Sevenoaks District Council v Patrick Delaney & Ors

John Quilligan, William and Chantelle Harrington, Thomas and Amanda Coffey along with Thomas, Sharon, Katarina and Naomi O’Brien are the remaining named Defendants to these injunction proceedings. In this judgment, I refer to them and their 16 children collectively as “the families”. When discussing all four of the Defendant men of the families, I refer to them as “the men” and when discussing all five of the Defendant women, I refer to them as “the women”. I refer to Sevenoaks District Council, which is the Claimant in the proceedings, as “the Council”.

The families are Gypsies and Travellers with Irish origins. Through their witness statements and in the evidence they gave direct to me, the men explain that they have never lived anywhere for long periods of time and that freedom to travel from place to place, partly for work and partly for cultural reasons, is central to their identity. They also say that they now want to establish a settled base for the families.

To someone who is not a Gypsy and a Traveller, this may well seem contradictory. To someone who is, there is no contradiction. According to Dr Siobhan Spencer MBE’s forward to the Third Edition of LAGGypsy and Traveller Law, a base, sometimes known as a “winter yard”, was something many Gypsy and Traveller families have had historically, sharing a site for caravans, land, facilities and stabling with others until the time came to move elsewhere. Further, paragraph 13 of Planning Policy for Traveller Sites (‘the Guidance’), December 2024 stresses the importance of travellers having a “settled base” where they can establish themselves, register with doctors to access healthcare, and enrol their children into schools.

Changes in the law and the attitude of the general public has significantly impacted on the availability of sites where such bases and temporary sites to stay during periods of travelling can be established. Some of this history is summarised by Sedley J in R v Lincolnshire CC ex parte Atkinson [1995] 8 WLUK 182 (‘Atkinson’). Even now, two decades on and despite it being government policy to create sites, as explained in documents like the Guidance, there is a shortage of places with planning permission for Gypsies and Travellers to live, whether for long or short periods of time.

Sevenoaks in Kent is no exception. The Council has granted planning permission for a number of sites in recent years, but it recognises that there is insufficient local provision to meet the needs of the gypsy and traveller community. In particular, it has not identified a five year supply of land identified as deliverable to create the number of traveller pitches it has recognised as necessary. Providing such pitches is not the only challenge the Council faces. It has responsibilities to safeguard and promote the welfare of children it its locality, some of whom will be gypsy and traveller children. It also has responsibility for administering the local planning system, including considering and determining applications for planning permission when they are made and enforcing planning control when it is breached. There are often tensions between these responsibilities and strong views can be expressed by the public about which ought to be prioritised, as Atkinson recognises.

This is the backdrop to the events that led to these proceedings which began with the men of the families hearing that Patrick Delaney, the owner of a piece of land known as Seasons Farm, Pooting’s Road, TN8 6SD, wished to sell it and, after visiting the site, decided to buy it jointly, which they did on 30 July 2025. I will refer to this as the farmland because historically it had been used for agricultural purposes. The photographs I have seen show the farmland as being relatively undeveloped prior to July 2025. There are buildings that could be used for agricultural purposes or shelter for animals in front of which is a large, level area bordered by trees. There is an access road and various amenities about a mile or so away. I should mention that Mr Delaney was originally a named target of the injunction but, once the Council learned he had no further role after the land was sold, the proceedings were no longer pursued against him.

The men of the families decided to establish a settled base on the farmland and moved onto it on Friday, 22 August 2025 in the touring caravans in which they had been living. They also brought some mobile homes onto the site (which despite their description are designed to remain static). Some construction materials and a digger were brought onto the site so some works could be undertaken. These began almost immediately. It is common ground that the families did not have planning permission for these works, though it was later sought.

The Council learned more of what was happening on the farmland the following day, 23 August 2025 from local residents. It did not welcome the news. Action was taken to obtain an urgent without notice interim injunction from Mr Justice Dove who was the out of hours duty judge that weekend. The injunction, which I shall call “the Dove order”, was granted at 4:49 PM that day. On 15 September 2025 which was the injunction return date for the Dove order, a variation to the Dove order was made by Mrs Justice Hill, though much of it remained unchanged. I shall call this “the Hill order”.

The Council says that the Dove and Hill orders have been breached in multiple ways by the men since they were made and continue to be breached. It also says that the women breached the Dove order between 23 August 2025 and 15 September 2025 by continuing to live on the farmland. The reason the Council does not claim that there is an ongoing breach of the Dove or Hill orders by the women is that the Hill order removed the prohibition on the families living on the farmland.

An application was made on the families’ behalf to vary the Dove and Hill orders on 4 November 2025. On 10 December 2025 the Council made an application of its own to enforce them by way of contempt proceedings. At a hearing on 5 February 2026, Ms Annabel Darlow KC dismissed the variation application and made case management directions for a one day hearing subsequently listed for 4 March 2026 at which the contempt application would be dealt with, including the issues of the liability of the 11 men and women for contempt of court and, if that were established, what sanctions ought to be imposed. Arrangements were also made to deal with an application the Council made for a final version of the injunction on 5 and 6 March 2026.

During the course of the hearings on 4 to 6 March 2026, Mr Fry, Counsel for the Council, indicated that these case management arrangements had been hopelessly optimistic (albeit because they had been premised on the assumption the men and women did not dispute any of the contempt for which they were said to be responsible). I agree. Even the liability aspects of this application have proven complex thanks to a combination of factual disputes, the unstructured, spontaneous way in which much of the case for the men and women was presented and a mass of evidence (the hearing bundle was just short of 4000 pages, was not indexed in a way to maximise accessibility, yet more material was submitted during the course of the hearing and continues to be filed). The net result was a three-day hearing on liability alone and this reserved judgment, which is not brief.

It is structured as follows.

Having sketched out the background already, I turn next to the detail of the evidence, starting by explaining the approach I will take to assessing it at §§‎‎18 to 21, then summarising the sources before discussing it chronologically: §§‎22–‎207.

There is one factual matter I have not yet determined which concerns what happened when Graham Cooke, a professional process server and Richard Morris, the Council’s Corporate Director of Planning and Regulatory Services, arrived on the farmland on Sunday, 24 August 2025 to serve the Dove order on the land. I do not need to resolve that conflict now to determine liability as I shall explain at §‎251-‎255 below, but it will be relevant to the decisions I need to make on sanctions. The reason I have not dealt with it yet is because Mr Cooke was unavailable for cross examination at the hearing on 6 March 2026. Mr Masters, Counsel for the men and women, agreed with Mr Fry that as this evidence was disputed, the opportunity to test it at a later date was important.

Mr Masters’ and Mr Fry’s submissions on liability are summarised at §§‎208‎-242

My analysis of the disputes about how I should approach liability follows at §§‎243-‎263. I set out my key findings of fact at and liability conclusions at §§‎264-‎286.

There is a significant amount of contemporaneous evidence in this case. In assessing it alongside the other evidence available, I have kept in mind the comments of Leggatt J at paragraphs 15 to 18 of Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd [2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm), Warby J at paragraph 39 of Dutta v GMC [2020] EWHC 1974 (Admin) (‘Dutta’) as well as the time-honoured remarks of Lord Pearce in the House of Lords in Onassis v Vegottis [1968] 2 Lloyds Rep 403 at 431 (‘Onassis’). The gist of those authorities is that, when giving evidence, people may be wholly dishonest as well as wholly honest, but they may also be dishonest about certain things only, or may honestly recount a memory of an event which they have misremembered and which did not, in fact, happen the way they remember it or at all because human memory is both fallible and malleable. The process of litigation itself can often distort human memories as people can become convinced of the rightness of their case and, over time, can unconsciously retrofit their memories of events to the arguments they are making, or suppress memories which are inconsistent with the way their case is put. Often the safest approach for a judge will be to establish, as far as possible, the objective facts as shown by any authentic contemporaneous documents, independent of the witness, and then to use the oral evidence as a means of subjecting these to what Warby J called ‘critical scrutiny’ in Dutta. Any “admitted or incontrovertible facts and probabilities must play their proper part” too, as Lord Pearce noted in Onassis. Broadly, this is the approach I have taken in this case.

When determining liability I have also kept in mind that, as far as proving contempt of court has occurred, the standard is identical to that in criminal proceedings, that is proof beyond reasonable doubt: Re Bramblevale Ltd [1970] Ch. 128 where Denning MR described the rationale for this as being because contempt of court is “an offence of a criminal character”. See too In re A (A Child) (Removal from Jurisdiction: Contempt of Court) [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1482. Hearsay evidence is admissible: Daltel Europe Ltd v Makki [2006] 1 W.L.R. 2704, but whatever form it takes, the evidence must be such as to prove a breach “with all the strictness that is necessary in such a proceeding as this, when you are going to deprive people of their liberty”: Churchman v Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee [1972] 1 W.L.R.1094.

What needs to be proven to this standard? In Re L-W (Children) (Enforcement and Committal: Contact) [2010] EWCA Civ 1253 (‘L-W’) at §34 Munby LJ summarised the then leading authorities in this way:

In Cuadrilla Bowland v Persons Unknown [2020] EWCA Civ 9 Leggatt LJ noted at §25:

A different standard applies to assessing whether the subject of an injunction has knowledge that an order has been made. That is tested to the civil standard, on the balance of probabilities: National Highways Limited v Kirin [2023] EWHC 3000 (KB) (‘Kirin’): §36.

The applicability of these principles was common ground between Mr Fry and Mr Masters. However, they took opposing views on the significance of knowledge of an injunction to liability. I will return to this issue below when summarising their submissions.

As I have already mentioned, there was a large volume of documents before the court. Some of this had been assembled for the contempt application only and the remainder was concerned with the final injunction application. This division broke down during the hearing because Mr Masters decided to cross examine the Council’s witnesses about the evidence they had submitted for the final injunction application and refer to various supporting documents. The basis for the contempt application itself was set out in the required N660 rider document giving details of the contempt alleged. This was supported by an affidavit of Alison Salter, the Council’s Development Manager, and another from Mr Morris, both dated 9 December 2025. Ms Salter made a second affidavit. Both had also filed witness statements. Mr Cooke had made a very brief statement to the court about service of the Dove order on the land, and then a slightly longer one was produced, replicating some of the wording but adding further information, and circulated on the morning of 6 March 2026. Accompanying the Council’s evidence are photographs of the farmland site, taken both at ground level and above, from video footage I was told had been made by a local resident using a drone camera. Many of these photographs have dates on them and extensive correspondence in letters and emails between the Council’s representatives and those of the families. There have also been numerous site visits to the farmland by Council officers which have been documented to some extent. Further, Ms Salter and Mr Morris were called at the hearing, gave some brief evidence-in-chief supplementing their witness statements and were then cross-examined and then re-examined. Whilst both were clearly keen to champion the Council’s position, I formed the view that they were generally credible witnesses. I make no findings about Mr Morris’ credibility in relation to the explanation of the order said to have been given to Mr O’Brien by Mr Cook on 23 August 2025, however Mr Morris primarily confined himself to first-hand evidence of matters he could speak about. I had some reservations about Ms Salter’s evidence because much of it was second-hand, based on what had been reported to her by others or which she knew, or thought was in the Council’s files.

Each of the men filed three individual witness statements along with a joint statement. I should say here that I do not find that helpful way of communicating evidence to the court because it is not possible to distinguish which evidence in such a statement comes from which witness and what is within their own knowledge as required by CPR 32.4(1) and CPR PD 32 §18.1. Nonetheless, I have considered the evidence in that statement. I also need to mention that all of the man of the families describe themselves as illiterate and said that their witness statements had been prepared through a process of discussion with their solicitor and the contents being read out to them and confirmed. I found the men to be generally credible witnesses. There were very few inconsistencies in their evidence and none of significance as far as the matters determined below are concerned. It did not appear to be rehearsed in any way. They described the same events and decisions differently, from their own perspectives rather than in a sense that made me think what they had to say was scripted. Their actions broadly made sense given what they told me about their own backgrounds and what had happened to the families prior to moving onto the site and subsequently. They made a number of concessions about breaches of the order, and although the joint statement was not as clear as it might have been, it included such concessions. They did not seek to evade responsibility in any way by dispersing blame or feigning ignorance. So, apart from some hesitation on Mr O’Brien’s part which I attribute to his unfamiliarity with giving evidence as it occurred with difficult and easy questions alike, they all answered questions straightforwardly. Their evidence was also tested at length by very experienced Counsel on matters of controversy, during which what they had to say emerged essentially unscathed, reinforcing my view that I was being told the truth. I stress, however I have made no findings here about Mr O’Brien’s encounter with Mr Cooke, his credibility in that regard, or what might follow in relation to the other men if I were to find his account inaccurate.

There is one other preliminary matter, which concerns illiteracy. Mr Quilligan said at the hearing that neither he nor any of the other men could read or write. He had email on his phone, but if you received one there was a lady who would look at it for him and he could get things printed out at the printing store to sign following her instructions, for instance an application for his children’s school. His brother-in-law could read. He could talk through emails with him, or send them for him. He didn’t know how to forward an email but could screenshot one and send it to someone by WhatsApp so they could explain what it meant. Mr Fry asked why he had not done this with the orders when they were first posted on the land. Mr Quilligan indicated he had not done that. Mr Quilligan’s evidence of being illiterate was not contested. I accept he is illiterate.

Mr Coffey said that he too was illiterate. He could scribble his name, but that was it. This is undisputed.

Mr Harrington also said he could not read or write. This too is undisputed,

At the hearing Mr O’Brien also said he could not read or write, but this was robustly challenged by the Council. Mr Fry showed him emails that came from an account which he confirmed was his and suggested that he had written them. He denied this and identified people he said had helped with their emails. He confirmed that he had a roofing and guttering business. There was correspondence between Exolum, which has a pipeline running across the site and someone identified as “TOB” using the email address [email protected]. That was his brother’s email address, Mr O’Brien said, but accepted the correspondence was addressed to him. He had not sent the emails in his part of the chain, however, he stressed.

