Narinder Singh, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

On 7 July 2025, the Claimant, Narinder Singh (‘Mr Singh’), arrived at London Heathrow having flown there from India, his home country. He had Entry Clearance for a visit to the UK, but officers of the Defendant, the Secretary of State for the Home Department (‘the Secretary of State’), stopped and questioned him through an interpreter using their Immigration Act 1971 (‘the 1971 Act’) powers. The relative Mr Singh was visiting, Sukraj Singh, was also briefly questioned. Decisions were then made to cancel Mr Singh’s Entry Clearance and detain him. He remained in an immigration removal centre for 19 days, after which he was released. He left the UK, as planned, on the return flight he had originally booked.

This judicial review claim challenges those Entry Clearance cancellation and detention decisions which Mr Singh says are unlawful for four sets of reasons. In summary, they are that the cancellation decision was unfair because there was no clear explanation of the officers’ concerns that false, that is to say dishonest, statements had been made and falsified documents submitted to secure Entry Clearance. The officers’ conclusions were not based on evidence and, crucially, there had been no opportunity to address their concerns. In these ways they had failed to follow the Immigration Rules and associated guidance, and to make adequate enquiries. Last, there was no proper basis to detain, the reasons given were not rational and detention was inconsistent with the principles set out in R v Governor of Durham prison ex parte Hardail Singh [1984] 1 WLR 704 (‘Hardail Singh’).

The Secretary of State says there is no force in these points. She maintains her officers explained why they were minded to refuse Mr Singh entry to the UK in a fair way. That was because false representations had been made. He had the opportunity to address their concerns which were based on the Entry Clearance application, the contents of which were Mr Singh’s responsibility, falsely stating that he had not been refused a visa for any country when in fact the immigration authorities in Canada had refused one. There were also discrepancies between what he had said at different times about his income and the work he did and good reason to think that the evidence of his income was false. His detention had been lawful, first, to enable enquiries to be made and, secondly, to facilitate his removal. Detention had been reviewed several times and when this judicial review claim was issued, he was promptly released.

However, the Secretary of State also says that there is no need for me to grapple with any of these substantive points because, despite permission having been granted on all grounds by Deputy High Court Judge Marcus Pilgerstorfer KC on 25 November 2025, Mr Singh’s claim should be struck out for two reasons. First, the post-permission court fee had not been paid in a timely way nor had an exemption been granted. Secondly, Mr Singh had ‘abandoned’ his claim by leaving the United Kingdom before it was heard and just before he left had signed a ‘waiver form’ expressly confirming he wanted to withdraw it.

These issues were argued before me on 22 January 2026 by Mr Singh acting in person, assisted by Mr Sukhraj Singh as interpreter, and Mr Pullinger for the Secretary of State. At the outset, I need to record my appreciation both of Mr Sukhraj Singh’s helpfulness and of the fair and measured way Mr Pullinger approached the case given his obligations to assist the court in circumstances where he faced and unrepresented opponent. Some important concessions were also made, rightly in my view, and the court was told about a serious inaccuracy in a witness statement produced by one of the Secretary of State’s officers. All of this is what the court expects in judicial review proceedings, but it is important that it is acknowledged.

At §§‎60‎ to 95 of this judgment I will deal with the two strike out issues and then the substantive dispute at §§‎96 to ‎145. What I have to say on strike out will come as no surprise to the parties. Had it been appropriate to strike out the claim, there would have been no need to proceed to hear argument on the substantive issues and so, after hearing submissions, I gave two short rulings to the effect that I considered strike out was inappropriate, indicating that I would give my full reasons in this judgement. Mr Singh and Mr Pullinger had no objections to this course. First though, at §§‎7 to ‎58, I will summarise the background to this claim.

Mr Singh was born on 1 May 1979 in India where he has lived all his life. He applied for Entry Clearance to come to the United Kingdom as a visitor on 11 January 2025. In correspondence submitted in connection with this application he says that he owned some land, from which he has an income, but he also works as self-employed electrician for many years. He is married and has two children. At the hearing, he told me that his daughter has recently married someone living in Australia and gone to live there. He hopes to visit her there at some point, he said. His mother lives with his wife and himself in their home.

Mr Singh describes Sukraj Singh as his “cousin brother”. One of the questions asked by the Secretary of State’s officers indicates that Sukraj Singh has a construction business here. In Entry Clearance application correspondence and during the 7 July 2025 interview, Mr Singh said that Sukraj Singh had invited him to visit the UK for the first time and ‘sponsored’ that visit, including by completing the Entry Clearance application form and forwarding copies of various documents and support the application. A two month visit was planned.

On 13 February 2025, the application was refused on behalf of the Secretary of State by someone who identified themselves as “RS LVH”. Their letter was accompanied by a note of their reasoning which states materially:

The last paragraph refers to the Immigration Rules concerned with whether someone is a genuine visitor, that is someone who “will leave the UK at the end of their visit” and “is genuinely seeking entry or stay for a purpose that is permitted under the Visitor route”.

Such decisions cannot be appealed and there is no right to an administrative review either, but Mr Singh secured help to prepare a Judicial Review Pre-Action Protocol letter challenging the decision. That letter was sent on 5 March 2025. It gives details of how Mr Singh’s income from his agricultural land was reflected in his bank accounts and which documents showed he was the landowner. He also points to income in those accounts attributable to his work as an electrician. As for ties to India, the letter highlights the presence there at that time of Mr Singh’s children along with his wife and his mother. Evidence of this had been submitted with his Entry Clearance application. It had not been considered, the letter says. These and all of the many other documents submitted in connection with his application are then listed. There was no reason to doubt that he would return back to India or that he was not a genuine visitor, the letter stresses. The refusal decision was unlawful because relevant evidence had been ignored, the letter concluded.

In a very prompt response dated 10 March 2025, another of the Secretary of State’s officers indicated that, in the light of what Mr Singh had said, the refusal decision would be withdrawn and reconsidered. Entry Clearance was then granted on 20 June 2025.

According to an American Express travel UK email which was part of the court bundle, on 1 July 2025 Mr Singh finalised his plans for the visit. A return flight was booked arriving on 7 July and leaving on 24 November 2025.

The journey to the UK did not go as planned. Mr Singh’s luggage was lost and then the Secretary of State’s officers were unwilling to grant him leave to enter, despite the Entry Clearance.

Paragraph 2A of Schedule 2 of the 1971 Act is concerned with travellers such as Mr Singh who have arrived in the United Kingdom with leave to enter which is in force but has been given to them before their arrival. Subparagraph (2) provides that they “may be examined by an immigration officer for the purpose of establishing” whether there has been “(a)… such a change in the circumstances of his case, since that leave was given, that it should be cancelled” or “(b) whether that leave was obtained as a result of false information given by him or his failure to disclose material facts”. It is not disputed that this was the power used to question Mr Singh or that the officers’ questioning was permissible.

