UK Insurance Limited v Bahader Hassankhail

In this claim, the Claimant, UK Insurance Limited (‘UKIL’) seeks to set aside the Order of Casper Glyn KC (Deputy High Court Judge) dated 29.06.2022, in claim no. QB-2019-003871 (‘the 2019 claim’), on the basis that it was procured by fraud. I summarise the procedural and substantive history to the extent necessary. I am grateful to counsel and the wider legal teams for their helpful submissions.

The 2019 claim concerned a road traffic accident which occurred in 2016 and in which Mr Hassankhail, the Defendant in this claim, was the Claimant. It is not in dispute in this claim or in the 2019 claim that Mr Hassankhail suffered personal injuries, including Traumatic Brain Injury. UKIL is the insurer liable in respect of damages in the 2019 claim. Liability was admitted in the 2019 claim in Mr Hassankhail’s favour. By order of 29.06.2022 Casper Glyn KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, approved the settlement of the 2019 claim by entering judgment for Mr Hassankhail for a total of £2,500,000 (‘the Approval Order’).

The case for UKIL in this claim is that after the Approval Order, UKIL obtained evidence which showed that Mr Hassankhail’s entire case in the 2019 claim was predicated on fraud. Thus UKIL seek a declaration and a set aside of the Approval Order with the consequence that all sums paid by UKIL as compensation and any or all costs be repaid.

On 5.11.2025 Ritchie J and SCJ Rowley heard the parties in this claim at a costs and case management hearing. They ordered, inter alia, that the anonymisation of Mr Hassankhail’s name be removed, and they set a timetable for any applications for specific disclosure. Both parties duly made such applications and they are the subject of this judgment.

On 20.02.2026 Moody J heard the parties in the 2019 claim and renewed a freezing injunction prohibiting Mr Hassankhail from removing, disposing, dealing with or diminishing the value of any of his assets.

There are 3 applications which were heard before me on 16 March 2026 and which I determine in this judgment. They are:

a.

b.

c.

I determined c. at the conclusion of the hearing for reasons I gave ex tempore. In summary, I allowed the application primarily because I considered that the additional cost to the parties and to Court resources in extending the trial date by 1 day was outweighed by the risk of even greater costs and resources likely to be incurred if the trial were to go part heard, the probability of which had increased since the previous listing order.

The principal remaining issues to determine are as follows.

a.

b.

In coming to my decision I have carefully considered the totality of the evidence and material placed before me which (at the time of the hearing) consisted of:

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

It is necessary to set out the rationale and the chronology of the 2019 claim to understand the context of the applications before me. The only live issue between the parties in the 2019 claim was quantum of damages. Mr Hassankhail’s case was that he had suffered moderate-severe or severe brain injury and UKIL’s case was that he had suffered a moderate or moderate-severe brain injury. Accordingly, the central issues in dispute in the 2019 proceedings were:

a.

b.

c.

d.

It is relevant to note here that Mr Hassankhail’s case in the 2019 claim was that he lacked capacity to litigate and to manage his property and affairs as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident. Thus, the Official Solicitor was his appointed litigation friend at the time of the Approval Hearing.

The final Schedule of Loss signed on 10.02.2022 for Mr Hassankhail totalled £12,702,415, including:

a.

b.

UKIL obtained surveillance evidence on Mr Hassankhail prior to the Approval Order and UKIL’s case was that this evidence appeared to show Mr Hassankhail acting in a manner that demonstrated markedly greater ability than his claim and his presentation to experts suggested.

In response to the surveillance evidence, Mr Hassankhail served further evidence including a statement from Mr David Mansour (‘Mansour 1’). It is UKIL’s case that following service of Mansour 1, Mr Mansour contacted Mr Hassankhail’s solicitors, Moore Barlow, to inform them that his witness statement was a lie. The extent of Mr Mansour’s contact with Moore Barlow is in dispute before the parties in this claim.

Following negotiations between the parties, an offer of £2.5 million gross was made on 14 June 2022 by UKIL and accepted in writing on 20 June 2022. UKIL’s case in this claim is that Mansour 1 was material to the decision to make that offer and that it was also material to the Approval Order.

In August 2022 Mr Mansour contacted UKIL to inform them that the evidence in Mansour 1 was not true. He gave a further statement (Mansour 2) in which he apologised to the Court for giving false evidence in Mansour 1.

