Benjamin James Smith & Anor v Richard Copestake

This is my decision on an application for an interim injunction in a claim for defamation, harassment, breach of confidence and unlawful interference following a hearing on 16th April 2026. The Claimants were represented before me by Mr Liam Wells on a direct access basis and the Defendant was unrepresented and appeared before me by CVP.

This hearing followed the order of Guy Vassall-Adams KC dated 2 March 2026 dismissing a previous application for interim injunctive relief and the subsequent order of Collins Rice J of 30 March 2026 for hearing of this on-notice application.

The first claimant is the founder and ultimate beneficial owner of the second claimant. The second claimant is a venture capital company which operates as a focused residential investment platform. The defendant was employed by the second claimant as a full stack developer between 25 September 2025 and 22 December 2025 when he was dismissed for gross misconduct.

In brief, the claim derives relates to the defendant’s actions since his dismissal. The primary claims in harassment and libel address the ways the defendant has aired his grievances against the claimants in several ways including:

The claimants also allege other coordinated activities including google optimisation with the effect of directing traffic to the website when searches are conducted about the claimants. In addition, the particulars relating to breach of contract with the second claimant include allegations that the defendant deleted client data, appropriated intellectual property from the second claimant, published non-public commercial information about the second claimant, among other things.

As context although not directly relevant to the application before me, aside from the present proceedings, the defendant says that he has brought proceedings against the second claimant in the employment tribunal with a trial date set for June 2027. The claimants deny any knowledge of those proceedings.

The claimants say there are ongoing police investigations into the conduct of the defendant although they do not specify the offences or exact conduct being investigated. The defendant told me in court that had been informed by Wiltshire police that they will take no further action and promised to send over the email he had received. In further correspondence to the court, however, he said that he must have misheard and that, in fact, investigations were ongoing. The claimant followed up with correspondence from Wiltshire police confirming that they had not closed the investigation. Therefore, it appears there is a current criminal investigation into related matters.

In relation to the injunctive relief sought in the claims for unlawful interference, I am guided by the principles set out in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Limited [1975] AC 396: firstly, is there a serious issue to be tried; secondly, whether damages would be a suitable remedy; thirdly, the balance of convenience.   

However, where the claimant seeks to restrain publication of libel, Bonnard v. Perryman (1891) 2 Ch. 269 makes it clear that injunctive relief will not be available in circumstances where the Defendant asserts the defence of truth.

The Human Rights Act 1998 section 12 outlines the approach to relief affecting the Convention right to freedom of expression and section 12(3) provides that:

Mr Wells submitted that the crux of the case was the claim of harassment relating to the first claimant in addition to the breach of confidence and unlawful interference claims relating to the second claimant and argued that the libel claim was secondary. This change of approach reflects the fact that an injunction in libel is an exceptional order for the court to make and the extremely high bar set in Bonnard v Perryman.

Mr Copestake did not make any submissions on the substance of the application, rather he spoke about the background explaining that the Website gathers together live feeds of stories and cases related to the claimant and that he attempts to moderate the WhatsApp group. He provided an index of evidence but none of the actual evidence was received by the court in time for the hearing. My consideration of the application, therefore, primarily focuses on the arguments and evidence submitted by the claimant.

I am grateful to Mr Wells for his submissions and clarifications on the framing of the application. Whether the claim is primarily in defamation or in harassment does not, however, affect my analysis in terms of the applicable legal test, as much of the relief sought in the application (in particular the removal of the website or parts of the website and closure of the WhatsApp group) clearly affects the defendant’s right to freedom of expression regardless of the basis of the claim. The main question for me, therefore, is whether it is more likely than not that the applicant will establish that publication should not be allowed, regardless of the primary thrust of the claim.