When re-examined, Mr O’Brien said he had stopped going to school aged 11 and had been “in and out” of school before then for weeks or months at a time. It was “difficult when you’re on the road.” He could text using speech recognition software, adding that he relied on others to read documents, such as emails out to him. He gave specific examples of the sort of people he would go to for particular purposes.

On this issue, I need to take note of the observations in the February 2026 update to The Equal Treatment Bench Book about the very poor, indeed deteriorating, standard of educational attainment of Gypsies and Travellers. Illiteracy rates are known to be high. What Mr O’Brien said in evidence about having trouble continuously throughout and since his childhood, and not attending school for this reason, would be consistent with illiteracy. Other than the emails for which he gave a cogent explanation, there is no evidence to suggest that what Mr O’Brien said about being illiterate was false.

Taking all this into account, I accept Mr O’Brien is illiterate. There is no evidence to suggest in any other manner that the families are literate and, besides, their illiteracy is not challenged by the Council.

Accompanying the statements of the men are some planning documents and welfare reports concerning the families’ circumstances, in particular those of the children. The men were also called and gave some evidence-in-chief, though this was not brief. Given the way the case had developed and the importance of the issues to the parties, I allowed Mr Masters some leeway with this. They were then cross examined and there was some re-examination.

The women gave no evidence at all. I took steps to ensure they were aware of their absolute right not to do so, but also that the court might draw an inference from their silence. Some important evidence was given by the men in relation to the women’s involvement in decision-making which I summarise below.

In his first witness statement, Mr Quilligan explains that he has never lived in a brick-and-mortar home. All of the other men of the family said the same thing. It was not their way of life, they said, which was nomadic. At the hearing he added that he had never lived on a settled site or owned land before. At the hearing, he added that he and his wife had visited the site a couple of times beforehand. They had paid for “planning assessments… like flood assessments”. He did not know when that was.

In answer to questions I asked to clarify his evidence, Mr Quilligan said that it was him and the other men who discussed these matters. They talked about the decision to buy the land jointly, weighing up the pros and cons. I asked what role their wives played and he responded:

As far as the works on the land and other things done to make it habitable, it was the men Mr Quilligan said that the men who did the work or made arrangements with others, such as the person recommended by Mr Delaney

Mr Coffey confirmed how the plan had come about in his written evidence, stating he wanted to make the farmland his “final home”. He had been living nomadically since birth but wanted his child to be able to compete in the world and gain education and knowledge. In his second statement he added that his family were seeking “to build a sense of safety and belonging.” At the hearing, Mr Coffey also confirmed that the decision to purchase the land and do the work to it was a decision of the men. The women just did not make the decisions in their culture. Asked whether the right way to understand this was as a division of responsibilities, with the men responsible for some things and the women others, such as the children, home care and medical matters, Mr Coffey said that was right.

Mr Harrington’s evidence about the plan was similar. At the hearing he said it was the men’s joint decision to find the site and develop it. They had not looked at other sites. He had always travelled around, in Essex and elsewhere, and had had no base.

Mr Quilligan also said that they had learnt about Mr Delaney’s willingness to sell the farmland from others in the gypsy and traveller community, spoken with him and visited the site. The men decided to purchase it jointly. They had been travelling together, and some of them were related.

Mr Morris’ affidavit describes the farmland as an open agricultural field in a rural setting that was originally accessed only by a simple metal gate (it is common ground that the families created another entrance to enable mobile homes to be delivered onto the site). He says it is in the Metropolitan Green Belt, which Mr Masters said was contentious but need not be resolved in this litigation. An oil pipeline runs through the site. Much of it is in flood zones, Mr Morris says. There are some structures on the site - a wooden barn and a field shelter – which Mr Morris said were used for agricultural purposes, as was the rest of the site. Dated photographs are consistent with this description.

The purchase of the farmland took place on 30 July 2025, as mentioned above. Ms Salters’ affidavit records that a search against the title was undertaken the same day.

In the joint statement the men say that they were conscious of the need to avoid safety risks at the site, in particular those arising from an Exolum pipeline running through it, underground. They say they obtained consent for a temporary agricultural track to be used for horse boxes containing ponies on 18 June 2025, and that road plates were subsequently put in place over the sections of this track underneath which the pipeline runs. They had since had correspondence with Carl Sadler, Pipeline Protection Advisor of Exolum, about longer term protection for the pipeline. Besides, what subsequently became the plots for the mobile homes and caravans had been located away from The pipeline area

The men all maintained that they did not know planning permission was required to establish themselves on the site and that they did not instruct planning consultants until they had moved there and realised the Council considered this necessary. The Council does not accept this is true. Mr Fry put it to Mr Quilligan that they must gave instructed the consultants earlier, which he denied. Mr Masters later intervened to say there was an obvious explanation for the speed with which the planning application had been prepared which was that Mr Delaney had investigated seeking planning permission earlier on using the same planning consultants and this work had been repurposed for the family’s application.

Mr Morris’ first affidavit states that the Council was told that a large digger had been delivered to the site on the morning of 22 August, and that officers visited at about 1:50 PM that day. Photographs were taken which show a digger.

At the hearing, Mr Quilligan said that before moving onto the farmland, the families had been staying on land near Clacket Lane Services on the M25, Kent. Before then, they had stayed in parks or fields all over the UK. They all moved on together at 5 PM on 22 August 2025.

Mr Quilligan added that they saw no one from the Council that day. He took a picture of his caravan on the site and sent it to his father. Later, the women and children went to bed. He and Mr Harrington worked through the night, resting only for a couple of hours, making sure the caravans were safe, positioning them and setting up lights and generators. Asked why they had waited until the bank holiday to move onto the site, he said that that was the only time that worked for the person Mr Delaney had recommended for delivering and laying down hardstanding along with other materials.

Mr Fry asked Mr Quilligan about his evidence that the ground had needed to be levelled so that the caravans could be put in place securely. Mr Quilligan elaborated. The touring caravans had jacks which could be adjusted to ensure they were horizontal, even on rough ground, but the mobile homes had to be positioned on ground that was level. They might be put on grass in the summer, but could not be left there in the winter, or in rainy weather. If the hardstanding laid down on the site were removed, the mobile homes could remain but only if it was dry. He and the other families had arranged for hardstanding material to be brought onto the site by someone Mr Delaney had recommended. The hardstanding could be surfaced once it was laid down. That never happened. He accepted that the families would have had to breach the injunction to put a surface over the hardstanding.

Mr Quilligan was asked about the septic tank at the hearing and confirmed it was brought onto the site when they moved in. It had processing equipment to turn waste into water. Mr Fry said that this was nonetheless was treated as sewage by the Environment Agency and consent for installing was required which had not been sought or granted. Asked about this, Mr Coffey said he didn’t know anything about the necessary consents being sought.

Mr O’Brien was also asked about consents. He said the machinery in the tank “cleaned” the waste and when necessary, a truck would come and clean out the whole tank. It was a treatment plant. “We are not putting any waste into the soil or the land or anything like that”, he added.

Mr Coffey’s witness statement explains that that he moved onto the farmland site at 17:41 on 22 August 2025 in order to make it the permanent residence of his wife and child. At the hearing he confirmed all of the families moved onto land at the same time. They travelled as a group.

Mr Coffey was later cross-examined at the hearing about removal of the hardstanding. He said that in the summer the ground would be rock-hard but in the winter it would be impossible to have a caravan on that so there needed to be some kind of hardstanding.

At the hearing, Mr Harrington confirmed the families and all moved onto the site together.

In cross examination he was asked about what would happen if the hardstanding were removed, and said that families could not live on the site without it because, unlike the caravans, the mobile homes had to be stood on a hard surface.

Mr O’Brien was asked about the families’ arrival on the farmland at the hearing. He said he had some video recorded on his phone from that day, starting with where they had travelled from on the journey there. They had arrived 5 PM—ish and he and his family had gone to bed early leaving Mr Quilligan and Mr Harrington staying up, fixing bits of units. He had also taken a short video with Mr Coffey and his children walking on the site the following morning.

Overnight some still images were made from these videos and exhibited to a witness statement from Mrs Choudhry. It is convenient to deal with all of this evidence together. Mr O’Brien’s description of the footage he had taken was accurate. He was cross-examined about them by Mr Fry. An image at 3 PM on 22 August 2025 showed that he was not on the site then. P.M. that day there was a lot of work going on at the site, he confirmed. Another image from 3:29 PM on 23 August showed work going on involving the septic tank, sheds, pipes on the ground, caravans and the mobile homes. Diggers were present, some hardcore path was down. Mr O’Brien confirmed this and that the works were necessary to make it land that they could live on. There are people besides the men and women there, he accepted, who were also Travellers. The last image from the video is a photograph on 24 August at 5:55 PM showing work on the site, caravans, diggers, children and cars.

Returning to the chronology, Mr Morris’ affidavit states that the Council started to receive “numerous complaints about works being undertaken at the site from the morning of 23 August 2025”. Supplementing this in a statement, he states that these included removal of part of the hedge to create a second entrance, earthmoving including scraping consistent with preparation of a hard surface, electrical cable installation, fencing being erected, delivery of some mobile homes, earth being dumped and raked over, a sewage tank being connected and trees being felled. Some of this work was over the pipeline. There was noise, dust and disruption including during antisocial hours impacting on local residents. An aerial photograph said to have been taken using a drone at about 7 AM that morning, shows the mobile homes and caravans situated at the edge of a rectangular area from which the grass has been removed, presumably by the digger which is standing there. There are various lorries on the site and touring caravans. Four people are visible.

The presence of the families on the farmland also attracted significant social media attention, ranging from the critical through to comments that were hostile, dehumanising of the families and threatening or inciting criminal acts. Similar comments were posted after later online press coverage of the families’ presence. The coverage has a common theme, i.e the families were trespassers on someone else’s land.

At the hearing, Mr Morris explained that the Council’s Leader had contacted him making it clear that decisive action needed to be taken. Solicitors were instructed and, in due course Mr Fry. An injunction was sought, considered on the papers and issued. It was premised on the farmland being unoccupied (save in the sense that there are people on it, undertaking works). In the joint statement prepared by the men, strong objections are raised to the Council’s characterisation of the site as unoccupied at the time the injunction was sought. It had been occupied since late afternoon the previous day.

Cross-examined about this by Mr Masters, Mr Morris said that after the Council had been sent an image of the digger on the site, the Councils efforts were focused on communication with people in the local community and their legal team. There had been no site visit between receiving the photograph and before the Dove order was sought to establish whether the site was occupied. In answer to a clarification question I asked, Mr Morris said that there had been no information the Council had before the Dove order was made indicating occupation, just development of the site. They reached the view it was unoccupied even though there were caravans there. He had not jumped to the conclusion that it was unoccupied, however, he stressed.

Mrs Salter’s evidence about this at the hearing was that the Council wouldn’t routinely look inside caravans on the site but might knock on the door to see if anyone was there.

In a written submission to Dove J which was disclosed during the course of the hearing before me, Mr Fry summarised the evidence I have also summarised at paragraph ‎56 and stated:

Mr Masters was fiercely critical of the timing of this disclosure and even more so of what it revealed. As discussed below, he argued in losing submissions that it was misleading and this was relevant to the issue of liability.

In the joint statement later prepared by the men, the court was directed to a paragraph of Ms Salter’s statement which is described as an accurate summary of the works undertaken by 1 o’clock on 23 August 2025 just prior to the Dove order being granted.

As the paragraph represents a useful, agreed stock-take of the pre-injunction position supported by photographs it is worth quoting in full:

The men’s joint statement describes the works undertaken by this point in time as being necessary for the site’s occupation in the interest of the families’ security and welfare, but adds that there was no intention to disregard the court or legal processes.

The Dove order contains the standard, prominent penal notice:

As for what is required, the order states materially:

As for service, at paragraph 4 the order provides that this is to be affected by “affixing at least 2 sealed copies of this Order and any future documentation in a transparent waterproof document wallet in prominent positions on or at the boundary of the sites which comprise the GPA Land and such affixing shall be deemed to be good and sufficient service on the Defendants”. The men are all named as defendants along with Mr Delaney and persons unknown carrying out and/or encouraging and/or facilitating or occupation without lawful planning consent.

The term “development on the land” is not defined in the Dove order or the Hill order, but it is important in this case. Ms Salters’ affidavit explains its meaning at §28. It is derived from section 55(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended) (‘the 1990 Act’) and means:

She adds that certain operations or uses of land listed in section 55(2) are not to be taken as involving development of land, but the material change of use of the injunction site from agricultural to residential use is not exempted in that way, in her view. The operational development work carried out at site are not included in the exceptions either nor are they de minimus. Her reasoning for this conclusion is noteworthy:

The reference to “5 mobile homes” is not explained, however.

Mr Morris was tasked with visiting the farmland on 24 August 2025 along with Mr Cooke who was there to serve the order. At the hearing, Mr Morris explained that they would have served the order earlier save for difficulties in arranging for the police and process server to attend at the same time.

Mr Cooke’s second statement about his role was circulated on the last day of the hearing. It states that he arrived “at 1000 hours” and:

Mr O’Brien was cross-examined about the evidence given in this statement. Mr Fry put it to him that he had said no one spoke to him. Mr O’Brien said that Mr Cook had not read the order out. They had no conversation about what it was for. Pressed on this point, Mr O’Brien said that there had been no conversation whatsoever with Mr Morris. Mr Cooke had said “something along those lines, but nothing about this is what has to be done or anything.” The words were “very limited”. He didn’t understand what the papers were for. What Mr Cook had said in a statement was “not the truth”.

Mr Fry put it to him that Mr Cooke could not read the injunction out, but had told him what it said. Mr O’Brien replied:

Mr O’Brien was cross examined further on this issue. Mr Cooke had not said “exactly nothing”. However Mr O’Brien maintained that he was not lying to the court about what had and had not been said.