According to the officer’s handwritten notes, their interview of Mr Singh began at 20.49 and finished it 21.50 on 7 July 2025. 51 questions were asked, 50 of which are very short. Many are about uncontroversial matters, such as what had been planned for the visit and when Mr Singh had last seen Sukraj Singh, and the financial support entailed by his sponsorship of the visit. Those that appear to be material to the subsequent decision to cancel Mr Singh’s Entry Clearance are as follows:

The interview of Sukraj Singh began eight minutes after Mr Singh’s interview was over according to the officers’ notes and it also lasted just eight minutes. Five questions were asked and answered as follows:

The decision to refuse leave to enter was then communicated by way of a written notice read to Mr Singh in Punjabi. It states materially:

The notice adds that administrative review the decision may be sought via an online application form “if you think there has been a case working error” and that he would not have to leave the United Kingdom while an administrative review was pending. It concluded with a warning that now was the time to tell Secretary of State’s officers about any reasons he had for wishing to stay the United Kingdom.

The same day, Mr Singh was issued with a notice giving him “[r]easons for detention and immigration bail rights”. This document refers the reader to “notes at the end of the document” which are a list of detention powers. A box has been crossed to indicate indicates that the detention power used was “(1)” i.e.:

Another box in the main part of the form has also been crossed to indicate:

adding this, further down the page:

The notice added that detention would be regularly reviewed.

Mr Singh was fingerprinted and photographed. The limited personal possessions he had on him were taken and a receipt was issued. He was then taken to the removal centre.

There were three reviews of Mr Singh’s detention before a decision was made to release him. Each is documented and reasons for further detention are given. The reasoning is not easy to follow and persistently inconsistent, to put it charitably.

The first review was on 8 July 2025. It is said that the “[c]ircumstances for initial detention” were “[t]o progress removal from the UK”. This contradicts what was said in the notice quoted above at §‎20. Under “Legal Basis of Detention” paragraph 16(1) of schedule 2 to the 1971 Act is cited. That paragraph of the statute is not concerned with removal, however. It states:

The “[b]rief summary of individual’s case” then given is:

Later in the form box was crossed to indicate a “Medium” risk of absconding and then this recommendation was made to the decision-making officer:

Pausing there, I should note that Mr Pullinger conceded that these reasons were not applicable to Mr Singh, not least because this was not a ‘late stage case’, he had not been encountered by chance, there was no illegal entry or previous absconding.

A different officer then authorised detention. Her only comments were:

On 11 July 2025, Mr Singh filed the present application for judicial review in the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber.

The second detention review was on 14 July 2025. No removal directions had been made and Mr Singh had not applied for an administrative review either (as noted at §4 of the Summary Grounds of Defence to this claim). Yet under “Case Progressive Actions” the review form recorded “the case has been concluded and passenger was refused permission to enter. Placed in detention while AR period is in place.”

Again, under “Legal Basis of Detention”, paragraph 16(1) of schedule 2 to the 1971 Act is cited. Although the first paragraph under “[b]rief summary of individual’s case” is identical to that of the first review, the remainder is different, stating:

Yet as I have already noted, no administrative review had been sought.

Later in the form risk of absconding is again assessed as “Medium”. There is also an unexplained assessment of “Medium” risk of harm to the public. This time no mention is made of relatives in the UK or the absence of them. Under “[r]ecommendation” the reviewing officer wrote:

The detention-authorising officer’s comments were:

Then, in a further box, various comments from the previous review are repeated including those which Mr Pullinger accepted were inapplicable to Mr Singh.

On 20 July 2025, directions were given for Mr Singh’s removal on a flight back to India.

The third detention review happened on 22 July 2025, which the Secretary of State acknowledges was a day late. Once again, the legal basis for detention cited was paragraph 16(1) of schedule 2 to the 1971 Act. The case history was repeated in identical terms to those of the second review. Risk of absconding was again identified as medium.

However, there were some differences. This time, the reviewing officer noted accurately that Mr Singh had not applied for an administrative review. They went on to note the removal directions had been set for the day of the review but that Mr Singh had been given insufficient notice so they had been withdrawn and reset for 30 July 2025. However, the officer recommended “[c]ontinued detention is appropriate to affect removal”.

Yet again this decision was authorised, with the responsible officer commenting:

Yet again the inapplicable previous review comments were repeated.

Oddly, when the removal directions were cancelled, the form recorded that “further consideration is being given to the above named person’s application for permission to enter” rather than the reason given in the detention review about insufficient notice of the removal directions. The removal directions notice makes no reference to any further consideration of Mr Singh circumstances.

The Upper Tribunal issued the judicial review claim on 24 July 2025 and, according to the Secretary of State’s skeleton argument, the sealed Claim Form was served on her on 25 July 2025.

The following day, 26 July 2025, Mr Singh was released from detention on immigration bail, subject to a prohibition on working, reporting conditions and a requirement that he provide current mobile telephone number and a valid email address. He was not required to live any particular address, but the notice is addressed to him at Sukraj Singh’s address.

The Secretary of State has provided no paperwork explaining why, on receipt of the judicial review claim papers, her officers’ view about the appropriateness of detention changed so dramatically such that immigration bail became appropriate. Her skeleton argument invites me to find “the claimant was released on 26 July 2026, after he provided the defendant with a sealed copy of his judicial review bundle” suggesting this was determinative. Possibly the Secretary of State decided that the time it would take to determine a judicial review claim meant that detention could not be justified by reference to Hardail Singh in the meantime, but this is nowhere stated.

At the hearing Mr Singh told me that he had been very unhappy whilst detained, this spoiled the visit to some extent and he still thought about his experiences a great deal and remained upset by them. These were submissions, however, not supported by any evidence, and in the circumstances I am unwilling to make findings about them. I am prepared to accept the common sense position which is that an unplanned 19-day stay in an immigration removal centre was not what Mr Singh had in mind for the first three weeks of his visit to the UK and is highly unlikely to feature on anyone’s bucket list of highlights for a visit to this country. It is also apparent that Mr Singh felt very aggrieved about the decision to cancel his Entry Clearance and did not want his trip to be a wasted one. This is all clear not only from his Grounds of Claim for judicial review but also his unwillingness to accept voluntary departure arrangements that were offered to him when he was detained.

On 6 August 2025 there was an exchange of emails between one of the Secretary of State’s officers and Canadian immigration authorities who confirmed that Mr Singh had been refused a Canadian visa. This is only notable because of what the Canadian authorities were told, which was a response was urgently needed because Mr Singh “has appealed the decision stating that he has not been refused a visa in the past.” This was simply wrong. There was no “appeal” and more significantly Mr Singh had not said anything like this in his Statement of Facts and Grounds for judicial review.

As Mr Singh’s planned return date approached, he made contact with the Secretary of State’s officers to explain he would be returning to India. At the hearing he told me that they had retained his passport and he was told he needed to present himself at the airport to recover it. He added that, in doing so, he was told he had to sign a form to get it back but that its contents were not explained to him in Punjabi, Hindi or at all. He signed the form, his passport was handed over and boarded the flight he had booked back in July.

These too were submissions, not evidence, and I need to approach them with real caution for that reason. However, the contemporaneous correspondence aligns with much of what Mr Singh said. In an email dated 19 November 2025, Ms Kirsty Watkis, who is one of the Secretary of State’s officers, tells a colleague Mr Singh was voluntarily departing the United Kingdom on 24 November and that:

Ms Watkis was here referring to what I shall continue to call the waiver form, adopting the Secretary of State’s description. The version Mr Singh signed is dated 24 November 2025 and headed “Disclaimer in the Case of Departure by Agreement”. It reads:

Ms Watkis has given evidence about the waiver form in a witness statement filed on the Secretary of State’s behalf. The statement is not in a CPR-compliant form, but nothing turns on that. She explains that on 13 November 2025 the Heathrow Casework Hub was told about Mr Singh’s intention to voluntarily depart the UK. She continues:

Mr Pullinger told me two important things about Ms Watkis’ evidence in submissions.

