RFV v The Personal Representatives of John Middleham (Deceased) & Ors

This judgment concerns the following three applications (together “the Applications”) for non-party disclosure made by (1) the Personal Representatives of Mr John Middleham Deceased and (2) Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Limited (together “the Applicants”):

The First Respondent attended the hearing and opposes the First Application in part only. The Second and Third Respondents did not attend the hearing and do not oppose the Second and Third Applications respectively, but will not disclose the documents sought without an order of the court.

The Claimant attended the hearing by counsel and takes a neutral position in respect of the Applications.

The Claimant’s mother (“YHN”) attended the hearing. She is not a party to the claim nor any of the Applications. She requested to be heard on all three Applications. For the reasons given in an ex tempore judgment during the hearing, I agreed to hear from her in respect of the Second Application only.

The Claimant’s 18 year old sister (“UJM”) also attended the hearing. She too is not a party but requested to be heard on the First Application. Again for reasons I gave during the hearing, I allowed her to do so. I also allowed YHN to assist UJM in making her submissions.

The court has been provided with a 749 page hearing bundle, plus 617 page supplementary bundle containing documents relating to the underlying claim in which the Applications are made. The court is grateful to counsel for the Applicants and First Respondent for their skeleton arguments.

This personal injury claim arises from a road traffic accident that occurred on 6 April 2010 when the Claimant, (DOB 26 November 2000 and then aged 9, now aged 25), was hit when crossing Spring Road in Birmingham by a vehicle driven by Mr Middleham. Mr Middleham has since died and the claim is pursued against the First Applicant as the personal representatives of his estate. The Second Applicant is Mr Middleham’s motor insurer.

Liability for the accident has been agreed on a 50/50 basis. Judgment has not however been entered and the proposed liability terms will need court approval.

The Claimant’s case is that she sustained serious injuries in the accident, including a fracture to her left distal femur; a soft tissue back injury; a mild head injury; scarring to her left leg and forehead; significant psychiatric and/or psychological issues resulting in anxiety, low mood, depression, nightmares, chronic pain, fatigue, loss of confidence and self-esteem; and the onset of non-epileptic attack disorder. The Claimant also suffers from non-accident related bilateral keratoconus causing a significant reduction in her vision.

The parties have been granted permission to rely on expert evidence in a number of medical disciplines. The question of permission for non-medical experts is to be considered at a further case management conference that has not yet taken place. The medical expert evidence as to which the parties have permission is as follows:

The Claimant’s schedule of loss is not yet fully particularised but she contends that she is significantly disabled, severely disadvantaged on the job market to the extent that there is doubt over her ability to obtain and retain any meaningful employment, and unable to live independently. The unparticularised heads of future loss include claims for care and case management, loss of earnings, accommodation and therapies. The Claimant contends this is a multi-million pound claim.

The Applicants’ position is that the accident's role in the Claimant's current presentation, especially in the development of the psycho-behavioural syndrome, is much more minor. They contend there are likely to be other non-accident related factors which are responsible for the Claimant’s current condition. It is those potential non-accident related factors that give rise to the Applicants’ desire to obtain disclosure of the documents subject of the Applications.

The Applicants seek disclosure of:

The First Application is supported by witness statements from Giles Kellner, the Applicants’ solicitor, dated 20 May 2025 and 23 May 2025. Mr Kellner also provided an updating statement, dated 23 February 2026, relevant to all Applications.

The letter of 18 January 2024 is titled “Child Safeguarding – MASH” (“the MASH Letter”). The acronym MASH is shorthand for the Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub. The MASH Letter is partially redacted. It records various concerns, although the redactions mask the identity of the subject of concern. The summary of concerns include:

The MASH Letter forms part of the Claimant’s GP records. Mr Kellner’s second witness statement explains that, because the letter is so heavily redacted, it was and remains unclear how the record relates to the Claimant. He contends it must relate to her in some way given confirmation from the Claimant’s GP practice that the document correctly forms part of her medical records. The Applicants’ initial application sought disclosure of the MASH Letter only. On invitation from the Claimant’s solicitor, the Applicants amended their application and now request all records relating or referring to the same safeguarding concerns identified within the MASH Letter, and any other documents which refer to safeguarding concerns pertaining to the Claimant.

