was summarised recently by Eyre J in R (Ford) v Coventry Magistrates Court [2025] EWHC 843 (Admin). At [32] he distilled the relevant principle thus:

This approach reflects a wider public law principle to the effect that “a person is entitled to be treated fairly at all relevant decision-making stages”: R (Citizens UK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWHC 1812, [2018] 4 WLR 123 at [94], per Singh LJ.

The Claimant’s case involved procedural impropriety and an inability for him to present his defence to the Magistrates. In those circumstances, applying the principles set out above, he was entitled to apply for judicial review and the existence of his right to appeal to the Crown Court does not justify a refusal of relief.

In the 6 March 2026 email, the Acting Senior Legal Manager for the Magistrates Court said that:

The CPS cannot find any documentation to show the Claimant served any section 142 application to re-open his case on the CPS.

In contrast, at [2]-[3] of his witness statement dated 16 February 2026 the Claimant contends that on 24 October 2024, he hand-delivered a three-page letter to Leeds Magistrates Court, which sought to make a section 142 application. He was accompanied by his friend. Mr Lee made the point that the Claimant is a regular user of email and it was perhaps surprising that he had made this application in person. The Claimant said that he made the application in person as he did not want it to get lost in the post or on email; and pointed to certain applications he has made in these proceedings by filing documents in person.

It therefore remains unclear whether the Claimant has in fact made a section 142 application: either the Claimant is wrong when he says he filed it, or the court has misplaced it.

What does seem clear is that even if the Claimant did file the application on 24 October 2024 as he says he did, he has not followed it up with the Magistrates Court, even when the CPS highlighted in their Summary Grounds filed on 3 February 2025 (see [36] above) that his failure to pursue this route was an issue in the judicial review proceedings. I say this because despite the volume of paperwork in this case, including a hearing bundle of over 500 pages, I was not taken to any item of correspondence from the Claimant after 24 October 2024 asking the Magistrates Court what was happening with his application.

The Claimant relies on the email from Leeds Crown Court to Leeds Magistrates Court dated 6 January 2025 referred to at [73] above as justifying his own lack of further communication with the Magistrates Court about the s.142 application. In that email, the Crown Court enclosed his appeal document and indicated that on receipt the magistrates would either decide whether to reconsider the case or to progress his appeal. It is the Claimant’s position that the Crown Court was in some way “directing” the Magistrates Court to progress his section 142 application.

In my judgement that is not a fair reading of the email: the Crown Court was simply forwarding the appeal document to the Magistrates Court and explaining to the Claimant what they would decide to do in response to it. On receipt of the document, the Magistrates Court plainly treated it as an appeal, as reflected by the next steps they took as set out at [75] above. I remain of the view that it was the Claimant’s responsibility to liaise with the court as to the progress of his section 142 application.

The caselaw cited under (iii) above is clear that the existence of the right of appeal to the Crown Court should not generally be a basis for denying a judicial review claimant relief.

However, an application under section 142 is very different to an appeal. Section 142 is intended to enable the prompt rectification of a “mistake” by a Magistrates Court. It operates in “limited” circumstances and is not an “expansive” power; it is “generally and correctly regarded as a slip rule” and does not extend “beyond a situation akin to mistake”: R (Williamson) v City of Westminster Magistrates Court [2012] EWHC 1444 (Admin), [2012] 2 Cr App R 24 at [31]-[33], citing in various respects R v Croydon Crown Court, ex parte DPP [1997] 2 Cr App R 411 at [13].

In Williamson, the Divisional Court considered whether section 142 could be used to allow an unequivocal guilty plea to be set aside. The Court held that there might be circumstances where this was the case: for example, where a guilty plea had been entered to an offence unknown to the law; where a jurisdictional bar was not appreciated by the defendant relating, for example, to a time limit or the identity of a prosecutor; or where the proceedings were, in truth, a nullity: Williamson at [36].

On the particular, and rather unusual, facts of this case, a section 142 application was an appropriate alternative remedy. I say this not least because the CPS accepts that on 24 September 2024 the Magistrates did make a mistake with respect to the facts and law surrounding the Claimant’s judicial review proceedings.

