Petrichor Energy FZCO (formerly known as CE Energy DMCC) v Alhaji Abdulrahman Musa Bashar & Anor

Petrichor Energy FZCO (the “Applicant”) applies for a post-judgment worldwide freezing order against the First Respondent Alhaji Abdulrahman Musa Bashar (“Mr Bashar”) and the Second Respondent, Ultimate Oil & Gas FZCO (“Ultimate”). The judgments relate to unpaid gasoil, sold by the Applicant to Ultimate and a personal guarantee given by Mr Bashar in support of Ultimate’s debt.

The application is supported by the second affidavit of the Claimant’s solicitor, Mark David Lakin of Stephenson Harwood LLP (“Lakin 2”); and the affidavit of the Claimant’s managing director, Christopher Eppinger (“Eppinger 1”).

The application is made without notice. I was satisfied that it was appropriate for the hearing to proceed on a without notice basis due to the risk that giving notice would prompt the Respondents to take steps which would defeat the very purpose of the injunction, as was supported by the evidence of Mr Lakin (in Lakin 2 at paragraph 237).

I was also satisfied that the matter was sufficiently urgent to be heard today on a without notice basis in circumstances where, as shall appear, there has recently been a conversation, on 15 March 2026, in the course of which Mr Bashar threatened to dissipate assets.

It is right to note at the outset that the Applicant does not start with a blank canvas in relation to this application for a post-judgment worldwide freezing order in circumstances where the Applicant had obtained, on 29 July 2024, a pre-judgment ex parte worldwide freezing order against the Respondents (“the Original WFO”), which was granted by Robin Knowles J, but which was subsequently discharged by Mr Charles Hollander KC (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court), that judgment being reported at [2024] EWHC 2846 (Comm) (“the Hollander Judgment”). The reason why that injunction was discharged was because the judge considered that the court was not satisfied that there was a risk of dissipation within the well-known test. In this regard, Mr Hollander KC stated at [61] as follows:

As was made clear to me at the outset of this application by counsel Nicola Allsop on behalf of the Applicant, the Applicant is not seeking to go behind the findings that the Court made on the material that was before it in October 2024. However, in essence, what is said is that matters have moved on, and have moved on significantly, in that regard and that is not limited to the fact that the Applicant has the benefit of significant judgments now against the Respondents, and yet, the Respondents, who on the disclosure aspect of the original freezing order disclosed assets of some US$170 million in support of their application to discharge the Original WFO, have not paid the judgments.

More than that, one of the factors which was relied on by the judge in the Hollander Judgment was the fact that a number of the assets, consisted of some US$17.5 million of real property in Dubai, and as identified at [56]:

As I shall come on to, in fact, subsequent to the Hollander Judgment, all those properties in a particular building in the UAE, as well as another property in the UAE, have indeed been disposed of.

Thirdly, and importantly, and as is addressed in the affidavit of Mr Eppinger, there have very recently been discussions about amending what was called the “new payment agreement”, which itself provided for a new payment schedule. That, at least in part, has involved without prejudice discussions but these were followed by a conversation which is said not to be on a without prejudice basis on 15 March 2026, The evidence of Mr Eppinger in relation to this, which is at paragraphs 11 to 13 of his affidavit, is as follows:

It is said therefore, by Miss Allsop on behalf of the Claimant, that whatever the position at the time of the Hollander Judgment, matters have moved on in three material respects since then: firstly, the fact that judgments have now been obtained; secondly, that there is now actual evidence of dissipation of assets and notwithstanding the sale of those assets, outstanding payments have not been made; and thirdly, that there has been a recent direct threat to dissipate of assets. It is against that backdrop that the Applicant applies for a post-judgment worldwide freezing order against Mr Bashar and Ultimate.

The Applicant is a UAE based oil trading company. In addition to Mr Eppinger, who is the managing director of the Applicant, there have been a number of other individuals involved in the dispute which include: Mr Michael Humphreys-Davies (“Mr Humphreys-Davies”), who was the Applicant’s distillates head trader at the time of the underlying transactions; and Mr Robin Biswas (“Mr Biswas”), the Applicant’s former Operations Executive. It was Mr Humphreys-Davies who was referred to in the recent conversation mentioned above.