The First Respondent relies on the evidence of its solicitor, Michael Morgan-Bullock, dated 12 February 2026, in response. Mr Morgan-Bullock explains that the MASH Letter pertains to a patient (“the Patient”), who is not the Claimant, and is confidential medical information obtained in the context of a private and legally protected clinician-patient relationship. His evidence is that the document was created by a psychiatric liaison team in a Birmingham hospital under the control of University Hospital Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust. He explains that the First Respondent only has possession of the MASH Letter because it hosts the MASH service for Birmingham and Solihull. He has no direct knowledge of how or why the MASH Letter came to appear in the Claimant’s GP records.

Mr Morgan-Bullock explains that the First Respondent owes the Patient a duty of confidentiality under common law clinician-patient confidentiality, the Data Protection Act 2018 and UK GDPR, and the NHS Constitution. He contends that disclosure of the MASH Letter without the Patient’s consent is impermissible without a clear and compelling legal justification, and where disclosure is necessary and proportionate. He does not accept that threshold has been met.

By the date of the hearing, matters had moved on. UJM attended the hearing and identified herself as the Patient. This disclosure, made initially through Ms Coulson with UJM’s consent, and then confirmed by UJM in her oral submissions, came as a surprise to the Claimant, the Applicants and the court.

UJM objects to her personal, confidential information being disclosed. She explained to the court that she had already found her involvement in the First Application very stressful and she had contacted her GP to instruct them to remove the MASH letter from the Claimant’s medical records as it related to UJM not the Claimant. YHN expresses her fear that disclosure would have a major adverse impact on UJM.

The Applicants seek disclosure of all records relating to or referring to YHN, alternatively an explanation why the documents are no longer in the Second Respondent’s control, or as to the grounds on which the Second Respondent claims a right or duty to withhold inspection.

The Second Application is supported by Mr Kellner’s witness statement of 28 August 2025. He explains that the Applicants wish to explore the extent to which YHN’s immigration status and/or threatened removal may have impacted upon the Claimant and the development or maintenance of her psycho-behavioural syndromes. YHN’s immigration status has become an issue due to a redacted letter within the Claimant’s GP records. Dr Abdul-Razak, sent a letter, dated 16 January 2020, to iAM Legal Services (“the Immigration Letter”). Mr Kellner assumes that iAM Legal Services were acting for YHN in respect of her immigration matters and that the Immigration Letter was prepared to set out various adverse effects should YHN be removed from the country. Dr Abdul-Razak refers to the Claimant being “completely reliant” on YHN, who cared for the Claimant at all times, tended to all her daily needs, attended all her appointments and acted on her behalf in all circumstances. The doctor expressed the hope that there would be “a positive response with regard to [YHN’s] application”.

The Second Respondent has not served any evidence in response to the Second Application but its solicitor sent a letter to the court, dated 10 November 2025. The letter attached a schedule of documents that the Second Respondent considered may be potentially relevant, and which it would supply as the court ordered. The Second Respondent suggests the documents be supplied to the court in the first instance to ensure any documents disclosed are necessary and relevant to the claim. The letter stated the Second Respondent did not intend to attend the hearing.

YHN has filed and served a witness statement, dated 16 November 2025, opposing the Second Application. YHN accepts that when the index accident occurred in 2010, she was an ‘overstayer’. She says she first applied to regularise her immigration status in 2015, and again applied and was granted leave in 2020 on the basis that all her British children depended on her for care. YHN does not accept there is any link between her immigration status and the Claimant’s deterioration in condition. Later in her statement, YHN refers to first attempting to regularise her immigration status in 2014 which is at odds with a reference earlier in her statement to 2015. YHN explains that she was issued with a derivative residence card on 22 January 2015, valid until January 2020, and on 14 August 2020 a settlement residence card valid until 14 August 2030. She states that by letter dated 18 December 2023, the Home Office confirmed that her application for British citizenship had been approved.

In her witness statement, YHN explains that she opposes the Second Application for wholly unredacted disclosure because the documents will contain personal and sensitive information about her other three children who are not party to the claim. She maintains disclosure should be proportionate, relevant and, where possible, redacted to protect other children and sensitive third-party information.

YHN’s position had altered somewhat by the date of the hearing. She told the court that she had written her statement under stress and was now only prepared to consent to the Second Respondent disclosing documents relating to the Claimant but nothing relating to her own immigration status. She maintained her earlier position that any references to her other children and any third parties should be redacted.

The Applicants seek unredacted copies of correspondence sent by the Third Respondent to the Claimant’s solicitors on 30 January 2025, and the attachments thereto (“the Attachments”). It is the Attachments that interest the Applicants. The attachments include the Third Respondent’s case note entries for the Claimant, covering the period from 2009 to 2024. Large sections of the entries, including a long entry in 2018, are redacted.

