East-West United Bank SA v Vladimir Gusinski & Ors

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 798 (Ch)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE Claim No. BL-2021-000049
BUSINESS & PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND & WALES
ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS LIST (ChD)
Rolls Building
Court 5
31 March 2026
BEFORE:
B E T W E E N :
EAST-WEST UNITED BANK S.A.
(in judicial liquidation)
Claimant
-and-
VLADIMIR GUSINSKI
GSC SOLICITORS LLP
BARRY SAMUELS
Defendants
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RULING
(Approved)
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MR JUSTICE RAJAH: The existing pleading is adequately summarised in paragraph 7.1 to 7.4 of the defendants’ skeleton. The proposed amendment is adequately summarised in paragraph 9 of the defendants’ skeleton, and the law is as set out in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the defendants’ skeleton.
Mr George objects to the amendment on the basis that it discloses no real prospect of success because no concerted action is pleaded. I do not accept that submission. Ms Stanley has made clear, that is not what the pleading at paragraph 98.(0A) is intending to do. It is not attempting to plead concerted action. It is attempting to plead sufficient knowledge to justify an inference of joinder to the conspiracy on a particular date earlier than that which had previously been mentioned. I accept Ms Stanley's submissions that it is at least arguable that it is not necessary to prove concerted action by D2 and D3 for them to have participated in or to have joined a conspiracy, and for the tort to be made out.
So far as limitation is concerned: this is linked to the pleading point as to timing. The original paragraph 98 said that Mr Samuels and GSC had joined the conspiracy on a date unknown, but by June 2018 at the latest. The proposed amendment says that they had joined the conspiracy on a date unknown, but by January 2018 or, alternatively, some later date. It is self-evident from reading those two pleas that what is being pleaded by way of amendment is within what was already there.
The particulars which were originally given of paragraph 98 particularised events which happened from June 2018 onwards, and the proposed amendment now seeks to rely, in particular, on the alleged diversion of funds from January 2018. That is the diversion of funds from NTV, which is already pleaded at paragraph 97 as part of the unlawful means conspiracy by Mr Gusinski to which D2 and D3 is said in paragraph 98 to have joined.
What is now pleaded in 98.(0A) are particulars of the joinder to the conspiracy pleaded in 98. They are not a new cause of action as such. The consequence of pleading that the relevant date of joinder to the conspiracy is January 2018 -- which was, as I say, already within and available to the claimant on the original pleading -- is that if they can establish joinder to the alleged conspiracy in January 2018, it means that loss which has been caused by the conspiracy since January 2018, which will then be recoverable from D2 and D3 as well . But that, it seems to me, is not the addition of a new course of action; it is simply a consequence of the claimant being in a position, it says, to prove something by evidence, which was already in its pleaded case. As a matter of pleading, these particulars are not strictly necessary, but where there is a serious allegation such as conspiracy, it is right that as a matter of fairness they should be pleaded so that the Defendants know the case they have to meet.
So far as delay in making this application is concerned, I have seen the explanations in the witness statements. The Claimant has had the documents since February 2025. They were reviewed from August 2025. I accept Mr George's submissions that the amendments should have been put forward earlier, and have not been. It was, however, raised more than two months before trial. As I say, it is not a pleading which needed to have been made, save as a matter of fairness to the defendant, and they will have had two months notice of this by the time of the trial.
So far as prejudice is concerned, I am not satisfied that it is going to require any further disclosure, because the issues raised by the amendment were clearly part of the disclosure exercise, which the parties were directed to carry out. A further witness statement may be necessary by the defendant's witnesses, and in particular Mr Samuels and Ms Dohmann, but that is not significant prejudice.
So far as expert evidence on Swiss and Cayman law, it seems to me that if Ms Stanley take out the references in subparagraph 3 and subparagraph 4 of 98 to the advice which it is said that Mr Samuels did not give or did not say, then Mr George does not need to get advice on Swiss or Cayman or indeed Russian law, but that is a matter for him.
So far as forensic evidence on the purported division, I anticipate that that is something which would be taken up in an inquiry after these proceedings, if the outcome of these proceedings is that the tort is established.
So far as an adjournment being required, I am not satisfied that an adjournment is necessary, and the trial can go ahead if the pleading is amended in the way which I have discussed with Ms Stanley.
So, I am going to allow the amendment, but subject to those comments as to how it is to be curtailed.
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