ABC & Anor v XYZ

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 879 (KB)
Case No.: KB-2022-005006
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE
Date: 15th April 2026
Before:
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BETWEEN
ABC [1]
DEF [2]
Claimants
- and –
XYZ
Defendant
Mr Ruck-Keene of counsel (instructed by Simpson Millar) for the Claimant
The Defendant did not appear
Hearing date: 27.3.2026
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APPROVED JUDGMENT
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.00am on Wednesday 15th April 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
The Parties
The first Claimant (C1) had a relationship with the Defendant (D) and they had a son, the second Claimant (C2).
Bundles
For the hearing I was provided with a skeleton argument from the Claimants, 11 bundles and a statement of costs for each Claimant. An anonymity order was granted by Hill J on 16.10.2023 and a freezing injunction was granted over the Defendant’s assets on the same date. His property is called “X” in this judgment. It is unusual to anonymise the Defendant’s name in personal injury actions but if he had been named then the public and the Press could have jigsaw identified his son, C2 and hence C1.
Summary
The Claimants sue the Defendant for damages for personal injuries caused by domestic abuse, battery, assault, harassment, controlling and coercive behaviour, attempted kidnap of C2, burglary, criminal damage and breach of restraining orders and prohibited steps orders. The Defendant has a drink and drugs problem. Eventually, the Defendant was imprisoned because of his crimes against C1 and C2, but he did not stop harassing the Claimants by communication from prison. He was released, the last time, in September 2024 and continued irregular harassment via third parties. The Claimants have had to move home more than once and C2 has had to move schools more than once. All this has caused C1 to suffer serious psychiatric conditions and some minor physical injuries. C2 has also suffered moderately severe psychiatric conditions. His education has been decimated and he lives in fear of being kidnapped again. He is also recorded as having harassed and assaulted his family and one other female partner.
The Issues
Default judgment was entered in May 2024, so this is the assessment of quantum in the two claims. The issues are:
The correct assessment of damages for pain suffering and loss of amenity;
The correct assessment of damages for past and future loss of earnings;
The correct assessment of other loss and expense claims;
How to deal with a CICA award to C1 of £26,000;
How to deal with the CRU recoupment when D has no insurance and has not obtained a CRU certificate.
The applications - trial in the Defendant’s absence
At the start of the hearing the Claimants applied for the trial to go ahead despite the Defendant having failed to attend. I gave an extempore judgment on that application. In short, I exercised the Court’s power under CPR r.39.3(1) and ordered that the trial should go ahead. Adjournment would probably not have brought the Defendant to Court. I ruled that the Defendant had been served at X several times, had not communicated either with the Court or the Claimants’ lawyers at all, had gathered no evidence, served no evidence and had attend only one hearing, by video, from prison. I ruled that he had been served with notice of the trial and found that he had decided not to attend. I have previously ruled that C1 could give her evidence live by video just in case he was going to attend. In any event, due to the Courts Act 2003 S.s 85 G and H, the Defendant would not have been allowed to cross examine C1, face to face, and would have needed a lawyer or someone else to do so.
Pleadings and chronology of the action
On the 1st of December 2015 a restraining order was made against the Defendant protecting C1. On the 14th of November 2018 a prohibited steps order was made against the Defendant protecting C1. On the 17th of April 2020 a life-long restraining order was imposed on the Defendant protecting C1.
On the 4th of October 2022 C1, without lawyers, issued a claim form against the Defendant on her behalf and on behalf of C2. Her particulars of claim were dated the 3rd of October 2022. Later she was permitted to amend them and the details of the claim on liability will be set out below, under the heading liability. She sought damages and provisional damages against the Defendant as a result of the torts which she alleged he had perpetrated on her. On behalf of C2 she made an intertwined claim for damages for personal injuries. At trial the claim for provisional damages was abandoned.
On the 16th of October 2023, Hill J made an anonymity order protecting the Claimants and a freezing order relating to the Defendant’s property in Essex (X). The Defendant was served in prison whilst he was in prison. Permission was given to the Claimant to file more detailed particulars of claim and a schedule. On the 4th of November 2023 amended particulars of claim and a schedule were filed and served.
On the 26th of January 2024 Martin Spencer J continued the freezing order and the Defendant appeared by video link at that hearing. Default judgment was entered on the 23rd of May 2024 due to the Defendant having failed to serve either a defence or an acknowledgement of service. Thus, no point was taken on limitation. Master Brown gave the main directions in June 2024 and the Claimants’ solicitors came on record in July 2024. At the end of July Master Brown directed that the Claimant should serve the Defendant with the updated schedule by October 2024. The Defendant was served whilst he was in prison. He was released on the 17th of September 2024. On the 29th of October 2024 Master Brown adjourned the case management conference and ordered that the Defendant could be served at prison for onward posting to his new address, because at that time nobody at the Claimants’ solicitors knew his address. In 2025 the prison service informed the Claimant that the Defendant was living at property X and therefore the schedule and medical reports were served there. In March 2025, at the CMC, Master Brown found that service on the Defendant at property X was good service and ruled that, going forwards, service would be on the Defendant at property X. The documents were all served there, including the final schedule of loss dated 11th September 2025 and the notice of listing details so the trial could be listed by agreement. The Defendant did not respond to any communication in the whole of the proceedings, either to the Court or to the Claimants’ solicitors. The trial was eventually listed by a notice dated the 21st of January 2026. The bundles were served on the Defendant at X on the 19th of March 2026 with a reminder of the hearing date and he did not respond. I am satisfied that the Defendant been properly served and knew of the trial date.