On 3 January 2024, Prime Rivers Petroleum (“Prime Rivers”) was incorporated in Nigeria. It is wholly owned by Petrichor Holding Limited, the group holding company.

Mr Bashar is a Nigerian businessman and the chairman and sole shareholder of Ultimate. He is also the Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of the Nigerian-based Rahamaniyya group of companies.

Ultimate is a commodities trading company incorporated in the UAE. It is the offshore trading arm of the Rahamaniyya group.

A further company in the Rahamaniyya Group, Rahamaniyya Oil & Gas Limited (“Rahamaniyya”), incorporated in Nigeria, conducts the onshore trading (i.e. in Nigeria) of the group. It is the owner of a large oil and gas storage depot at Apapa in Lagos, Nigeria (the “Rahamaniyya Depot”). Mr Adebowale Aderemi (“Mr Aderemi”) is the manager of the Rahamaniyya Depot and Rahamaniyya is majority owned by Mr Bashar.

Zamson Global Resources Limited (“Zamson”) is a Nigerian incorporated entity, also engaged in the provision of oil and gas storage at a warehouse near Koko, in Nigeria (the “Koko Depot”). Mr Ibrahim Sulemain (“Mr Sulemain”) is the manager of the Koko Depot. The majority of the shares in Zamson are held in the name of Mr Alhaji Zayyanu Bashir (“Mr A Z Bashir”), who is the brother of Mr Bashar. The Claimant believes that Mr A Z Bashir holds these shares for Mr Bashar but Mr Bashar and the solicitors for Zamson have denied this (as is addressed in Lakin 2 at paragraph 17(b)).

The following individuals have also been involved in the dispute on the Respondents’ side: Mr Kanwar Ratra is the Chief Executive Officer of Ultimate since its establishment in 2016; a Ms Jane Millan (“Ms Millan”), one of Ultimate’s operators in Dubai; and a Mr Peter Rabara (“Mr Rabara”) a former employee of Ultimate.

Turning to the underlying contracts which I can deal with more shorty than might otherwise be the case, given that the Claimant has now obtained judgment. The Applicant and Ultimate entered into a series of contracts for the sale by the Applicant to Ultimate of various parcels of gasoil and JetA1 fuel, starting with five spot contracts (the “Spot Contracts”), followed by a term contract entered into on 25 April 2023 (the “Term Contract”).

Although Ultimate belatedly paid for the product that was delivered under the Spot Contracts, it failed to pay interest under all 5 spot contracts and did not pay the demurrage due under the first and fourth spot contracts. On 22 November 2023, the Applicant commenced DIAC arbitration proceedings against Ultimate under the Spot Contracts seeking recovery of unpaid interest and demurrage.

Two lots of cargo were delivered to Ultimate pursuant to the Term Contract and Ultimate also defaulted on its obligations under the Term Contract.

On 14 January 2024, the Applicant and Ultimate entered into the Payment Agreement, which provided a mechanism for Ultimate to pay its outstanding debts under the Spot Contracts and Term Contract and, subject to compliance with the terms of the Payment Agreement, the Applicant was to supply further cargo to Ultimate. Pursuant to the Payment Agreement and as security for Ultimate’s obligations thereunder, Ultimate was required to provide the Applicant with nine undated cheques. Ultimate provided nine undated cheques all signed by Mr Bashar.

Mr Bashar also gave a personal guarantee on 14 January 2024, in support of Ultimate’s obligations under the Payment Agreement (the “Personal Guarantee”). As Ultimate complied with its initial obligations under the Payment Agreement, the Applicant agreed to sell a further cargo of gasoil to Ultimate pursuant to the New Spot Contract dated 24 January 2024.

Ultimate then breached its further obligations under the Payment Agreement by failing to pay additional sums as they became due. On 20 March 2024, the Applicant put Ultimate on notice that it was in clear breach of the Payment Agreement and that the Applicant was entitled to exercise all of its rights under the Payment Agreement, the Spot Contracts, the Term Contract, the New Spot Contract, or at law without any further notice to Ultimate. By letter dated 21 March 2024, Ultimate denied being in default.

On 4 April 2024, the Applicant firstly presented seven of the nine cheques for payment, and, secondly, demanded payment from Mr Bashar under the Personal Guarantee.