The Third Application is supported by Mr Kellner’s fourth witness statement, dated 7 November 2025. He explains that the Attachments in their redacted form reveal the Claimant’s father contacting the Third Respondent in 2017 and expressing concern about the Claimant’s care, but the significant redaction means that the experts cannot consider the context and relevance to causation.

By email dated 11 November 2025, the Third Respondent confirmed that it does not oppose the Applicants’ draft order, but requires an order before it can provide unredacted copies of the Attachments.

The question of anonymity of the participants in these Applications arose when UJM attended the hearing and unexpectedly identified herself as the Patient. UJM is a vulnerable 18 year old, who is not a party but has become involved in the Applications through her status as the subject matter of the MASH Letter. The MASH Letter includes sensitive personal details as to sexual, physical and emotional abuse she is alleged to have suffered, and as to her mental health. It is clearly important to respect her Article 8 rights.

The Claimant herself is a protected party. The determination of the claim involves the necessary exploration of details of her private life, including as to her medical records and family circumstances. By the date of the hearing of the Applications, the Claimant had not yet made an application for an anonymity order but the case has all the hallmarks of one in which an order is appropriate. The court could not be satisfied an anonymity order is not necessary to protect the Claimant and her family; applying the guidance in PMC v A Local Health Board [2025] EWCA Civ 1126 at [96]-[107] and JX MX v Dartford and Gravesham NHS Trust [2015] EWCA Civ 96 at [35].

It would be concerning if the identity of the Claimant and UJM were to be disclosed by the publication of this judgment. I consider it appropriate to make anonymity orders at this stage to protect the Claimant and UJM. To ensure neither of these individuals can be identified by jigsaw identification, the Claimant’s Litigation Friend, who is her father, and YHN, the Claimant’s mother, will also need to be anonymised. Subject to any representations at the handing down of this judgment, I propose the current PF10 form of order be adopted. That will provide any interested party, whether or not a party to the proceedings, to apply to set aside or vary the anonymity order.

By section 34(2) of the Senior Courts Act 1981:

CPR 31.17 governs applications for non-party disclosure. By 31.17(3):

The court has long recognised that the jurisdiction to order non-party disclosure is intrusive and one the court must ensure is not used inappropriately, even by consent: Flood v Times Newspaper Ltd [2009] EWHC 411 (QB) at [29] (“Flood”). Non-party disclosure remains an exception and not the rule: Frankson v Home Office [2003] 1 WLR 1952 at [10] (“Frankson”).

There is a three stage test to be applied:

For the purpose of CPR 31.17(3)(a), “likely to support the case”, means no more than “may well” rather than the more exacting “more probable than not” standard: Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No. 4) (CA) [2003] 1 WLR 210 at [225G-H] (“Three Rivers”).

For the purpose of CPR 31.17(3)(b), guidance as to what is “necessary” can be drawn from how it is applied in the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction. That involves looking at “necessity arising from the absence of any other practicable means of obtaining essential information” having regard to all the circumstances including the size and resources of an applicant, urgency and public interest. The concept of necessity is flexible and falls to be determined in light of the facts of a particular case. See Sarayiah v Royal & Sun Alliance Plc [2018] EWHC 3437 (Ch) at [32], [33], [36].

Even if the 31.17(3)(a) and (b) threshold criteria are satisfied, the court retains a discretion: Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 1885 at [14]-[15]. The exercise of discretion may involve consideration of the rights, including Article 8 rights, of individuals would be affected by disclosure: Kerner v WX, YZ [2015] EWHC 1247 (QB) at [25].

The Applicants seek disclosure of three categories of documents in the First Application. The first and second categories concern the unredacted MASH Letter, and documents relating or referring to the same safeguarding concerns, (together “the MASH Documents”). The Applicants contend those documents are relevant to the determination of the cause of the Claimant’s alleged psychiatric and/or psychological conditions. The Applicants point to references in the expert evidence whereby the experts have asked for clarification of the position:

Mr Hill, for the Applicants, submits that the MASH Documents are relevant, regardless of whether the Claimant herself is the subject matter of the MASH Letter, given what the experts say about the importance of understanding the family situation more generally.

Ms Coulson, for the First Respondent, maintains the First Respondent’s objection to disclosing the MASH Documents. Ms Coulson submits that the documents are not relevant as they relate to UJM not the Claimant. Further, that disclosure was not necessary given that both the Claimant’s mother and father were giving evidence in claim and the Applicants could, if need be, cross-examine them about the identity of UJM and any relevant events. Ms Coulson contends that the experts could provide their opinions on causation premised on alternative factual bases, which could be applied by the court once findings of fact were made.