First, the final paragraph was not accurate. The waiver form had not been read to Mr Singh in Punjabi at all. The interpreter available was a Hindi interpreter (as noted above, in response to this submission, Mr Singh repeated that the waiver form had not been read out to him in any language). Secondly, Mr Pullinger said that the “internal processes” Ms Watkis mentions are used routinely to bring judicial review proceedings to an end when people voluntarily departed. They are invited to sign a similar but tailored waiver form and then, in turn, the Secretary of State invites the court to refuse permission for judicial review if it has yet to be granted, or to strike out any claim for which permission has already been granted.

This is a convenient point to say more about what happened to this judicial review claim after it was served on the Secretary of State and so just before Mr Singh was released from immigration detention.

Summary Grounds of Defence were filed on 15 August 2025 which set out some of the background in chronological form,, cited the Immigration Rules and then sought to rebut each of Mr Singh’s four grounds of claim. The claim was transferred to the Administrative Court by order of Upper Tribunal Judge Helen Rimington made on 12 October 2025. The court was urged to refuse permission and award the Secretary of State her costs.

Permission was granted by Deputy High Court Judge Pilgerstorfer in his 25 November 2024 order, as I have mentioned. Besides making case management directions, his order contained the standard “Notes for the Claimant” rider beginning with “to continue the proceedings, a fee is payable” with advice on payment and how to seek a fee remission. From my own enquiries of the court staff, it seems the order was sent out under cover of a standard letter to Mr Singh to the email address that was given to the Upper Tribunal on his judicial review Claim Form.

Mr Singh did not pay the court fee or apply for a remission until much later. Normally this failure would have prompted Administrative Court staff to write to him warning that if the fee was not paid or remission successfully sought, the claim would be automatically struck out. However, no such letter was sent as far as I have been able to establish. Instead, the claim was listed for the 22 January 2026 hearing.

Following that listing, on 5 December 2025, the Secretary of State filed very brief Detailed Grounds of Defence. Through them, she asserted that Mr Singh’s departure and signature of the waiver form on 24 November 2025 indicating his wish to withdraw his claim meant that there was “no longer any live issue for the Court to determine”. Given this, the Secretary of State invited the court to treat the claim as academic and refuse permission or strike it out.

When the case was allocated to me, I made enquiries about whether the court had heard anything from Mr Singh since permission had been granted. Nothing had been. The emails that had been sent to the address given to the Upper Tribunal had gone unanswered. However, I noticed amongst the court papers that Mr Singh had given another email address for correspondence which had not been used by court staff. Mr Singh was contacted at that address and responded promptly indicating that he did wish to proceed with his judicial review. When asked about court fee, he said that he would make an application for fee remission, and did so, again promptly. The application was made too close to the hearing for it to be determined but given Mr Singh had been granted a remission when he first made his claim, it seemed to me that there was a real possibility that this application would be granted too. Against this backdrop, I made a case management order on 21 January 2026 indicating I would deal with the issue of non-payment of the fee and, if Mr Singh’s claim was not struck out on that basis, then consider the Secretary of State’s application to strike it out on the basis that it had become academic or effectively withdrawn through the waiver form.

CPR 3.4(2) permits the court to strike out a statement of case in any civil claim including one seeking judicial review. The examples given at §13.10.3 of the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2025 (“the Guide”) are abuses of process such as “acting in bad faith or with an improper purpose, attempting to re-litigate a decided issue and/or persistent failure to comply with rules or orders of the Court.” The Guide stresses that parties must have an opportunity to argue against strike out, unsurprisingly.

Fordham J analysed some of the circumstances in which post-permission strike out may be appropriate in R (Hussain) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2022] EWHC 82 (Admin) (‘Hussain’), a case about whether regulations prohibiting collective worship during the Pandemic were unlawful. Permission was granted but the regulations were then changed. The court was asked to strike out the claim and did so as the claim had become academic. At §§3-4, Fordham J noted that strike out in judicial review was an exceptional course, as emphasised by the Court of Appeal in R (Kumar) v Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs [2006] EWCA Civ 990 at §65. “[T]he court will expect to be given very clear-cut reason as to why the substantive hearing has now become inappropriate”, he said.

In R (Hidena Tax Ltd v The Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2025] EWHC 551 (Admin) (‘Hidena’) Sheldon J determined that a claim to do with the Revenue’s recovery of unpaid tax, was academic after certain agreements had been reached on how what was due would be identified and handled. He had been the permission-granting Judge. Given the post-permission developments, the claim had become academic, in the sense discussed in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Salem [1999] 1 AC 450, per Lord Slynn at 456G – 457B and R (Zoolife International Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food And Rural Affairs [2007] 2995 (Admin). In short, an academic claim as one where there is no longer a lis - that is a dispute - between the parties that affects rights and obligations. Salem gives examples of exceptions, such as where a large number of similar cases exist and authoritative determination may help resolve them.

CPR 3.7(1)(d) is concerned with strike out in another, very specific set of circumstances, that is where a court fee has not been paid and no remission has been granted. The relevant subparagraphs read:

Similarly, at paragraph 10.1.4.2, the Guide explains that a claimant:

However, the hands of the Court are not tied. The Guide itself notes that alternative directions can be given and the provisions of CPR 3.8-9 allow relief from sanctions to be granted subject to the tests set out in Denton v TH White [2014] EWCA Civ 906 (‘Denton’).

I explained to Mr Singh that the court fee had not been paid when it should have been, shortly after permission was granted, and he ought to have applied for remission then. I summarised each of the three Denton tests and invited him to make submissions about them. As far as breach of the rule was concerned, Mr Singh did not dispute that he was required to pay the fee earlier, but said he had not known until he had been contacted about the hearing at his alternative address, and then had applied for the remission straightaway. He not known what had happened to his claim since he was released from detention. After that, he had stayed for the remainder of his visit, gone home and gone back to work. He did want to pursue his claim, he indicated, and was ready for the hearing today. Mr Singh added that he had not used the email address he had given to the Tribunal on the Claim Form since returning to India, but his other email address in the court papers were still in use.

Mr Pullinger said that it was difficult for the Secretary of State to take a position because she was not privy to the court’s internal correspondence, but despite Mr Singh not being sent a reminder to pay the fee, what was said on the face of the order was clear enough. The fee was required and it had not been paid. CPR 3.7(1)(d) provided for strike out in the circumstances.

In my view, strike out under CPR 3.7(1)(d) is not permissible in this case. Strike out is a serious step and, as the Guide notes, will normally not be taken before a party has an opportunity to persuade the court that it should not happen. CPR 3.7(1)(d) carves out a narrow exception to that general principle, but it is made subject to a mandatory warning notice procedure. The Court “will” serve a notice on the claimant requiring payment of the fee if, at the time the fee is due, the claimant has not paid it or made an application for full or part remission. This step means the claimant has an opportunity to put matters right, by paying the fee or seeking a remission. Mr Singh had no such opportunity because the court never sent out the required notice. It does not matter that, if it had been sent out to the address given to the Upper Tribunal, Mr Singh may well not have seen that notice. The automatic strike out trigger is only pulled once the notice procedure is followed.