Liability
I set out below a brief summary of the rather harrowing details set out in the Claimants’ particulars of claim, all of which I find proven, because judgment was entered in default on the amended particulars of claim and because the Defendant has not disputed any of the assertions therein. I interleave, with the particulars of claim, evidence from the first Claimant's witness statement, which I accept. C1’s relationship with the Defendant started in 2011. She fell pregnant by him and he turned abusive during her pregnancy. He was coercive and controlling and made constant accusations of infidelity. He would grab her phone and check her social media sites. He would kick C1 when he was angry and would make suicide threats. On one occasion, when they went out with friends, he bent her fingers back under the table. On another, he hit her with a pole. He was often on drugs, including cocaine, which he sometimes took in a shed in the garden. He would burst into her bedroom with a knife, disturbing her sleep, alleging infidelity and searching for imaginary lovers in the cupboards. He would interrogate her interminably about infidelity, five nights out of seven. When he was drugged up, he would smash plates and other household items. C1 lived in constant fear. The Defendant would demand sex when she did not wish to give it to him. On various occasions he threw her out of the house. During their relationship the Defendant regularly visited prostitutes and this diminished the first Claimant’s self-respect. C1 tried to end the relationship many times and in response the Defendant variously strangled her, grabbed her and kicked her. Eventually, by January 2014, the C1 had thrown him out so he moved to his mother's house. C1 put his clothes and belongings in bags. He set light to the bags, punched C1 and threw a photo frame at her. He cut her arm and smashed up the house. He was arrested. Bail conditions were imposed on the Defendant which he then breached. The Defendant broke back into her property. In 2014, on a Spanish holiday, the Defendant assaulted C1 and the Spanish police arrested him. The Defendant punched the Claimant who became unconscious. By 2014 C2 was put on the Social Security at risk register. The Defendant threatened to ruin the whole of C1’s family. In September 2014 the first Claimant moved out to a friend’s house. The Defendant thereafter attacked C1 in the town centre and threatened to kill her by strangulation. He then stole C1's car, was pursued by the police and crashed the car. He was charged with drink driving. The Defendant made many phone threats to C1 from prison. In March 2015 C1 found a new private rental but the Defendant stalked that address and, in a drug induced psychosis, broke in and smashed up the contents and stole some. C1 had to leave the new address and the Defendant was sent to prison again. A restraining order was imposed on the Defendant in 2015. In June 2016 C1 had to move again and the Defendant again stalked her at her new premises, then assaulted her by kicking a door into her face, causing facial scarring. In November 2016 the Defendant violently tried to strangle C1 and the police were called. In 2017, during family proceedings over contact or access to C2, CAFCASS staff were concerned about the Defendant using drugs and sleeping with prostitutes and advised against access. Moving forwards to October 2019 the Family Court refused the Defendant face to face contact with C2. In November 2019, a woman came to C1's property and pleaded for the Defendant to have contact with the C2. During this discussion the Defendant burst in, assaulted C1, went up to the second Claimant’s bedroom, grabbed him and ran towards the exit. He was stopped by a local cafe owner. The Defendant threatened to kill C1. Whilst C1 and C2 were at the police station they saw the Defendant at the police station during processing for the assault and attempted kidnapping. The Defendant was found guilty of breaching the restraining order and assault. The charge of attempted kidnapping was left on file. The Defendant was imprisoned either in late 2019 or early 2020. Since then he has tried to contact the 1st and 2nd Claimant using third parties or other means of communication.
Evidence on quantum
I heard evidence from C1 by video and read her witness statement and the expert medical reports set out below. In her live evidence C1 informed me that her educational and employment history was as follows. She had left school at 16 and then gone to high school/college between 2005 and 2007. She then attended Southend College but dropped out in 2008. She then attended East London College to study media but dropped out after a year in 2009. She started as a care worker at the care organisation shown on her tax records and earned £3,190 in the tax year 2010 to 2011. Then she changed to work in the family Bureau De Change where, in the tax year 2011 to 2012, she earned approximately £14,000 and in 2012 - 2013 she earned approximately the same sum. In the tax year 2013 - 2014 she only earned £2,100 or thereabouts because she was getting into difficulties with the Defendant and C1 gave birth to the C2 on the 10th of August 2013. She took maternity leave of approximately 9 months. She never truly got back to work after that as a result of the violence and abuse from the Defendant and her psychiatric difficulties, as I shall explain below.
C1’s evidence was that, but for the Defendant’s violence and abuse, she would have gone back to full time work after her maternity leave and C2 would have been cared for by her grandparents, who had in fact brought C1 up. In any event, he went to preschool. She is not sure what she would have done because the family Bureau De Change business closed within a year or two of her stopping work. She developed an interest in doing a psychology degree in 2019 and entered counselling training, but those interests arose as a result of her suffering from the Defendant’s tortious behaviour. I do not make a finding that she would have chosen those routes but for the Defendant’s torts. In any event, she did not complete either course. She told me that it is likely she would have gone back into office-based work, perhaps in a bank, or using her office manager skills, in multiple similar roles. She had managed 2 to 3 employees when she was working in the family business. She gave evidence that she would have worked until normal retirement age but for the domestic violence.
As to the effects of the Defendant’s torts on C1, these will be set out in the summaries I make of the medical reports below, but in her own words she asserts that she suffers post-traumatic stress disorder and has obsessive compulsive disorder syndrome symptoms, together with depression, anxiety and hyper vigilance, nightmares, flashbacks, insomnia, guilt and shame. The Defendant’s release from prison in September 2024 also led to further fear and an increase in the Claimants’ symptoms. C1 is scared every time somebody knocks on the door. During the more recent family court proceedings in 2025, the Defendant threatened to kidnap C2 again and made some of those threats during a hearing. That caused a recrudescence of both Claimants’ symptoms.