Two days later, on 6 April 2024, the Applicant was informed by the bank that all of the cheques that it had encashed had been returned by the bank due to an “irregular” signature. The Applicant later lodged a criminal complaint in relation to the dishonoured cheques which resulted in Mr Bashar being sentenced, in absentia, to one year in prison. At the parties’ request, this sentence was later revoked. I address this matter further, in due course, below because it is important to put the timing of this in context, as the Hollander judgment preceded the findings of the court and Mr Bashar being sentenced to one year in prison.

As already noted above, on 22 November 2023, the Claimant commenced DIAC arbitration proceedings against Ultimate under the Spot Contracts seeking recovery of unpaid interest and demurrage in respect of these cargoes.

On 17 April 2024, the Applicant commenced proceedings against Mr Bashar under the personal guarantee, under claim number CL-2024-000225 (the “PG Proceedings”).

On 7 May 2024, the Claimant commenced LCIA proceedings against Ultimate under the Term Contract for outstanding demurrage and interest due in respect of the first cargo and the remaining principal and interest in respect of the second cargo (the “LCIA Proceedings”).

On 24 July 2024, the Applicant applied, for and on 29 July 2024 was granted, the Original WFO (in support of the PG Proceedings, LCIA Proceedings, and the New Spot Proceedings). Ultimate and Mr Bashar ultimately successfully applied to set aside the Original WFO on the basis that the Deputy Judge was not satisfied as to the risk of dissipation.

On 25 July 2024, the Applicant commenced proceedings against Ultimate in claim number CL-2024-000426 in respect of the sums due under the New Spot Contract (the “New Spot Proceedings”).

On 9 August 2024, the Applicant applied for summary judgment or to strike out Mr Bashar’s defence in the PG Proceedings, and on 21 November 2024, the Applicant applied for summary judgment or to strike out Ultimate’s defence in the New Spot Proceedings.

Following the hearing of both summary judgment applications on 23 January 2025, judgment was handed down on 14 February 2025 by Mr Paul Stanley KC (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court) who awarded summary judgment to the Applicant and ordered:

The court gave permission to appeal on a single point of law regarding the scope and operation of s. 49(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, but that appeal was not ultimately pursued as a consequence of further agreements between the parties.

On 10 March 2025, the Applicant made an application for a third-party debt order against funds held by the Access Bank UK Limited (“Access Bank”) for Ultimate, which was granted by the court on 12 March 2025 (the “First ITPDO”). The First ITPDO was discharged by Master Thornett on 10 April 2025 on the application of the Applicant to facilitate without prejudice discussions.

On 10 October 2025, the Applicant applied for interim third-party debt orders (the “ITPDO”) against Access Bank in respect of bank accounts held in the name of Mr Bashar and Ultimate. Access Bank confirmed that at the time of service of the ITPDO they: (a) did not hold, and had never held, any funds on behalf of Mr Bashar or accounts in his name; and (b) that they held four accounts with Ultimate with a total credit of US$1,316.14 and £90. The court discharged the ITPDO in respect of Mr Bashar at the request of the Applicant on 17 November 2025.

Ultimate opposed the making of a final third-party debt order on the basis that this would apparently have a detrimental impact on its relationship with Access Bank with whom it alleged it had a US$30 million trade finance facility.

On 23 December 2025, Master Davison made the final TPDO requiring Access Bank to pay the Applicant £90 and US$1,316.14, with the Applicant’s costs of the TPDO application in the amount of £233.50 to be retained out of those funds. The Applicant has since received those funds.

On 5 December 2025, the Applicant filed proceedings against Mr Bashar and Ultimate before the DIFC Courts seeking recognition and enforcement of the Summary Judgments as a judgment of the DIFC Courts (the “DIFC Court Proceedings”). Mr Bashar and Ultimate have challenged the jurisdiction of the DIFC Court, on what the Applicant believes to be spurious grounds, one of which was withdrawn on 23 March 2026. However, during the course of oral submissions before me, Miss Allsop updated me as to the position as to the points that were actually taken at the hearing last Friday on 27 March 2026, which were, to an extent, different. I bear in mind what I was told by Miss Allsop in that regard. In the event, judgment was reserved.

On 24 April 2025, the Applicant, Mr Bashar and Ultimate entered into a further settlement agreement (the “New Payment Agreement”), providing for payment in several instalments starting on 25 April 2025.