Turning to Mr Morris’ evidence, his affidavit says that there had been no occupation of the site on the morning of 22 August 2025. When he arrived around 9:50 AM on 24 August, he introduced himself to two police officers who were already present and saw that Mr Cooke was busy attaching the necessary papers to the original entrance eastward of the newly created one where they had already been posted. The only two people present were two men (“white males”) adding “there was no evidence of any occupancy of the caravans”. No works were happening. He introduced himself to the two men one of whom said he was Tom. According to Mr Morris, he volunteered “what’s done is done and there will be no more works on the site”. Mr Morris says he left around 10 AM. Later that morning, he contacted JMS Tippers as some of their vehicles had been seen on the site. They emailed back to say “we were told there was full planning on the site by Tom”.

Mr Morris confirmed all this at the hearing, adding that one set of papers had already been fixed to an entrance gate post. The people he spoke with did not say they were illiterate, nor that they could not understand the order.

Mr Masters asked him about what he had done to establish whether the site was occupied during this visit. Mr Morris said he had not inspected the caravans. He believed the only people on site were the men in conversation with the process server. There was no activity around the caravans.

Mr Quilligan’s evidence about these events is limited. He said was that he was asleep in his caravan with his family when Council officers first visited the farmland on 24 August 2025, but he had heard about it later and saw papers attached to posts around the site. Asked whether he had experienced this before by Mr Fry, he said that if the families were staying somewhere they were generally told by someone that they needed to move on, in person. He knew the papers had been put there for a reason, but not why. He thought if it had been important, someone would have said something and explained, for example saying that they had to leave and when. Normally that was what happens. Mr Fry asked Mr O’Brien and Mr Coffey what if anything had been said. They reported nothing had been said to them. Mr O’Brien had asked a question, but there had been no answer.

At the hearing, Mr Coffey confirmed that he had been awake and outside when the Dove order was served. One or two men had been putting up the papers. A car came along after that and Mr Morris got out of it, wearing casual clothes. He and Mr O’Brien tried to have a conversation with Mr Morris, but he refused to speak with them. He just blanked them, walked down to a gate and started putting a piece of paper on it. He would not even acknowledge them. No one else explained what they were posting. Between then and 29 August 2025 no one explained to them what they could or could not do. Mr Fry challenged Mr Coffey about this, telling him Mr Morris’s evidence was that he, Mr O’Brien and Mr Coffey had spoken. Mr Coffey denied this. Those are the facts, he said. Mr Morris said nothing. He thought “the other guy might have said something”. He had no conversation with any of them. No one explained everything to them. As soon as Mr Morris came, he assumed authority and started sticking papers up and there was no conversation. They left after 10 minutes or a bit less than that.

Mr Fry put it to Mr Coffey that this was incredible. Wouldn’t he want to know what was happening? Mr Coffey said they had asked and was told nothing. They could do no more than ask. Mr Coffey said:

He added that he had told Mr Quilligan what had happened later that day.

Mr Harrington’s evidence at the hearing was that he had been in bed when the Council officers had arrived. If they had looked at the caravans it would have been obvious that they were occupied. Mr O’Brien and Mr Coffey had told him about visit after he had woken up. They said that there were guys at the gate with some paper putting it on fences. He didn’t understand, or know whether it was important or not.

Mr O’Brien also gave evidence about the service of the order at the hearing, though he was initially confused about the date, before confirming that it happened on the Sunday after they had arrived. The other men had been in the caravans and had been up the night before, but he and Mr Coffey had been there when one man had arrived and began sticking “stickers” on the gate, then the fencing. “I am not sure did he say I am here processing, hanging this or whatever the case may be”, Mr O’Brien added. Then Mr Morris pulled up in his car, casually dressed. They tried to speak to him, but he did not speak to them, but walked over to police officers who were there. He then went to the far gate, made his way back to his car and left. “But there was no recognition or talking from the other guy either.” No one explained anything. The people had been there for about 10 minutes.

Mr Fry put it to Mr O’Brien that when Mr Morris had visited on 24 August 2025, he introduced himself to two men one of whom identified himself as “Tom” and that person had said something to the effect of “what’s done is done, and there will be no more works on the site”. Was that him? Mr O’Brien said that Mr Morris had not introduced himself to him, nor said those words. There had been no conversation with them at all. He denied he was lying. He had never spoken to Mr Morris, ever. Mr Morris had refused to speak to him on 24 August.

Towards the end of Mr O’Brien’s evidence, he said that Mr Morris had not walked around the site and, had he done so he would have seen some of the children there. He also said that Mr Morris had been the second to arrive. “The other guy was there first of all with the police”.

Later in Mr Quilligan’s cross examination about the events of 24 August, Mr Fry suggested that the families had instructed planning consultants and solicitors from the date of the service of the order. Mr Quilligan said that had not happened until the following Tuesday or Wednesday.

Ms Salter’s affidavit records multiple visits to the site between 23 August and the date on which it was made, 9 December 2025. Early on, it was noticed that children were on the site, so for example, on the second visit the presence of children aged 6, 7 and 15 was noted by an enforcement officer, three children were noted as being present on 27 August (about which I say more below) and there were further visits on 29 August, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 23 September and 2 November.

At the hearing, Mr O’Brien recalled Council officers visiting again a couple of days later and other times during the next week or two. They stuck up more notices without telling the families anything and then left. No explanations were offered.

Ms Salter’s affidavit goes further than Mr Morris’s evidence as regards occupation of the site, and is not entirely consistent. She begins by stating that the definition of occupation most relevant to this case is that given in the Collins dictionary “the occupation of the building as the act or fact of someone living or working in it”. From the photos she exhibited, she says she could see that the mobile homes and caravans were not connected to services on 25 August 2025 and that remained the case on 26 August. The cesspool is still not been installed by then. For example camping, is not occupation she says, adding:

Part of Ms Salter’s affidavit ws a schedule listing when children were seen on site and their images captured by the drones a local resident was flying nearby. This describes people on site from 24 August 2025. When Mrs Salter gave evidence at the hearing, she indicated that there had been limited drone footage before that date - just snapshots - and problems uploading it onto the Council server so this evidence is not helpful to establish when occupation began. Further, another part of her evidence suggested occupation had begun on the 22nd.

Ms Salter made some further comments about this when concluding her evidence at the hearing. Occupation had to do with change of use, she said. Bringing something onto land for a few days didn’t change the use. Something permanent is necessary. The permanency of the families occupation had been established when the Council saw waste pipes for drainage connected to new water pipes. Residential use had been established then.

Cross-examined on this topic, Mr Morris said that his colleagues had come to the conclusion the site was occupied between the 26th in the 29th “because of the change in the character of the site over those few days”. The Council accepted the site was occupied by 29 August 2025.

I had some clarification questions about this at the hearing. Ms Salter said there was occupation evidence before the 24th but it had not occurred until after that. There might have been people “staying overnight in a caravan, like they were camping” but there hadn’t been services available.

At the hearing, Mr Quilligan said that Mrs Choudhry of Brilliance Solicitors was instructed a “couple of days” after the Council had visited the site, but was not specific about the date. He was emphatic that she had not been instructed before they moved onto the site. They were being told about criticism and abuse online by his brother-in-law, on Facebook and elsewhere with pictures of their caravans, and thought they needed to take advice. Pressed by Mr Fry about when he had first met Mrs Choudhry, Mr Quilligan said it was on the Tuesday or Wednesday after they had moved in. He could not say which, She “then had a look at the paperwork, I think it was on the Friday”. He could not remember whether he had given Mrs Choudhry a copy of the order on the Tuesday or Wednesday.

Mr Fry questioned Mr Coffey about why solicitors had been instructed. They knew something was wrong but had done nothing about it, he suggested. Mr Coffey said no, they had done something which was to instruct Mrs Choudhry. They had known the papers posted were legal documents.

Mr Harrington’s evidence at the hearing was that all four of them had decided to instruct the solicitors, though he couldn’t remember who had first made contact. They had all been together when that had happened. He didn’t really know anything about the order until the meeting on 29 August 2025. No one had read it out to him before then.

Mr O’Brien said the families had not expected the reaction their arrival had caused. It was a brutal reception. That wasn’t the Council, he stressed, but threats were being made online which others were telling him about.

However, it is clear that some of the attention the families were receiving from the Council was upsetting. At the hearing, Mr O’Brien was asked about correspondence between Brilliance Solicitors and the Council regarding the frequent visits. An email of 3 September 2025 was read out stating that the families were not causing nuisances and the visits were causing significant distress and intimidation. Had he instructed the solicitors to send this email, Mr Fry asked. Mr O’Brien replied that they had said the Council should tell them the time they were coming so that they would know and be able to sort the kids out and then officers would be more than welcome but they had visited all of a sudden and when that happened his son and ran out onto the road and there could have been a funeral if the car had come. So I just wanted to be told beforehand the email had been sent. Mr Fry said that had not been communicated in the email. Early in the chain, on 2 September 2025 Mrs Choudhry had questioned what the legal basis was for visits. The Council had replied explaining that there was a legal power to enter the farmland to establish whether or not breaches of the order had occurred, to prepare criminal prosecutions. Mr O’Brien replied that they had told the Council many times to arrange visits by appointments.

Exhibited to Ms Salter’s affidavit as exhibits AS/16 and 17 are what she describes as photo timelines which are a compilation of drone footage supplied to the Council by a local resident, photographs and enforcement site visit notes.

AS/16 covers the period from 22 to 24 August 2025 (so the last day of this straddles the time before and after the Dove order was served). The earliest image on 24 August is marked as taken on 11:47 AM.

What I take from this material as follows. There is a gate leading onto a field. There is no obvious sign of damage. On 22 August, a digger has been brought into the farmland. Later that day there is an image of various caravans on site and two mobile homes along with some vehicles. There are also some storage units or sheds of some kind. On 23 August a digger is being used to clear the grass from a rectangle of land. By late afternoon on 23 August, the land has been flattened in that area and there are what appears to be some surfacing materials in piles resting on it. There is another pile of material by late morning on 24 August. The vehicles have been moved by the afternoon of 24 August. For instance the diggers are elsewhere and their shovels are in the ground. An image shows some of the surfacing material spread across the rectangular area at 18:50 PM on 24 August. By 20:00 that day, a strip of surfacing material has been spread from one end of the rectangular area to the other.

AS/17 covers the period from 25 August to 30 August 2025 (so from the day after service of the order through to the day after the men say its effect was explained to them by Mrs Choudhry). What I take from this is as follows.

By 10:16 a.m. on 25 August 2025, three mobile homes and some of the touring caravans had been moved onto the rectangular area abutting where the surfacing material had been spread in most cases. By 13:46 that day, fences had been put up separating some plots, three of which had mobile homes on them. Two had caravans on them. It appears from an image taken at 14:20 on 25 August 2025 that another mobile home is in the process of being delivered by lorry. By 10 AM on 26 August, much of the site has been organised in a very orderly way with the mobile homes and three storage sheds in place and the caravans nearby. By 27 August, a pit has been dug a few metres back from the rectangular area and a machine or plant has been put within. An undated image next in the sequence shows a large pile of dirt surrounded by chipped surfacing material near to the road. The next shows three or four mobile homes on site (one may be a storage unit; it is hard to tell from the angle). There are five storage units or sheds in addition to this. Three of the four plots have some sort of green surfacing in addition on top of the darker, grey surfacing material spread earlier. Everything is orderly. The photographs and plans made as a result of the enforcement site visits are consistent with these images.

Ms Salter’s affidavit lists a series of works said to have been undertaken since the Dove order. She characterises these as “further development”. This evidence is not as helpful as it might be because it does give dates for all of the works undertaken. However, in summary, it is said that engineering operations have taken place involving holes dug in the ground along with trenches, widening of access to a classified road, creation of a roadway and hard standing and laying of hard core, that the use of the land has been changed, sheds have been erected first on 29 August 2025 and then by 30 August, fencing has been erected along with the post with a floodlight, raised platforms and steps at three plots (one on 19 November 2025, though, at an unknown time). The affidavit says that hardstanding access, surface clearing and hard surfacing has taken place on 24 August along with the laying of bitumen. Mrs Salter adds that hard surfacing “to construct a road” took place on an unspecified date. Fencing took place between 24 and 26 August she adds. And access works were undertaken between 24 and 29 August. Access was widened on 24 August and earth was found piled close by alongside the road on 26 and 29 August. Machinery was put onto the land between 23 and 24 August for development purposes as was plant. After the injunction, on 25 August, caravans and mobile homes had been moved onto the rectangular area, and vehicles had been brought on too, which is said to breach the prohibition of bringing caravans vehicles or mobile homes onto the land. Occupied caravans and mobile homes were in place between 25 and 29 August (though Ms Salter says that by the time of her affidavit there had been no occupation of some of the mobile homes). A cesspool had been placed on the land between 24 and 27 August. Ms Salter adds that there were no electric, water or other infrastructure services in place before the injunction but afterwards LPG canisters were installed on site and there were cables from the mobile units running to power, water and waste facilities. These works were confirmed by visits on 2 to 5 September, she says.

Cross-examined about this at the hearing, Ms Salter acknowledged that a significant amount of the work had been undertaken before 29 August 2026 but other things had been done afterwards. The sheds “appeared” on 30 August, she said.

In the joint witness statement, the men say this about their actions following the service of the Dove order:

Mr Fry asked Mr Quilligan whether he still accepted those breaches had occurred (that is, of all of the terms of the Dove order except for direction of a gate).

Mr Quilligan’s response was:

Pressing Mr Quilligan, Mr Fry asked whether he denied the Dove ordered been breached after 29 August. Mr Quilligan said that Mrs Choudhry had explained then that “from the Sunday that we were there we should not have done all of these things”. Clarifying his answer in response to a question I asked, Mr Quilligan said he didn’t think these things had been done after 29 August.