That does not mean this claim cannot be struck out for non-payment of the fee when it fell due or the late application for a remission. CPR 3.4(2)(c) allows this on the basis that there has been a failure to comply with a rule or court order. However, this is not an appropriate set of circumstances for the exercise of that power for these reasons.

To start with, it seems to me in principle wrong to treat the present situation as analogous to that in which the Rules Committee has decided strike out should be preceded by a mandatory warning notice. The appropriate way to proceed is to apply the Denton principles to deciding whether strike out ought to be the appropriate response to Mr Singh’s failure to comply.

Failure to pay a court fee or seek a remission when required is, in my view a serious rule breach and, here, the court’s permission order. Court fees are important to ensure that the administration of justice is sustainable. Fee remission is an important, indeed constitutionally fundamental, exception to the principle that litigants should make a contribution by payment of such fees: R v Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham [1998] QB 575 (‘Witham’). I accept the reason the breach occurred is understandable, if not good. Mr Singh had been using two email addresses both of which are mentioned in the court papers. He ought to have told the court which he was using after his return to India, but as soon as he was contacted on that alternative address he responded.

I also need to step back and consider all the circumstances. This is an important case for Mr Singh for reasons I shall come to. This was Mr Singh’s first and only breach of a rule or court order and he acted extremely promptly to put matters right by seeking a remission. There is no real prejudice to the Secretary of State in not striking out on this basis. There is very considerable prejudice to Mr Singh in that his claim will come to an abrupt end. Weighing all this up when I gave my ruling at the hearing, I considered the sanction of a strike out was not appropriate and proceeded to consider the remaining issues in the claim, starting with the Secretary of State’s strike out application.

The Secretary of State’s strike out application was put in two ways although Mr Pullinger quickly, and in my view rightly, conceded the first was unsustainable.

That first way was to say the claim was academic in the Salem sense because, as in Hussain and Hidena, circumstances have changed during its course. Of course, these were not post-permission changes of circumstances because Mr Singh had coincidentally left the UK the day before Deputy High Court Judge Pilgerstorfer’s order granting permission. There is nothing to indicate the Judge knew about Mr Singh’s departure, however. The position the Secretary of State took in her application was that permission should not have been granted, given the departure and the waiver form, and both made the claim academic. The claim was not being “maintained” by Mr Singh, the Secretary of State’s skeleton argument asserted.

I pointed out to Mr Pullinger that this was not an obviously academic claim. The claimants in Hussain and Hidena had challenged worship restrictions and tax payment arrangements which had been overtaken by events and so no longer effected them by the time the strike applications were made. By contrast, although Mr Singh’s visit was now over, the cancellation of his Entry Clearance appeared to have serious ongoing consequences because under “Part suitability” the Immigration Rules provide:

The “relevant time period in SUI 12.1” in a case where someone “[u]sed deception in an application (for visits this applies to applications for entry clearance only)” is 10 years. It follows that where someone such as Mr Singh has Entry Clearance cancelled on the basis that they used deception to secure in the first place, any application for entry clearance or leave to enter they make in the following decade must automatically be refused. In the Secretary of State’s guidance on this topic, Part Suitability: previous breach of UK immigration laws (accessible) which was most recently updated 27 February 2026, this is bluntly referred to as “a 10 year ban”.

I also asked Mr Pullinger about the possible effect of having Entry Clearance cancelled on these applications to visit other countries. After all, it was the refusal of visas for Canada that had troubled the officer dealing with Mr Singh when he arrived at Heathrow.

Mr Pullinger’s response was that the ban meant the claim was not academic in the conventional sense, and that if it remained in place in place it would have an effect on visa applications generally.

The second basis for the Secretary of State’s strike out application was forcefully pursued, however. Mr Pullinger said the wording and effect of the waiver form was straightforward. It stated both that Mr Singh wanted to withdraw his claim and for the Secretary of State to inform the authorities. Officer Watkis had not ticked the box to indicate this on the version she had prepared because, as her statement explained, she did not know Mr Singh’s intentions. It would have been ticked after it was explained to Mr Singh.

I asked Mr Pullinger why only one box was ticked given the waiver form says “Ensure the applicant ticks all relevant boxes”. If the other boxes were relevant, why were they not ticked too, rather than crossed? He said that the ticks and crosses were “interchangeable” and both indicated agreement. Officer Watkis had “tailored” the waiver form for Mr Singh so it was ready for him to sign. It was not mandatory for him to withdraw the judicial review claim so that box was unmarked when it was printed.

At this stage in his submissions, Mr Pullinger also told me about there being no Punjabi interpreter, adding that the officer who had handed over the waiver form for signature did not speak Punjabi either. There was only the Hindi interpreter available. Mr Pullinger could not explain why Ms Watkis’ statement said so emphatically that communication with Mr Singh was in Punjabi, or why the waiver form also said so. There were no contemporaneous documents available. He accepted that, and said that the officer involved was away. There was a “conflict of evidence”, he said.

Mr Pullinger maintained that the waiver form was an appropriate, pragmatic way to deal with a situation where someone no longer wishes to proceed with an application or litigation here in the UK and is departing voluntarily. It was much easier for the Secretary of State to notify the court. If someone is leaving the UK, they are indicating a clear willingness to “abandon their judicial review”. Their intentions are also clear from the waiver form, once signed. Mr Pullinger was not sure any court would insist on a N279 Notice of Discontinuance been completed in such circumstances. The claimant’s intention is clear. Once it has been expressed through signature of the waiver form, the only live issue is costs and here as the Detailed Grounds of Defence indicated, none was sought by the Secretary of State so this claim had become academic in this alternative way.

I explored the implications of this submission with Mr Pullinger. He accepted that when the Government Legal Department contacted the Administrative Court and asked it to do one or the other of these things it is not acting as a solicitor for the judicial review claimant (and could not be as there would be a clear conflict of interest) and neither ias acting as an agent of the claimant because there is no common law arrangement of ‘principal’ and ‘agent’ either. He also accepted that the waiver form was not a form N279 Notice of Discontinuance, given its wording. Notices of Discontinuance were not used in these circumstances, he said.

I asked Mr Pullinger what happens in the situation where a judicial review claimant (or appellant, for that matter) changes their mind after departing from the UK, given the waiver form expressly anticipated that happening before they left. He said this was impermissible if someone has signed a valid waiver form on an “informed” basis. If the claimant were permitted to change their mind after doing so even though they have not completed any Form N279, the Secretary of State would be put at a disadvantage because she would be proceeding on the basis the claim was not being pursued. It would be unfair to her, even though she may have prepared Detailed Grounds of Defence opposing the claim as a backup, as here. A claimant should not be permitted to “flip-flop”. However, Mr Pullinger accepted that, in circumstances where a claimant is not a client of the Government Legal Department nor its principal, there is nothing to prevent them from contacting the court to say they wanted to proceed with a claim. He agreed that, even if the communication channel the waiver form sought to create involved some form of agency, it would be terminable by a claimant.

Mr Singh’s response to all of this was that, at Heathrow when he was collecting his passport, the lady he had spoken to just indicated he should sign the waiver form. It had not been explained to him in Punjabi or Hindi or any other language. He did not understand Hindi anyway. He recalled the only ticked box (about withdrawing the judicial review claim) being ticked already. He did not tick it. He just had to put his signature on it. He thought he was signing something just to indicate was collecting his passport.