As for C1’s residual earning capacity, this is evidenced in the past by her inability to work in any meaningful way since 2014. Now, she does a little bit of beauty work for family and friends. She is worried about expanding that business because if more people come to her house the Defendant might find out where she lives and if she worked in a salon the Defendant might find out where that work was. She earns between £75 and £270 per month and is too afraid to increase her work due to the risk of the Defendant finding out where she is or where C2 is at school.
As for C2, C1 asserts he is suffering post-traumatic stress disorder, mood disturbance, depression, anxiety and fear. He sleeps with his mother, despite the fact he is age 12. He has changed schools many times, the last time just after the Defendant was released from prison. These conditions cause him low self-esteem and he has difficulty making friends. He cannot have friends round to his house for fear that his father will find out where he lives. He is never allowed outside alone. His mother drops him off and picks him up from school. He has been regularly bullied at school. Each time the bullying gets serious his mother takes him away from school. He has not had much treatment despite the advice in the expert reports, to which I shall refer below. The reason explained by C1 in her evidence is that he has recently had to change schools again and she needed to settle him in again. Serious treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder, involving EMDR, is exhausting and she wants him to have settled down before he focuses on that treatment.
Looking to the future, C1 struggles to see light at the end of the tunnel. She stated that her symptoms had not changed since mid 2025 and had worsened leading up to the date of the contact hearing. She had not yet started on the serious therapy recommended by Doctor Payne, including EMDR. She had paid for some lower level counselling including preparation for EMDR. She had found it helpful but exhausting and so realises how important it will be to focus wholly on that therapy when she starts it. She sleeps poorly. She is afraid all the time. When I asked why she did not move away from the area she responded that she could not leave her grandparents, whom she loved and who love C2. They are in their 80s and they are unwell. She is their support system and they are her support system and they provide support for C2. The Protection Orders that she has in place are to keep the Defendant away from various addresses and from her grandparents’ house. The police have a red flag alert system in place if the Defendant turns up any of the relevant properties. In September of 2025 the first Claimant was approached by a friend of the Defendant in the High Street where she lives who had tried to pressurise her into allowing the Defendant to see his son. In addition, the Defendant's partner emailed C1 in 2025, to put pressure on her. She finds these contacts triggering for her. She is not sure if the Defendant has found out where C2 is currently at school and is afraid, if he does, about what will happen. C2 has special educational needs. Although he has shown some emotional improvement he is still scared of his father.
I asked C1 what she would do when C2 reaches the age of 18 or 25. Would she anticipate that the risk from the Defendant to her would decrease when C2 is an adult? C1 was afraid that the Defendant would still be angry at her and does not think that the Defendant will ever stop being angry at her.
In relation to her residual earning capacity if, in future, the risk from the Defendant reduces and she can get back to full time work, C1 advised that although she currently would like to do coaching, if she did full-time beauty therapy, working 35 to 40 hours per week, she might be able to earn £800 per week, net of expenses.
C1 is also scared that this litigation will increase the risk for her by angering the Defendant. Once judgement is obtained C1 intends to enforce it on property X which the Defendant owns and she fears that he will react with anger.
C1 accepted, when I asked her, that she had been awarded £26,000 by the CICA. She had made a claim for C2 but when the instructed solicitors firm shut down, she did not continue the claim and it was never completed.
I was favourably impressed by the way that C1 gave her evidence. Despite all that she has been through, the way that she presented was not exaggerated nor was it over emotional. I accept all that she told me. I take into account that she was not put under pressure through cross examination but I did myself ask some quite searching questions and I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that her account of events is true.
The expert evidence
In relation to C1, there is no expert evidence of her physical injuries, nor was I shown any photo of the scar on her head. There is no report from a consultant psychiatrist. However, there are three reports from Doctor Louise Payne, a clinical psychologist. In her first report, dated June 2020, she recorded that she had read C1’s GP and hospital notes. In her opinion, C1 had no prior psychiatric history. The psychiatric symptoms emerged after the Defendant’s first domestic violence assaults. Doctor Payne advised that C1’s psychiatric conditions were solely attributable to the abuse and assaults. She gave two diagnoses: post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD). She made no reference to DSM V or ICD 10 criteria. Doctor Payne advised that the conditions have had a significant effect both on C1’s social and her occupational functioning. C1 finds it difficult to trust men and to socialise and her fears have effectively prevented her from working. As to the details of the C1’s suffering, initially the Defendant was romantic and attentive, but by June 2012 he was jealous and started assaulting her. He became paranoid about her being unfaithful to him. There were multiple incidents in which he accused C1 of being unfaithful over the most minor of household triggers, for instance a kettle was moved by a few inches which led to the Defendant asserting that she had entertained a lover in the house. C1 felt very frightened by his anger. He belittled her by inspecting her underwear for indications of infidelity and he repeatedly interrogated her. Often those interrogations led to violence. She was woken up in the small hours of the morning with such allegations. She suffered repeated punches, kicks and was on occasion pushed down stairs. C1 was forced to have sex with the Defendant against her will. She reported his abuse to the police on many occasions. He was excluded from their shared property many times. There were 14 reports to the police in the the period between 2012 and 2013. The cycle would be: accusations of infidelity, interrogation, violent abuse, report to the police, remorse, apologies, guilt, resumption of relationship and then repeat. They separated finally in 2014 and thereafter C1 did allow some contact between the Defendant and the C2, however the C2 had witnessed much of the abuse which C1 had suffered before and after they separated and eventually the C1 obtained a restraining order in 2015. Even after he was sent to prison (before 2019) he still contacted C1 via third parties, so she felt constantly watched and scrutinised. By October 2019 the family court ordered that the Defendant would have no more face to face contact with the C2. The month after that order the Defendant attempted to kidnap C2. He violently assaulted C1 in her own property and tried to run away with C2. This was a particularly traumatic event for both of the Claimants. It happened one morning. The Defendant used a woman to trick the first Claimant into opening the door. He then burst in and assaulted her and grabbed C2 from his bedroom. Local café owners stopped him running off with C2. The Defendant was eventually arrested and imprisoned.