In October 2022 Mr Hassankhail sought and procured a Mental Capacity Act 2005 COP3 from his GP stating that he had regained capacity to manage his property and affairs. On 30.09.2023 Dr Kassim examined Mr Hassankhail and reported to the Court of Protection on 8.10.2023 that Mr Hassankhail had financial capacity and capacity to litigate.

Of further relevance is Mr Hassankhail’s application in August 2022 in the Family Court against Mr Mansour for a non-molestation order (NMO). The first NMO was obtained on 2.09.2022 which prohibited Mr Mansour from the following:

Mr Hassankhail’s defence to this claim is, inter alia, that Mr Mansour provided evidence to UKIL and/or their solicitors in breach of the NMO and that the pursuit of these proceedings is an abuse of process and should be struck out.

The ultimate issues in this claim are likely to be:

a.

b.

The applicable legal framework was not in dispute between the parties and is therefore briefly set out below.

No privilege (either litigation privilege or legal advice privilege) attaches to documents “if the document comes into existence in relation to a fraud, crime or other iniquity.” Al Sadeq v Dechert LLP [2024] EWCA Civ 28 §53[AB/413]).

The Cout must be satisfied on the material available that it is more likely than not that the iniquity exists.

The principle of iniquity extends to ‘fraud or other equivalent underhand conduct which is in breach of a duty of good faith or contrary to public policy or the interests of justice’: Al Sadeq v Dechert LLP [2024] EWCA Civ 28 §55.

As to the parameters of conduct which is to be properly described as iniquitous, it is important to note that it does not apply to ‘ordinary run of cases’, such as putting forward an account of events which the client ‘knows to be untrue, and which therefore involves a deliberate strategy to mislead the other party and the court, and to commit perjury’: Al Sadeq v Dechert LLP [2024] EWCA Civ 28 §58.

The touchstone of iniquity is ‘whether the iniquity puts the conduct outside the normal scope of such professional engagement or is an abuse of the relationship which falls within the ordinary course of such engagement.’

Collateral waiver of privilege allows for documents that would otherwise be non-disclosable on public interest grounds to be required to be disclosed.

The “starting point in establishing the extent of collateral waiver is to ascertain the issue in relation to which the [voluntarily disclosed material] has been deployed, known as the transaction test (General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn Ltd v Tanter [1984] 1 WLR 100, 113D, per Hobhouse J), waiver being limited to documents relating to that transaction subject to the overriding requirement for fairness. The transaction is not the same as the subject matter of the disclosed document or communication, and waiver does not apply to all documents which could be described as relevant to the issue”: R (Jet2.comLtd) v CAA (CA) [2020] EWCA Civ 35 § 113[AB/324].

The Court objectively determines what the real transaction is so that the scope of the waiver can be established. If only part of the material involved in that transaction has been disclosed, further disclosure should be ordered: Fulham Leisure Holdings Ltd v Nicholson Graham & Jones [2006] EWHC 158 (Ch) §18 [AB/145].

Additional principles of fairness may come into play if it is apparent that the disclosure is part of some bigger picture (not necessarily part of some bigger transaction) and fairness, and the need not to mislead, requires further disclosure. The application of this principle will be very fact sensitive: Fulham Leisure Holdings (supra) §19.

The test to be applied in ordering specific disclosure is summarised at CPR PD 31A §5.4:

UKIL’s application for Specific Disclosure

UKIL’s case is that the iniquity exception applies and the iniquity on which they rely is the same as that in the substantive claim. The core elements of fraud are said to be:

a.

b.

c.

The principal question is whether a prima facie case is established, namely a case which allows a conclusion on a provisional basis that the iniquity exists. That is a conclusion to be reached on the civil standard of proof on the balance of probabilities.

In reaching my conclusions, I am mindful that the iniquity relied on in this application is the same as the iniquity in the main proceedings and I qualify my findings by emphasising that the proceedings before me are at an interim stage and may turn out to be wrong. I have assessed the evidence presented without the benefit of a full trial and without testing the evidence. I further observe that nothing in this judgment is intended to cause prejudice to the ultimate assessment of the trial Judge and after a full ventilation of the evidence and the issues in the claim. I am also aware that if I conclude that the iniquity is established so as to require disclosure, the communication will be made available and if it should subsequently be held that the iniquity did not take place, the privilege will have been wrongly invaded in a way which cannot be reversed.

UKIL’s case is that Mr Hassankhail deliberately and flagrantly presented himself dishonestly to the experts in the 2019 claim. Mr Colton KC submitted that Mr Hassankhail took drugs with ‘extraordinary frequency’ and that the dishonesty was designed to trick the experts to reach conclusions based on false self-reporting, which in turn led to false professional assessments, including an assessment of capacity to manage financial affairs.