The New Payment Agreement allowed Ultimate three grace periods, permitting it a further ten UAE banking days to pay any of the instalments. In the event that either (i) payment was not made within the grace period, or (ii) Ultimate utilised all three grace periods and then failed to make a further payment on time, the Applicant was then entitled, amongst other matters, to commence enforcement in relation to the Summary Judgments, and to pursue the DIAC and LCIA arbitrations, after having given the necessary notice.

Having exhausted all three grace periods, Ultimate failed to pay the fifth instalment which was initially due on 25 August 2025. Ultimate requested additional time to make payment, which the Applicant granted. Addendum 1 dated 22 August 2025 extended the payment deadline to 1 September 2025, and Addendum 2 dated 1 September 2025 extended it to 8 September 2025. Ultimate failed to pay the fifth instalment by the extended deadline. A part payment of the fifth instalment in the amount of AED 1,745,625.00 was made by Ultimate on 13 September 2025. On 11 October 2025, Ultimate made a part payment of AED 1,470,000.00 towards the outstanding balance of the fifth instalment payment, leaving an outstanding balance of AED 461,747.37 in respect of that instalment.

Ultimate did not pay the following on time: (i) the sixth instalment, due on 25 September 2025; (ii) the seventh instalment, due on 27 October 2025; or (iii) the eighth instalment, due on 25 November 2025. The sum of US$32.7 millionremains outstanding under the PG Summary Judgment and the US$7,460,390.95 (exclusive of costs and interest on costs) under the New Spot Summary Judgment.

On 5 December 2025, the Applicant filed a Request for Arbitration (the “RFA”) dated 5 December 2025 seeking that disputes arising out of or in connection with the New Payment Agreement be referred to LCIA arbitration. In accordance with clause 24.3 of the New Payment Agreement, the Applicant sought consolidation of the further arbitration with the existing LCIA Arbitration relating to the Term Contract. On 25 February 2026, the LCIA Tribunal confirmed that the arbitral proceedings would be consolidated.

By the end of January 2026, Ultimate should have paid 10 instalments under the New Payment Agreement totalling AED 45,777,172.70 but had only paid AED 8,731,683.56, leaving a shortfall of AED 37,045,489.14.

As a result of without prejudice discussions, four payments were made by Ultimate between 5 February 2026 and 28 February 2026 totalling AED 12,855,150. In accordance with an agreement between the Applicant and Ultimate, the Applicant has also agreed to the corresponding release of product stored in the Koko Depot.

On 15 March 2026, and as already foreshadowed, Mr Eppinger received a telephone call from Mr Bashar, in which Mr Bashar urged Mr Eppinger to accept Ultimate’s payment terms. Mr Eppinger declined and demanded that Mr Bashar make a significant payment in March, and Mr Bashar responded in the terms that I have already quoted.

The sum of AED 120,089,582.69 and £94,025.56 (approximately US$32.7 million) is owed by Mr Bashar in respect of summary judgment in the PG Proceedings.

The sum of AED 27,491,540.66 and £63,859.28 (approximately US$7.5 million) is owed by Ultimate in respect of summary judgment in the New Spot Proceedings.

The court will more readily grant a freezing order as an aid to enforcement of a judgment than on an interim application (see Babanaft International Co SA v Bassatne [1990] 1 Ch 13) per Kerr LJ at [37]:

The applicable principles were recently considered by Calver J in the case of Griffin Underwriting Limited v Varouxakis [2021] EWHC 226 (Comm) in which he stated at [29]-[34] as follows:

Whilst this is an area which does not appear to be fully developed in the case law, it appears that this requirement is more or less similar to the requirement on an interim application to show a risk of dissipation (see the judgment of Hamblen J (as he then was) in SPL Private Finance (PF1) IC Limited and 17 Others v ARCH Financial Products LLP [2015] EWHC 1124 (Comm).

Although generally there is no requirement that the Applicant provides specific evidence as to the existence of the Respondents’ assets and their location in order to obtain a WFO, a post-judgment injunction must be sought for a legitimate purpose - the ultimate collection of the debt. Therefore, there must be some prospect that the injunction will aid the judgment creditor in execution, as opposed to place illegitimate pressure upon him (see Masri (supra.) at [34]).