After a discussion between myself and Counsel, and then between Counsel after I had risen for a few minutes, Mr Fry then went through each allegation made about works after 29 August using a table that form part of Ms Salter’s evidence.

First, three sheds were put up on 30 August 2025, he suggested. Mr Quilligan said he thought that happened on 29 August. Mr Fry then clarified this, suggesting that these two sheds were put up on the 29th and one on the 30th. Mr Masters accepted this.

On 1 September 2025, works were done such that pipes became visible from the rear of the compounds for electricity and water. Mr Quilligan said he didn’t know if they were installed then. The pipes came out of the mobile homes. The associated works probably happened on 1st September but he couldn’t remember.

On 2 September 2025, a power junction box was added near the back of the mobile homes. Mr Quilligan said there was a power box behind Mr O’Brien’s mobile home, but they had power before then. He didn’t know whether a junction box had been installed on the 2nd.

Next, Mr Fry said drainage pipes were added along with the cesspool, again on 2 September. Mr Quilligan said he didn’t know the exact dates, but pipes were connected to the septic tank.

On 3 September, suggested Mr Fry, trenches were laid from the hardstanding area to the cesspool and pipes could be seen. Mr Quilligan said he knew there were pipes there. It could have been on that date, but he was not sure.

Then on 4 September 2025, further orange pipes and black cables were installed along with a white junction box, suggested Mr Fry. Mr Quilligan said he didn’t know if there were two junction boxes on the land. He knew about one, however. When re-examined about cabling, he said he didn’t accept that plugging the cable into the mobile home involved a breach of the order.

Mr Fry clarified he was not saying that Mr Quilligan had bought material for these works onto the site. It could have been there already. But it was being installed around this time, he suggested.

Mr Coffey was also asked about works undertaken after the Dove order. He accepted that the CCTV cameras had been put up afterwards - he had been involved in that himself - as he had in preparing the septic tank and putting in steps for some people. The sheds had been put in the same day as the meeting. The CCTV cameras had been put up because on many occasions people had come onto the site shouting abuse. He had a disabled, severely autistic child who could not hear or speak, and has mobility problems. He was worried about him. He wanted to be able to document people coming onto the property. He didn’t accept putting up the CCTV cameras was a breach of the injunction because they were not sunk into the ground and had been put there for protection.

Mr Fry offered Mr Coffey the opportunity to add anything he wanted to say about breaches of the Dove order. Mr Coffey had nothing to add.

At the hearing, Mr Masters asked Mr Harrington about works happening after the 29 August 2025 meeting. He affirmed that the hardstanding was down, the mobile homes were in place, the septic tank was in and there was fencing. The servicing of the hardstanding was not done because of the order. CCTV cameras were put up later, because of the abuse the families were subject to. He did not think that breached the order. As for the steps to his mobile home, he confirmed they came with it, as a kit. He assembled them at the time and didn’t think that breached the order. He had a shed, that had been put up before the meeting. He thought his was the first to be built.

Mr Fry offered Mr Harrington the opportunity to add anything about works after that meeting. He said they could remove things, if necessary, and he was asked to by the Council. Mr Fry said that the Council had already told the families to remove everything.

Asked about the sheds at the hearing, Mr O’Brien said they had been there from day one, up against the fencing (it was unclear to me whether he meant sheds were in kit form or assembled at this time, however). He had the assembled steps for the mobile home but had never put them in place outside its entrance “with all this hullabaloo”. He had just put a box there. When his mobile home had been exchanged for another, he had just switched the plumbing and electrical connections.

Asked about the CCTV cameras, Mr O’Brien said that they had never thought about putting CCTV up but the police had raised that. Someone else who regularly visited, Mr Brooks, had suggested that they wore body cameras after a woman had pulled up in her car and hurled abuse at him and Jamie. When they installed CCTV cameras, they didn’t dig into the ground anything to do so. The order had not said anything about CCTV. Installing it had been in their interests. People had come onto the land and pulled down fencing, which had led to one of their horses running away. The CCTV cameras were good security, he said. The police had said they needed a gate but as they did not have one then to install CCTV. They had asked many times for a simple gate but been refused. They tried tying a rope across the gateway, but Mr Brook had come and broken it with his car, so people could still drive onto the farmland. They hadn’t dug holes in the ground to install it, though just fixed it to polls that were there, in November. A friend who worked with them had helped.

At the hearing, Mr Quilligan could not recall exactly when playing consultants had been instructed but he said it was after they had moved onto land and were being told about Facebook posts that were critical of them. They spoke to their solicitor first. Mr Fry put it to Mr Quilligan that the words

in the joint statement suggested that this company had been instructed around the time the farmland had been purchased, not after they had moved in. Mr Quilligan denied this. His past experience was that the families would be challenged from time to time when they moved onto land by being told that it did not belong to them, and so they needed to move on.

At the hearing, Mr Harrington was asked who had instructed the consultants. It was not him, he said, but thought it was Mr O’Brien.

Mr O’Brien recalled getting Mr Woods’ number on WhatsApp from a friend. Contact was not made until after the order was served. He was one of the people who talked to Mr Woods. He had not been aware there had been any need for planning permission before that because they owned the land. There were already water and electricity facilities there.

When cross-examined, Mr O’Brien said that they had taken a map to Mr Woods, and then shown him the old entrance and the new one they had made to get the mobile homes onto the site. They had not taken the Dove order, however, but it had come up in the discussion and he had said to bring it to him. He had first been instructed after the bank holiday weekend and they had said “we have to put in a planning application” and “we need planning for the place where we are”. They had gone to his office in Reigate. Mr O’Brien was not sure about the date, it could have been the 26th or 27th, but it had been him and Jim who were gone. Answering a question I asked to clarify when he had realised planning permission was needed and whether that had been over the bank holiday weekend, Mr O’Brien said:

Challenged by Mr Fry about whether Mr Woods’ application could possibly have been made on the same day that Mr O’Brien went to see him, Mr O’Brien said that Mr Woods would be the person to answer that question.

A planning application (Ref: 25/0246/FUL) was submitted by planning agents instructed by the men. At the hearing Mr Quilligan said that this was the second one who had been instructed. The first had been very difficult to get hold of and unresponsive. The families had not known what planning involved. They solicitors had to explain it to them, as developments occurred. Mr Coffey said that he had not been involved in conversations with their planning consultant, only paying fees.

On 3 September 2025, the Council wrote to the planning consultant advising that the planning application was invalid and what documents were required to make it valid. At the hearing, I asked Mr Masters why a valid application has yet to be made, according to the Council. He told me that the families had been assembling all the documents the Council required, which they had almost done. Meanwhile they had been pursuing the appeal against the enforcement decision. There had been changes to the planning system which meant it was difficult to simultaneously appeal and submit a new application.

Ms Salter says that she was one of the officers who visited the site on 27 August 2025. They were approached by two “17 year old males” who said there were no adults present. A small child appeared and then a car arrived men got out and began running in their direction. “[T]he men became agitated and threatening” and “[w]e felt threatened and unsafe and left the site”, she says. The threatening behaviour is not identified.

The man had a very different take on these events. Although it is not necessary for me to resolve this conflict to deal with the issue of liability, what they had to say does need to be recorded. Mr Quilligan discussed this visit in his evidence at the hearing. His perspective was different. He and Mr O’Brien had been called back to the site and Council officers were there as were some of the children, but Mr O’Brien’s son had run away onto the road. There were no threats. Mr O’Brien had started running but only to catch up with his son. When he came back he had asked the officers why they had not said that they were coming. He had not raised his voice.

Giving evidence about this at the hearing, Mr Coffey confirmed Mr Quilligan’s account, as did Mr Harrington. He had been there. One of the children had panicked and ran away. All he recalled of what Mr O’Brien said was that his son had problems, panicked and ran off. There had been no aggression.

Mr O’Brien also remembered this happening when asked about it at the hearing. Ms Salter had been talking about him in her evidence. He had been at the horse shop and had been called back to the farmland by Mr Coffey’s son who said that there were strangers on the land. He had jumped in his car, drove back and seen his son running up the road. He had said to the Council officers that all they had to do was “get us over here”. He had not raised his voice. His son had ADHD and unbelievable anxiety. Ever since then, the Council came with the police.

After this, said Mr Quilligan, the Council officers continued to visit frequently but always with the police.

At the hearing, Mr Fry read out part of a report from Exolum written after a site visit by Jamie Brooks on Thursday 28 August at 8:52 AM. The report explains that Mr Brooks had been digging a hole to install a marker for where the pipeline was but was stopped by Mrs Choudhry who explained that an injunction was in place and he could put himself in contempt of court. He told her about the pipeline and why the safety markers need to be installed. Mr Quilligan said he didn’t “know about it.” She had come on the Tuesday or Wednesday and it was on Friday that she had given advice to stop what they were doing. Mr Fry questioned Mr Quilligan robustly about this but he maintained it was only on the Friday that advice was given.

Mr O’Brien was cross-examined about this visit too. Mr Brooks’ mentions “Tom O’Brien” being on the site and accepting a “safety letter” before digging began. He had been there at the same time as Mrs Choudhry and she plainly knew what the injunction meant, Mr Fry suggested. Mr O’Brien recalled meeting Mrs Choudhry twice. He could have been there on occasion, but she never told him work had to stop then or previously, he confirmed. When she had told them to stop, later in the café, they had done so. She had never said before “Tom, you can’t do these works, it’s a breach of an injunction” or anything like that. Mr Fry said that he knew Mrs Choudhry and she was good at her job. She would have said this. Mr O’Brien maintained that the first time she had said these things was later, in the café.

In his evidence-in-chief at the hearing, Mr Quilligan said that, on a Friday a week after the families had arrived, so 29 August 2025, Mrs Choudhry met with him and the other men at a café to read through the Dove order and explain it to them. She said “she had got hold of the paper work or something” and then “look, do not do anymore, you have done what you have done, just stop what you are doing now.” By then “all the big things” had been done including setting up a boundary fence, water and electric connections and installing a cesspit. He thought some sheds had been put up by then, but he could not be sure.

Mr Fry questioned Mr Quilligan at the hearing about when he became aware of a court order having been made. It was not true that he first knew about this on 29 August 2025, Mr Fry suggested. The families surely knew before. Mr Quilligan denied this. They knew the Council had come “with papers”, “but we did not know what we were meant to do, we did not know.” Mr Fry suggested to Mr Quilligan that he had not at any stage told his solicitors that he didn’t understand the Dove order. Mr Quilligan said no, he had not.

As to whether Mrs Choudhry had told him about the order prohibiting occupation of the site, Mr Quilligan said he remembered that. She had said the Council didn’t want them living on the land but they would go to court to see if they could be permitted to do so. They had thought they were living on the land before the order and so thought the prohibition on living there did not apply. That was his feeling at the time.

Questioned about the 29 August 2025 meeting, Mr Coffey said he thought that was the date on which the Dove order was read to him and it was the first time he was made aware of its contents. As to whether she had gone through paragraph by paragraph, he said they had “got an understanding” of the order from that meeting. He couldn’t remember if Mrs Choudhry had been on the site before then, but the main works had been done before the meeting. Asked if she had spoken before about what could not be done because of the order, he said “we knew nothing about the other bits and pieces. We kind of needed to know the full information so we did not know.” Pressed on this by Mr Fry, he said that he had not been aware that the order did not let him build on his land. On the phone before the meeting Mrs Choudhry was telling him things but not what the order actually was. Until the 29 August 2025 meeting, they had not had the “full version”.

Mr Coffey said he didn’t know whether Mrs Choudhry had been on the land on 28 August 2025 because he had been there. He had been away working then.

Mr O’Brien’s evidence at the hearing was that the first time the order had been explained to him was at the meeting, “when the solicitor read it out” in the café. It was difficult for Mrs Choudhry to get them together, he said as everyone had different things to do, with their children for example. She read it out, they did not understand it and she explained it bit by bit in her words so that they understood it “and then we knew the severity of it, of course”. She said “obviously stop, stop, everything has to be stopped”. Mr O’Brien added “that was when we stopped more or less. We did put CCTV up, we did fix the septic tank. I mean I hold my hands up we did it.”

At the hearing Mr Harrington recalled the 29 August 2025 meeting and said that was when he was first made aware of what the papers that had been posted on the site were about. Mrs Choudhry had briefed all four of the men. No one else had read the contents to them before then.

There was another significant event on 29 August 2025. Besides successfully seeking the injunction, the Council took steps to enforce planning control at the site, given its view that the development was unauthorised. A notice was prepared and copies were served on the site identifying a breach of planning control in the form of:

The families appealed against the enforcement notice on the grounds that planning permission ought to be granted a period for compliance ought to be extended. However, on 17 December 2025 the Planning Inspectorate indicated that the first of these grounds was barred by section 174(2A) of the 1990 Act and that the ground would be dealt with by way of written representations. The appeal has recently been allowed in the limited sense, with the inspecting extending time for compliance from three months to 12.

15 September 2025 was the return date for the Dove order and the hearing was held in the Royal Courts of Justice to determine whether it should be extended. By this point, Mr Delaney’s position had been explained and so he was removed as a named party to the injunction. Mrs Justice Hill was told about the positions of the parties by their respective Counsel.

The terms of the Dove order were extended but varied in two respects. Subparagraphs three (m) and (n) were changed to provide:

The Council appears to accept that the pace of works fell off very significantly after 29 or 30 August 2025, but maintains that further works took place after that date that were prohibited by the Dove order and then the Hill order.