In my judgment, the abuse of C1 by the Defendant can be split up into the following periods:
2012-2014: 1.5 to 2 years of cohabitation with regular physical violence, verbal harassment and sexual violence.
2014-2019: 5 years of visiting violence, burglary, criminal damage, threats, assaults and intimidation.
2019- September 2024: 5 years of irregular intimidation and threats, some from prison and some via third parties.
September 2024-today: irregular threats via third parties and during CAFCASS interviews and at a Family Court hearing.
The symptoms which C1 suffered as a result of this abuse are listed in detail in the first report. Whilst living together, she suffered constant anxiety and fear of his moods and violence. She developed OCD relating to reciting “protection prayers” as if they could help to protect her and re-ordering objects around the house so that they were “right” so that she would have a good day. She suffered insomnia, which she had never suffered before. She felt frightened that he would wake her up in the night and start the cycle of abuse. She suffered hypervigilance. She became his sexual slave and used sex as a pacifying tool to calm him down. She was frightened when he attacked her. She was frightened all the time after they split up, in particular when he broke into her various properties. She suffered nightmares for herself and for the kidnapping of her son (after 2019). She suffered depression and low mood, lack of confidence and guilt. Coincidentally, she also developed multiple body pains which were never formally diagnosed. She self-funded a course of hypnotherapy in 2017 which was ineffective. She underwent a course of cognitive behavioural therapy in 2019 but after that she was assaulted again.
Currently, C1 is avoidant of going out. She takes her son to school and collects him, for his protection. She has low self-esteem, impaired motivation and low concentration. She has tried a relationship with one new man but the Defendant warned him off and so she has been unable to form permanent relationships.
Treatment: Doctor Payne recommended 20 to 25 sessions of focused PTSD cognitive behavioural therapy together with eye movement desensitisation reprocessing therapy (EMDR) and narrative exposure therapy (NET).
As for the prognosis, Doctor Payne advised that the C1 has been able to maintain her home and care for her child. After the recommended treatment Doctor Payne advised that C1 will engage in hobbies and social life significantly better in future. As for work, Doctor Payne advised that the torts have caused C1's inability to work, but advised that after successful completion of the recommended trauma focused intervention, C1 will be able to work in future.
In her second report dated October 2024, Doctor Payne noted that C1 had self-paid for 118 sessions of therapy, which was helpful. She had found the EMDR element of it exhausting. She would try to avoid EMDR in future. She noted that C1’s GP had prescribed: Zopiclone (for insomnia, dependency problems, stopped June 2019, restarted after attempted kidnapping); Mitrapazine (felt too groggy). Doctor Payne noted that the Defendant had been released from prison in 2021 and later detained twice more in prison and released the last time in September 2024. C1 remain terrified and anxious, with very poor sleep. She lived in fear. She had been receiving “heavy breathing” calls. She did not feel adequately protected. She was too anxious to increase her work, either at home (due to the risk of the Defendant finding out her address) or in a salon (due to the risk of him finding out her place of work). Doctor Payne did not provide a proper prognosis in that report. She recommended EMDR and trauma focussed CBT in 25 sessions which would lead to a “significant improvement”. However, she did not anticipate or assess the future risk of relapse if the Defendant again threatens or attacks either C1 or C2 or causes C2 to move school again or causes C1 to have to move accommodation again. Doctor Payne stated that the Defendant is a significant threat to C1’s safety.
In her third report, having been asked to explain her prognosis more clearly, Doctor Payne advised that the 118 sessions of therapy had not improved C1’s conditions. She estimated that, after 25 more focussed sessions of trauma-based therapy, C1’s symptoms would not resolve. Instead C1 would likely still be afraid and hypervigilant and will take steps to minimise the “perceived risk” and this perception will have an indefinite continuing impact on her earnings.
I asked C1 why she had not moved away from the area where the Defendant lives and whether she would feel less afraid once D2 grows up, say at age 18 or age 25. She was unsure of how she would feel. She asserted that she could not leave her grandparents for whom she cared.
Quantum for C1
Pain, Suffering and Loss of Amenity
The domestic violence which C1 has suffered was severe, of long duration, included physical assault, sexual assault and psychological assault and involved belittlement and undermining coercion. The Defendant’s behaviour has ruined a substantial part of C1’s enjoyment of life from her mid 20s to her late 30s. He has eradicated her ability to gain self-esteem and independence through work. C1 has been diagnosed with PTSD and OCD as a result of the abuse she has suffered. There is no report from a consultant psychiatrist on whether antidepressant pills or other medication would assist. This is a gap in the Claimant’s evidence. The Clinical Psychologist’s prognosis is woolly.
Which category?
