Salford City Council v Fortis Developments Ltd & Ors

On 20 December 2023, after a contested hearing, I made an order requiring that Mr Morgan (with others) comply with certain conditions attached to a specific planning permission. My judgment is reported at [2023] EWHC 3175 (Admin). My order (insofar as relevant) required that the following steps be taken:

This judgment deals with the determination of the Claimant’s contempt application made against Mr Morgan and the fifth Defendant. The fifth Defendant has accepted that it is in contempt of court. I heard evidence on 12 November 2025 and submissions on 16 February 2026. This judgment will only deal with the fact of contempt. If Mr Morgan is found to be in contempt a consequential hearing (referred to by the parties as a sentencing hearing) will follow.

Throughout the process Mr Morgan has had the benefit of being represented and advised by an experienced team. In December 2023 he instructed Mr Giles Cannock KC and at this and the earlier hearing he has been represented by Mr Shemuel Sheikh. On each occasion his solicitors have been Walker Morris LLP.

Mr Morgan provided a witness statement for that hearing and gave evidence and so was cross-examined. He was represented at the hearing by experienced solicitors and counsel. I heard submissions on the contempt application on 16 February 2026.

The claimant asserts that Mr Morgan failed to install the cycle storage located on the ground floor in accordance with the drawings by 4pm on 31 December 2024 and failed to implement the landscaping scheme in accordance with the drawings by 4pm on 31 December 2024.

I am satisfied that the procedural rigour required by CPR 81 has been followed and that at every stage Mr Morgan has been fully aware of his various and important rights, for example the right not to provide any advanced notice of his own evidence and the right not to give evidence or be subjected to cross examination.

The order provides that the respondents (including Mr Morgan) “shall comply with” certain conditions (including condition 6) to which the planning permission 18/71414/FUL was granted.

The following matters are of relevance:

There was no substantive dispute between the parties about the approach I should take.

I was referred to Re LW (Children) [2010] EWCA Civ 1253. In that case, Munby LJ derived the following general propositions from the authorities (see paragraph 34):

The order requires Mr Morgan to instal cycle storage in different locations and to implement a landscaping scheme.

The Claimant recognises that cycle storage has been installed outside of the car park in purported compliance with the order set out at paragraph 1a above. The storage is probably in the wrong place and for reasons that have not been explained it has been fenced off and so is unusable. However, given the nature of these proceedings it is accepted that the allegation in respect of paragraph 1a above should not be pursued.

Some work (up to 15%) has been done on the landscaping scheme, but it has not been completed. Mr Morgan submits he has complied with the order because he has “implemented” (or commenced) the scheme and if he is wrong about that he submits through Mr Sheikh that it was not possible for him to comply with the order for 2 reasons: first it is too expensive and secondly because he does not control the land on which the work would need to be done.

It is convenient to determine at this stage what the is meant by the obligation to “implement” the landscaping scheme.

Mr Morgan submits that to implement the landscaping scheme he (or someone else on his behalf) need only have carried out an “operation” that makes a material contribution to the landscaping scheme. He says that is a low threshold that has plainly been surpassed.

The argument is put in this way (paragraph 10 of Mr Sheikh’s skeleton argument):

Section 56 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1980 sets out rules that determine when a development has begun. That question can be important for a number of reasons, most commonly to determine if, at a given point, a planning permission has lapsed. Section 56 provides that for certain statutory purposes development will be taken to have begun “on the earliest date on which any material operation comprised in the development begins to be carried out”.

I accept that planning permission is implemented (in this sense, acted on) when work commences. I do not accept, and do not understand it to have been suggested, that conditions are, as a matter of planning law, fulfilled when work on them commences. The order requires a landscaping scheme to be implemented. It does not require a planning permission to be implemented.

The order must be construed objectively. It is therefore helpful to consider the normal meaning of the transitive verb “to implement” in this context. The Oxford English Dictionary (accessed at www.oed.com) defines the verb as “To complete, perform, carry into effect (a contract, agreement, etc.); to fulfil (an engagement or promise).”

Mr Sheikh, who appears for Mr Morgan, drew my attention to the Cambridge Dictionary (which appears to be a dictionary for “learners of English”). It broadly mirrors the OED definition (“to put a plan or system into operation”) but includes a further definition “to start using a plan or system”.

There is a clear difference in my view between implementing an abstract plan (in this sense “a scheme”) and implementing a definite programme of works. The former is perhaps best understood as having no finite end, whereas the latter has a clear end.

In my view, the plain and obvious meaning of the order was that Mr Morgan (in common with the others bound by it) was to complete the landscaping scheme by the given date. I reach that view for these reasons:

Before dealing with this point, I remind myself of the burden of proof. It is clear that it lies at every stage with the applicant. I accept that includes the need to establish (see Re LW (Children) [2010] EWCA Civ 1253) that it was within Mr Morgan’s power to comply with the order. It is also clear that for the burden to be discharged I must be sure (that is, satisfied to the criminal rather than the civil standard) that it was within Mr Morgan’s power to comply with the order.

I note that the contempt application (at boxes 5 and 12) asserts that Mr Morgan has “knowingly breached” the terms of the injunction.

In considering whether that burden has been discharged to the relevant standard I am required to consider the totality of the evidence I have heard and read. Mr Morgan has chosen to give evidence. He provided a witness statement in advance of the hearing and gave oral evidence and was cross examined. He did not assert a privilege against self-incrimination at any stage.