Returning to Ms Salter’s affidavit, she states that site visits between 1 to 5 September showed a power junction box in place, cesspool and drainage pipes, power cables outside the mobile homes and other pipework. A visit on 23 September 2025 noted that caravans and mobile phones had 2 inch brown waste pipes connected to the cesspool and that three floodlights had been installed. It is not clear when any of these things occurred, only when they were seen. Officers who made a site visit on 10 October 2025 noted that “new mobile home connected to drainage”, small blue pipes from the compounds running down towards a stream, a broken water pipe, floodlight on a pole that was not connected to power, and lighting to the rear of one of the mobile phones that was. Again, it is unclear when these works were done. Mrs Salter adds that on 16 and 19 November CCTV poles were erected and connected to power. AS/36 is an image of three poles described as being for CCTV but it is not possible to make out what they are (it is certainly possible that these are the floodlights mentioned in the affidavit). At the hearing, Ms Salter said that the CCTV was development in her view because the cameras were connected to power and were on tour poles attached to the ground at considerable height, adding that in her view this would be the type of works that a builder would normally be employed to undertake and thus this was development for the purposes of section 55 of the 1990 Act. She thought the poles used must have been sunk into the ground

Mr O’Brien’s mobile home was replaced with a new one on 4 October 2025. Ms Salter was asked at the hearing whether this represented a breach of the injunction and said she had not said so in her evidence. She had not used the word “”unlawful” about that, she said. The affidavit had not been clear.

Ms Salter’s affidavit says that on 19 November chipped stone was laid out over an existing surface outside of Mr Quilligan’s mobile home.

At the hearing Ms Salter indicated work had ceased in November, but she recorded an enforcement visit on the 20th when the men had asked to show her the cesspool and had asked for permission to fix it. She went back to the office and consulted the Council’s environmental health team. They had advised it was not something they could fix because of the way the waste drainage had been installed and in any event it was “not necessary” because there was a Portaloo on site the families could use that. If repairing the cesspit was a necessity, they would have expected to be contacted about it, but the advice she had was that it was not. “There was no justification for it. Other alternative provision was acceptable”.

This exchange of correspondence was before the court. Catherine Smith, an environmental protection officer had advised on 13 October 2025 that the families were using a private sewage treatment plant (i.e. a machine, not a cesspool). A colleague advised the next day that there was no way of knowing if the water supply was sufficient and a consent was necessary. A risk assessment was then done identifying a series of high risks. Ms Salter raised the family’s request for works to be undertaken to secure the septic tank with Ms Smith on 5 November 2025 commenting “the potential for foul water contamination is high as a result of the improperly installed piping and septic tank. With the welfare interests of the occupants of that site in consideration, this is a factor that contravenes the individual human rights and remains a highly unsafe condition to live in.” This prompted the variation request, she explained, seeking comments. Ms Smith replied to say that the contamination risk was very low. Stability can be addressed by using temporary measures not requiring any permanent works on the site. She considered no permanent works were required as a matter of urgency. In a further email of 21 November 2025, a colleague, Colin Holden, advise that if the cesspool connection were not repaired, the portable toilet provision on the site could be added to or chemical toilets used. Building control permission might not be necessary but the plant had to be installed in accordance with building regulations and the environmental agency had not given its consent. There were concerns the system had not been installed in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions. It was “proportionate for the resident of the site to make alternative provision with portable sanitary units such as that already on the site.

Mr Masters asked whether there had been any risk assessment of whether permission should be granted to undertake the repairs requested. Ms Salter said there had been no request from the solicitor with details of those repairs.

Mr Masters also asked whether the cabling in September were major repairs or tinkering with things that already been done. Mrs Salter said firmly that they were prohibited by the order and not so small as to be inconsequential, but did not give details.

When cross-examining Mr Quilligan on these matters, Mr Fry suggested that on 23 September after the Hill order was made, the caravans and mobile homes had installed 2 inch brown waste pipes to connect them to the cesspool. Mr Quilligan said he did not think so. The pipes connected to the cesspool were the orange ones discussed further in his evidence.

Were three floodlights installed on the 23 September, Mr Fry asked. Mr Quilligan accepted that lights had been connected then to the back of his mobile home, where there was a socket that these were “sitting on the fence”, not put into the ground.

Had a further mobile home been brought onto the site on 4 October, Mr Fry asked. One was taken off and another put on, Mr Quilligan accepted, and this was simply connected around 10 October.

Were further floodlights installed around 10 October, Mr Fry asked. Mr Quilligan was not sure. He didn’t know how many lights they had, only that he had to plug into his mobile home.

Mr Quilligan accepted that steps been put outside his mobile home on 6 November. Re-examined about that later in his evidence, Mr Quilligan said he believed these were not put down in breach of the injunction because they did not involve any building. They were supplied with the mobile home so people could get in and out of the raised door.

Other witnesses discuss the steps too. Mr O’Brien added in a statement that he had not installed the steps that came with his mobile home after the injunction was made and there was a two foot drop from the doorway to the ground. Mr Coffey had put the steps in place leading up to the door of his mobile home, He said at the hearing that he could have jumped down but his son could not because of his disabilities.

Had steps been built outside Mr Coffey’s mobile home on 19 November, Mr Fry asked. Mr Quilligan agreed. Mr Quilligan accepted CCTV cameras had been put in around this time, and connected to electricity. Re-examined about this, Mr Quilligan said he thought he was entitled to put CCTV in. The cameras were not mounted in the ground but strapped to a post.

Asked whether he had put some stone chippings on his own plot, Mr Quilligan said that he had put stones down. He had become frustrated because his son had an accident on the hardstanding, falling. No one else had done this.

At some point later in the autumn, the septic tank on site became unstable, pipes were detached and were leaking. Mr O’Brien discusses this in his second witness statement. The families were concerned about contamination risk. In Mr Harrington’s second statement, he discusses problems with the septic tank having shifted causing the toilets on site to become blocked and other plumbing to become dysfunctional. The temporary repairs they had attempted were not effective. A comprehensive repair by a plumber was likely to be needed, as well as stabilising the tank but these steps were prohibited by the orders. At times the families had no access to clean water for up to 2 days. The families were concerned about hygiene.

Mr Quilligan spoke about these problems at the hearing. The families had contacted the Council about repairing the septic tank. When Ms Salter visited they had spoken about it and she said that their solicitors should make a request, but there was no answer. This meant the families were left without toilets. It was not practical to drive 10 to 15 minutes to get to public facilities when the children needed the toilet, nor to use the Portaloo toilet on the site because that was a hundred metres away from where the caravans. The children could not be taken there in the winter simply to go to the toilet when it was cold, wet and muddy and there was no lighting, especially at night. He thought the septic tank could not just be left when the problems developed, he said. Re-examined about this, Mr Quilligan said that the cesspit repairs were necessary because the families had to go to the toilet.

Mr Coffey agreed at the hearing that he had been involved in repairing the septic tank. That was done because they had not been allowed to fix it and people couldn’t use the toilet. He couldn’t take his son to the Portaloo in the night. The need to repair the septic tank had been discussed with Council officers on one of the visits. He and Mr Quilligan explained the need for work to be undertaken. They heard nothing back from their solicitors.

At the hearing, Mr Harrington agreed that the septic tank had been repaired after the 29 August 2025 meeting. It was because the children needed to use the toilet. It was not practical to walk to the Portaloo at night.

Mr O’Brien was cross examined about the septic tank too. He found it difficult to talk about it. It had become unstable and all the pipes went everywhere so they asked the Council whether they could repair it and do a professional job. They had been told just to leave it and communicate through solicitors. They left it for a while, but could not keep doing that. Sewage was going to come out of it. His nine year old daughter had nowhere to go to the toilet at night when it broke down, and would soil the bed or use a bucket. Other children had needed to go across the field (I assume to use the Portaloo). There were 20 people on the site. The Council had also said that they should use bottled water, but they could not wash their clothes in that. Edenbridge had been welcoming, letting them use their showers there and some local garage had offered the use of the toilet any time they wanted to. These people had been fantastic, he said.

Mr Fry asked Mr Quilligan why works continued to be carried out after the orders in circumstances where it was accepted in the joint statement that this was a breach of them. Was that for safety reasons? Mr Quilligan said it was. Asked about whether advice had been taken, Mr Quilligan said that they had been advised by the police to put in the camera and Mrs Choudhry had said she would write to the Council about this. He put his hands up to laying down the stone on his own plot. He was just upset at the time, really upset as the injuries his son had after he fell could have been avoided. He didn’t think the Council had been asked about this at the time.

A well as being frequently visited by Council officers, the men all discuss even less welcome attention from local people, although at the hearing they took pains to point out that this was by no means a universal reaction to their presence on the farmland.

For instance, in his second statement, Mr O’Brien describes local people driving onto the land and subjecting the families to vitriolic abuse shouted from their vehicles.

Mr Quilligan echoed this in his second statement, adding that the lack of a gate on the entrance to provide some measure of security meant this could happen easily. The police had been called to the site on multiple occasions. Drones were frequently flown over the site, making the families feel under constant surveillance. At the hearing, Mr Quilligan added that the problems ranged from people driving by with their horns pressed constantly to driving onto the site and shouting abuse. The police advised them to put in a gate and CCTV cameras. They asked their solicitor about this, she said she would send an email to the Council but there had been no reply. They decided to put up CCTV cameras, strapping them to posts. They were not driven into the ground as the Council suggested and they did not believe this breached the injunction.

Mr Harrison makes similar points in his second statement. The visits would often happen at midnight. They had reported them to the police but little has been done. In a joint statement, the men of the families strongly objected to the drone flights.

More positively, Mr O’Brien said that a neighbour who also had horses had been welcoming including when one of their horses had escaped onto her land when fencing has been pulled down.

However, the lack of a gate on the entrance to the farmland meant there was a risk of the horses straying onto the road, and one had, going missing from 9 to 11 October 2025. This and the harassment from people driving onto the site was what had motivated the families to ask for a variation of the Dove and Hill orders to allow one to be installed. This was refused by Deputy High Court Judge Darlow KC, as I have mentioned.

There have been further problems, the man said.

The hardstanding on the site had been a problem too, said Mr Harrington in his second statement. His six-year-old son had fallen, cutting himself badly. The surface was littered with shards of glass and loose metal fragments. It had been intended to be a temporary surface to be covered over, but the injunction had prohibited that, he said at the hearing. He and his wife had needed to seriously restrict the children’s play outside due to the risks underfoot.

At the hearing Mr Quilligan explained that the hardstanding deteriorated further because surface had not been applied to it. The heavy rain early in the year had caused mud and it had sunk into the ground. There was not anything left to see.

Mr Harrington’s statement adds that all of this had taken a real emotional toll on his family exacerbating anxiety and depression.

In her affidavit, Ms Salter says that numerous harms are being caused by the families presence. In summary, these are harm to the Green Belt in principle, harm to = its openness through encroachment into the countryside, to the character of the Hamlet of Pootings and its surroundings, to biodiversity exacerbated by the lack of mitigation measures, to nationally significant infrastructure and to development in an unsustainable location. Consultation with local residents prompted comments about harm to the setting of the National Landscape, to a protected hedgerow, to the safety and welfare of residents from the water supply, potential contamination and inadequate waste drainage, generally and after the cesspool connection broke, onto the pipeline and from a water pipe with an unknown termination point,. The Council had since received further information about harms to biodiversity, habitats and protected species, inadequate protection of the pipeline, and risks to road users of straying horses.

The Council is receptive to appropriate planning applications from Gypsies and Travellers, Ms Salter says, but what had occurred was a flagrant breach of planning control.

Mr Masters made lengthy submissions about the relationship between what he said was a conspicuous absence of welfare enquiries to inform the duties the Council owed the families under the Children Act 1989, the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘the 1998 Act’) and the Equality Act 2010 (‘the 2010 Act’).

Mr Morris discusses the Council’s perspective on some of these matters in his first witness statement which post-dates his affidavit. The main focus is the Council’s decision to proceed with enforcement action, starting with the enforcement notice.

Mr Morris says that the planning application submitted on 26 August 2025 provided no information about children on site or their medical or welfare needs. There were children on site and so its planning assessment was made on that basis. On 5 September 2025, he says unnamed officers spoke to “Tom”, asking if there were any welfare considerations such as health and education needs, to be taken into account. The response was that there were school-age children, one of whom had special educational needs and needed medical attention. Mr Morris’ comment on this was that the best interests of children were a primary consideration but not determinative of planning issues and the Council had only been able to obtain limited details. In favour of allowing the development was the general need for gypsy and traveller pitches, and the need for children to have a settled base. The lack of supply of specific, deliverable sites within the adopted local plan conflicted with national planning policy. Existing development plans and those in progress did not demonstrate that sufficient sites could be delivered to meet individual need. It was likely that gypsy and traveller pitches would need to be found within the Green Belt in such circumstances given the character of Sevenoaks District. Children on the site needed to have a settled base to allow access to continuous education and healthcare, but the Council had weighed against that the principle of harm to the Green Belt, the character of the landscape and biodiversity, the difficulties of development in an unsustainable location and a “potential risk posed to national infrastructure”. The case for very special circumstances had not been made out. “Very special circumstances do not exist” he adds.

At the hearing, Mr Morris said he did not undertake welfare checks himself and accepted the Council did not have a five-year supply of sites to meet gypsy need in its area and that this triggered a presumption in favour of development, and consideration of whether it ought to be permitted in the Green Belt. Mr Masters said this was relevant because it meant the application for planning permission had a reasonable prospect of success. Mr Morris strongly disagreed with that. The Council’s view on the likelihood of success had been explained in the enforcement notice he said.

As far as the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) is concerned, Mr Morris recites the terms of Article 8, then observes that refusing permission “could represent an interference with the rights of the intended occupants” but this must be weighed against “the wider public interest, and it has been established that the development would have a harmful impact on the Green Belt, and on the delivery of sustainable development”. He then asserts “the interference is limited in respect to Article 8 (right to family life and home)” concluding that “enforcement action would be proportionate to the legitimate aim of preserving the environment and controlling the use of the site in accordance with the general public interest.” There were also safety concerns about the pipeline and the water supply.

Mr Morris’ evidence also discusses how Article 8 was taken into account in relation to the decision to seek an injunction. Article 8 and article 1 of protocol 1 were relevant to the development because the rights of the landowner to enjoy their land subject to reasonable and proportionate controls had to be weighed in the balance. An injunction “could be interpreted as an interference”. Here the breaches of planning control that had occurred were flagrant, purposeful, extensive and ongoing. There was nothing to indicate the defendants would rectify existing breaches. It was likely that they would continue. The harm to the Green Belt and the amenity and character of the rural area meant the injunction was a proportionate step to take, he adds.

As regards the public sector equality duty imposed by section 149 of the “Equalities Act” sic Mr Morris identifies key considerations as being “the importance of the decision and the severity of the impact on the Council’s ability to meet its PSED” and “the likelihood of discriminatory effect or that it could eliminate existing discrimination.” He adds:

Asked about welfare checks at the hearing, Ms Salter said that children had been found on site by the enforcement officers on 26 August 2025 which was concerning and this was reported to the County Council through safeguarding procedures. She added that thought was not going to be given to equalities issues during the course of the difficult visit she had attended herself on 27 August. She had felt unsafe. After that, the Council’s solicitor had contacted Mrs Choudhry by email asking for information about the welfare of those on site on 4 and 5 September.

However, around this time, the families made some efforts themselves to present the Council with evidence of their welfare needs, contacting Dr Violet Cannon of an organisation called Proud Gypsy Traveller CIC who produced a short ‘community level welfare report’. It appears it was supplied to the Council around 12 September 2025 because it is exhibited to a witness statement from Mrs Choudhry of that date. In re-examination, Mrs Salter said it was only then the Council had learned of how many people were living on the site. The report is not discussed in Mr Morris’s evidence, or in his third statement post-dating the reports. The information in the report is sensitive and it is unnecessary to go into the detail, but the gist is that several of the children of the families have significant disabilities and serious health problems, and some of them have been held back in education on account of their lack of time in school. Dr Cannon adds that there would be risks to health, education, accommodation, cultural well-being and the possibility of an immediate overwhelming reliance on statutory services were the families evicted from the site. Her professional opinion is that the welfare needs of the family are overwhelmingly served by allowing them to remain. I note that Dr Cannon does not give her qualifications or details of instructions.

Ms Salter briefly mentioned “the reports” at the hearing and said the Council’s community safety team had sought more information. Cross-examined by Mr Masters, she said that notwithstanding the Council being concerned about children on the site no welfare enquiries have been carried out at all. She disputed this, asserting “we had carried out extensive enquiries and they are in our evidence.”

In answer to clarification question I raised about whether the Council had undertaken any kind of holistic assessment of the families’ circumstances after the urgency of seeking the interim injunction passed, looking at the pros and cons of making the site habitable, Mss Salter said that the planning enforcement officers were accompanied by people from the community safety team responsible for taking the lead on such issues. It would have been them to act if they considered it appropriate. They had not asked for any action from a planning point of view to be taken. No recommendations have been made. Nothing had been logged with the Council’s housing team about the family’s needs. The police had not raised anything with them either.

During the hearing, Mr Quilligan was asked about whether the Council had undertaken any welfare checks of the families. He said that this was something the families had discussed with their solicitor, who had said it would be raised. The Council had never come and asked how the families were, however. They had needed permission to do so. They came very regularly, every day, but only to inspect the site.

Mr Coffey was also asked about this and said he couldn’t remember whether his solicitors had called him to discuss the Council carrying out such checks. Whenever the Council came around they were interested in things like steps, fields and hardstanding, not people living on the site. He had always been able to arrange discussions with the Council when they wanted to have them.

Mr Harrington said that there would have been a problem had the Council told them they needed to sit down and have a discussion about welfare enquiries.

Asked about this, Mr O’Brien said the Council had never looked into the families’ needs, even when they had told officers things were wrong. When cross-examined he added that there were no welfare checks undertaken by the Council.

As mentioned at §‎53 above, as well as expressing some regret for the way in which the works of the site were undertaken, the joint statement offers apologies for several breaches of the Dove order.

At the hearing, Mr Quilligan was asked by Mr Fry whether the apology was genuine. Mr Quilligan said yes it was. They had not wanted to do stuff that they were not supposed to do. They didn’t want problems with the court thinking that they did not listen to what it had said. Asked if works prohibited by the court order had been removed or undone, he said he did not know why not. They could try to bring the fencing down if they had to. If the CCTV had to go, it had to go.

Asked about the joint apology, Mr Coffey also said it was genuine. Asked why the works in breach of the court order not been removed, Mr Coffey said that the cameras were for safety, because the families were being harassed but they could remove them. The septic tank was for toilets for the kids to use.

Mr Harrington was asked about his apology. He said they hadn’t known “about them” (which I take as a reference to the allegations of breach mentioned in Mr Fry’s question), but was an apology.

Mr O’Brien was asked about the apology, he said that he had apologised to the courts sincerely. He added that the Council hadn’t helped with the families’ needs by giving them permission to do things. Surely they were entitled to clean water, but they had been told to use bottled water. He confirmed that nothing had been done to remove works done in breach of the Dove order but they could remove the CCTV, even though they needed it.

It was clear at the hearing that the Council considered the families had no future on the site and no interest in where they might go if they left.

Unsurprisingly, the families had a different perspective. Mr Quilligan said that, despite all the problems they had experienced, living on the farmland brought real benefits for the family. He did not want his children to grow up as he had. He wanted them to be able to read and write. This son had joined local clubs. They went to mass regularly on Sundays. They are registered with a local doctor. His son had health difficulties, which had led to him being hospitalised on a couple of occasions. Mr O’Brien’s son was autistic and had mobility problems. His niece had problems too.

Mr Harrington was asked about the future at the hearing by Mr Masters. He said it would be devastating if the families had to move on. Three of his children had secured school places - his nine year old daughter, his six year old son and his two year old son who was now going to nursery. It would be impossible for them to have an education if they had to keep moving round, and that was not what he wanted. His older children were behind with schooling. They needed an education which they could not get if there was no base.

Mr Fry submitted that the way the proceedings had been conducted by the representatives of the men and women should not obscure what was, in reality, a straightforward case of contempt. In fact, the Council had understood there were no disputes until Mr Masters’ skeleton has been received late, and at the prompting of the court. Much of that skeleton argument was in any event irreconcilable with the evidence the men had given to the court in their statements and orally.

Yet there were further problems. The men had confirmed their evidence was true including their admissions to breaching the injunction but then professed that they had not understood it. There had also been unexpected new evidence which had caused the Council real difficulty in advancing its case. This included the late evidence of occupation and Mr O’Brien’s insistence that the injunction had never been explained to him. In short, the defence’s approach was chaotic and the agreed case management directions had been undermined to the extent that a one-day hearing would last more than three days.

Before 22 August 2025, this had been undeveloped, agricultural land last used for that purpose. An unauthorised development began that afternoon after the digger had been delivered and proceeded at a rapid pace. The Council had also acted rapidly securing the Dove order. Besides development, that order prohibited occupation or continued occupation. The Council had reached a view based on the information they had at the time it sought the Dove order that the site was un occupied. In the light of Mr O’Brien’s mid-hearing evidence and what the other men had said, it accepted the site was occupied from Friday afternoon. There had been no such evidence before the hearing, however. However, what Dove J had been told about the rights of those who wished to use the site for residential purposes - and, as it turned out, were already there - was correct. They had been there for less than a day and their rights were necessarily limited and easily outweighed by the legitimate aims the Council was seeking to further by securing an injunction to prevent occupation and further works.

At the 15 September 2025 return date, the injunction was maintained with minor variations, reflected in the Hill order. No variations were sought until 5 February 2026. The application failed and there was no appeal.

Nothing in the Dove or Hill orders was complicated or difficult to understand and, besides, the men and women were professionally advised by solicitors and a planning consultant. Straightforwardly, the injunction prevented preparatory works to enable development on the land and development itself. The acts did not have to amount to development within the meaning of section 55(1) of the 1990 Act if they were preparatory to development. Paragraphs (a) to (p) were non-exhaustive examples of prohibited works. The injunction was breached through direct acts, instructions to others to act in breach, permitting breaches and failing to do what the injunction required which was cease occupation. All of these things had occurred.

I explored this part of the Council’s case with Mr Fry in submissions. As regards the CCTV, what would have happened if the injunction had been made and the families had contested it, but not occupied the land. Would they not be entitled to install CCTV cameras to protect their property? Mr Fry said this was a distinct situation. Here the CCTV had been installed to enable the development to continue. He added that the same was true of repairs to things that may have been installed prior to the Dove order. If they enabled the development or were permissive of ongoing breaches, these were prohibited acts. The terms of the Dove and Hill orders were sufficiently clear to encompass repairs and incidental works, he said.

The Council had followed the appropriate procedure to enforce the injunction having documented multiple breaches since service was affected. It had set out its allegations properly in a form N600 rider.

In the joint statement the men had rightly taken responsibility for breaches of each and every term of the injunction, save for the erection of a gate. Apologies had been offered.

Notwithstanding this, the court needed to be satisfied to the criminal standard that the three ingredients of liability were present as summarised in South Oxfordshire District Council v Smith [2024] EWHC 2985 (KB) at §15. Mr Masters had not disputed this.

First, having received notice of an unambiguous order, the contemptor did an act prohibited by the order or failed to do one that was required. The relevant test is notice. A defendant’s knowledge of “all the facts” does not mean knowledge that their actions or failures amount to contempt. Knowledge about that was relevant to sanction only. The Dove order had provided that it was to take effect immediately reflecting CPR 40.7(1). CPR Part 81 set out the procedural framework.

Here, the requirements had been followed. The Dove and Hill orders had both been served on the land in accordance with the alternative ‘service on the land’ provisions set out in the orders themselves, including provision for service on persons unknown which applied to the women until they became identified. Whilst points had been taken about precisely what had happened when service was affected, no one disputed it had been. There was no dispute that the Dove order was served on the land and a certificate of service verified that, as did Mr Morris’ and Mr Cooke’s evidence. Mr O’Brien was told about the injunction. Mr Quilligan accepted the Council had come onto the land with papers even though he was asleep at the time. Mr Coffey knew those papers meant “something was wrong”. This led to Brilliance Solicitors being instructed. It was not credible that Mr Coffey did not understand a legal document had been served. Mr O’Brien had made a connection between the papers and the need to seek planning permission, undermining his evidence about knowledge. Besides, it was unreal for the men to say that there was no connection between the papers being posted on the site on one hand and the extensive works over a bank holiday weekend and their occupation. The men were either wilfully ignoring reality or more likely not telling the truth.

If a defendant says they have no knowledge of an injunction against them, under Kirin §36, they must show “on the civil standard, s/he did not have knowledge of the existence of the order and/or its material terms” but that goes only to sanction. Disobeying an order after service is a form of strict liability.

All the men said the order had been explained to them on 29 August 2025, but for that to be the date of knowledge for sanction purposes, the court had to accept a series of remarkable propositions. The first was that no one on the land realised the papers were important and advice should be taken straight away. Mr Cooke’s evidence of summarising the injunction would have to be false. The men would have had to decide that it was not worth photographing the order, and messaging someone who could read to explain it to them. All of the men would have to be illiterate and incapable of using emails to seek advice on the order that way. Mr Quilligan’s evidence about it not occurring to him that planning permission might be necessary until after the order was served would have to be accurate as would Mr O’Brien’s evidence that a planning consultant was instructed and able to send a detailed application letter in a single day. The evidence that the planning consultant had not been shown the order when first instructed would also have to be accurate. Mrs Choudhry’s involvement from 27 August would have necessarily involved her withholding the most critical piece of advice she had to give to her clients about obeying the Dove order until 29 August, despite communicating its gist to the Exolum engineer on site the next day. This would have been a serious failure by an experienced solicitor who had acted in similar cases. Strikingly absent was a witness statement from Mrs Choudhry verifying this had happened. None of these propositions were credible. The court should not be persuaded to the civil standard that the men had any lack of knowledge.

Once a person has notice of an order, they are obliged to obey it. There is no obligation to explain it. The person who is the subject of the order must find out what it means if they are uncertain.

The second ingredient was that the contemptor had to intend to do the prohibited act or failed to do a particular required act. Thirdly, she or he needed to have knowledge of the facts which would make the carrying out of the prohibited act or omission to act a breach of the order.

Particulars of the breaches were set out in the N600 supported by evidence from Ms Salter, Mr Morris and in turn their colleagues who had undertaken enforcement visits and members of the public who had supplied video and images. Extensive breaches had occurred in the days and weeks following the grant of the order as catalogued in the evidence. The evidence also recorded multiple admissions. The breaches continued after 29 August 2025, despite what the defendants had said about the order being explained to them then.

As regards the defence, Mr Masters’ primary submission, that there were additional matters for the court to consider at this stage of determining liability such as failures to make welfare enquiries, undertake human rights balancing exercises for the purposes of the 1998 Act or equality impact assessments for the purposes of the 2010 Act, was simply wrong. Cuadrilla demonstrated that the legality of the Dove order could not be revisited now. The appropriate procedural route to do that was a prompt application to vary or set aside. There had been an obvious opportunity to make one at the return date hearing before Hill J. It had not been seized, even though the families had been professionally represented by then and representations were made to her on other matters. Whether or not welfare enquiries had been carried out were irrelevant to the three liability tests, as were human rights considerations. They could have a bearing on whether a final injunction ought to be granted at all and its terms, but not to liability. The Council’s position was that it had done or attempted to do all the required assessments, but that was an issue for the final injunction stage of the proceedings, not liability. Besides, the criticisms of what the Council had done to secure the Dove order were unreal. The Council had visited the site after the digger was reported and it was unoccupied then. It had then acted promptly on the information it had. It was wrong to say that Article 8 rights to remain there in occupation had somehow accrued in the following hours.

Illiteracy had been raised for the first time as a defence in Mr Masters’ skeleton, but the point was bad. Cuciurean v Secretary of State for Transport [2021] EWCA Civ 357 (‘Cuciuream’) and Kirin made it clear that there was no mens rea requirement for a breach.§79 of ADM International SARL v Grain House International SA [2024] EWCA Civ 33 underscored that subjective understanding or intention with the meaning of an order was “logically irrelevant to the existence of a civil contempt because there is no requirement of an intention to breach it”. Inability to read the order, or impracticality of making contact with those who could help by reading it or explaining it, went only to sanction.

The points made about necessity and the reasons for the development and breach of the order were also bad. Planning laws form part of the rule of law to which everyone was subject and all are required to obey court orders, as M v Home Office [1994] 1 A.C. 377 showed. It did not matter that the families felt they had a need to carry out the development or even that they had been advised by the police to install CCTV cameras. None of this represented a lawful excuse. The court ought not to tolerate breaches of its orders. What the families ought to have done from the start was to make a valid application for planning permission and then, if they believed the Dove order had been wrongfully made, applied to vary or set it aside. No application was made until this year. By then, further breaches of the injunction had been committed, including repairing the septic tank. Sheffield City Council v Brooke [2018] EWHC 1540 (QB),(‘Sheffield’) did not assist the men. That was an extreme case about a breach being necessary in circumstances where there was an immediate physical risk to safety such that a question of “defence of another” arose: §48. The advice of the police about CCTV installation was not analogous. Mr Masters’ argument was that the men should be indulged because they had carried out “further works to improve the comfort on land they have developed in breach of planning control and in in defiance of an injunction”. The situations were not analogous. The court was being asked to do the very thing counselled against in the Sheffield judgement at §49, which was to allow its orders to be “circumvented by defendants advancing spurious justifications for acts which have been prohibited.”

The women had raised no defence at all. The court was not bound by “gypsy and traveller cultural norms.” They too were in contempt.

The court could be sure that each of the defendants was in contempt and should find accordingly, Mr Fry concluded.

Mr Masters’ closing submissions on the families’ behalf began by contending that there was an intermediate stage in contempt proceedings, prior to determination of liability, in which the court had to ask itself whether the claimant, if a public authority, was breaching the human rights of defendants to the injunction by pursuing the proceedings. This was the effect of section 6(1) of the 1998 Act, which prohibits public authorities from reaching the ECHR rights set out in schedule 1 subject to certain exceptions, read with section 7(1)(b) which provides:

This, said Mr Masters, enabled a ‘human rights defence’ to be raised at any stage in proceedings, including in the course of closing submissions. Were such a defence successful, it would render an order unenforceable regardless of any findings court might otherwise make on liability.

Where a right, such as Article 8 ECHR involved testing justification to the proportionality standard, the court was obliged to scrutinise the public authority’s decision and determine whether justification had been made out as in cases such as R (SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15 and, where the court ruled refusal to allow a pupil to wear a jilbab did not violate her Article 9 or Article 2 of Protocol 1 rights and Belfast City Council v Miss Behavin’ Ltd [2007] UKHL 19, a licensing case where a local authority had lawfully decided that the appropriate number of sex shops that ought to be licensed in its area was zero.

In the present case, the families’ Article 8 rights had not been properly considered when the Dove order was made. The court was entitled, indeed obliged to investigate that, and reach a ruling. The Council was wrong to say that Article 8 could not be engaged in the present circumstances where people who were obviously Traveller families as defined in the guidance had moved onto land they owned, merely because services had yet to be connected. Ms Salter’s rationalisation of the concept of ‘occupancy’ was irreconcilable with the Caravan Site and Control of Development Act 1960 which defined “caravan site” as one “on which a caravan is stationed for the purposes of human habitation and land which is used in conjunction with land on which a caravan is so stationed”.

Article 8 would have been engaged by the presence of touring caravans, and certainly was when mobile homes were put on site so as to create a settled base. The Council’s initial denial of occupation flew in the face of reality. Mr Morris’ position on occupation, communicated to the court through the submissions made to secure the Dove order, had no basis. It appeared to be the result of external pressure. Mr Morris’ failure to investigate occupation when he came to the site to overseas service of the Dove order was extraordinary. The Council’s actions would necessarily interfere with the Gypsy and Traveller lifestyle of those who were living on site by the time the Dove order was made, which was Article 8-protected: Chapman v. the United Kingdom (Application Number 27238/95), §§73 and 96. The variations in the Hill order had recognised the reality of the situation.

In such circumstances, an obligation to make enquiries was triggered, prior to the Dove order. The Council had been given even more information about the family circumstances during the course of the following weeks, most significantly the Dr Cannon report. There was no evidence that the Council had undertaken proper enquiries or assessments, followed by the human rights balancing exercise required by, at either stage or even to date. What was necessary was illustrated by South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter [2004] UKHL 47, which also arose in the planning context, see Waverley Borough Council v Gray and others [2023] EWHC 2161 (KB), another case involving travellers who had been the target of injunction proceedings. Although that was a case about whether a final injunction should be made, the duty to consider welfare issues discussed there was an ongoing one.

Further, said Mr Masters, knowledge that the families were Gypsies and Travellers was enough to put the Council on notice that they were likely to be illiterate, yet the “reasonable precaution” of reading out and explaining the Dove order to them had not been taken. This breached “a basic requirement of fairness that those relying on the terms of the injunction should make sure that those bound by it understand its terms.” The men and women were not denying that work had continued after the Dove order was granted, but this occurred at a time when they were ignorant of its terms.

It followed that the men and women could only be guilty of non-compliance with the Dove order from when it was read to them on 29 August 2025 and they became aware of it. The evidence was consistent on that issue. Speculation about whether it could, or should, have been explained to them earlier by their solicitor went nowhere. L (A Child) In the matter of Gous Oddin [2016] EWCA Civ 173 (‘Oddin’) showed that there was no contempt of an injunction not communicated to a defendant. Their illiteracy was relevant to findings of whether or not there had been wilful disobedience.

By 29 August 2025, the main, substantive engineering works had all been completed. No more were undertaken. The men did not continue with planned works such as surfacing the hardstanding area or finishing the cesspit. The Dove order was therefore complied with save possibly for particular, minor works which were either explicable or outside of the scope of prohibited “development”.

The work subsequently done to the cesspit was an emergency repair, about which the Council had left them with no real choice. This was a situation in which an urgent, protective step was necessary, as in Sheffield.

As to the CCTV cameras, their installation was not section 55(1) 1990 Act “development”. They were installed by being tied to posts and fencing, on the recommendation of the police and as an urgent and necessary form of protection. The steps leading up to the mobile homes were not “development” either and the only available evidence indicated they were not permanent structures.

The fencing was in place by the time of the Dove order being explained to the men and it was reasonable to keep it in place for security reasons. By now, the hardstanding had all but disappeared, as explained in Mr Quilligan’s evidence.

There was no ongoing breach of the Hill order through occupation. Occupation had been consented to because the variations made in the Hill order were unopposed. The Hill order was a “status quo order” allowing occupation of the land until a final order was made. Any formally unlawful occupation in breach of the order had been cured by the variation. Besides, there could be no contempt arising from occupation of one’s own land. This was not, in reality, a green field site.

The families were not currently breaching planning law by being on site because the appeal they had made meant the effect of the enforcement notices was suspended: section 175 (4) of the 1990 Act.

I need to deal first with this part of Mr Masters’ submissions. As I understand it, he contends I must assess whether the Council’s decision-making from the point at which it decided to seek the Dove order to date involves a breach of Article 8 ECHR either because it has not conducted an appropriate balancing exercise, informed by sufficient enquiries about the families’ circumstances, or because the evidence before the court is sufficient for me to conclude that liability findings would in themselves involve a breach. In other words, the effect of a ‘human rights defence’ which Mr Masters says section 7(1)(b) of the 1998 allows the men and women to raise, is to introduce an intermediate stage in determination of liability. If a court concludes at this stage that there is either form of breach, it can go no further and must dismiss the application. I endeavoured to summarise this in discussions with Mr Masters and he confirmed my understanding is broadly right. I asked whether there was any authority he could point to where this had happened, either in the context of Gypsies and Travellers or perhaps in a case involving article 10 free speech rights. He said that there was not.

I reject Mr Masters’ submission for these reasons.

First, the courts have repeatedly held that the judge’s task at the liability stage of contempt proceedings is a narrow and disciplined one of the kind described in L-W and Cuadrilla. It is not concerned with the way the claimant has exercised its powers or discharged its public law duties (if there happens to be a public authority). It is concerned with whether the defendant has obeyed the court. That is the policy underpinning the framework described in L-W at §34 by Munby LJ and in Cuadrilla at §25 by Leggatt LJ. Nowhere in those or any other authority is there an intermediate stage identified.

Secondly, the courts have identified appropriate routes for matters that fall within the ambit of Mr Masters’ human rights defence, which are to apply to set aside or vary injunctions that ought not to have been made in the first place. This was acknowledged in Cuadrilla at §§38-39 and Mid Bedfordshire DC v Brown [2004] EWCA Civ 1709 at §25. Most tellingly, the provision for a return date on an ex parte injunction means that there will be a very early hearing in almost all cases at which a defendant can make submissions that an injunction ought to be varied or set aside because of a procedural impropriety or because it breaches their rights, including human rights. Arguments of this kind are commonly raised at that stage in media cases, for instance. The effect of Mr Masters’ submission would be that a defendant can reserve their position until the 11th hour as far as liability is concerned and then raise criticisms of the claimant, and possibly the injunction-granting judge, which they chose not to raise at the renewal hearing or in a subsequent variation or set-aside application. There is no mandate for this in the CPR or case law. Section 7(1)(b) states that ECHR rights can be raised “in any legal proceedings” but not that they can be raised at any and every point in time.

Thirdly, even if the course Mr Masters urges on me were somehow permissible, a claimant would need to be given sufficient notice of a fully particularised defence of this kind in order to meet it. In this case, notwithstanding agreed case management directions, Mr Masters’ skeleton was late and raised the human rights defence only in high level terms, essentially challenging the Council to demonstrate it had undertaken the enquiries and assessments which was said to be lacking. Understandably, the Council’s had difficulty in doing so, perhaps best illustrated by Ms Salter’s evidence that such assessments were conducted by colleagues. The procedural logic of Mr Masters’ submission is that each local authority claimant must be prepared in any case where one might be raised. That is untenable.

The alternative way, Mr Masters puts this submission is that the court must be satisfied that a liability determination will not lead to a human rights breach. There are difficulties with this too, however. First, the authorities Mr Masters relies on are ones where decisions and policies were challenged in a way that enabled the court to have an informed perspective on the right said to be engaged and the extent to which the actions of the public authority had respected or interfered with them. Typically, that would happen through judicial review proceedings, though not necessarily. Mr Masters’ submission would mean the court having in a case such as the present one a quasi-inquisitorial role at the sanction stage, which it would be ill-equipped to undertake. Secondly, Mr Masters was unclear about what remedy the court could offer if it decided that sanctioning would involve a human rights breach. He suggested that the court would simply decline to enforce the order as a matter of discretion. However, I consider that exercising judicial discretion is not at the heart of the exercise of determining liability at this stage of the process. Rather, it is examining the facts of what the order says, and the defendant’s conduct grappling with the questions L-W and in Cuadrilla pose. Thirdly, Mr Masters made a point about how an injunction that obliged Gypsies and Travellers to leave land could interfere with their Article 8 rights. However, he did not explain how determining whether or not the men and women were in breach of the Dove and Hill orders could have such an effect. It might well not, because the court might decide that there ought to be no sanction for a breach.

Properly understood, the decision to make an injunction in the first place and, if one is made, what its terms ought to be, involve questions of proportionality and necessity as with an application to vary or set-aside based on arguments that the effects are disproportionate. Sanctions and sentencing are the paradigms example of the proportionality decisions (in the sense of the relationship between knowledge, agency, culpability and penalty). Liability is not the stage at which proportionality comes into play.

It follows that this part of the defence fails. At the liability stage, is not necessary for me to decide whether the Council’s enquiries about the families’ welfare or other matters were sufficient, nor whether it struck or attempted to strike a legally unimpeachable balance between the different rights and interests at stake for Article 8 purposes or had due regard to the mandatory relevant considerations listed in section 149 of the 2010 Act, whether by means of an assessment or otherwise. These are important matters, but not at this stage.

To recap, Mr Masters submission was that the Council had an obligation to inform the men and women of the terms of the injunction and, in any event, it could not have any effect on them for the purposes of liability until they were informed which was on 29 August 2025.

This submission has no basis in the case law. Oddin is not authority for the proposition that a claimant has a duty to ensure knowledge of the content of an order communicating an injunction. §§58-60 explain the difficulties in terms of defects in the order and ineffective service. In Cuciurean Warby LJ confronted the issue of knowledge squarely, holding at §§56 to 62 that it was sufficient for a claimant to show that the defendant was served with the order for actions which breached it, to amount to contempt. It was not necessary to prove he knew of its contents, although that might be relevant to penalty. Soole J made the same point in Kirin at §58:“in this context ‘notice’ is equivalent to ‘service’ and vice versa” and that “there is no further requirement of mens rea, though the respondent’s state of knowledge may be important in deciding what if any action to take in respect of the contempt”.

In other words, to establish liability is to demonstrate service of the order to the criminal standard, but knowledge of what it says and means does not matter at the liability stage of the analysis. Knowledge is only relevant to sanction. Knowledge of what it said meant that it would be unjust to impose a penalty.

It follows that, even if the men only found out about what the order said and meant on 29 August 2025 (and the women found out soon afterwards), that would make no difference to their liability from the time of service on 24 August 2025 provided they were properly served. There is no dispute about proper service, as Mr Fry says. For completeness, I find the Dove and Hill orders were served on the land in accordance with their alternative service provisions. There is no evidence to suggest otherwise.

Thus, having considered the submissions on knowledge carefully, it seems to me the appropriate time to make findings will be after any further evidence is adduced at the sanctions stage of this process, particularly from Mr Cooke. It is clear, and accepted by the Council, the pace of works fell off very dramatically after 29 August 2025 which may be consistent with the consistent account the men gave of being made aware of what the order said and meant on that date by Mrs Choudhry when she spoke to them in the café. However, on the Council’s case they were already aware, at least of the gist of the order and so defied it over the previous four days. I will need to return to this important issue at the next hearing.

Mr Masters’ submission was that the Hill order had both retrospective and prospective effects, authorising not only future continued occupation but also that which had taken place since the order.

I reject this submission. The Hill order states that the men and women shall not “permit, allow or engage in any further occupation of any caravan or mobile home already on the Land”. I agree with Mr Masters, and this does not appear to be disputed by the Council, that occupation of caravans and mobile homes already on the site is permitted under the terms of this order, but nothing suggests that its effects are retrospective. “Further” necessarily implies what happens from a point in time being described onwards. The point in time is the date of the Hill order. It follows that the question of liability for breach of the Dove order in the form of occupation up until then is something I must determine.

I see no force in Mr Masters’ submission that there cannot be a breach of an order occasioned by someone residing on their own property. No authority was cited for this proposition. Every day in the Family Court injunctions are made prohibiting people who own property from entering and residing there because they have or may act unlawfully in some way.

Mr Masters made a very brief submission at the conclusion of the hearing that, if he were wrong on the other aspects of the defence, this was a Sheffield case. Mr Fry says this is misconceived as discussed above.

There is some recognition in the authorities that liability will not arise where a person finds themselves in breach for reasons that are outside of their control, for instance because travel disruption makes it possible to comply with an order to be in a particular place at a specified time. In this way, the courts recognise that non-compliance with an injunction involves agency on the part of defendants in relation to their actions. Sheffield takes matters a step further, however.

On 22 January 2018, in the course of Sheffield City Council’s “Streets Ahead” tree-felling operations, the defendant, Mr Brooke, who had previously given an undertaking not to enter designated safety zones, attended a site where contractors and security staff were engaged in removing protesters; having been informed of earlier confrontations and, from a limited vantage point, hearing distress from a protester being removed, he formed the mistaken view that she was being assaulted and, acting in anger, forced his way through the barriers into the safety zone with others, remained briefly, and then withdrew, with the consequence that the felling operation was disrupted and did not proceed. In determining whether the entry into the safety zone constituted a contempt, Males J held that, in principle, the common law defence of acting in defence of another was capable of applying in committal proceedings, and that question fell to be assessed by reference to the criminal law standard. Thus “the question [was] whether Mr Brooke had an honest belief” that it was necessary to act in defence of another, “regardless whether that belief was mistaken or reasonable.

Properly understood, the ratio of Sheffield is that, in circumstances where a defendant acts on such an honest belief formed in the heat of the moment, the requisite intentional breach sufficient to found liability for contempt is not established.

This has no application in the present case. Taking the men’s evidence at its highest, their actions in preparing the septic tank, installing CCTV cameras and, in the case of Mr Quilligan, laying some surfacing outside his caravan were not in the heat of the moment or in defence of another in a sense in which that concept is recognised in criminal law.

I now turn to the key facts including those surrounding alleged contempts of court, assessing liability using the approach described above at §§‎18-‎20.

It is now accepted by the Council that the families occupied the land from just after 5 PM on 22 August 2025. Even if that had not been conceded, I would have found this to be the case on the basis of all the evidence I have summarised above. As Mr Quilligan eloquently put it, where else would the families have been once their caravans were on site?

The men formed a plan to buy the farmland to establish a settled base, and though the women were informed of this they were not involved in the decision or actioning it. The men purchased the land. The men made the arrangements through Mr Delaney’s contact for plant machinery to be brought to the land to develop it in line with the plan. This is undisputed. It is not suggested that the women had any decision-making role or did anything to breach the Dove order besides occupy the land.

I accept the men are illiterate for the reasons I have given at §§‎25-‎31. There is no evidence to indicate they have ever owned property, or sought planning permission before. I conclude that they have not done so and that their account of having spent their lives travelling without a settled base is accurate. Notwithstanding what the Council says about the planning consultant only being instructed after the Dove order was made, their account of this was consistent. Having considered the consultant’s letter carefully, it is apparent that much of it is standard wording that does not suggest a careful review or instructions about the family’s circumstances that would have taken time. Moreover, if the consultant had been made aware of the terms of the Dove order, it would be remarkable for the letter not to engage with it. I conclude that it is highly likely the consultant was instructed after the Dove order was made. All the available evidence points one way, despite the speed of the letter’s production being uncommon for planning consultants. It is not disputed that Mrs Choudhry’s firm was instructed after the Dove order was made.

It is possible that some or all of the men had a sense that planning permission was needed, or might be, at some point. The email from the digger company to the Council is supportive of that, but not determinative. It is not necessary for me to determine this issue and it was not explored with all of the men in cross examination so I make no finding about it. It is common ground that no planning permission was sought until later.

I accept Mr Morris’ evidence that the Council assumed the site was unoccupied when the Dove order was sought, based on the visit early on 22 August 2025. There is no evidence to suggest the Council knew the families were there until later.

The agreed state of the site just prior to the Dove order being made is described above at §‎64. Much of the works had already happened by then. It is also uncontroversial that further works happened between the time on 22 August 2025 when the Dove order was made and its service on the land just before 10 AM on 23 August 2025.

Service on the land was effective: §‎254 above. Liability arose for breaches of the Dove order from that point onwards, including occupation up until the point of the Hill order: §‎257 above. The families had received notice of an unambiguous order.

Turning to acts and starting with occupation, in the case of the women, I find each of them were in contempt of court by failing to do an act that was required, by intentionally and knowingly occupying the land after the Dove order required them to leave (save for when they necessarily would have been away for temporary reasons, about which I have no evidence) from the moment of notice of the Dove order on 23 August 2025 at 9:50 AM up until the point when the Hill order was made. This is not disputed, as I understand their defence. In any event, there is no evidence of any of the women being coerced to remain in occupation on the land. There may be issues about knowledge of being in breach and the extent to which they had a real, practical choice to leave in order to comply with the Dove order, but these are matters relevant to sanction, not liability.

Similarly, the men remained in occupation on the land (apart from temporary absences) from the point of notice of the Dove order until the point when the Hill order was made. I find each of them is in contempt of court during this period for this reason. Again, issues of knowledge, practical choices and apologies are relevant to sanction, as are other matters.

To be absolutely clear, I make these findings to the criminal standard. I note that in the joint statement, to some extent occupation in breach of the Dove order has admitted (though details are not given from when it is admitted). I have taken account of some hearsay evidence about what Mrs Salter says based on the Council’s files such as other officers’ site visit noted (see §23 above), but have given it less weight that the evidence I heard from witnesses that could be tested.

I find that works developing the farmland as defined in section 55(1) of the 1990 Act (see §‎69 above), and preparatory to development of the farmland, took place between the point of notice of the Dove order on 23 August 2025 until 29 August when the men left the site to meet Mrs Choudhry at the café. These works are as described in the evidence discussed at §§103 and 105 above. As noted already, the men have not sought to avoid the responsibility they say they bear jointly for what has happened since occupation of the site began, or blame each other. There were some subtle differences in the roles they played, but none of them held himself out as a leader in this regard and the sense was that decisions were made not only intentionally but collectively, following discussion and in knowledge of the facts. I therefore find that each of the men is equally liable for these breaches of the order because they either personally breach the order in those ways or permitted or instructed others to do so. I also make these findings to the criminal standard. Again, admissions that the Dove order has been breached in these ways are made in the joint statement, though without giving dates.

I find that the sheds were on site but at least one of them was moved into place on 29 August 2025 and possibly three. I consider moving one shed into place on that date which is admitted was development as defined in section 55(1) of the 1990 Act. Though it is unclear who was responsible for this, at the very least, the men intentionally and knowingly permitted this breach of the injunction to happen. I find this too was contempt of court, again to the criminal standard. There is insufficient evidence to support a finding that one of the sheds was moved into place on 30 August 2025 to the criminal standard and I make no such finding. It is not correct to say that the sheds appeared on 30 August, as the site photographs show them that beforehand. However, the work on the sheds including moving them, occurred after notice of the Dove order and the café meeting. It was part of the development as defined and I find this too was in contempt of court to the criminal standard.

Recalling the Dove order’s specific prohibition on “install[ing] any electric cable, waterpipe or any infrastructure or carry[ing] out any associated works on the land”, I find that the piping works intentionally and knowingly undertaken on 1 September 2025 which are admitted were preparatory to development because they facilitated connecting the families’ homes to the on-site water and power facilities beyond simply attaching plugs or plumbing connections, was in breach of the Dove order and in contempt of court. These works were admitted by Mr Quilligan: §‎114.

I decline to find that power junction boxes and cabling were installed on site on 2 and 4 September 2025 to the criminal standard such that this involved a breach of the Dove order in contempt of court. This is not admitted and the photographic evidence does not clearly show the date on which this happened, less still who was responsible. Elsewhere in the evidence there are clear indications that the site had power and water prior to its occupation by the families. I cannot be sure whether this junction box and cabling installation happened or, more importantly still, when. There is also a real possibility that the cabling works were minor or incidental and so not development as defined in the Dove and Hill orders generally, or involved installation or associated works (which is also an unsatisfactorily vague term). This too reinforces my view that a finding of contempt in this respect to the criminal standard is not open to me on the evidence I have seen.

I find that drainage and other pipes were added to the cesspool/septic tank area and that trenches were laid from the hardstanding area to the cesspool. The evidence is unclear as to when this happened and who was responsible, but it is clear to the criminal standard from the photographs that it occurred after notice of the Dove order and I have concluded that the men either undertook these works, or permitted or instructed that they should happen, intentionally and knowingly in either case. As the cesspool/septic tank was a joint project for everyone’s benefit, I consider each of the men were responsible as this was part of the plan they had formed for the site. I find that the men are all are in contempt of court in this respect also.

I find that installation of the CCTV cameras was not development as defined in section 55(1) of the 1990 Act, nor preparatory to development, an installation or associated works. I make this finding for the following reasons. First, the consistent evidence of the men was that the CCTV cameras were installed by strapping them into poles or posts that were already in place and connecting them to power. There is no clear evidence to the criminal standard to the contrary. The images I have seen of what is said to be the CCTV cameras are taken from drone photographs at height. I cannot be sure that those photographs show CCTV cameras on those poles. More significantly, there are no images showing exactly when the poles or posts were there and whether they were put in place at the same time as the CCTV cameras or were there previously, which is what the men say. There is no direct first-hand evidence of this, save from them. Even if there were clear evidence of poles being driven into the ground to support CCTV cameras, I would not have been persuaded that this amounted to development as statutorily defined. Nor would I have been persuaded to the criminal standard that installing CCTV cameras on this site was necessarily preparatory to its further development (the position might have been different had the CCTV cameras being installed from the start).

For similar reasons, I find that placing floodlights around some of the mobile homes on the site on 23 September and 10 October 2025 was not development as defined in section 55(1) of the 1990 Act, nor preparatory to development, an installation or associated works. There was no clear evidence that mounting the lights involved works defined in that way. Mr Quilligan’s evidence was that they were simply fixed into place and plugged in.

I also decline to find that the repairs undertaken to the cesspit, septic tank and treatment tank area after it shifted were either development in breach of the Dove order generally or associated works and so contempt of court. I cannot be sure of this to the criminal standard because the internal correspondence between the Council’s officers indicates that repairs might be permissible without specific permission, although there is some debate back and forth about that. Of course, the men did not know about this when they decide to go ahead with the repairs without the permission they had asked Mrs Salter about, but given the range of views within the Council between its subject expert officers, I cannot be satisfied to the criminal standard that repairs were something which breached the order, absent permission. The question of whether Environment Agency consent for this facility was necessary or not is irrelevant.

Whilst not relevant to my findings on this issue, I found some of the correspondence about the cesspit, septic tank and treatment plant very troubling. Behind the scenes, Ms Salter was extremely concerned about the situation to the extent that she offered her opinion that withholding permission for repairs raised human rights issues for the families. However, one of the officers from whom she sought advice appeared to be under the impression that there was a single “resident” on site, not a number of families that included several children and the corporate position ultimately reached was that they ought to indefinitely make do with a single Portaloo somewhere on the site, or possibly bring in further Portaloos. Quite how this could be reconciled with the Council’s welfare responsibilities towards the children living on site is unexplained. In submissions, Mr Fry described the family’s concerns about the cesspit, septic tank and treatment plant as a “sob story”. This was not appropriate.

I decline to find that the use of the steps said to be supplied with the mobile homes by placing them outside those homes was development as defined in section 55(1) of the 1990 Act or preparatory to development. Necessarily, this would take place after the mobile homes are in place, no or minimal assembly of the steps was required and they were removable.

Mr Quilligan admitted that laying a surface on the hardstanding outside his caravan was a breach of the order. I accept his explanation for it which was that he was concerned about his son’s safety after a fall on the unsurfaced hardstanding which caused injury. However, this was an intentional act, with knowledge of the facts, and so a breach of the order and so contempt of court by Mr Quilligan alone.

For completeness, I should say that I have not found that the replacement of one of the mobile homes with another was a breach. The Council has not argued that it was and if there were any ambiguity on that topic, Mrs Salter’s comments about this would amount to a waiver.

Regardless of whether or not they knew and understood the terms of the Dove order before 29 August 2025, each of the women and men and are in contempt of court because they have breached the Dove and Hill orders in the ways described above.

I will now hear any further evidence that goes to sanction and submissions on that issue.