As already quoted from the decision of Calver J in Griffin, the requirements are, in this context:

As already foreshadowed, the Respondents have disclosed US$170 million of assets in support of the discharge of the Original WFO. Whilst that may no longer be the true value of Mr Bashar’s assets, not least given that he has disposed of some assets for a lesser value than that which was identified at the time of the Original WFO, i.e. property in the UAE, there is no doubt that Mr Bashar is a wealthy man and that evidence, in terms of the disclosure on the previous Original WFO included moveable property, including a large and expensive luxury car collection and a significant number of high value watches. I am satisfied that the freezing order is sought for the legitimate purpose of assisting in the process of the ultimate collection of the debt.

The applicable principles in relation to risk of dissipation are well known. Two of the most well-known statements are those of Cockerill J in Petroceltic Resources Limited & Ors v David Fraser Archer [2018] EWHC 671 (Comm), and that of Popplewell J in Fundo Soberano de Angola v Jose Filomeno dos Santos [2018] EWHC 2199 (Comm) at [86]:

In the former case Cockerill J stated as follows:

In the latter case Popplewell J stated:

An applicant for a freezing order does not need to establish the existence of a risk of dissipation on the balance of probabilities. It is sufficient for the applicant to prove a danger of dissipation to the “good arguable case” standard (see Lakatamia Shipping Company Limited v Toshiko Moritomo [2019] EWCA Civ 2203 at [36]).

In this regard, I bear in mind the following points:

I am satisfied that there is solid evidence on which there is, at the very least, a good arguable case of risk of dissipation. The matters that have been relied upon by Miss Allsop on behalf of the Claimant apply equally to demonstrating a risk of dissipation in relation to Mr Bashir and in relation to Ultimate in circumstances where Mr Bshire is the ultimate decision-maker and controller of Ultimate.

Those factors which I am satisfied give rise to such arguable case of a risk of dissipation fall into a number of categories. Some of those categories were already in existence at the time of the Hollander Judgment. Others of those categories, which I have already foreshadowed, have arisen subsequent to the Hollander Judgment. Notwithstanding the fact there is no challenge to the Hollander Judgment as such, it remains relevant to consider some of those matters which were before the judge and which gave rise to the Hollander Judgment because those facts now have to be seen in the light of subsequent events as well.

Since the Hollander Judgment, Mr Bashar has disposed of assets worth many millions of dollars. In that regard (and following the summary judgment hearing on 23 January 2025 and the summary judgment on 14 February 2025), between January and the end of August 2025 Mr Bashar sold all the Park Lane units in UAE. In March 2025, Ultimate closed its UK establishment and in April 2025 Mr Bashar sold his villa in Meadows 5, which was said by him to be worth some US$3,812,117. What it was sold for is not known.

Those events are to be set against the backdrop not only of the fact that the summary judgment had recently been entered on 14 February but also that at around about the same time as Mr Bashar was selling his villa in Meadows 5, the Court of Appeal rejected the Respondent’s application for a stay on 4 April, and it was soon thereafter on 24 April that the new payment agreement instalments were due by 25 April and then subsequently on 26 May, 25 June, and so on until 25 August. Then on 16 July 2025, Mr Bashar sold units 901 to 909, 913, and 915 to 921 for a total price of AED 13,420,000 (approximately US$3,656,675.75).

I am satisfied to the requisite standard, for the purpose of this without notice application, that the timing of those sales does, indeed, support a risk of dissipation for the following reasons:

What is more, the sale of those assets, which would have realised a large amount of money, as I have just identified, do not appear to have been used to pay off the debts to the Claimants in circumstances where the Respondents were well aware of such debts. Not only was there a large number of sales in rapid order, it also appears that the sale price was very significantly below the values disclosed at the time of the Original WFO. They were estimated then to total, the relevant Park Lane units, some US$9,497,148, but the total sale price for these units was only approximately US$3,656,675. So very significantly, indeed almost US$6 million less, than they were said by Mr Bashar on oath to be worth some months earlier.