Mr Allen KC asserts that this is no more than false reporting in the account of drug use and is not out of the ordinary run of cases.

In my view, the material presented establishes a prima facie case on the balance of probabilities of this iniquity and for the following principal reasons.

Mr Hassankhail told numerous experts that he did not use drugs:

a.

b.

c.

This is to be contrasted with the evidence from Mr Hassankhail’s phone records which show that he was a frequent user of crystal methamphetamine (“crystal meth”, referred to as “tina” and “t”), gamma-hydroxybutyrate (“GHB”) and amyl-/alkyl-nitrites (“poppers”). I was directed to 37 messages, none of which were disputed by Mr Hassankhail, which support a conclusion of heavy and frequent drug use:

i.

ii.

iii.

iv.

v.

vi.

vii.

viii.

ix.

x.

xi.

xii.

xiii.

xiv.

xv.

xvi.

xvii.

xviii.

xix.

xx.

xxi.

xxii.

xxiii.

xxiv.

xxv.

xxvi.

xxvii.

xxviii.

xxix.

xxx.

xxxi.

xxxii.

xxxiii.

xxxiv.

xxxv.

xxxvi.

xxxvii.

In particular, it is striking that the morning after a night with Mr Mansour, when it was clear from Mr Hassankhail’s telephone messages that he had taken drugs (see S/1394) Mr Hassankhail is interviewed by his Consultant Psychiatrist, Mr Procopio, and states that ‘he is not using drugs and that he has never used drugs in his life’. Further, his self reported symptoms at the time of the interview (07.08.2021) are recorded as, inter alia, slow thinking process, daytime drowsiness, anhedonia and very low libido.

In my view, it is the totality of the context of false reporting here that takes it out of the ‘ordinary’ and in particular:

i.

ii.

iii.

iv.

In the 2019 claim Mr Hassankhail claimed substantial damages for the costs of a financial deputy for the rest of his life and his lack of capacity underlined his claims for £7,812,069 in relation to care and case management.

Mr Hassankhail’s evidence to his deputy [S/69] was that ‘he spent all of his benefits money on taxis and pizza. Despite several attempts he could not tell me, even roughly, how much he regularly spent on food and clothing.’ Consequently, she ‘formed the view that he operated entirely with cash and largely relied on his friends to feed him.’ She attributed the cash found in his room as ‘consistent with…his lack of understanding about budgeting or his own vulnerability’.

In my view, the material presented establishes a prima facie case on the balance of probabilities of this iniquity for the following principal reasons:

i.

ii.

iii.

iv.

The totality of the evidence presented to me at the hearing and summarised in UKIL’s skeleton argument persuades me at this interim stage, that it is more likely than not that the iniquity alleged, namely the Mr Hassankhail’s dishonest presentation to his legal advisors, the experts and the Financial Deputy, did occur.

In my view, the material presented establishes a prima facie case on the balance of probabilities of this iniquity for the following principal reasons.

There is evidence which originated from Mr Hassankhail which shows that he knew Mansour 1 was false when it was obtained. In particular, the phone messages relating to the night of 25.03.2022 at EuroHotel more likely than not support the conclusion that it was Mr Hassankhail who booked the hotel and that he requested Mr Mansour to pay him back for the hotel bookings, drugs and taxis [S/1531]. That was also the evening during which Mr Hassankhail was subject to surveillance which suggests that instead of taking a taxi (the costs of which Mr Hassankhail subsequently asked Mr Mansour to pay), he travelled to the hotel unaccompanied and via train, bus and on foot. This evidence as to who made the booking and how Mr Hassankhail got there is in stark contrast to Mansour 1 §11, namely that the EuroHotel “was organised and booked by me” and “I had to give him very detailed directions as he finds it difficult to follow instructions. I think Bahader took public transport and kept getting lost and he kept texting me about directions and I was sending him messages to tell him how to get to the hotel”.

Further, Mr Hassankhail’s message to Mr Mansour of 12.06.2022 supports the conclusion that he knew Mr Mansour 1 was false: “Do you know i was not gonna tell you this but let me tell you for your education, you have signed that statement and its already been sent to court and as you lied in that statemnet your in contempt of court. The ball is in my hand about this matter if i want to use it anytime” [S2/52].