It transpired only during the hearing that the MASH Documents relate to safeguarding concerns about UJM. I am not persuaded by the First Respondent’s submission that because the MASH Documents pertain to UJM, rather than the Claimant, that they are not relevant. The neurologists and neuropsychiatrists agree that understanding the family dynamic, and any stressors therein, is key to determining causation of the Claimant’s psychological and/or psychiatric conditions. If the Claimant has a sibling or half sibling who has been subjected to parental physical abuse and/or sexual abuse by others and/or who has attempted suicide, disclosure of documents on that topic ‘may well’ impact on causation in a way that supports the Applicants’ case that the Claimant’s presentation is caused or contributed to by factors other than the index accident. [Three Rivers applied.] The wider family dynamic is of relevance and the first stage of the test in CPR 31.17(3)(a) is made out.

The Applicants have to establish that disclosure of the MASH Documents is necessary in order to fairly dispose of the claim or to save costs. The effect of the various comments made by the neurologists and neuropsychiatrists is that they, understandably, want as much information as possible about the family dynamic including information as to (a) who was the subject of the safeguarding issues identified in the MASH Letter, (b) who were the alleged perpetrators of abuse and (c) whether there was proven evidence that the alleged abuse occurred. By dint of UJM’s disclosure during the hearing, the Claimant and Applicants, and in turn their experts, now know that the MASH Letter relates to UJM. No one suggested UJM’s disclosure was untrue. Indeed, her identification confirms what had been the Applicants’ recent working assumption. Disclosure of an unredacted version of the MASH Documents is not now necessary to establish that. It will also be possible to determine who UJM’s parents are without the disclosure being necessary. YHN confirmed she is UJM’s mother. The Claimant likely knows who YHN’s father is.

Without full disclosure of unredacted copies of the MASH Documents, many of which have not yet been provided in even redacted form, there is a risk that the experts will not have the greatest possible understanding of the overall family machinations to assist them when opining on causation. I am mindful that neither the Applicants nor Claimant have any alternative means of obtaining the unredacted MASH Documents. I likewise take into account that cross-examination of the Claimant’s father and mother at trial would not necessarily yield reliable evidence as to the safeguarding issues concerning UJM. To the extent that either or both parents are implicated in the allegations, they would have a right not to answer questions that incriminated themselves. In any event, they are far from independent witnesses.

However, notwithstanding the aforementioned observations, whilst I am persuaded that disclosure of an unredacted form of the MASH Documents would be desirable to assist the experts, I am not persuaded it meets the higher threshold of being necessary in order to dispose fairly of the claim now that the experts know that UJM not the Claimant is the subject of the MASH Letter. This answers the key question that had been unclear. Even if the experts had unredacted versions of the MASH Documents, it would not necessarily be clear whether the allegations were true, still less would it show what the Claimant knew and believed about the allegations. The experts will however have access to the Claimant’s own medical records, which may record any specific concerns she raised about matters that were troubling her. In any event, even if I am wrong in my conclusion that the MASH Documents do not meet the “necessary” threshold under CPR 31.17(3)(b), this is not a case in which it would be appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion to order unredacted disclosure of the MASH Documents in any event.

The power under CPR 31.17(3) is discretionary. I remind myself that exercise of the power is the exception not the rule; per Frankson. The Article 8 rights of UJM are clearly engaged in respect of the MASH Documents. The documents concern details relating to UJM’s private and family life of a highly confidential nature, including as to alleged physical and sexual abuse and suicide attempts. I am not satisfied it can be said to be necessary in a democratic society to interfere with UJM’s Article 8 rights so as to protect the rights and freedoms of the Applicants (or indeed the Claimant). UJM is not a party to the claim and is a highly vulnerable 18 year old. She was a child when the MASH Letter was generated. It was apparent from her presentation in court that she is highly distressed at being dragged into the First Application. YHN, as UJM’s mother, shares her daughter’s concern about disclosure, as does the First Respondent. It is far from clear why the MASH Letter even forms part of the Claimant’s GP records given it relates to UJM. Now that the Applicants know that UJM is the subject of the safeguarding referral, that gives the experts a factual basis upon which to opine. In addition, the Applicants have the ability to explore the factual matrix of the claim via the Claimant’s medical records and, to some extent, by cross examination of the Claimant’s lay witnesses. There is also merit in the First Respondent’s submission that there is significant public interest in maintaining public confidence in clinician-patient confidentiality. Ordering the First Respondent to make disclosure risks undermining not just UJM’s confidence in being able to speak freely with her clinicians, but also the confidence of the wider public. The First Application insofar as it relates to the MASH Documents is therefore refused.