There are, of course, various permutations as to why that might be the case. Either the initial valuation was overstated, which itself would suggest a lack of truth as to what was said at the time of the original disclosure exercise, or conceivably, the market could have dropped, or equally, the sale could be at an undervalue which would, of course, be consistent with a fire sale, which itself would be indicative of dissipation of assets to evade enforcement of a judgment. On any view, the rapid disposal of so many units, in such factual circumstances, gives rise to a risk of unjustifiable dissipation of assets.

The very non-payment of the judgment debt itself supports a risk of dissipation for a number of reasons. Firstly, in response to the Original WFO, the response disclosed, supported by Mr Bashar’s sworn affidavit, assets in the sum of US$170 million. Therefore, on their own evidence, the Respondents could pay the judgment debt, but have chosen not to do so. It therefore appears that the present case is one of ‘will not pay’ rather than ‘cannot pay’.

Secondly, the value of the products, which remains in the tanks, is now at an all-time high due to the ongoing hostilities in the Middle East, and an onward sale by Ultimate would significantly reduce the judgment debt. Indeed, based on spot market prices, as of today’s date they would go very closely to discharging the judgment debt, dependent, of course, on the condition of the cargo.

I am satisfied the Respondents’ behaviour points towards a risk of dissipation. There is a considerable history of defaulting and honouring debts, breaching promises, and the extensive accrual of liabilities. The point that I am going to come on to in relation to the dishonoured cheques also points to dishonesty as well, and certainly adopting low standards of commercial morality.

This is an important factor where the factual position has moved on since the Hollander Judgment because in relation to those cheques, Article 675 of the UAE Commercial Transaction Law Number 50 of 2022 makes it a criminal offence to sign a cheque in a way which prohibits its honouring, punishable by a prison sentence of between six months and two years, and a fine of not less than 10% of the cheque value. On 22 April 2024, the Applicant filed a criminal complaint with the Dubai police regarding the returned cheques, which was registered on 25 April 2024, and on 23 December 2024, the UAE Public Prosecutor accepted the criminal complaint and transferred it to the Criminal Court.

Then on 30 January 2025, the Dubai Criminal Court found Mr Bashar guilty and handed down an in absentia judgment sentencing him to one year in prison despite Mr Bashar’s legal representative attending the hearing submitting a memo advancing a civil claim against the Applicant. The Dubai Criminal Court considered the arguments raised by Mr Bashar to be a tactic to avoid payment. Following entry into the new payment agreement, the criminal prosecution was closed on 17 June 2025. The UAE Criminal Court closed the criminal case between the parties due to a reconciliation between the parties.

Whilst, therefore, the sentence was discharged by agreement, the position remains that to provide dishonoured cheques, with the explanation given by Mr Bashir not being accepted by the court, and the court finding that a criminal offence had been committed and sentencing him to one year in prison, all strongly support a lack of honesty on the part of Mr Bashar. That is an important distinction from the position at the time of the Hollander Judgment.

As Miss Allsop demonstrated in her oral submission before me, and as is also addressed in the evidence of Mr Lakin, the initial disclosure (as required under the Original WFO) made on 5 August 2024, failed to disclose assets of over US$41 million, including his own home in Nigeria said to be worth over US$21,300,000, and also to fail to disclose a number of petrol stations in Nigeria. Both of those are things which Mr Bashar could hardly have forgotten about. The accompanying affidavit in which Mr Bashar said, “I apologise these assets were not identified on 5 August 2024” was no more than a bare apology and no credible explanation could be given. The explanation given by his solicitors Holman Fenwick Willan (“HFW”) was no more fulsome in that regard.

It was also notable, and remains notable, that Mr Bashir, who has got a primary residence in Nigeria, disclosed only a single bank account in the UAE and no bank account in Nigeria. In addition, and in a nine-day period before the return date, no less than US$3 million were allegedly paid out in the ordinary course of business, and yet no accounts were identified through which all those millions of dollars would be passed.

In his judgment discharging the Original WFO, Mr Hollander KC stated:

Mr Hollander KC did not go on to make any findings about that in circumstances where he was discharging the injunction. However, on the material before me, I have no doubt, certainly for the purpose of a without notice of application, that there was a prima facie case that the terms of that worldwide freezing order were breached in terms of asset disclosure.