Added to the above, there is material

before me of Mr Hassankhail asking Mr Mansour to give evidence in the 2019 claim in order to respond to the surveillance evidence. Whilst this evidence on its own would not lead me to conclude that it is more probable than not that Mr Hassankhail personally took steps to procure false evidence, it does add support to the conclusion under this category that it is more likely than not that the iniquity occurred.

Mr Allen KC on behalf of Mr Hassankhail argued that UKIL’s case on the iniquity exception is wholly dependent on the evidence of Mr Mansour. I disagree. It is clear to me that on any view, the relationship between Mr Mansour and Mr Hassankhail bitterly deteriorated and that both men made various allegations against each other. My role in this application is not to determine the ultimate truth of those allegations nor is my assessment on the facts at this preliminary stage dependent on Mr Mansour’s credibility. In coming to my assessment I have relied on the evidence that has not been disputed by Mr Hassankhail and I have primarily considered the evidence that was presented by Mr Hassankhail’s legal team in the 2019 action coupled with his own words contained in the phone records.

Standing back from the conclusions reached above, I turn to the terms of the requested order [SSB/12,13] and I address them in turn.

All documents relating to the Defendant’s use of funds received from 1 January

UKIL’s case is that Mr Hassanhkail had, contrary to his presentation in the 2019 claim, full capacity to manage his property and affairs and that he fraudulently presented evidence to the contrary. The temporal period specified ends with the assessment of Mr Hassankhail by Dr Kassim, who assessed him as having capacity. There is no privilege argument that is or can be properly raised in reply to this request. Rather, Mr Allen KC asserts that this is a fishing expedition and that Mr Hassankhail’s property and affairs were managed by the professional Deputy over the relevant period and that it was open to UKIL to apply for disclosure of those documents in the 2019 claim but they chose not to do so.

In my view, these documents are relevant, not least because there is evidence that Mr Hassankhail had more than one bank account. They are straightforward for Mr Hassankhail to collate and it is entirely in accordance with the overriding objective that they be disclosed to UKIL. I accordingly order disclosure.

All documents relating to the procuring, preparation, drafting and service of the

The main issue under this category is whether the iniquity exception applies. In light of my findings above, it plainly does such that Mr Hassankhail cannot claim legal professional privilege. These documents go to the central plank of UKIL’s claim, namely the circumstances in which Mansour 1 was procured, prepared, served and filed. I therefore order such disclosure.

All documents relating to the conduct of Claim Number QB-2019-003871 between 1 January 2022 and 30 June 2022. This will include the following:

i.

ii.

The main issue under this category is also whether the iniquity exception applies. For Mr Hassankhail, Mr Allen KC argued that these are all privileged documents and that even if they are not, the ‘request goes far beyond what could be ordered’.

It seems to me that both the advice prepared for the purpose of the Approval hearing and the detail of instructions and advice given and received during the relevant period is central to this claim. On the latter point, there is evidence before me that Mr Hassankhail is likely to have given some instructions directly to his legal representatives. The relevance of both is clear on UKIL’s case that Mr Hassankhail dishonestly represented his capacity to litigate and manage finances.

On the question of the scope of order for disclosure, I was not given assistance on what might be a narrower and more reasonable request or order. In these premises and given my conclusions on iniquity, I propose to order disclosure of i. and ii. above, relating to instructions, advice and the Approval hearing. The catch-all category of ‘all documents relating to the conduct’ does not seem to me to add anything of relevance to UKIL’s ability to run their case. Moreover, it is desirable that any order I make be as specific as possible, particularly in the context of the iniquity exception to privilege at a preliminary stage – as above, if I am wrong on iniquity, the privilege cannot be undone.

The Defendant’s GP, medical records and talking therapy records from 30 June 2022 to 30th September 2023.

All documents relating to the Defendant’s rehabilitation, including support worker, case management records from 30 June 2022 to 30th September 2023.

I take these two categories together because they both concern medical evidence which is confidential but which would have to be disclosed as part of the personal injury proceedings. They are not privileged documents. Mr Hassankhail resists disclosure on the basis that they do not relate to any factual issues in the proceedings and that the time period extends beyond the period of alleged fraud. As to the relevance to the pleaded case, it is clear that the medical records are highly relevant to UKIL’s case that Mr Hassankhail dishonestly represented his symptoms and his capacity. It is relevant that following the Approval Order, he sought a declaration that he had capacity and the documents sought will show the extent to which the relatively swift recovery was occasioned by proper treatment and the engagement with his rehabilitation programme.

As to the time period, it is entirely appropriate for UKIL to be provided with all documents up to the assessment by Dr Kassim.