Mr Singh was emphatic that he wanted his judicial review case to be heard as he had been in correspondence with the court prior to the hearing. He had a visa (i.e. his Entry Clearance) when he arrived for his visit yet was stopped at the airport, questioned and sent to the removal centre. It was upsetting and disrespectful. He remained very upset about what had happened. He wanted the Entry Clearance removed and his name cleared. If it remained in place he would have problems getting visas in future, most importantly to visit his daughter in Australia now she had moved there. He wanted “a bright future” unaffected by the Entry Clearance cancellation.

In reply, Mr Pullinger maintained that the claim should be struck out because the waiver form was legally significant regardless of Mr Singh’s wish to proceed. I asked which of the bases for strikeout under CPR 3.7 covered this scenario. On reflection, Mr Pullinger said that this was better understood as being a CPR 38.3 situation. He took me to the parts of that rule said to be applicable:

The present circumstances, Mr Pullinger said that this court ought to permit the waiver form to be used instead of Form N279 pursuant to (5) notwithstanding Mr Singh’s objections. I expressed some concerns about this marked change of approach partway through the hearing. Mr Pullinger said that the language used in the strikeout application had been “clumsy at best” and the Secretary of State ought to have applied to treat the waiver form as a notice of discontinuance. He was clarifying the Secretary of State’s position and the claim should be discontinued on this basis.

In my view, the alternative arguments for strikeout and permission to treat the waiver form as a notice of discontinuance are equally lacking in merit.

Starting with the factual position, I have concluded that the waiver form Mr Singh signed does not have the legal significance attributed to it by the Secretary of State. On the contrary, I consider it has no legal effect. According to the Secretary of State, this is a highly significant document which the court ought to treat as equivalent to the prescribed form for discontinuance of the claim (Form N279, which “must” be used unless the court decides otherwise). Mr Pullinger accepted that a person signing the form had to do so on an “informed” basis. Yet even on the Secretary of State’s evidence, Mr Singh did not sign it on such a basis because, contrary to what the form says on its face and to Ms Watkis’ witness statement, it is now accepted that it was never explained to him in Punjabi. Leaving aside what Mr Singh told me himself about which languages he can understand, there is no evidence to indicate that Mr Singh speaks any other language. All other discussions with him have been conducted with the assistance of a Punjabi interpreter. I had no sense during the hearing Mr Singh had any knowledge of English. Everything had to be translated to him before he could respond.

Ms Watkis’ insistence in a witness statement that the waiver form was explained to Mr Singh in Punjabi, and her pre-completion of that form by crossing the box to indicate that had happened herself (contrary to what the form says ought to happen, which is for the individual to tick the boxes applicable to them) is troubling. Yet there is no conflict of evidence to be resolved here. There is simply no evidence that this form was ever read to Mr Singh in a language he could understand. His own explanation of being presented with the form and it being indicated to him where he should sign in order to get his passport back makes sense and I consider it is likely to be true, even though it is submission, not evidence. However even if the form was explained to him and some other language, whether English or Hindi, in signing it he was doing something which necessarily could not be “informed”.

Suppose the form had been explained in Punjabi and signed on an informed basis. In those circumstances, I still am doubtful that any court would accept it as an appropriate substitute for a Form N279. Certainly, I would not do so because it does not even identify the proceedings that are being withdrawn. Withdrawal of a legal claim is not a small step to take and the court has prescribed a clear form, and published explanatory notes about its effects, for good reason. Further, CPR 38.6(1) provides a default rule for costs to be awarded against the claimant when such a form is used to discontinue a claim. The Secretary of State’s waiver form does not explain what will happen about costs. As a happen in this case, she decided not to pursue them, but if her waiver form were treated as a substitute for a notice of discontinuance, it could easily lead to someone unknowingly being subject to a costs order against them.

These points in themselves are sufficient to dispose of the Secretary of State’s strike out application and 13th hour application partway through the hearing to treat the waiver form as a notice of discontinuance. However, for completeness, I would add that, in my view, none of the CPR 3.7 bases for striking out a claim arise here. The logic of the Secretary of State’s position on unfairness and disadvantage to her, is that, having signed her waiver form at an airport, a claimant ought to be locked into discontinuance even if they did not understand what they were signing, or did but changed their mind subsequently. That is impossible to accept when the result would be an absolute bar to continuing with litigation. It would raise serious issues not only under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) which is made enforceable here through section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, but also under the common law which, as Witham shows, recoils from measures that have the effect of barring access to the courts.

Mr Pullinger’s submission that any other result was disadvantageous and unfair was not an attractive one. It cannot sound in the strike out provisions listed in CPR 3.4(2)(a), (c) or (d) particularly in a case where permission has been granted. As for CPR 3.4(2)(b), which covers the situation where a “statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings”, this is not an apt basis for a strike out where a statement is not abusive and claimant wishes to proceed with a claim based on it. It is impossible to see how a claimant signing the Secretary of State’s waiver form, and then subsequently indicating and maintaining that they want their claim to be determined after all, is abusive of the court system itself to the extent their claim should be struck out. If the Secretary of State ends up being put to costs needlessly because of the timing of a claimant communicating their position, that can be dealt with proportionately when costs are dealt with. In any event, that is not this case. The Secretary of State prepared for the hearing. She filed evidence. Her detailed Grounds of Defence address each of the grounds of claim.

For these reasons, I decline to strike out this claim and refuse permission to the Secretary of State to treat her waiver form as a notice of discontinuance.

Entry Clearance is not determinative of leave to enter. Officers at the border have the power to examine a person who has arrived in the United Kingdom to establish whether there have been changes in circumstances and whether leave has been obtained as a result of false information being given or failure to disclose material facts: paragraph 2A(2) of schedule 2 of the 1971 Act. Paragraph 2A(2) gives these provisions teeth, providing that “an immigration officer may, on the completion of any examination of the person under this paragraph, cancel his leave to enter.”

Paragraph 9.7.3 of the Immigration Rules elaborates on the use of this power:

The statute and rules are supplemented by guidance, specifically False representations: caseworker guidance (‘the guidance’). The version applicable when Mr Singh’s entry clearance was cancelled had been updated 12 December 2023, but there is a later version. He incorrectly cites another version of this document in his skeleton argument, but it is not disputed that the correct version is relevant.

Materially the guidance recognises “‘false’ means not true, incorrect or misleading” and necessarily involves their having been deception rather than merely the communication of inaccurate information: see page 6. “‘Representations’ means statements or assertions that can be made orally or in writing, by the applicant or third party such as… a friend… and can include… answers in an application form.” A “false document” is one that “has been altered or tampered with”, a “counterfeit document”, a “document which is being used by an impostor”, “a document which has been fraudulently obtained or issued” or “a document which contains falsified or counterfeit entry clearance Visa or endorsement”: see page 7. This reflects the definition in paragraph 6 of the Immigration Rules.