It seems to me that the pleadings now before me reinforce the assessment by Guy Vassall-Adams KC in the reasoning for his order of 2 March 2026, that “the nub of the claims is reputational harm.” The particulars relating to the harassment claim are almost all related to allegedly defamatory publications on the casefile website, on LinkedIn and in the WhatsApp group. The remaining particulars relating to Google optimisation and the control of domain names and websites appear to be speculative at this stage and are, in any event, fundamentally linked to reputational damage.

The interest of journalists in the claimants’ affairs was pointed out by Mr Wells as further evidence of a pattern of harassment by the defendant. However, the fact that the matters on the website are potentially of interest to journalists working for a national newspaper, rather serves to strengthen potential defences of public interest or truth. Instead of bolstering the harassment argument, it weakens the case for restricting freedom of expression at this stage in the proceedings.

Mr Wells characterised the WhatsApp group as “a conspiracy of people making plans to harm the Claimant”. He said that the defendant is administering the group and knows who is in it, including Mr Fincham who has previously been found to have harassed the first claimant. He says that causes the claimant alarm and distress and is sufficient to amount to harassment.

The exchanges on the WhatsApp group are undoubtedly nasty, with overtones of aggression against the claimant and homophobia. It is clearly not a nice group. But the most egregious examples are posted by other members of the WhatsApp group, not the defendant himself. While the question of whether the WhatsApp group is “private” or “public” may not be relevant to the question of publication in a defamation claim, it is relevant to the claim in harassment. The WhatsApp group is about the first claimant but it is not addressed to him. It is unclear how the claimant obtained the screenshots from the group but he was not invited into the group. It is therefore difficult to see that it is directed at the claimant in such a way as to amount to harassment because it does not appear that the defendant intended the claimant to join the group or to have access to the discussion within the group so as to be aware of the content.

I can understand why the first claimant is unhappy and upset about the defendant’s activities. However, the alarm and distress outlined by Mr Wells in the first claimant’s written evidence focus on the earlier actions of Mr Fincham and Mr Walsh predating any contact between the first claimant and the defendant. While that background may add to the claimant’s sensitivity to the defendant’s activities, it relates to an entirely separate incident and cannot form the basis for a finding of a pattern of harassment by the defendant in this case. Mr Wells conceded that the question of liability for control of the WhatsApp group in such a claim throws up novel legal points. In my view it would not be appropriate for me to attempt to decide those points in the context of the current application.

Based on the evidence and submissions before me, I do not think it is more likely than not that the first claimant would succeed in showing that the defendant’s role in creating the WhatsApp group, along with the website and LinkedIn posts reached the threshold of harassment. This is despite the questionable exchanges in the WhatsApp group and the inclusion of members in the WhatsApp group who have previously harassed the claimant. Aside from the reputational damage of the content of the allegedly defamatory material, while it is unpleasant, the additional factors of persistence and oppression do not appear to me be present at this stage such as to clear the test for injunctive relief. That is not to say that I find the actions of the defendant to be reasonable, and the situation may well change in the future, but I must apply the test based on the evidence and submissions before me.

Mr Wells’ submissions focused on the harassment claim as he recognised the clear challenges in applying for interim injunctive relief in relation to the libel claim in light of Bonnard v Perryman. He drew my attention to Laing J’s (as she then was) observations in  Merlin Entertainments PLC v Cave [2014] EWHC 3036 (QB); [2015] EMLR 3 at [40] that:

I hope that Mr Copestake understands the seriousness of these proceedings and the potential consequences for him of any escalation in his conduct which could change the picture, both in relation to these proceedings and to the police investigation. I should also stress that lying to the court is a very serious matter that could lead to separate proceedings. This judgment is in no way an endorsement of Mr Copestake’s actions to date and it is not the end of the matter; it is simply a decision on the application before me.

The claimants seek relief that will affect the defendant’s freedom of expression in relation to the claims for misuse of private information for the first claimant and breach of contract and breach of confidence in relation to the second claimant. The Cream Holdings test therefore also applies to these.