The third category of disclosure sought in the First Application relates to safeguarding concerns pertaining to the Claimant herself. The First Respondent does not oppose disclosure of those documents, nor does the Claimant. Notwithstanding the lack of opposition, the merits of this aspect must still be considered: Flood at [29].

As to CPR 31.17(3)(a), documents pertaining to safeguarding concerns about the Claimant may well support the Applicants’ case on causation. The neurologists and neuropsychiatrists agree that possible safeguarding concerns relating to the Claimant may have a bearing on her presentation.

I have considered whether the disclosure is necessary in order to dispose fairly of the claim. In my view it is given that the experts need to understand any safeguarding concerns surrounding the Claimant in order to opine in an informed way on causation. I have considered whether the Applicants have other ways of obtaining the information. They do not. The Claimant could have applied to the First Respondent for disclosure, however she has failed to do so.

It is appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion to order the First Respondent to disclose any documents relating to safeguarding concerns pertaining to the Claimant. Whilst the Claimant’s Article 8 rights are engaged, she does not object to the disclosure being made. Indeed, the documents likely fall under the Claimant’s duty of standard disclosure in the claim anyway.

The neurologist and neuropsychiatrists make various references in their reports to the potential relevance of YHN’s risk of removal from the country to the Claimant’s presentation:

The only details of the documents held by the Second Respondent comes from the schedule attached to the Second Respondent’s solicitor’s letter of 10 November 2025. Many of the descriptions of categories of document are very general. They include YHN’s UK visa and immigration files, documents relating to an appeal hearing in October 2014, various “children health care appointments/records” and “school documents”, various solicitor’s letters, “personal documents and medical records” and “bank records”.

The Applicants contend that the immigration appeal hearing in 2014 may well be relevant as it is proximate in time to the Claimant’s deterioration. Mr Hill submits that it is already known that the Claimant’s condition was deployed in support of YHN’s immigration applications and/or appeals, and the experts need an understanding of what was contended and the timeline in order to inform their opinion. Mr Hill concedes that any documents relating to other children could be redacted or removed.

There is a general consensus between the relevant neurologists and neuropsychiatrists that external stressors may be relevant to cause of the Claimant’s psychiatric and psychological presentation. Those experts identify YHN’s risk of removal as a potential external stressor. That is unsurprising. The risk of a parent and primary carer being removing from the country is very likely to be a significant stressor in a child’s life, even more so for an injured child. Understanding the risk of removal and applicable timeline may well yield evidence that supports the Applicants’ case on causation and/or adversely affect the Claimant’s. I am therefore satisfied that the Second Application satisfies CPR 31.17(3)(a).

It is not realistically open for the Applicants or Claimant to obtain a complete picture of the immigration applications without court order,. It is known that some form of appeal hearing occurred in 2014, although the details of precisely what that hearing was are unclear. Immigration proceedings are generally held in public and the appeal likely resulted in a judgment. Even assuming the parties could obtain a copy of the relevant appeal judgment and order, that alone would not provide complete information. YHN’s immigration matters proceeded for a number of years before and after 2014, and appear to have included interactions with the Second Respondent that extended beyond public immigration hearings. Both YHN and the Claimant’s father have provided lengthy witness statements in support of the claim. However neither statement makes any mention of the immigration issues that YHN continued to face for many years after the accident. Cross-examination of the parents at trial could not guarantee that accurate evidence would be forthcoming given the passage of time, the likely factual complexity of the immigration dealings that continued over many years, the parents lack of independence, and YHN’s position at the hearing that she was unwilling for her immigration details to be disclosed. Without disclosure of any of the immigration documents, neither the Applicants’ nor Claimant’s experts will be able to give informed opinions on causation. In my judgment, disclosure by court order of at least some of the immigration documents is therefore necessary in order to dispose fairly of this claim. The requirements of CPR 31.17(3)(b) are therefore met.

The question of whether the court should exercise its discretion to invoke the exceptional power to order disclosure of the immigration documents involves the consideration of the competing rights of various third parties. The Article 8 rights of YHN are engaged as many of the documents are likely to contain details of her private and family life. The schedule of documents provided by the Second Respondent also alludes to information about unidentified children, including school records. The information provided by YHN, coupled with the known letter from Dr Abdul-Razak, suggests that the unnamed children are likely to be the Claimant and her siblings. YHN also indicated that there may be details of third parties within the documents.