The guidance adds this, importantly, at page 8:

Under the “Mistakes” heading, the guidance continues at page 16:

At page 19 it adds (my emphasis):

Much of this guidance is intended to reflect, and indeed refers to, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Adedoyin v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 773 (‘Adedoyin’ below, but also known as ‘AA’). Adedoyin concerned a refusal to extend leave to remain on the basis of a very similarly-worded immigration rule. The appellant had committed road traffic offences, but believed and declared he had no convictions. Central to the case was the question of whether this information he had given when seeking further leave had to be false in the sense of involving lies or deceit, or merely inaccuracies: §43. Rix LJ with whom the court agreed held that dishonesty or deception was necessary and it had to be deliberate: §§51, 76 and 81. An innocent mistake would not suffice.

The courts have also considered what fairness demands of the Secretary of State’s officers when they seek to establish whether false representations are been made. In R (Wahid) v Entry Clearance Officer [2021] EWCA Civ 346 the applicant was asked whether he had been given any police cautions, and replied that he had not despite having once been stopped when leaving the United Kingdom after a blunt knife on a keychain had been found in his luggage, then questioned and cautioned by the police. The issue in his case was whether a conclusion ought to have been reached that he had dishonestly withheld information about the caution without putting that specific allegation directly to him. Endorsing Adedoyi at §30, Carr LJ noted a false representation had to be deceitful and “[m]ere nondisclosure will not suffice.” Where an Entry Clearance Officer harboured suspicions of dishonesty, procedural fairness required that the applicant be given an opportunity to respond: §32. Even though Mr Wahid was only seeking an Entry Clearance as a visitor, “a finding of dishonesty is a particular serious matter going to a person’s character”: §33.

These principles were revisited once more by Tim Smith sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge in R (Tazeem) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWHC 1828 (Admin). One of the Secretary of State’s Offices cancelled a would-be student’s Entry Clearance having formed the view he had falsely represented his ability to speak English and the authenticity of the English tests he had undertaken was doubtful. This decision was quashed on the basis that the deception and authenticity concerns had not been put to the claimant fairly so as to allow a response whether by way of a ‘minded to decision’ or otherwise. At §§69 and 70 the Judge observed:

Both Wahid and Tazeem draw on R (Karagul and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWHC 3208 at §103 where Saini J summarised these general public law principles as ones operating in such cases (with the caveat that their application will of necessity be modified depending on the terms of the statutory regime):

The other important public law principle in play in the present case was one I raised with Mr Pullinger during the hearing because Mr Singh had alluded to it a number of times in his grounds but cited no authority. It is the Tameside obligation on a public authority decision maker to make sufficient enquiries about matters relevant to their decision before making it. In Balajigari v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 673 (‘Balajigari’) at §70 the Court of Appeal endorsed Haddon-Cave J’s summary of the obligation and its limits in R (Plantagenet Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] EWHC 1662 (Admin) at §§99-100:

Mr Singh’s grounds for judicial review appear to have been prepared with at least some assistance from AI and, as is common with such documents, contain a few citation errors. However, relevant cases are identified and the arguments advanced are concise and to the point. Their meaning was clear to Deputy High Court Judge Pilgerstorfer and it is to me.

The first ground is that the cancellation decision was premised on alleged false representations about Mr Singh’s employment history, related financial evidence and the Canadian visa refusal, but there had been no adequate opportunity to respond to the serious allegation that he had made representations of that kind before the decision was made. At the hearing, Mr Singh added that he had told Sukraj Singh about the Canadian visa refusal when he was putting together the papers for his Entry Clearance application and so the failure to mention it was a genuine mistake. Mr Singh adds that he had acted to clarify those inconsistencies that were put to him at Heathrow, but what he had said had not been assessed “or followed up”. There had been both unfairness in not grappling with the innocent explanation of Sukraj Singh’s mistake and a failure to “conduct further enquiries”. In short, this first ground is a complaint of unfairness and Tameside failure to make the enquiries needed to make a legally sound decision.

Mr Singh’s second ground overlaps with his first. Deception had been inferred, but there was no evidence that he intended to deceive. There was no discrepancy at all in the information given about work, as he had consistently described himself as having an income from agriculture but also self-employment as an electrician. His inability at Heathrow to provide the kind of documents that had been submitted with the Entry Clearance application was not indicative of dishonesty. At the hearing he added that he had not thought to carry all of those documents with him and had no internet access at the airport to show what he had submitted. This material had been provided electronically in the first place and it was absolutely genuine. The Secretary of State had no basis for saying otherwise. The omission of information about the Canadian visa refusal was down to an honest error by Sukraj Singh, he insisted. Adedoyin emphasised the importance of actual evidence of deception and the insufficiency of speculation. This second ground is therefore essentially a rationality complaint.

Mr Singh’s third ground is that the Secretary of State’s officials had not followed her policy guidance on distinguishing between innocent mistakes and false representations. No good reasons were given rejecting the innocent explanation for the Canadian visa refusal not being mentioned, nor was the lack of further enquiries explained. The third ground is a combination of a further rationality complaint and about lack of legally adequate reasons.

In reply to the first ground, Mr Pullinger said that Mr Singh had been given a full opportunity to respond to the concerns the Secretary of State’s officers had. Questions 19 to 22 and 40 to 42 concerned Mr Singh’s work. His finances were explored in questions 23 to 31. The nondisclosure of the Canadian visa was raised at questions 37 to 39. Question 45 drew the threads together and was the ‘minded to’ notification anticipated by the guidance.

I asked Mr Pullinger about the reference to a “change of circumstances” in question 45. What was the significance of that given it did not feature in the cancellation decision reasons? Mr Pullinger said that this was not part of the decision. It was ‘off the menu’. Change of circumstances had been something it was open to the officer to put to Mr Singh, but ultimately was not an issue, only false representations were.

I also asked Mr Pullinger where in question 45 was it suggested that there had been false representations in relation to the provision of financial information. Mr Pullinger said that the references to Mr Singh’s inability to provide evidence of his income or savings, when he heard provided documents for as application, and then in saying that he did not provide them were all concerned with “false representations and/or change of circumstances.” I explored with Mr Pullinger what exactly the false representation was and he told me that, even at a late stage in the interview, Mr Singh had not said anything about submitting bank statements and it was only when it was put to him that he had made false representations that he accepted that bank statements had been submitted in support of the application. There was a discrepancy, said Mr Pullinger, between what Mr Singh was saying had been submitted and what actually had been.

I explored the meaning of question 45 with Mr Pullinger, explaining it was not easy to follow. According to the decision itself the alleged false representation was not something said interview in Heathrow, but in the original application. Mr Pullinger said there was a complication because documents were provided on Mr Singh’s behalf and these were documents he apparently had no knowledge of. That had aroused the officer’s suspicions. Only then, once challenged, had Mr Singh said that he had provided bank statements.

Mr Pullinger returned to the bank statements later in his submissions, stating that the underlying concern of the officers were that they were false documents. Mr Singh had not provided them himself and was unaware of their existence. He had no knowledge of them and they did not pertain to him. A false representation of this kind justified refusal of leave to enter regardless of whether the evidence was determinative of entitlement to a visa. I asked when this particular allegation of false documents was put to Mr Singh. Mr Pullinger submitted that general concerns about statements had been put forward and that was sufficient. The allegation did not need to be “precise” and it was difficult to see how a more exacting formulation of the concerns would have made any difference. Mr Pullinger accepted the refusal decision did not deal with Mr Singh’s lack of awareness of false documents and had no explanation. I pointed out that the pre-action protocol letter Mr Singh had sent in relation to the original entry clearance refusal listed, amongst other things, the bank statements that had been submitted. Mr Pullinger said that this letter had been prepared “with help”.