Mr Wells submitted that some of the information about the first claimant published on the website and shared on the WhatsApp group was private information. While he conceded that some of the information might be available through publicly available sources like Companies House, he said that some things, such as his familial relationships, were only known to the defendant because of his employment. The evidence before me on this point is limited, however, overall, I am not persuaded on the basis of the evidence and submissions I have heard, that the threshold is met that it is more likely than not that any of the existing publications would not be allowed on the basis of a misuse of private information or breach of confidence claim. This is because it is unclear whether the information referred to is already in the public domain. The suggestion that the connections between different individuals and businesses could only be made with access to confidential or private information is not sufficiently well supported to reach the threshold for injunctive relief of the kind sought.

In relation to the scope of the injunctive relief sought which includes taking down the website, or large parts of it, removal of the LinkedIn posts and closure of the WhatsApp group (or groups), it appears to me that, even if the threshold for injunctive relief were met in this case, which it is not, to grant an interim injunction in the terms sought would be wholly disproportionate. This oppressive approach is reflected more generally in the particulars of claim which

Turning to the remaining forms of relief sought. The approach I adopt to this aspect of the application is that set out in American Cyanamid. In relation to breach of contract, I accept that there is a serious question to be tried based on the contract between the defendant and the second claimant and the alleged retention of data as well as the retention of the AI system ALEX that Mr Copestake accepts he has kept. Based on the evidence before me, however, I am not persuaded that damages would not be an adequate remedy in the case. In relation to the unlawful interference claim, I am not persuaded, based on the evidence before me, that there is necessarily a serious issue to be tried and, again, even if there were, I think that damages could be a suitable remedy.

Mr Wells submitted that the potential losses, in particular those related to the Luxembourg Fund, are significant and asserted that Mr Copestake would not be in a position to pay those damages. The evidence connecting Mr Copestake’s actions to any impact on the Luxembourg Fund, however, is tenuous, based on a single email from a potential investor. And it links back to the Website and the issues related to freedom of expression albeit through the route of allegations related to unlawful interference. I do not, however, find this sufficient to show a serious issue to be tried.

I note that the claim form puts the value of the claim as damages not exceeding £10,000 and injunctive relief. This estimate covers the bulk of the claims that relate to defamation and harassment for which injunctive relief is sought. There is not sufficient particularisation to demonstrate that damages would not be a suitable remedy for these remaining aspects of the claim. It appears, in relation to the remaining matters that do not interfere with the defendant’s right to freedom of expression, and in the absence of strong evidence and arguments to the contrary, damages would likely be a suitable remedy in these circumstances.

At this stage of the proceedings, there is limited and contradictory evidence to show that the defendant holds any data or information other than the ALEX programme. There is no real evidence before me that there is an imminent risk that, even if he did hold any company data, he would do anything further with it. The claimants have not persuaded me that damages would not be a suitable remedy for the specific contractual and intellectual property dispute related to the retention of the ALEX programme. The additional information sought can be acquired through standard disclosure procedures as the proceedings develop. Therefore I find that the balance of convenience lies in not making the injunction applied for.

For the reasons given, I dismiss the application for injunctive relief.

I realise that the defendant is a litigant in person and that Mr Wells is instructed by the claimants on a direct access basis so I take this opportunity to clarify that this decision relates only to the application for injunctive relief before me. The defendant has raised the question of whether these proceedings could amount to a SLAPP for the purposes of s.195 Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023. I have not made a determination on this point as there was no formal application to that effect before me, but I note that this matter may need to be determined at a later stage of the proceedings.

I trust that both parties understand that these proceedings are complex and could have significant consequences for them. The requirements to fulfil procedural rules remain applicable, even for self-represented parties. I note that, in my view, there are deficiencies in the pleadings before me and I would encourage both parties to pay close attention to the requirements of PD53B and to review their pleadings accordingly. I take this opportunity to reiterate that dishonesty in court proceedings may have very serious consequences beyond the proceedings themselves.