I am satisfied that there have been attempts to obstruct what are rightly characterised as legitimate attempts to enforce a summary judgment on what can be characterised properly as spurious grounds. For example, Ultimate sought to delay the determination of a third-party debt order application in respect of Access Bank by seeking to adjourn the hearing at the last minute, having instructed counsel and solicitors for the hearing, the result being that that adjournment probably cost more than the Applicant recovered from Access Bank instead of simply paying the funds to the Applicant.

Another example is that Mr Bashar and Ultimate have opposed recognition and enforcement of the summary judgment in the DFC Courts on grounds which at least, according to the Claimants, are unfounded, one of which was withdrawn, albeit they pursued such objections, and judgment has been reserved.

The evidence before me, as addressed by Mr Lakin in his second affidavit at paragraph 43(d), is that there has been interference and blocking of the Applicant’s attempts to sample the unpaid product, which remains in the Rahamaniyya and Koko depot.

I have already identified that Mr Bashar owns a number of items of personal property, including vehicles and watches, which could be easily disposed of. There is also an issue, which I have already foreshadowed, as to whether or not Mr Bashar actually owns the shares in Zamson, which are held by his brother on his behalf, although that has been denied by both Mr Bashar and Mr Zamson.

I consider it is an important factor, albeit one which has not been overplayed by the Claimant, that according to the evidence of Mr Eppinger on oath, which I take at face value, during the conversation with Mr Bashar on 15 March 2026, Mr Bashar stated that if Ultimate’s offer as to payment was not accepted, he would start to “dispose of his assets” and in circumstances where the Applicant has not accepted Ultimate’s offer, I consider that this does, indeed, provide direct evidence of a risk of dissipation.

Of course, it is possible that on the return date, more evidence will be before the court in that regard, and it does not follow that the Respondents will necessarily accept the account, or the entirety of the account, that has been given as to what was said. Nevertheless, I consider it an important further supporting factor when overlayed on top of the dissipation of the UAE properties and the failure to pay the judgments following summary judgment.

In separate proceedings brought by Sahara Energy Resource Limited, Mr Bashar was found to be in contempt of court following the breach of an injunction to deliver up product (that Ultimate failed to pay for) and by order made on 7 February, was committed to prison for ten months and fined £500,000, which the Applicant says indicates the seriousness of Mr Bashar’s contempt (which he in due course purged).

Whilst Mr Hollander KC did not attach any real weight to this factor, I consider that that factor now has to be considered against the backdrop of the fact that the Respondents are continuing to fail to comply with court orders, and I do consider that it does further demonstrate a disregard for due legal process, notwithstanding the risk of imprisonment. So whilst not the most important factor, and whilst it is a factor that no real weight was previously attached to, that this court has previously not found to attach any real weight to, I do consider it is a relevant factor as part of the overall picture.

Accordingly, and for all those reasons, I am satisfied that there is, at the very least, a good arguable case of risk of dissipation.

I then turn to consider whether it is just and convenient to grant the relief that is sought.

As is well established, the “just and convenient” requirement is relevant to whether a freezing order should be granted and on what terms (see Holyoake v Candy [2017] 3 WLR 1131 per Gloster LJ at [45]).

Grant and Mumford on Civil Fraud (first edn., paragraph 28-059) identifies a series of non-exhaustive factors which are relevant to the question of whether it is just and convenient to grant a freezing order, and with which I agree. They are as follows:

Turning to the application of such factors to the facts of the present case, I am satisfied that it is just and convenient to grant a worldwide freezing order in the present case for the following reasons:

I have been addressed extensively in relation to the obligation of full and frank disclosure both in the evidence of Mr Lakin, in the skeleton argument in support of the application, and in the oral submissions of Miss Allsop today. I bear in mind all those points which have been made. I am satisfied that none of them tell against the granting of the relief which is sought. I will deal with them briefly in such circumstances.

Firstly, it is right that the Original WFO was discharged by Charles Hollander KC for the reasons given by him in the Hollander Judgment. However, as I have addressed during the course of this judgment, matters have moved on significantly since then, and there are now judgments against the Respondents. There is the actual evidence of real property assets being disposed of, and there is the very recent threat to dispose assets.