All documents relating to the Defendant’s travel outside the UK from 1 January

The disclosure of this category is agreed between the parties.

The Aceris IT report mentioned on 5 November 2025, date unknown

The request for disclosure of this report arises out of the hearing on 5.11.2025 when, as I understand it the Court was provided with an email from Mr Hasssankhail, referring to a report from Asceris in respect of the veracity of the 11.06.2022 email from Mr Mansour to Mr Hassankhail’s solicitors in the 2019 action, Moore Barlow. Mr Allen KC told me at the hearing on 16 March 2026 that his client has no control over the report, which was obtained by Moore Barlow for the purpose of any liability, advice or litigation against them and given the significance of the assertion that Mr Mansour contacted them to inform them that Mansour 1 was not truthful around the date of the acceptance of the offer which led to the Approval Order.

I do not have sufficient evidence to assure myself that Mr Hassankhail has control over this document, which appears to be an internal Moore Barlowe IT report relating to receipt of emails from Mr Mansour. Further, I accept that this document is likely privileged if prepared in contemplation of assessment of liability or legal proceedings. It is in these premises that I refuse to order its disclosure.

The Defendant’s tenancy agreement for his property at 1A Stockbury Road.

The Defendants COP3 and supporting documents.

The Defendant’s pass certificates or equivalent documents for driving theory and driving practical tests.

I take the three categories above together which are disputed primarily on the basis of relevance. In my judgment, they are all clearly relevant to the pleaded case that Mr Hassankhail misrepresented his capacity to manage his affairs and finance and that he dishonestly exaggerated his vulnerabilities. Accordingly I order their disclosure.

Mr Hassankhail seeks the following, set out in Schedule to his application and addressed in numbered categories below.

(1)

Mr Hassankhail’s principal points in relation to category (1) are that UKIL’s copy of Mr Mansour’s email of 24.04.2024 [C/1260] was produced as an exhibit to one of UKIL’s solicitor’s statements, Ms Baptist, and served approximately three months after standard disclosure. I accept that contact between Mr Mansour and UKIL prior to the Approval Order is highly material to the claim. Without more, I was not minded to accept the submission that the failure to disclose the email of 24.04.2022 as part of standard disclosure, meant that ‘it seems likely that C has also failed to disclose i. the response to that email and ii. any other emails passing between Mr Mansour and Direct Line/the Claimant. However, post hearing (namely after the hearing before me on 16.03.2026), there was further disclosure and submissions from the parties on this point. In light of those developments, I will order disclosure under category (1)(i) only and for the following reasons. In the evidence presented at the hearing and in written and oral submissions by Mr Colton KC I was told in unequivocal terms that UKIL had conducted searches for this information as part of its standard disclosure and that there were no further documents to disclose. After a draft of this judgment was circulated to the parties, I was informed that there was a second email ‘located on Direct Line Group servers, sent from the email address

on 24 April 2022 at 12:32.’ I also understand that the solicitors for UKIL were aware of this second email by at least 25 July 2025. That meant that the basis on which the case was presented in Court on 16 March 2026 was false. Mr Colton KC and the wider counsel team have apologised repeatedly and unreservedly. I accept that apology. However, I am left with heavy unease about why this email was not previously disclosed. Moreover, I have not been given any reason, let alone good reason for this error, which I regard as deeply concerning. This email should have been disclosed as part of standard disclosure and the fact it was not is a significant factor in favour of ordering disclosure of Category (1)(i).

Further and to the extent that any such communication (i.e. communication between Mr Mansour and UKIL prior to 29.06.2022) is privileged, in my judgment, UKIL has waived privilege by disclosure of the two emails, the second of which was explicitly ‘enclosed by way of disclosure’ on 21.04.2022. In any event, and as I understand UKIL’s case, their position is that they did not become aware of the allegations from Mr Mansour until August 2022, otherwise it would have been inconceivable that they would have authorised and asked the Court to approve the settlement of £2.5 million. Further and given all the circumstances, including the unexplained disclosure of further evidence, plainly relevant to Mr Hassankhail’s defence, I conclude that fairness demands disclosure of all communications prior to the Approval Order.

Categories (2) and (3) are:

(2)

(3)

Categories of documents in (2) and (3) refer to contact between UKIL and Mr Mansour and communications about Mr Mansour. The first issue to consider is whether these documents are privileged. My focus in approach is on the position of UKIL, the party claiming privilege and the question of dominant purpose which I must determine objectively, based on all the evidence, including the subjective intention of the author of the document. Applying this test to the facts, it is clear to me that all these documents are covered by litigation and/or legal advice privilege.