At paragraphs 84 to 90 of his written evidence, Mr Morgan deals with the post injunction position. At paragraphs 89 and 90 he says:

It is instructive to consider Mr Morgan’s oral evidence and also to look at how he dealt with the failure to complete the works by the required date at the time.

As to the second point, the claimant’s evidence is that in correspondence leading up to the performance deadline, Mr Morgan did not raise any issue of impossibility and, to the contrary, joined with others (notably YVM) asking for an extension of time to complete the work.

Mr Morgan denied that was the case, despite the fact that the relevant correspondence from Daniella Lipszyc who described herself as “Head of Group Legal for the Fortis Group” made express reference (in a letter dated 17 December 2024) to acting “for all parties in this matter”. He insisted that he knew nothing of the letter and that he had only met its author at a directions hearing. Miss Lipszyc (who I understand to be a solicitor) was not called and had no opportunity to answer the allegation that she had wrongly stated the extent of her authority.

In my view the correspondence clearly shows that Mr Morgan (with others) was seeking more time to comply with the order. I reject his evidence that that was an error on the part of Miss Lipszyc.

Mr Morgan told me in evidence that he did not believe he was bound by the injunction. He was aware of my decision that he should be bound (he was in court to hear the argument and the judgment and instructed leading counsel to oppose being joined in to the order) but told me that he believed that my decision was wrong and so believed that he was free to ignore it. There was no application for permission to appeal the order. Mr Morgan told me that was because he was not told that appeal was a possibility.

It is plain that Mr Morgan’s subjective belief about the correctness of the order cannot assist him. Mr Sheikh was obviously right not to advance the point. Mr Morgan’s evidence and views are however important in the context of this application.

In my judgment there is nothing in the site control point.

I am prepared to accept that Mr Morgan had no absolute right to enter the site and carry on the landscaping work. He is however, very closely connected with the fifth Defendant and its directors who are also bound by the order to complete the work.

Mr Morgan was asked in cross examination if he had ever asked the fifth Defendant if he might access the site. It strikes me that in the context of the order the fifth defendant would have no reason to refuse entry and indeed might possibly have been compelled to allow access.

Mr Morgan confirmed he had not asked for access. He was then asked what he thought would have happened if he had asked. Whilst the question potentially called for speculation it was not objected to. Mr Morgan’s answer (according to a note of his evidence kept by his solicitors) was that he “assumed” he would have been afforded access. My note of his response was “they would have said yes”. Whichever version is taken the outcome is the same. Mr Morgan could have had had access if he had asked.

In my judgment there is nothing in the affordability point.

I have no doubt that Mr Morgan’s evidence about his means was carefully selective. For the year from 6 April 2023 to 5 April 2024, he appears to have had an income of around £50,000 derived from dividends. The obligation to comply with the injunction arose in December 2023 and the deadline for action was 31 December 2024. The tax return says nothing about his income between 6 April 2024 and 31 December 2024. Mr Morgan’s evidence is that at the time of his witness statement he “personally” had no other income, asset (save for the home he lives in with his family which is jointly owned with his wife) or savings.

The reality is that Mr Morgan is connected to over 40 companies and that his financial affairs are not transparent and are closely linked to those companies. He has significant business interests. One of the companies of which he and his wife are directors (M Capital Partners Limited) has assets of around £3.9m. He transferred his shares in that company to his wife in March 2024 a few months after I made the relevant order.

Mr Morgan also made no reference to M Realty International Limited. That company had net assets of in excess of £470,000 in the financial year 2022/23. Again, Mr Morgan transferred his shareholding in it to his wife in March 2024.

When dealing with his assets in evidence Mr Morgan did not mention these companies. As Mr Smyth put it in closing were it not for the diligent inquiries and internet research of the Claimant in discovering these links, the Court would have proceeded on an entirely incomplete, erroneous and misleading basis.

Mr Morgan was not happy to openly reveal his address. His witness statement ought to have included details of his place of residence (see CPR PD 32 para.18.1(2)) but did not. He told me he was concerned for the safety of his family. I have seen no basis for any such fears, but I allowed Mr Morgan to share his address with me and counsel by writing it down. The address is not therefore a matter of public record. Nonetheless Mr Morgan accepted in cross examination that the house is substantial with an indoor swimming pool and a billiards room.

In evidence he told me squarely that his financial means had “little relevance” to the case. I found that surprising given that a key aspect of his defence is that he did not have the means to complete the work.

In my view the real reason that Mr Morgan did not comply with the order is not that he could not afford to do so or that he could not access the land, it is that he simply felt that he could ignore it because he did not agree with it. That is why he felt that his ability to fund the work was not relevant and that is why his headline point was that he was wrongly included in the order.

The totality of the evidence I have read and heard strongly indicates that Mr Morgan is well able to finance the completion of the landscaping.

I regret to say that I found Mr Morgan to be thoroughly dishonest. The only parts of his evidence that I found no difficulty in accepting were his firmly held (but plainly wrong) view that he was entitled to ignore the order and that for that reason, his wealth was irrelevant.

I am satisfied to the criminal standard (so that I am sure) that Mr Morgan did not implement the relevant landscaping scheme by 4pm on 31 December 2024 and that he was able to do so within the required timeframe. I am satisfied to the requisite standard that he had the financial means to do so and that he was able to access the land to carry out the work. I am further satisfied that the reason for non-compliance was Mr Morgan’s entirely misconceived conclusion that he could ignore the order.