Further discrepancies had been put to Mr Singh, Mr Pullinger added, for instance what had been said about the refused Canadian visa in the application. Mr Pullinger accepted that Sukraj Singh had not been asked about Mr Singh’s explanation for the omission of this information on the application, but the process did not need to be “perfect”. I asked whether this might be an instance of insufficient enquiries having been made. The officers had been able to speak to Sukraj Singh. Did fairness, the Tameside duty or both not require them to ask him about the deception for which he – rather than Mr Singh - was said to be directly responsible? Mr Pullinger refuted this suggestion. Balajigari made it clear that the court could only intervene if there was an unreasonable failure to question and however desirable it might have been to question Sukraj Singh further on this issue, reasonableness did not require that to happen. The concern had already been put to Mr Singh himself. Reasonable enquiries had been made of him. That was sufficient. The high bar of an irrational failure to ask further questions had not been reached. The officer was entitled to come to the conclusion that Mr Singh was not telling the truth. Mr Singh was responsible for what was said in the application, regardless of who submitted it. The Immigration Rules made that clear.

I asked Mr Pullinger why the cancellation decision made no mention of Mr Singh’s explanation about the refused Canadian visa being assessed and found incredible, a lack of reasons that was specifically raised in Mr Singh’s grounds. Mr Pullinger said that was not necessarily part of the decision’s reasoning because, “packed into” question 45 was the inference “and your explanation is not credible”.

However, Mr Pullinger accepted that if Sukraj Singh had been told about the Canadian visa refusal but had just forgotten to mention it, the omission would have been an innocent mistake, not a false representation. He also accepted that if Sukraj Singh had been asked what had happened and had confirmed that he had mistakenly omitted to mention the Canadian visa, then the officer would have needed “something more” to conclude they had been a false representation about the visa. Mr Pullinger said there was nothing else in the documents he could point to support the allegation of a false representation being made.

Mr Pullinger confirmed one other important point in concluding his submissions which was that that the “two central concerns” were the false documents and information about the Canadian visa refusal.

The Secretary of State’s position on why it was appropriate to cancel Mr Singh’s Entry Clearance has not been entirely clear or consistent. However, the appropriate starting point for understanding it must be the written notice of 7 July 2025. That is where the contemporaneous reasons for the cancellation decision ought to be found. I need to highlight some of the features of that notice before discussing the questions that preceded it.

First, the notice says nothing about changed circumstances being a reason for the cancellation. It follows that although question 45 referred to concerns about such changes, ultimately the officer concluded there were none. Mr Pullinger confirmed that submissions, as noted above at §113.

Secondly, the notice expressly refers to false representations “used to obtain your entry clearance”. It does not say, in terms or by necessary implication, that false representations are made on arrival. For this reason, I cannot accept Mr Pullinger’s submission that there were false representations during the Heathrow interview in the form of not mentioning that bank statements had been submitted in support of the application. Even putting this point at its highest, Mr Singh simply failed to mention in his answer to question 33 a particular set of documents that had been submitted and then explained in answer 45 that he had submitted bank statements, something which he had also made clear in his first letter before claim. This is not evidence of an attempt to deceive the Entry Clearance Officer or even the at officer Heathrow. Neither is it evidence of intent to deceive because bank statements were submitted and it was in Mr Singh’s interests for the officer at the airport to know that because it would help show his application had been supported comprehensively with documents. In any event, Mr Singh’s answers to questions 25 to 33 indicated that he had a bank account. He was not concealing how his financial affairs were organised. However, the most significant difficulty with this part of the Secretary of State’s case is that it amounts to impermissible ex post facto reasoning contrary to the principle explained inR v Westminster City Council, ex parte Ermakov [1996] 2 All ER 302 (‘Ermankov’) because it does not feature in the refusal notice. I will come to what the notice does say about bank statements shortly.

Thirdly, as mentioned above at §‎120, Mr Pullinger indicated that, despite the comments in the notice about Mr Singh’s work, this was not a decisive concern. I agree because the concluding paragraphs of the notice indicate that the false representations that were relied on were the failure to declare the Canadian visa refusal and the “financial documents submitted in your application”. It follows that is not strictly necessary to examine what part the concerns about Mr Singh’s description of his work played in the decision. However, for completeness, I will address this. At question 19, Mr Singh was asked what he did for work and said straightforwardly “I work a [sic] agricultural work and electrical work”. He then elaborated about being self-employed as an electrician. It follows that the officer was wrong to say “[u]pon arrival you claimed you were a farmer” and to suggest that this inconsistent with what was later said about being both a farmer and electrician. Mr Singh had volunteered the information about both forms of work at the outset.

The only possible discrepancy was between what was said to be on the Entry Clearance application form (which was not before the court), “that you are a self-employed electrician”, and Mr Singh working in that capacity but also in agriculture. Again, I consider this could not be something the Secretary of State could rationally rely on as evidence of a false representation. What Mr Singh had said was accurate. However, even if, contrary to my view, failing to mention working both as an electrician and in agriculture on the form potentially could be a false representation, the principle in Adedoyin meant that had to be put to Mr Singh. Putting this point another way, it was inconsistent with the Secretary of State’s own guidance on how to assess the falsity of representations not to do so. That did not happen. Question 45 cannot conceivably be read as raising a concern about false representation to do with Mr Singh’s occupation in a way that enabled him to understand it and respond. The first time he would have been aware that the officers considered this was significant was when the notice was read out. As in Tazeem, that was just too late.

Once these factors are stripped from the decision-making process, two concerns remain.

The first is the omission to mention the Canadian visa refusal. To recap, Mr Singh accepts this was not mentioned on the form and says he had told Sukraj Singh about it but that he had forgot to include information on the Entry Clearance application form which was therefore inaccurate in this respect. Mr Pullinger accepts that this was a potentially innocent explanation for the omission. I agree, especially as Mr Singh did not conceal the refusal from the officer during the interview. Instead he volunteered information about it in his answer to question 38.

Reading the relevant parts of question 45 again, they were “I believe that false representations have been used to obtain your visa… [n]amely, your failure to declare your CAN Visa refusal… Do you have anything to say?” There are real difficulties with this as a basis for the cancellation decision. As discussed in Wahid at §30, non-disclosure in itself is not the same thing as dishonesty which is why it is so important that the alleged dishonesty is identified clearly and put to the person who is said to be responsible for it, especially during a high-stakes interview, through an interpreter following a long flight: Tazeem at §§69 and 70. There must be an opportunity “to address the claimed wrongdoing”: Karagul at §103. Page 19 of the guidance makes this very point about the need for precision. Since the failure to declare the Canadian visa refusal could have come about for entirely innocent reasons, the officer needed to explain his reasons for thinking otherwise at a minimum so that Mr Singh had a chance to address them.