The editors of the Judicial College Guidelines (JCG) deal with psychiatric injuries at section 4. They split such awards into 3 categories: (A) psychiatric damage generally; (B) PTSD; (C) sexual and/or physical abuse. Comparing the top figure for each category, the highest is for the consequences of physical and sexual abuse. These categories overlap. Little or nothing in personal injury is wholly discreet and separate, most injuries come in combination and overlap with each other. In my judgment, whilst C1’s pain, suffering and loss of amenity, could fall into any of the 3 categories. It is closer to PTSD than general psychiatric injuries and it is closer to sexual/physical abuse than solely PTSD. Therefore, I place C1’s injuries in category 4(C).
Which grade?
Within 4(C), sexual/physical abuse, there are four grades. The highest is (a) severe (£109,830-£183,050, upgraded for inflation to £116,000-£194,000), and the lowest is (d), less severe (£11,870-£25,100, I have not upgraded these). In my judgment the appropriate award for C1 is the grade named “severe”. This is because C1 has suffered: (1) severe abuse, of (2) long duration, and (3) severe psychiatric sequellae, of (4) long duration. I do not need to repeat the duration or the severity of the abuse, both are set out above. However, I do stress that C1’s suffering has been for over 14 years, it has been constant, albeit fluctuating and it has made her unable properly to socialise, to start a new sexual relationship and unable to work. These are severe sequellae. It is to her great credit that she has given her life to care for C2 and to continue to support her loving grandparents.
Where within the grade?
The updated grade guidelines are £116,000-£194,000. To discern the appropriate award for C1’s suffering within that range of awards I have looked at the awards in Kemp & Kemp on Quantum volumes 3 and 4. In section Q, at Q1-000 is a CICB, an award of £65,000 (updated by inflation to approx. £124,700) was made to a woman with severe PTSD and enduring personality changes following one rape at knifepoint after leaving an underground station on the way home. Thereafter she was unable to sustain a relationship and had no children. She did work on for many years as a teacher but her inability to travel on public transport and her hypervigilance and fears led her to give up teaching. She then worked from home, but even that petered out due to her PTSD. The rest of the awards are lower than that one. In Kemp & Kemp, section C4, are the awards for psychiatric damage following physical abuse. In Re B, at C4-002, the applicant was awarded £50,000 by the CICB (current value about £138,800). She suffered physical and sexual abuse by her father in two long batches of years from age 3 – 17. Her symptoms were very severe, involving 47 inpatient admissions to psychiatric hospitals, because she had an untreatable personality disorder with self-harming. I consider that the suffering in that case was more severe than C1’s.
The prognosis for C1 is positive. She is 36 years and 9 months old. She has stoically held her life together, obtained court orders to protect herself, called the police when necessary and loved and taken care of her son and grand parents. She has not fallen apart. As her son grows and becomes more independent, at age 18 and age 25, I consider the risk from the Defendant to C1 will diminish. With treatment, Doctor Payne prognosticates that C1 will be able to return to full time work and will improve psychiatrically. Whilst counsel for C1submitted that the appropriate award would be £130,000, I consider that the appropriate award would be £125,000.
Past Loss, C1
Medical expenses. I award the sums claimed for counselling of £6,660.
Loss of earnings. C1 has claimed past loss of earnings on the basis of the average of her two previous years’ earnings before the Defendant started the physical and emotional abuse in 2012. In fact, C1’s HMRC records showed the following as her earnings before the abuse:
05/06: £63;
06/07: £298;
07/08: £0;
08/09: £0;
09/10: £0;
10/11: £3,190 (Ashley Care);
11/12: £14,061 (LFU);
12/13: £13,914 (LFU);
Maternity leave: C2 was born on 10.8.2013.
In evidence C1’s explanation for her previous earnings history was that she had left school at 16 in 2005, went to college and did various courses, few of which she completed. She did a stockbroking course which likewise she did not complete. Eventually she did care work and then went into the family Bureau De Change business in 2011 (age 22) for 2 years, until she became pregnant (age 24). That business is noted on the HMRC records as “LFU”. It is her case that she would have returned to full time work but for the abuse. Unfortunately, the family business closed 1-2 years after 2014. The but for earnings sum she claims are calculated at £13,200 npa. The updated but for past loss of earnings claim, over the years since C1’s estimated return to work date after maternity leave (2014), was calculated at £151,800. C1 has given credit for her residual earnings of £2,807 to the date of the schedule (11.9.2025) and £5,207 to the date of trial. The residual earnings are from a little beautician work at her home with friends and family. So, the net claim is calculated as £142,392 in the schedule and £146,592 to trial.
I am prepared to accept that C1 would have returned to work pretty much full time after the birth of C2, with the support of her grandparents for child care. I consider that she would not have been a high earner. Taking into account the mean wage for women in the UK in 2015 was £28,402 gpa (£22,310 npa), I would have put her in the lowest quartile, so below that sum. I consider that the claimed sums are modest and in the correct zone. I also take into account that wages increased substantially between 2015 and 2026. I fully accept that the PTSD, OCD and fear of the Defendant has prevented her from working full time since 2014. Thus, I award £146,592 to trial, as claimed
Miscellaneous expenses. I do not doubt the Claimant’s veracity and I note that the schedule of loss was signed by the Claimant, however I do not consider, on the balance of probabilities, that the sums claimed have been proven. C1 claims for: the expense of a coaching course (not completed); an Open University Psychology degree (not completed); increased car insurance; damaged clothing; a damaged window; a damaged phone; a damaged sofa; a damaged mirror and £2,500 which the Defendant took from her. Not a single receipt has been provided for any of these expenses and they are not mentioned in the Claimant’s witness statement. They were not confirmed in live evidence either. I do not regard that as sufficient to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the Defendant’s torts caused these losses. They should have been listed in the witness statement with some explanation of the circumstances of each loss and the estimates of value. I am also unconvinced, in the light of C1 not completing earlier courses before she met the Defendant, that C1 has proven that the cost of the incomplete counselling and Open University courses was caused by the Defendant. I award no sum under this head of loss.
Interest. I award interest on the past loss at half the special investment account rate which I am informed is 9.76%.
Future loss and expense, C1.
Medical. I award the sums claimed for future therapy treatment in the sum of £4,000.
Loss of earnings. The usual way of calculating future loss of earnings is the multiplier/multiplicand basis. It would not be unreasonable for this Court to find that C1 would have earned the average wage for women but in the lower quartile (the lowest 25%) in the light of her lack of qualifications. The ONS figures for women, Table 1.1a, for the lowest quartile, using the 2025 figures, shows £347.1 gpw (or £18,049 gpa). In her evidence C1 stated that working full time in her beauty role could earn her £800 pw which, if she worked 45 weeks pa, would be £36,000 gpa. These two figures give me the top and bottom of the potential range of earnings in evidence. Taking into account her weak employment history and multiple unfinished courses I consider a gross annual income averaged for life at £25,000 gpa would be reasonable (£21,520 npa). C1’s office and digital platform skills would have been kept up to date if she had been in full time work but for the torts.
As for the multiplier, for a women aged 37 years 9 months, the future earnings multiplier to age 68, from Ogden Table 12, would be 27.42. The Table C discount, for her low educational qualifications, would be 0.77. So, the but for earnings multiplier would be 21.11. Thus, the but for earnings at their highest would be 21.11 x £21,520 = £454,287.
C1’s residual earning capacity is low at the moment and in my judgment will remain low until she takes the treatment and the risk from the Defendant decreases as her son grows up. It will step down at 18 and will reduce thereafter as he reaches independence. It will be his choice whether he sees his father or not. He is currently aged 12, so at the least, there are 6 more years of potential family courts conflict. C1’s office and digital platform skills are out of date. Her recent experience has been in beauty. This is a low earning field. The ONS median figure for beauticians (code 6222) was £23,795 gpa in 2025. I work on the basis that C1 will take the therapy recommended by Doctor Payne., As a result C1 will be much improved, as advised by Doctor Payne, in 6 months. I consider that from then onwards C1 will be held back by her residual symptoms and her reasonable and rational fear of further abuse and violence from the Defendant towards herself and C2. For the next 6 years I consider that fear is justified. I factor in that he will probably breach the restraining order again. Thereafter, the claim for loss becomes much more speculative. C1 should be able to get back to full time work, albeit with a deeply damaged work history, an out of date cv and out of date skills in all fields save for beauty. Thus, I consider it difficult, speculative and rather too uncertain for me to put a multiplier on C1’s residual earning capacity. The best I could do would be to calculate a very low earning capacity for 6 years and then a full time earning capacity in beauty, which is reduced and delayed by a damaged cv, out of date skills, together with enduring low level OCD and PTSD.
I consider that the most appropriate way to approach the future loss of earnings award is a Smith v Manchester award. C1 is in work, albeit doing low hours and self-employed. But for, she would have been working full time, albeit with no qualifications. Her future earnings will be damaged in the next 6 years and thereafter the loss will reduce and may disappear between ages 43 and 68 (25 years). With a maximum loss in mind of £454,287, I consider that C1’s award should fall into the mid range of Smith v Manchester awards set out in Kemp & Kemp on Quantum at chapter 10-035.1. I award 3 years net loss of £21,520 npa = £64,560.
CRU. There are various sums which are usually offset in personal injury claims. Firstly, the Compensation Recovery Unit (CRU) is entitled to recoup sums relating to State Benefits paid to C1 over 5 years from the date of the tort. The repayment is to be made by the Defendant but some of the sums recouped can be deducted from the damages paid by the Defendant to the Claimant under a judgment. Apparently, the Defendant has not communicated with the CRU despite being required by law to do so. S.4(1) of the of the Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997 provides “Before a person (“the compensator”) makes a compensation payment he must apply to the Secretary of State for a certificate of recoverable benefits” and s.6(1) provides that: “(1) A person who makes a compensation payment in any case is liable to pay to the Secretary of State an amount equal to the total amount of the recoverable benefits.” S.7 provides:
This section applies where a person has made a compensation payment but—
has not applied for a certificate of recoverable benefits, or
has not made a payment to the Secretary of State under section 6 before the end of the period allowed under that section.
The Secretary of State may—
issue the person who made the compensation payment with a certificate of recoverable benefits, if none has been issued, or
issue him with a copy of the certificate of recoverable benefits or (if more than one has been issued) the most recent one, and (in either case) issue him with a demand that payment of any amount due under section 6 be made immediately.
The Secretary of State may, in accordance with subsections (4) and (5), recover the amount for which a demand for payment is made under subsection (2) from the person who made the compensation payment.”
In Crooks v Hendricks Lovell Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 8 at [6] Lindblom LJ (with whom Arden and Moore-Bick LLJ agreed) held “The scheme places responsibility for repaying the relevant benefits not on injured person himself, but on the compensator.”
Accordingly, I consider that C1 has no responsibility to apply for a CRU certificate. The obligation is solely on the Defendant to pay any recoverable benefits and no deduction should be made from any damages that would otherwise be awarded to the C1 to reflect the liability on the part of the Defendant to repay the recoverable benefits. However, it might be wise for the Claimant’s lawyers to write to the CRU to inform them of the judgment and the Defendant’s failure to apply for a certificate.
The CICA award. Although this was not mentioned in her witness statement or her schedule of loss, I asked C1 if she had received an award from the CICA and she admitted that she had received £26,000. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012 provides:
(1) An award under this Scheme will be withheld or reduced if in respect of the criminal injury to which the award relates the applicant, whether in any part of the United Kingdom or elsewhere: …
receives an order for damages from a civil court;
An award will be reduced by the amount of any payments listed in sub-paragraph (1), net of any benefits recoverable under the Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997 or equivalent legislation (whether in any part of the United Kingdom or elsewhere).”
…
(1) A claims officer may require repayment of all or part of an award where the claims officer is satisfied that evidence received after final payment has been made shows that the applicant:
…
has received a payment in respect of which a reduction could have been made under paragraphs 54, 55 or 85.
The amount of a repayment under:
sub-paragraph (1)(a) or (b) will be the full amount of the award made to the applicant; and
sub-paragraph (1)(c) will be for the amount the applicant has received which could have been deducted from their award”
Clause 85 deals with matters before a CICA award is made. That is in the past. The award has been made and paid. There is nothing in either the wording of the Scheme or in Annex A, the guide to interpretation, that indicates either way as to whether the meaning of the ‘amount that applicant has received’ under Para 110(2)(b) is the same as the amount of ordered as damages by civil court under Para 85(1)(b). There is no assistance in Kemp 30-105 to 106. There does not also appear to be any relevant caselaw. I proceed on the basis that clause 110 permits the CICA to recoup all or part of the award if it overlaps with the sums I have awarded, but only when the Defendant actually pays sums to the first Claimant. I consider that there is a real prospect that a CICA claims officer may require repayment of such of the £26,000 CICA award as is considered to overlap with the damages award after, or at the time when the Claimant enforces the judgment and receives damages from the Defendant. I am concerned that if costs and damages are enforced and the money in the Essex property “X” is inadequate to cover all the sums due, that C1 is at risk of losing the CICA award and only recovering part of her damages.
Award to C1
I assess C1’s damages as follows:
|
Item |
£ |
Totals £ |
|
|
A |
Pain, Suffering and Loss of Amenity |
125,000 |
|
|
Interest 6.78% |
8,475 |
133,475 |
|
|
B |
Past |
||
|
Medical |
6,660 |
||
|
Loss of earnings |
146,592 |
||
|
Misc |
0 |
||
|
Interest 9.76% |
14,993 |
168,245 |
|
|
C |
Future |
||
|
Loss of earnings |
64,560 |
||
|
Medical |
4,000 |
68,560 |
|
|
Grand total |
£370,280 |
||
|
CRU This is the Defendant’s liability. |
|||
|
CICA award: £26,000. Once the Defendant has paid C1 in full the CICA should be notified and all or part of the award which overlaps with the above award should be repaid. |
C2
Pain, Suffering and Loss of Amenity.
There was no witness statement from C2, instead C1 gave evidence of his suffering. Other than the attempted kidnapping in November 2019, there is no allegation that the Defendant was physically violent towards his son. However, what C2 witnessed before November 2019 was violence by his father on his mother. Then matters really came to a head in November 2019 when the Defendant broke into C1’s flat, assaulted C1 and then grabbed C2 from his bedroom and ran downstairs with him attempting to kidnap him. This caused trauma to C2.
Professor Rehman, a clinical psychologist, provided two reports and two side letters on C2. In the first report (March 2022) he set out – for the CICA, not for this Court– the severe PTSD and acute stress disorder suffered by C2 after the attempted kidnap. He advised that C2 needed 12-15 sessions of CBT plus EMDR and play therapy. He advised that he would give a prognosis 3-4 months after the treatment was done. He set out a chronology of the moderate PTSD caused by his parents’ separation and the abuse by the Defendant of his mother before the kidnapping attempt. However, since the attempted kidnap, C2 had developed temper tantrums, anger outbursts, insomnia, reliving the event, obsessive talking, a new stutter, and he had separation anxiety from his mother.
The second report was dated September 2024 and recorded that low level treatment had been given to C2 via play therapy in school in 2022. C2 had been diagnosed with ADHD in 2023 and was still suffering from PTSD and depression. The Professor did not state that the ADHD was caused by the abuse. C2 was afraid of the forthcoming release of his father from prison. He had been forced to move house and schools due to the Defendant’s behaviour and he had been bullied at school. He had got into a lot of fights. By this time the professor advised 10-12 sessions of therapy with 8 sessions of EMDR integrated into them. These had not been given so far. Again, his prognosis was to say he would provide one when the treatment was done.
In two supplementary letters the professor advised C2’s solicitors to obtain an educational psychologist’s report and stated that there was a risk of relapse if the Defendant breached the court orders restraining him.
Thus, overall, the professor has not provided any prognosis because he wanted to do so after the treatment was done and the treatment he suggested has not been done. C1 explained that she could not start it until C2 was settled at school and the Defendant’s release from prison in late 2024 led to C2 being withdrawn again from his school and a long search for a new one. This is evidentially unsatisfactory because without a prognosis I cannot assess the longevity of the symptoms. He was not called to give live evidence.
Deborah Middleton provided her educational psychologist’s report dated April 2025. She read the reports of Professor Rehman and the school reports. She interviewed C2. He was polite and friendly. She carried out no comparison between the school reports of C2 before November 2019 with those after. She merely accepted C1’s account. C1 told her that before 2019 C2 had reached all his milestones early, apart from talking. C1 asserted that he was basically fine until year 3-4 (ages 8-9). I comment here that C1’s chronology does not fit with the kidnapping which occurred in November 2019, when C2 was aged 6 (in year 2). After the kidnapping C2 did not feel safe. He interpreted challenges as threats. He was hypersensitive and hypervigilant and tended to freeze or fight. His development was damaged and he was at risk of leaving school with no qualifications. In future he needs one to one individual SEN attention weekly, for the rest of his schooling years. The expert advised that C2 needs 38 CBT sessions and 8-10 EMDR sessions, when he becomes more comfortable. He may need top up therapy in adolescence. Ms Middleton’s prognosis was that, with therapy, C2 would improve but he would suffer “lifelong effects” and may struggle with activities of daily living without support.
I find it difficult to get an accurate picture of C2’s prognosis. The lack of a prognosis from Professor Rehman does not help. There is no report from a consultant psychiatrist on whether antidepressant pills or other medication would assist. The nearest I have to a prognosis is from the educational psychologist. However, doing the best that I can, I proceed on the basis that once he has had the recommended treatment he will improve. I take into account that whilst he is still a child he will be at serious risk of the Defendant trying once again to re-enter his life and that will probably cause abuse, violence to C1 and an increase in C2’s symptoms.
There is no claim for the costs of private SEN support fees in the schedule, so I work on the assumption that the Local Authority will provide the SEN he needs. This seems a bit hopeful to me, but I can only work on the evidence I have been given and the claim as drafted.
C2 submits that the appropriate category for his pain, suffering and loss of amenity, is JCG 4(C) “Physical and sexual abuse” at grade (b) “Moderately Severe” (£54,920 - £109,830) updated for inflation at 3% to £56,568 - £113,125. Taking into account that the prognosis is so unclear I consider that the award would be better placed in grade (c) “Moderate”, attracting updated awards scaled at £25,853 - £56,568 (updated). In this case the abuse was intermittent and not directed at C2 before 2019. The event in 2019, whilst traumatic, was a single event which caused the largest exacerbation. I am unsure of the contribution of the ADHD diagnosed in 2023 to his suffering. No expert states that this was caused by the abuse, so it is not part of the award. As for the longevity of the symptoms, I take into account what Ms Middleton states but I have no long term medical prognosis and am not prepared to assume long term serious psychiatric suffering without one. The burden of proof rests on the Claimants.
The Claimant placed reliance on TVZ v Manchester City FC [2022] EWHC 7. In that claim various Claimants sought damages from MCFC for sexual abuse caused by Barry Bennell whilst they were at the football academy, aged between 10 and 14. Johnson J dismissed all the claims: (1) on limitation grounds; and (2) holding there was no vicarious liability. He then went on to assess quantum, obiter. He had expert evidence from consultant psychiatrists. He also took into account the additional damages due for assault and battery in such cases over and above the psychiatric injury awards. I have reviewed the awards for pain, suffering and loss of amenity but they were for sexual abuse and there is no such abuse towards C2 in this case. I do not find them of much direct help.
I consider that an award of £30,000 would be appropriate for this young boy’s symptoms covering: (1) symptoms to date, which have been intense; and (2) on the basis that his mother will now do as advised and get him focussed treatment; and (3) thereafter C2 will improve, but will always have some lifelong vulnerability and educational effects.
Expenses and loss
C2 makes no claim for past loss. As to future loss, I award £15,808 for the costs as claimed for the various medical therapies and for the gratuitous care C1 will give transporting C2 to and from those therapies. I refuse to award £250 for a laptop on the basis that C2 would have needed one in any event.
As for C2’s claim for future loss of earnings, this is difficult to assess. He is 12. He has ADHD and would have had it in any event. His parents have split up. This would have happened in any event. His medical prognosis is unclear, but is not bad, it is hopeful. However, the kidnapping and the Defendant’s breaches of the restraining orders, have led to C2 changing schools, losing confidence, being very afraid and constantly talking about his father being a bad man. He is doing poorly at school. He does not settle well or make friends easily. This, despite his average scores on his psychological testing, which would suggest that but for he would have had an average school career. I do accept that the abuse and the psychiatric conditions are having and will have an adverse effect on his education and on his earning capacity, but the financial sequellae thereof are speculative and far in the future. It is not logical to put a multiplier/multiplicand figure on the loss. I could reasonably assess his but for earning capacity at the average for men in the lowest quartile, but I have no yardstick for his residual earning capacity. Therefore, I consider that, in this case, C2’s loss can only be assessed by a Smith v Manchester style award. I put his loss in the general range 1-2 years net loss. Counsel for the Claimant informed me that the mean figure for the lowest quartile for all jobs for men was £31,049 gpa or £25,876 npa. I shall make an award of around 2 years net loss, being £50,000.
Award to C2
Adding up the awards made above, the award to C2 is as follows:
|
Item |
£ |
Totals £ |
|
|
A |
Pain, Suffering and Loss of Amenity |
30,000 |
|
|
Interest 6.78% |
2,034 |
32,034 |
|
|
B |
Past |
0 |
|
|
C |
Future |
||
|
Loss of earnings |
50,000 |
||
|
Medical |
15,808 |
65,808 |
|
|
Grand total |
£97,842 |
||
|
CRU and CICA. I am informed that no relevant State Benefits have been paid to C2 and he withdrew his CICA claim after his solicitors firm folded and before any award was made. |
Conclusions
I assess the damages due and payable by the Defendant to each of the Claimants as follows: to C1: £370,280. To C2: £97,842.
END