Secondly, whilst it may be said that there is some security for the judgments (in terms of the product in the tanks), the reality is that there have been suggested potential bars to any sale of the same, including it being denied in correspondence that the Applicant is entitled to resell the product. In this regard, Rahamaniyya and Zamson have not permitted full access to the product, which has led to proceedings to apply for delivery up. Inevitably, any future sale is likely to be viewed as a salvage sale in the market. There is evidence before me that the quality of the product is likely to have deteriorated which would have a negative impact upon price. Additionally, there is also an issue in relation to the value of the Nigerian Naira at the moment as compared to the US dollar. Finally, and puzzlingly, Ultimate does not appear to have been willing to sell the product notwithstanding the fact that there are currently very favourable market conditions, and that could suggest that the product is not readily saleable, which would impact upon the security value. In such circumstances, and whilst the product, if on spec, would offer a considerable amount of security, possibly even approaching the value of the judgment debt subject to daily volatility, the other factors lead me to consider that there is a very real risk that the cargo will be worth significantly less than those amounts.

In terms of the property disposals, it may well be that it will be suggested that there is a legitimate commercial explanation for selling the properties, but if that is so, it is rightly pointed out to me that it is surprising that the realised sums have not been put to discharging the debts.

It is said that Mr Bashar has apologised to court for his past contempt, and that, in fact, he gave explanations as to the Sahara payments, he suggested that he was ill-advised by his lawyers, and that sums were ultimately paid. All that is true so far as it goes. I do not regard the Sahara contempt as an important aspect of the risk of dissipation, but it does seem to be the case that history is now repeating itself in terms of the failures to pay set against the backdrop of the evidence of risk of dissipation that I have identified.

I have also considered the question of timing and any delay in seeking relief. Due to the terms that have been negotiated, it would not have been possible to bring matters before this court before September or October 2025. There have then been subsequent payments. I am satisfied that there has been no material delay in bringing this matter forward.

I have had drawn to my attention what is often called the “stable door point” which was expressed by Cockerill J in the Petroceltic case, but as was memorably said by Cooke J in Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corp v Recoletos Ltd [2011] EWHC 2242 (QB) at [29], the granting of a worldwide freezing order will at least ensure that such dissipation does not continue even if the horse has bolted and all that is left is a miniature pony. In fact, on the evidence before me, I consider the likelihood is that something more than a miniature pony will be left, but only time will tell in that regard.

I have already addressed that I do not consider that the Claimant has acted in an oppressive manner, and I also do not consider that the fact that a high interest rate applies, impacts upon the position. Such interest is simply compensation for the Claimant being kept out of the money.

Finally, and also foreshadowed, it is possible that the evidence of Mr Eppinger will not be fully accepted on any return date. It may also be said that that conversation was without prejudice, given that it was set against a backdrop of earlier without prejudice negotiations. However, Mr Bashar is well aware of the without prejudice principle and it has been expressed on previous occasions. It was not expressed on that occasion. So if he wished it to be on a without prejudice basis, he could easily have done so. In any event, without prejudice privilege does not extend to negotiations as to how an admitted debt is to be paid (see Bradford & Bingley v Rashid [2006] 1 WLR 2066 per Lord Brown at [72]-[73]). In addition, without privilege cannot be used as a cloak for fraud.

For all those reasons, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant a worldwide freezing order post-judgment in the terms sought.

There are also before me applications for alternative service in circumstances where such orders were made at the time of the Original WFO was made. It is said that those orders still apply, but out of an abundance of caution, the Applicant also seeks permission to serve the application and all relevant documents on the Respondent by alternative means, namely by email.

The court has jurisdiction to permit alternative service out of the jurisdiction by alternative means “where it appears to the court that there is good reason to do so” pursuant to CPR rule 6.37(5)(b)(i) (application for permission to serve the claim form out of the jurisdiction), CPR rule 6.15 (service of the claim form), and CPR rule 6.27 (applying rule 6.15 to “any document in the proceedings”).

I am satisfied that there is good reason in this case to do so. In particular, and as is usually the case in the context of applications for freezing orders, the freezing order needs to be brought to the attention of the Respondents at the earliest possible juncture so that they are aware of the same and are obliged to comply with the same, and to avoid a relevant person unwittingly breaching the terms of the order. I am also satisfied that service by email in this case has proved effective to date. There is also evidence before me in Lakin 2 at paragraph 259 that there is no specific law that forbids service of legal documents by email in either UAE or Nigeria. Accordingly, I make the orders for alternative service that are sought.