Immigration documents that allow the timeline to be ascertained, and allow an assessment of the perceived or actual risk of YHN’s removal to be assessed, will assist the experts. It will be likely impossible to assess the timeline and level of risk if, as YHN suggests, disclosure is limited to only documents relating to the Claimant. The Claimant was not the applicant in the immigration matters. Her role seems to have been peripheral; she was referenced as a child with medical needs who was dependent on YHN for care. An understanding of the details of YHN’s applications to the Respondent, and any immigration litigation arising therefrom, is required in order for the Applicants to be able to fully exercise their right to defend the claim. Given the importance of the immigration, I am persuaded that disclosure of the immigration documents insofar as the documents touch on the Claimant or YHN is a necessary interference to protect the rights of the Applicants and Claimant to a fair trial of the claim. I note that immigration proceedings themselves are generally heard in public such that YHN had no legitimate expectation to privacy in any event.

Any references in the documents about the private lives of children other than the Claimant, or third party adults, should however be redacted. It is not necessary to interfere with their Article 8 rights in circumstances where the Applicants’ aim of the Second Application is achievable without the need to disclose those details.

The Second Respondent’s suggestion that the court undertake the exercise of vetting the documents is misguided. Neither s.34(2) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 nor CPR 31.17 envisage the court undertaking such a supervisory role. The precise form of wording of the order can be discussed on the handing down of this judgment. The Second Defendant is encouraged to liaise with the parties of the claim to agree suitable wording for a draft order to reflect this judgment. The order should provide for disclosure of the documents cited in the schedule to the Second Respondent’s letter of 10 November 2025, subject to redaction of the personal details of any child or third party adult whose private life is referenced.

The Third Application is not actively opposed by the Third Respondent but that does not obviate the need for the court to actively consider the merits of the same: per Flood. Whilst I have not heard from YHN in respect of the Third Application, I am alive to her concerns about details pertaining to her other children being disclosed.

The Attachments include the Claimant’s social services records. The potential relevance of external stressors to causation identified by the neurologists and neuro-psychiatrists in relation to the First Application, apply equally to these documents. Indeed, Prof. Carson’s letter of 7 January 2026 makes express reference to the relevance to determining causation of unredacted copies of the Attachments. The requirement under CPR 32.17(3)(a) is thus made out.

A disclosure order is necessary in order to fairly dispose of the claim. Disclosure will not be forthcoming voluntarily. The Third Respondent’s email of 11 November 2025 makes it clear that although it does not oppose the Third Application, they require an order of the court before providing unredacted copies. The Claimant could apply for disclosure from the Third Respondent but has not done so. The Applicants are left with little choice but to make the application themselves. I am therefore satisfied that the requirement under CPR 31.17(3)(b) is satisfied.

No information has been provided as to what type of information has been redacted. Some of the redactions, such as a case note entry for 19 November 2009, refer to an unidentified child other than the Claimant. Given the known references in documents sought in the First and Second Applications to the Claimant’s siblings, it is possible, indeed likely, that some of the redactions in the Attachments also reference the siblings. Other redactions are more comprehensive, such as case note entries on 27 November 2009 and 23 October 2018, such that it is impossible to glean any substantive details.

There is clearly a risk that information about the private and family life of the Claimant’s siblings’ and/or other third parties may be revealed if wholly unredacted disclosure were to be made. The experts are interested in information about external stressors in the Claimant’s life. If that stressor arises from events surrounding a third party with whom the Claimant has contact, it does not necessarily follow that the experts need the name of the other third party. I am not therefore persuaded that wholly unredacted disclosure is necessary at this stage to protect the Applicants’ rights to defend the claim. The current level of redaction is however obstructive and impinges the parties’ ability to fairly litigate the claim. The appropriate balance is struck by requiring disclosure of the Attachments in an unredacted form save to the names or other identifying features of any third party in respect of whose private life is referenced. The redaction must not extend to removal of the ability to identify factual events, and must be limited to the identification of individuals. Once that enhanced level of disclosure has been provided by the Third Respondent, it can be reviewed by the parties and their experts to assess whether the disclosure addresses the factual issues relevant to causation. I make it clear that it will remain open to the Applicants, or indeed the Claimant, to renew an application for non-party disclosure if they wish to contend the enhanced disclosure still impedes their ability to assess causation.

The effect of my findings is as follows: