HPT, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In this case, the claimant sought permission to apply for a mandatory order for his release from immigration detention, a declaration, costs and damages. He sought urgency and an interim order directing the defendant to release him to a suitable bail address (as a destitute asylum seeker, he is eligible for section 95 accommodation once released from detention).

This case came before Ms Susie Alegre, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, on 19 March 2026. Ms Alegre considered the case on the papers, granted urgency, and directed the case be listed with a time estimate of three hours for consideration of anonymity, permission, and interim relief.

The case came before me on Tuesday this week, 14 April. Three preliminary matters fell to be considered; (i) an anonymity application made on behalf of the claimant; (ii) the claimant's application of the day before, 13 April 2026, for an order granting permission to rely on witness statements of the claimant and his representative in support of his application for permission to apply for judicial review; and (iii) the defendant's application dated 8 April 2026, sealed on 13 April 2026, for the redaction of names of civil servants who fall outside the grades that comprise senior civil service ("junior civil servants" or “JCSs”) and other redactions.

The hearing began late because the claimant was produced at court in custody and it was necessary to move to a court with a secure dock before the case could proceed. By the time the parties' submissions concluded shortly before 4 pm, I considered the most appropriate course was to notify the parties of the outcome of all issues, save for the issue of redaction of documents.

The redaction application had been sent to me at 16.45 hours on 13 April, unaccompanied by any authorities or submissions on the lawfulness of redaction of documents, notwithstanding that it, ostensibly, raised important novel issues of law of public importance given the derogation from open justice and open government sought. I heard oral submissions on the issue from Ms Masood but considered that the Defendant should be afforded the opportunity of making amplified submissions in writing before I determined that issue.

At and following the hearing, I made the following rulings. First, before embarking on substantive discussion, (i) I granted the claimant anonymity; (ii) I granted the claimant permission to rely on the two statements.

Second, following the hearing, I, (iii), granted permission to the claimant to apply for judicial review on all grounds; (iv) refused the claimant's application for interim relief, but I directed that the substantive hearing should be listed on an expedited basis and, having made enquiries of the list office, informed the parties that I considered the hearing should be listed in the week of 18 May 2026; (v) directed the defendant should make further submissions in writing, if so advised, by 4pm on 16 April 2026 on the issue of redactions, so that I could consider them before the hand-down of the reasons and judgment; and (vi) directed the case be listed today for me to set out my reasons for those decisions and my judgement in respect of the redaction application. I gave the claimant permission to attend today's hearing via PVL and he has attended.

These are my reasons for those decisions and my judgment in respect of the redaction application.

The claimant is an asylum seeker. There is evidence that naming the claimant will increase the risk he would face if returned to his country of origin. The claim relies on personal medical and sensitive information in which the claimant has a reasonable expectation of privacy. The defendant has said that she is neutral in respect of the application. In my judgment, there are compelling reasons for the limited derogation from the principle of open justice that an anonymity order in respect of the claimant will entail. Accordingly, the claimant has been anonymised as "HPT".

This application was unopposed and the application is granted.

The claim comprised three grounds for permission to apply for judicial review: ground one, breach of the Hardial-Singh principles; ground two, breach of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; ground three, breach of the Defendant’s Adults at Risk in Immigration Detention policy (“AAR policy”) and Tameside duty.

There was also an additional claim, unlawfulness of the claimant's first period of detention from October 2024 to March 2025. This is described as an "additional claim". The parties agree that it is earmarked as only being relevant in the event of a transfer of the claim to the county court for assessment of damages. I need say no more about it.

The claimant arrived in the United Kingdom by small boat from France on 31 May 2021 and claimed asylum upon arrival. He is from Iraq, although he claims to have been born in Iran.

On 28 September 2021, the claimant was convicted of theft at Harrow Crown Court and sentenced to six weeks' imprisonment. He was taken to His Majesty's Prison, Wormwood Scrubs, and released the same day. The defendant took no deportation action at that time.

During 2021, the claimant began reporting mental health symptoms, including auditory hallucinations. On 2 January 2022, the Metropolitan Police cautioned the claimant for criminal damage. By early 2022, his records indicated a history of threatening self-harm and suicide within asylum accommodation. He reported a suicide attempt by jumping from a hotel roof and received a prescription for olanzapine.

On 13 May 2022, police attended the claimant's Colchester Hotel after he threatened a staff member with a knife and expressed suicidal intent. Witnesses described him as, "manic and frantic", with rigid limbs. Officers detained him under section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983. He resisted and spat at officers during transport.

After being sedated and discharged from hospital, he returned to the hotel and racially abused a security guard, resulting in his arrest. He was remanded to HMP Chelmsford on 16 May 2022.

On 10 August 2022, the claimant was convicted at Ipswich Crown Court of possession of a bladed article, assaulting an emergency worker and the racial or religious aggravated harassment of an individual. He received a total sentence of eight months' imprisonment.

Whilst serving this sentence, he threatened suicide on 2 September 2022. He was released on licence on 14 September 2022. Shortly after, on 27 September 2022, professionals made an urgent mental health referral due to the high risk of self-harm and harm to others they perceived.

On 11 March 2023, the claimant received a police caution for threatening abusive or insulting behaviour. An OASys report, dated 27 June 2025, highlights a domestic abuse call log entry from the following day, 12 March 2023, regarding a stalking allegation.

This was closed due to evidential difficulties and a lack of support from the complainant. It formed part of an investigation concerning the rape of a female complainant by the claimant. This preceded a second separate rape investigation that led to the claimant's indictment (see below).

On 7 July 2023, the claimant received a six-month conditional discharge at East Kent Magistrates' Court for the possession of an article with intent to cause criminal damage. On 8 August 2023, he committed a further offence by shining a laser at a police helicopter. From 11 December 2023, the claimant failed to maintain contact with the Home Office, resulting in his classification as an absconder.

On 30 March 2024, police arrested the claimant for burglary. He was granted immigration bail. On 12 April 2024, he was arrested for the rape of, and making threats to kill, a 22-year-old homeless man. The complainant alleged the claimant beat, abducted and orally and anally raped him after offering him food in Slough. The claimant was remanded to HMP Bullingdon. During his detention, the claimant attempted to withdraw his asylum claim although he later refused to sign the official withdrawal paperwork.

In June 2024, the Crown Court at Reading convicted him of the August 2023 laser offence and of failing to surrender to custody, sentencing him to a total of four months' imprisonment. On 13 August 2024, the defendant withdrew his asylum claim for non-compliance. On 8 October 2024, the Crown Prosecution Service discontinued the rape and threats to kill charges after losing contact with the complainant.

The defendant detained the claimant on 9 October 2024, pending deportation. Due to his aggressive behaviour, he remained at HMP Bullingdon rather than being transferred to an immigration removal centre. On 16 October 2024, the defendant served on him a Stage 1 deportation decision and a "one stop" notice under s.120 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

The claimant's mental health deteriorated sharply during this period. On 25 October 2024, he engaged in self-harm, spraying blood against cell walls which necessitated the use of a body belt and head guard. On 1 November 2024, he was placed on suicide watch after tying a ligature around his neck.

On 16 December 2024, the defendant received the claimant's translated response to his one stop notice. On 9 March 2025, the defendant released the claimant on immigration bail with a GPS tag to no fixed address. Despite being accepted under MAPPA (that is Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements) Category 3, Level 2, the claimant quickly lost an approved bail hostel placement due to poor behaviour and became street homeless.

Whilst homeless, he mostly complied with reporting requirements. On 20 March 2025, Duncan Lewis solicitors notified the defendant that they represented the claimant. On 4 April 2025, the claimant was imprisoned for 14 days for breaching post-sentence supervision via drug use.

Following his release on 14 April 2025, he was placed in Home Office accommodation in Southend-on-Sea. On 30 April 2025, the defendant decided the claimant's further representations did not constitute a fresh claim, serving the "decision to file" rather than to his solicitors, apparently because he was then homeless.

On 7 May 2025, he received a further 14-day sentence for breaching supervision by failing to reside at an approved address. He was released on 20 May 2025.

On 27 June 2025, the claimant attended his probation office. He was detained for immigration purposes, held initially at Loddon Valley Police Station. He threatened to self-harm and collapsed. Police took him to hospital. Hospital staff assessed him and discharged him with no concerns.

On 27 June 2025, the probation service completed an OASys report, identifying the claimant's emotional well-being as a significant concern. While he consented to support referrals, the report assessed him as being a high risk of self-harm and a very high risk of serious harm to the public and known adults. It warned that his suicidal ideation could escalate rapidly in custody.

The report detailed police investigations into serious offences, including rape and threats to kill, which it noted the CPS had discontinued due to the inability to locate the complainant. It highlighted a pattern of manipulative and predatory behaviour, noting that the claimant targeted vulnerable individuals whilst using threatening language and references to extremist groups. The assessor emphasised the claimant's mental health struggles, including a history of self-harm, suicidal ideation and auditory hallucinations.

These factors, combined with his impulsivity, anger outbursts and crack-cocaine addiction, which he funded through crime, had led to previous detentions under the Mental Health Act 1983, following aggressive behaviour. The claimant exhibited hostility towards authority, frequently abusing probation and prison staff when frustrated. His repeated breaches of immigration bail and supervision requirements compounded by a lack of fixed address increased the risk of his associating with criminals or exploiting vulnerable individuals.

Consequently, the probation service linked his behaviour and attitudes to a high risk of offending relying on Level 2 MAPPA management, electronic monitoring and strict reporting to mitigate the danger he posed.

On 3 July 2025, the defendant refused the claimant's human rights claim of 16 December 2024, having considered his Article 8 ECHR rights, but not addressing his Article 2 and Article 3 rights. On 7 July 2025, the defendant served the claimant in person at HMP Bullingdon with the Stage 2 deportation decision.

On 15 July 2025, the claimant appealed against the Stage 2 decision, indicating on his appeal form his intent to rely on protection grounds. He subsequently served submissions arguing that the tribunal had jurisdiction to determine his protection claim within the human rights appeal.

In September 2025, a detention review estimated his removal timescale at two to four months. On 14 November 2025, the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) directed the defendant to review the stance of those representing the claimant in the FtT and to provide a response to their contention that the protection grounds were not a new matter and that the FtT therefore had jurisdiction to determine his protection claim.On 14 November 2025, the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) directed the defendant to review the stance of those representing the claimant in the FtT (in that, at that stage, they did not consider the protection grounds to constitute a new matter) and to provide a response. The defendant failed to respond.

On 15 December 2025, the tribunal again directed both parties by, 5 January 2026, to provide a skeleton argument / written submissions as to whether the appellant can rely on protection grounds addressing jurisdiction and the "new matter" arguments.

On 28 January 2026, Dr Syed Zia Ali produced a medico-legal report diagnosing the claimant with personality disorders, depression and psychotic symptoms, including command hallucinations. Dr Ali concluded the claimant was unfit to fly, at high risk of suicide, and that his mental health was being severely damaged by his detention. The report, which also noted the claimant's manipulative behaviour and drug addiction, was served on defendant on 2 February 2026.

At the substantive appeal hearing on 10 February 2026, the defendant withdrew the challenged decision, stating its intention to interview the claimant regarding his protection claim and to rewrite the Stage 2 deportation decisions. FtT Judge McMahon treated the appeal as withdrawn and strongly criticised the defendant, describing her "… engagement with the substance of [the appeal], to have been, lacking and, quite frankly, nothing short of appalling …" See paragraph 12 of the decision and reasons in appeal number HU/00911/2025.

On 10 March 2026, the defendant scheduled an interview in respect of the claimant's protection claim for 18 March 2026.

For the sake of completeness, the claimant currently faces pending prosecutions for two non-dwelling burglaries and one dwelling burglary, all contrary to s.9(1)(a) of the Theft Act 1968, going equipped for theft and possession of a Class A drug (crack cocaine). I understand the police and/or CPS have agreed not to prosecute these offences until after the claimant's deportation. As of today's date, the claimant had spent almost ten months in immigration detention.

There have been some six bail applications during this period. The last was heard by Judge McMahon, who refused immigration bail at the 10 February 2026 hearing. While the judge acknowledged the legal presumption in favour of bail and the fact that the claimant had already been detained for eight months at that stage, the judge determined that imperative reasons of public safety justified his continued detention.

Judge McMahon placed weight on the OASys report, classifying the claimant as posing a very high risk to the public and staff. The medico-legal report of Dr. Ali, noting the manipulative description he gave of the claimant and that the claimant lacked empathy and displayed a disregard for the safety of others, further diagnosing him with impulsivity and anger outbursts. The judge also noted his past conduct, noting the claimant's history of aggressive behaviour, including his admission that he "kicked off" during a previous period of bail-supported accommodation in March 2025.

Judge McMahon concluded that the evidence indicated that the claimant was likely to commit further offences and posed a danger to the public if he were released. Consequently, he ruled that detention remained necessary for the protection of others.

In the ten-month review of the claimant, dated 1 April 2026, the author of the review classified the claimant as a high risk of absconding, re-offending and causing harm. Following his release from detention in March 2025, it was noted he consistently breached his bail conditions, refused to maintain contact with probation and demonstrated aggressive and abusive behaviour towards staff. He remained assessed as an AAR Level 1 vulnerability due to his mental health.

The defendant proposes to deport the claimant via section 3(5)(a) Immigration Act 1971 ("the 1971 Act"): "A person who is not a British citizen is liable to deportation from the United Kingdom if … the Secretary of State deems his deportation to be conducive to the public good". That is to be read with section 5(1) of the 1971 Act, which sets out the procedure for and further provisions as to deportation. Section 5(5) of the 1971 Act provides that:

Paragraph 2(3) of Schedule 3 to the 1971 Act confers on the Secretary of State the authority to detain a person "where a deportation order is in force against any person …pending his removal or departure from the United Kingdom …"

This authority to detain must be exercised in accordance with public law, including the well-known Hardial Singh principles. In the Crown (on the application of I) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 888, Dyson LJ , as he then was, summarised the principles as follows:

At [47] to [48], Dyson LJ explained how to approach these principles:

He added in relation to the risk of absconding, at [53]:

In the Crown on the application of MH v SSHD [2010] EWCA Civ 1112, at [64] to [66], the Court of Appeal established that, while a realistic prospect of removal must exist, the defendant need not specify an exact date or time frame within which it is to occur. The Court determines a reasonable detention period by balancing the specific circumstances of each case. In R(on the application of Fardous) v SSHD [2015] EWCA Civ 931, the Lord Chief Justice clarified at [37] to [41] that determining a "reasonable period" is a fact-sensitive exercise requiring a case-by-case approach. The Court rejected the use of tariffs or guideline periods, stating that any attempt to establish such metrics would be inappropriate. In the Crown (on the application of Lumba and another) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12, at [104], Lord Dyson endorsed what he had said in the Court of Appeal at paragraph 48 of I (see above) and proceeded to confirm at [110] that the risk of re-offending is a relevant factor to the assessment of the reasonable period of detention.

He further set out that delay to removal caused by the detainee's unmeritorious legal challenge to deportation or their failure to cooperate are also relevant conditions that can support the reasonableness of the period of detention/ removal at [121] to [128].

Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 came into effect on 28 September 2023. Subsection 12(2) added new provisions to paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the 1971 Act, inserting them directly after subparagraph 2(3). These legislative additions follow:

In the R (on the application of MXV) v SSHD [2026] EWHC 251 (Admin), the High Court comprehensively analysed the effects of these amendments. The Court clarified that the legislation establishes the defendant as the primary decisionmaker regarding the reasonableness of the detention period and the likelihood of removal, which correspond to the second and third Hardial Singh principles. The court would maintain its original direct approach when assessing the first and fourth principles, which govern the purpose of detention and the defendant's obligation to act with reasonable diligence.

Nevertheless, the High Court observed that this legislative change possessed a limited practical impact for two distinct reasons. First, because individual liberty is at stake, the court must subject the defendant's decisions under the new provisions to anxious scrutiny. This heightened standard of review narrows the scope of what the court will accept as a rational decision.

Furthermore, the court retains the authority to quash the defendant's determinations if she commits other public law errors, such as failing to follow her published policies, neglecting to gather relevant information, or making material mistakes of fact.

Secondly, the 2023 Act does not restrict the ability of a detained person to challenge the lawfulness of his detention under Article 5 ECHR. When a claimant relies on Article 5, the Court retains its full jurisdiction to evaluate the relevant factors independently, including the proportionality of the ongoing detention.

The High Court noted that this human rights assessment broadly replicates the judicial exercise that Courts conducted when applying the Hardial Singh principles prior to the 2023 legislative changes.

Article 5.1(f) ECHR provides that:

The effect of Article 5 ECHR is that it mirrors the domestic application of the Hardial Singh principles. In Lumba, at [30] it was said, "all that the Hardial-Singh principles do is that which Article 5(1)(f) does". See also R (on the Application of A) v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 804 at [74] to [75].

On the other side of the same coin, the European Court of Human Rights said in JN v United Kingdom (Application No. 37289/12) 19 May 2016 at [97],

Mr Shattock, on behalf of the claimant, contended that his ongoing detention is unlawful asserting it breaches the Hardial Singh principles, article 5 ECHR and the defendant's own AAR policy. He argued the ten-month duration of detention was unreasonable. There was no realistic prospect of removal in the near future and the defendant had failed to act with the required diligence, a point reinforced, he submitted, by the FtT’s criticism of the defendant's conduct.

Furthermore, he submitted that the claimant's vulnerability, substantiated by medical evidence of suicide risk, justified his assessment as Level 3 under the Adults at Risk in Immigration Detention policy (he had been assessed at Level 1). This, he submitted, made his continued detention unsustainable, particularly when his prior period of detention was also allegedly unlawful.

The defendant disputed these claims, maintaining that the detention was necessary and lawful given the claimant's high risk of re-offending and of absconding.

Ms Masood, on behalf of the defendant, argued that the detention remained within a reasonable period, citing the complexity of the claimant's history and the ongoing progress towards a fresh deportation decision. Perhaps significantly, the complexity of the defendant's argument, insofar as it engaged with the defendant's failure to comply with the November and December 2025 directions of the FtT, in the context of the claimant having provided evidence shortly before the hearing of 10 February 2026 and that late service of material contributing to delay, led to the concession in the course of discussion that the claim might properly be seen as arguable. It was arguable that the FtT hearing of 10 February 2026 not being a review could have proceeded but for the withdrawal of the challenged decision by the defendant on the day.

Insofar as the AAR policy was concerned, she asserted the defendant's assessment of the claimant at Level 1 was rational and that, in any event, his detention would be authorised even at Level 3 due to the public protection risks he presents. Therefore any public law error in this respect was immaterial applying section 31(3C) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 ("1981 Act") and so, if necessary, permission should be refused in respect of ground 3 pursuant to section 31(3D) of the 1981 Act.

The parties' divergence on the balance of convenience regarding interim relief may be summarised as follows: the claimant argued that the lack of any firm removal timetable necessitated his release which could be managed through stringent bail conditions.

The defendant sought to resist relief, contending there is no strong prima facie case of unlawfulness and that the public protection risk and the necessity of maintaining immigration control outweigh the claimant's arguments for liberty.

I granted the claimant permission to apply for judicial review on all three grounds. The challenge to the lawfulness of his current detention is arguable, in my judgment, particularly in light of the duration of his confinement, his documented mental health vulnerabilities and the procedural history of his immigration appeal. It is arguable there have been breaches of the second third and fourth Hardial Singh principles. It is, therefore, appropriate to grant permission on ground one. Ground two may add nothing to ground one, but the principles are such that permission on ground two is appropriate.

The FtT's robust criticism of the defendant's engagement with the appeal process underscores the arguability of ground one, particularly principles three and four and ground two. As to ground three, this is arguable given the evidence of Dr. Ali. On the basis of the argument I have heard, I do not accept it would be appropriate to invoke section 31(3D) of the 1981 Act.

In my judgement, following on from the above analysis, an assessment of the competing arguments dictates that there is a strong prima facie case. However, turning to the balance of convenience and risk, whilst I am mindful of the claimant's vulnerability and the evidence concerning his mental health, the balance of convenience does not favour his release to a bail address.

The June 2025 OASys assessment, the findings of the FtT judge at the bail hearing of 10 February 2026, the previous convictions of the claimant and his escalation in offending, together with separate allegations - albeit only allegations - of rape, admissions of crack-cocaine abuse and supply and admissions of violence or disorder, whilst in bail-supported accommodation, paint a stark picture of a high-risk individual who poses a significant risk of danger: that is a significant risk of serious harm to the public and those in authority with whom the claimant has contact. There is also, in my judgement, strong evidence that the claimant is at risk of absconding.

The report of Dr. Ali and the evidence of the prison's ongoing management of the claimant's mental health need to be weighed, when considering the balance of convenience. While the claimant's conditions are concerning, the evidence shows that he is under constant observation within the prison estate, where his self-harming behaviours are actively managed, the prison medical team continues to engage with him and there is no evidence to suggest that the prison is incapable of providing the necessary care for his psychiatric presentation. Consequently, I am not satisfied that the risk of harm to the claimant is such that it overrides the clear imperative for public protection at this stage.

However, one of the other factors I weigh, when considering whether interim relief is appropriate, is the fact that it is possible to expedite the claim, so that the final hearing of the substantive claim may be dealt with within five weeks The risks of the claimant committing further serious offences or of absconding upon release remain too high to be adequately mitigated by bail conditions. Ultimately, I refuse the claimant's application for interim relief.

Notwithstanding the refusal of interim relief, as I have said, I recognise the arguable concerns regarding the timeline of the claimant's proposed deportation and the criticisms levelled against the defendant's procedural conduct. There is, in the circumstances, a need for the substantive hearing of this claim to be expedited and listed at the earliest available opportunity. The defendant is expected to comply strictly with future directions to ensure that the hearing in May can proceed without any impediment.

The defendant applies for permission to rely on the redactions set out in the annexed witness statements of Mr Charles Curry and Ms Fung Cheung, both dated 7 April 2026: the former addressing the redactions of the names of junior civil servants in the defendant's disclosure bundle and the latter addressing the other redactions.

The defendant, through Charles Curry, Deputy Director of Home Office Security and Investigations, contends that redacting the names of JCSs working within the Special Cases Unit of the Home Office (“SCU”) is necessary to protect staff from targeted abuse, harassment and risk to their physical safety. He argues that, because the SCU handles high-harm sensitive immigration casework, often involving individuals associated with terrorism, state threats or organised crime, staff in non-public facing roles face a heightened security profile. Disclosing their identities could, he suggests in his witness statement, inadvertently provide threat actors with the information required to facilitate intimidation, social engineering or physical targeting.

Mr Curry emphasises that the UK's current threat level is "substantial", noting that groups, such as hostile states and organised crime groups, actively seek to disrupt government processes and influence outcomes. He cites previous incidents where SCU officials were specifically targeted with extreme abusive threats after their names were inadvertently disclosed in legal proceedings, requiring police intervention and measures to protect their private lives. He suggests that, even in cases where staff have previously appeared in public, maintaining anonymity remains a vital evolving security strategy to protect them from ongoing future or future reprisal.

Further, Mr Curry argues that systemic disclosure would undermine the Home Office’s operational effectiveness. He suggests that, if names become public, it will create a "chilling effect" on the recruitment and retention of specialist staff, thereby compromising the ability of the SCU to carry out its critical national security functions. He also notes the risk of piecemeal identification, where nefarious actors could aggregate names from various legal proceedings to build a picture of the team, rendering redactions in high-risk cases ineffective. Ultimately, the defendant maintains that the names of these civil servants are irrelevant to the determination of the issues in the present judicial review. She asserts that the proposed redactions do not impair the intelligibility of the disclosed documents and she offers to provide documents with cyphers if any party finds the redacted versions indecipherable, ensuring that the transparency and accountability of the proceedings are not undermined by these security measures.

Ms Cheung, a lawyer with the Government Legal Department, has explained separately how other redactions have been effected to obliterate contact telephone numbers, email addresses and other sensitive information, and third-party sensitive and personal information.

In in the Crown (on the application of IAB and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Another [2024] EWCA Civ 66, it was held, on an appeal which upheld the decision of Swift J in the Administrative Court, that:

At [29] Bean LJ went on to say;

At [34], the court cited [48] of the judgment of Swift J in R (on the application of FMA v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] 1 WLR 723:

The 2025 Judicial Review Guide was updated following IAB. As said in IAB, in relation to the 2023 guide, it reflects the authors’ understanding of the law. 15.5.3:

In the course of discussion with counsel, I drew a distinction between the redactions explained in Ms Cheung's statement and those in Mr Curry's statement.

In Ms Masood's submissions, she relied on the content of the statement of Mr Curry, contending that SCU officials face unique risks due to the nature of their work on high-harm immigration casework, including terrorism and state threats. When probed over a particular redaction, which I could see had been repeated several times throughout the 179 pages of redactions annexed to the witness statements and application, Ms Masood said that it was appropriate to read it out because it should not have been redacted in the first place.

In further written submissions of Ms Masood, Ms Masood helpfully submitted, pursuant to my order of Tuesday 14 April 2026:

I maintain the distinction I drew in discussion with counsel now. I grant permission for the redactions to remain where they address sensitive contact information or third-party personal data, as detailed in the witness statement of Ms Cheung. These redactions are consistent with the guidance in 15.5.3 of the JR Guide, which permits the removal of contact details so as to protect operational integrity and personal privacy.

However, I am not persuaded that failing to redact the names of JCSs within the SCU creates a real risk to personal safety or national security sufficient to warrant redaction.

The Court of Appeal in IAB established that the routine redaction of civil servants' names in judicial review proceedings is inimical to open government and leads to a breach of the duty of candour. The principle is clear, unless there are "good and specific reasons" for redaction, names of officials are disclosable. I find no material distinction between the JCSs in IAB and those in the present case; both involve officials working within the Home Office on sensitive matters. The defendant has failed to provide evidence demonstrating a "real risk" to these specific individuals. Generalised assertions regarding the "substantial" UK national threat level and the possibility of harassment or a speculative risk do not satisfy the high threshold required to override the duty of candour, in my judgement. To justify redaction, the defendant must provide evidence of a specific credible and immediate threat directed at the individual officials concerned or something else giving rise to good and specific reasons for redaction. The duty of candour requires the court to understand the context and provenance of disclosed documents; redacting the names of those who authored or processed the decision-making documents obscures the history of the case and hinders the court's ability to assess the accountability of the public authority.

In those circumstances, the application to redact documents is allowed, in part, but otherwise refused as set out above.