Compounding this, I consider Mr Singh is right to repeatedly point to the lack of enquiries around the reason for the Canadian visa not being mentioned in the application. Only three questions were asked about it, and critically none were put to Sukraj Singh. In circumstances where Mr Pullinger very fairly accepted that Sukraj Singh could have corroborated Mr Singh’s account of the omission and, had he done so, other evidence of falsehood would have been needed to reach a conclusion that this was not an innocent mistake, it seems to me that failing to question Sukraj Singh was procedurally unfair and a breach of the Tameside duty. After all, Sukraj Singh was the very person who had made the representation that may have been false - or an innocent mistake. These were not circumstances in which the Secretary of State could rationally conclude there was no need to put questions to Sukraj Singh because as Mr Pullinger accepts, there was no other evidence of falsehood. Sukraj Singh’s account would therefore be decisive given what Mr Singh had said, but inexplicably it was not sought.

Last, as far as the Canadian visa refusal is concerned, I accept Mr Singh’s submission that what is said in the refusal notice cannot be reconciled with what the guidance says at page 16 about grappling with a potentially innocent mistake. I am not suggesting that the officer needed to set out and answer all of the considerations listed there, but the decision notice, at a minimum, needed to explain that the officer had found the explanation was not credible and why given it had the potential to extinguish are concerned that the representation in the form of been false.

This brings me to the final concern in the cancellation notice: “I am satisfied that your visa may have been assessed with a different outcome had you not used false representations… namely… the financial documents submitted in your application”.

The start of the Secretary of State’s difficulties here is that the notice does not actually refer to false documents. Notwithstanding this, Mr Pullinger characterised the authenticity of the bank statements as central, submitting that the officer had concluded that the those presented for the Entry Clearance application by Sukraj Singh did not relate to Mr Singh at all and he had no knowledge of them. “False documents” have a specific defined meeting in paragraph 6 of the Immigration Rules and the guidance, as noted above at §99. At its highest, then, the Secretary of State’s case that the documents presented were false in one of the ways that fits the definition is that Mr Singh did not mention having submitted bank statements in his answer to question 33, only to do so what would have been approximately 10 minutes later in his answer to question 45.

This submission is unsustainable. Failing to mention then mentioning having submitted a particular set of documents is nowhere near evidence, or even a possible basis for suspecting, that what was submitted was falsified, regardless of who submitted it.

Even if that were wrong, at no point was a concern about falsified documents being presented put to Mr Singh. The demands of procedural fairness as explained at §§69 and 70 of Tazeem and page 19 of the guidance were not met. The only thing said in question 45 about the statements was “[s]uch documents were provided for your application, but you have said you did not provide them”. That could not possibly be understood as an allegation about the statements’ authenticity. Further, the refusal notice does not even suggest that this was an underlying concern. Again, this is impermissible ex post facto rationalisation. It cannot form a justification for the entry clearance cancellation because it did not at the time that decision was made.

There is a further problem which Mr Singh’s grounds raise. It is that the authenticity of the documents was never explored with the very person who Mr Pullinger said was responsible for the falsehood, that is Sukraj Singh. Again, it seems to me that if the officer formed that suspicion, he had to put it to Sukraj Singh (if it was practical to do so). As Sukraj Singh was interviewed and fully answer questions, that easily could have happened. There was therefore a failure to make proper enquiries and it was not rational for the officer to conclude there was no need to make them, if that was his thought process.

For these reasons, the cancellation decision falls short of the standards of fairness, due enquiry and rationality set by public law. It was unlawful.

Detention of a person refused entry pending their removal is in principle justifiable under Paragraph 2A(2) of schedule 2 of the 1971 Act as noted at §99 above. Article 5(1)(f) ECHR also permits this. Hardail Singh imposes limits as explained in Lumba (WL) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12 (‘Lumba’) and more recently in R (MXV) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 251 (Admin). In summary, detention must be used only as a “last resort” and so alternatives always must be considered: Lumba at §§300 and 312. The Secretary of State must intend to deport the person and can only use the power to detain for that purpose. The person to be removed may only be detained for a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances. If, before the expiry of the reasonable period, it becomes apparent that the Secretary of State will not be able to effect removal within a reasonable period, he should not seek to exercise the power of detention. Last, the Secretary of State should act with reasonable diligence and expedition to effect removal.

The gist of Mr Singh’s final ground, that challenging his detention, is that, contrary to the Secretary of State’s reasoning, he was not someone who had sought to evade immigration control. There had been no non-compliance with past restrictions or conduct suggesting he would breach conditions, if imposed. His removal was not imminent when detention had been authorised and alternatives had not been considered, such as reporting conditions.

The Secretary of State’s position explained in her summary Grounds of Defence was that there were no legal or practical barriers to removal so it was likely to have happened soon after Mr Singh was initially detained and indeed removal directions had been promptly set. When the judicial review claim was issued, he was promptly released. There had been regular reviews in the meantime.

That said, Mr Pullinger indicated early on in this part of the discussion that that if the cancellation decision were unlawful, it followed that Mr Singh was unlawfully detained because the detention was to give effect to a removal that was the consequence of the cancellation decision. I agree that analysis is correct. I would qualify it in one respect, however. It seems to me that the detention that occurred in order to question Mr Singh cannot be criticised as unlawful, partly because justification for detention for that purpose only involves the Secretary of State’s officers reaching a rational view that examination of the passenger is warranted. In any event, Mr Singh did not challenge or even complain about being questioned.

Although I do not need to examine the detention closely in these circumstances, I consider it appropriate to make some brief comments as Mr Singh was so aggrieved that he had been detained as well as having had his Entry Clearance cancelled.

First, the “legal basis for detention” as set out in the review documents I have quoted above is largely inaccurate. It is repeatedly indicated that Mr Singh has been detained for questioning when in fact the questioning was over. It is also repeatedly, and wrongly, stated that Mr Singh is pursuing administrative review. These points may be attributable to an initial error and then repeated use of a standard form, but they are indicators of the care with which the decisions to deprive Mr Singh of his liberty for a significant period were made. More problematic still are the stark and obvious errors in the description of Mr Singh’s circumstances as being someone who was encountered by chance, evading immigration control and with a immigration history consistent with that. As Mr Pullinger correctly conceded, none of this reasoning related to Mr Singh. It was a serious series of errors for the Secretary of State’s officers to make in circumstances where they formed and continued to form part of the justification for detaining him. Then there is the remark made about Mr Singh having no relatives in the UK, which, given where it appears in the form, presumably was part of the justification for not releasing him on conditions. Mr Singh did have a relative; Sukraj Singh. Indeed it was to Sukraj Singh’s home that the ultimate release letter was addressed.

Compounding these inaccuracies and conspicuous by its absence is any meaningful analysis of why Mr Singh could not be released temporarily pending removal. The most significant part of the reasoning that sets out considerations that might weigh against release is the inaccurate information which had nothing to do with Mr Singh’s own circumstances.

For these reasons, even if I had found cancellation of Mr Singh’s Entry Clearance had been lawful, on the basis of the evidence before me I would nonetheless have concluded that his detention was unlawful in any event because it was to a material extent based on egregious errors of fact and, perhaps more significantly still, alternatives were not considered as they ought to have been, weighing up the factors indicating whether or not Mr Singh would comply with release on conditions.

Mr Singh’s Entry Clearance was unlawfully cancelled and he was also unlawfully detained. Public law remedies cannot provide him with the “bright future” he seeks as an outcome to this litigation, but it can and must ensure that the challenged decisions are effectively expunged and have no future adverse effects on applications for Entry Clearance to visit this country or ability to seek visas for others. I have asked for submissions about how to achieve that through an appropriate order.