I next consider the question of waiver, including collateral waiver of privilege, most forcefully advanced on the basis of the email of 9.08.2022 and the transaction or the issue in relation to which that disclosure was made.

In my view, the essence of that which Ms Baptist was seeking to disclose was a response to the allegation that UKIL failed to make full and frank disclosure in the application for the freezing injunction concerning any contact with Mr Mansour before 29.06.2022. [C/766]. As part of that response, Ms Baptist exhibited various emails from Mr Mansour to UKIL, including the email dated 9.08.2022 to Mr Grahamsley which contained ‘extensive personal information about the Defendant’. Mr Allen KC asserts that as a consequence, UKIL waived privilege in respect of all communications with Mr Mansour. I do not agree. The issue or transaction here is the extent of communication between Mr Mansour and UKIL prior to the Approval Order i.e before 29.06.2022. I do not consider that UKIL has waived privilege in relation to communication after the Approval Order.

With regard to the defence of abuse on the basis of encouragement and/or facilitation of Mr Mansour’s breach of the NMO, I do not consider this to be a sound basis on which to order disclosure of privileged documents. I have considered whether fairness and the need not to mislead dictate further disclosure notwithstanding privilege and I conclude that they do not, on the facts of this case. It is not apparent to me that the communication during the operation of the NMO is part of the ‘bigger picture’. Further, communication between UKIL and Mr Mansour during the NMO goes to the question of strike out and/or a defence based on abuse. Communication prior to the Approval Order goes to the question of materiality and operative cause of Mansour 1. These are not parts of the same picture.

Moreover, Mr Hassankhail has already been provided with evidence from Ms Pizzala and Ms Baptist on the extent of UKIL’s communications with Mr Mansour. Mr Hassankhail’s argument is that the claim should be struck out on the basis of abuse because it is based on material procured and provided in breach of the NMO. It is open to him to make that argument on any application for strike out that he may elect to make and it is equally open to him to argue the abuse as a defence to the claim, in the manner asserted in the Defence. In these premises, and on the question of fairness and the test under CPR 31, I conclude that disclosure of all documents between UKIL and Mr Mansour would not further the overriding objective. They are privileged and I accordingly refuse their disclosure.

Categories (4), (5) and (6) are:

(4)

(5)

(6)

In relation to categories (4), (5) and (6), the main thrust of Mr Allen’s submissions is that there was a waiver of privilege in Mr Grahamsley’s witness statement of 23.03.2023 concerning the advice he received in relation to quantum, Mr Mansour’s evidence and his decision to make the offer of 2.5 million which was ultimately accepted. Mr Hassankhail demands that in light of the waiver, all documents which are relevant and which contextualise what has already been disclosed need to be further disclosed. I agree. It is important that both Mr Hassankhail and the Court have full visibility of the advice received and the ultimate assessment made by UKIL about Mr Mansour’s evidence. That will be a critical part of the Court’s ultimate assessment of materiality in this claim. In my judgment and in accordance with Jet2 (above) §114, I propose to make the order sought at 4 -6 in the terms sought.

Categories (7) and (8) are:

(7)

(8)

In relation to categories (7) and (8), I consider that these documents are privileged but that privilege has been waived in respect of them by deploying them in the 2019 proceedings. I have not been addressed by the parties on the extent of disclosed and undisclosed material. Nor has it been clearly articulated how they are of particular relevance to the claim. Nonetheless, I bear in mind that the surveillance evidence (specifically, the surveillance footage) was the very seed which gave rise to Mansour 1 and so its relevance is clear on the face of the statements of case. On this basis, and to the extent that these documents (specifically the surveillance footage and the surveillance logs) have not been disclosed, I will make an order for disclosure.

Unusually and regrettably, I received further evidence and submissions after the hearing on various matters, some of which are apparent from my judgment above. An additional point, not raised before me at the hearing was the date range on any order for UKIL disclosure. Given its practical and principled significance, I give my brief reasons here for including the date range requested by the UKIL post hearing. The waiver of privilege upon which I order disclosure relates to the advice received and the assessment made by UKIL as to Mansour 1. It seems reasonable to infer from the evidence that a date range from January 2022 until the Approval Order is most appropriate – that is the date range covering all relevant evidence concerning Mansour 1, ending with the date when the settlement was approved. Further, a wider date range would be disproportionate, in accordance with unchallenged evidence from Ms Pizzala.