The Claimant could have obtained through the section 142 route exactly what he seeks in these proceedings, namely a quashing of his conviction and sentence. His right of appeal to the Crown Court would have been fully preserved, so he would not have been prejudiced in any way. Achieving these outcomes would have been much cheaper and quicker for all concerned. Section 142 applications are specifically “designed to deal with an obvious mischief: namely the waste of time, energy and resources in correcting clear mistakes made in the magistrates courts by using appellate or review proceedings”: Williamson at [31].

Indeed, had the Claimant progressed the section 142 application shortly after he became aware of what happened on 24 September 2024, it is a reasonable inference that it would have been determined by the Magistrates Court at some point in the first half of 2025 and any fresh trial would likely have taken place by now.

For these reasons, the section 142 application in this case falls within the suitable alternative remedy principle described by Sales LJ in Glencore, at [68] above: it was the “particular sort of procedure or remedy” that was “appropriate” to the Claimant’s case; and yet the Claimant has failed properly to pursue it. Accordingly, this court should be “slow to conclude in its discretion that the public interest is so pressing that it ought to intervene to exercise its judicial review function along with or instead of that statutory procedure”.

In deciding how to exercise the discretion with respect to relief, it is also relevant that, to some degree, the Claimant’s own conduct has contributed to the position he finds himself in. His initiation and conduct of multiple judicial review proceedings, alongside his failure to progress the section 142 application, has contributed to significant delay (albeit that some delay has been caused by court resourcing issues): see [37]-[43] above. It could therefore be said, as Mr Lee quite fairly posited, that to grant the Claimant relief effectively “rewards” him for this unhelpful conduct.

However, on balance, I am satisfied that the discretion to order relief should be exercised in the Claimant’s favour, for the following reasons.

First, the Claimant was convicted and sentenced in a procedurally unfair way and there is a public interest in that unlawful decision being corrected as soon as possible.

Second, the reality is that even if a fresh trial were to take place within the next three months in the Magistrates Court, it would still be over three years from the events that led to two of the three charges the Claimant faced, about which PC Baldwin will need to give evidence again.

The public interest requires that criminal proceedings are conducted expeditiously, not least because memories fade and because both victims and defendants have the right to determination of a criminal charge as soon as reasonably practicable. This is reflected in the overriding objective of the Criminal Procedure Rules which provides that dealing with a criminal case “justly” includes “dealing with the case efficiently and expeditiously”: Crim PR 1.1(2)(f).

Third, refusing the Claimant relief on the grounds that he should now initiate a fresh section 142 application or seek to progress his existing one will simply add to this delay. Mr Lee told me that it may take several months for a section 142 application to be listed before the Magistrates Court. The Magistrates would then need to be made aware of the relatively complex procedural history set out above and determine the application, before any fresh trial could take place. In my judgement such a course is not consistent with the interests of the parties or the overall public interest on the facts of this case.

Fourth, as Sales LJ made clear in Glencore, part of the rationale for the suitable alternative remedy principle is that it avoids “expensive duplication of the effort which may be required if two sets of procedures are followed in relation to the same underlying subject matter”. This is similar to the observation in Williamson at [31], cited at [96] above.

Now that the Claimant’s judicial review claim has been determined, there has been extensive judicial resource expended on determining the relatively complex factual background to the Claimant’s claims and, insofar as it has been possible to do so, exactly what happened on 24 September 2024. All of these processes would need to be duplicated if I required the Claimant to take recourse in a section 142 application. That is contrary to the rationale set out in Glencore.

Fifth, it appears likely that the Magistrates would accede to a section 142 application if it was made. On that basis there is no prejudice to the CPS in granting the Claimant the same relief now, nor did Mr Lee contend otherwise. Indeed, it could be said that such a course assists the CPS as, if a fresh trial takes place as a direct result of my judgment, it should enable their witnesses to give evidence more promptly than would otherwise be the case, if a section 142 application was required first.

For all those reasons, the existence of the Claimant’s right to make an application under section 142, whether he has already sought to exercise it or not, does not justify a refusal of relief on this claim.

Accordingly, for all these reasons, the Claimant’s claim succeeds. I quash his conviction and sentence and the financial penalties imposed on him.

It follows that the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority must remove the penalty points from the Claimant’s driving licence forthwith; and that the West Yorkshire Enforcement and Collection Centre must stop enforcing the financial penalties against him.

If there is to be fresh trial of the charges faced by the Claimant, in light of the delay that has occurred to date, it would be in the public interest for that to take place as soon as possible.