R v Bhipon Chahal

The Defendant faced trial alongside six others on a 3-count indictment. Namely conspiracy to supply cocaine (count 1); conspiracy to supply heroin (count 2); and conspiracy to supply cannabis (count 3).

The Defendant was one of two who featured on all 3 counts, alongside a Kamaljit

On 20 August 2021 the Defendant attended court with his co-accused for a plea and trial preparation hearing (PTPH). The Defendant pleaded guilty to all 3 counts on the indictment and indicated that a basis of plea would be submitted in due course. Three of his co-defendants also pleaded guilty.

A trial was fixed for the remaining two defendants but both also pleaded guilty in advance, such that the listed trial did not take place.

Bases of plea were submitted by some (but not all) of the defendants and a Newton hearing was contemplated.

The Defendant’s basis of plea (submitted 23 February 2022) was that the lead defendant was his uncle, and that at all times he was acting under his uncle’s instructions. The Defendant’s case was that he acted under considerable emotional pressure, which included threats of violence towards his family. The Defendant also disputed various aspects about his level and duration of involvement, and the extent to which he benefited from the conspiracy.

On 6 April 2022 the parties attended court for a mention hearing, at which time the Defendant was awaiting a response to his basis of plea. The court ordered that the

The prosecution disputed the Defendant’s factual assertions (see sentencing note) and the

On 21 February 2023 litigators acting for the Defendant wrote to the prosecution to advise that he “does not wish to have a ‘Newton hearing’” and that “submissions will be made on his behalf based upon the evidence”.

A prosecution document dated 11 May 2023 and uploaded to the Digital Case System recorded that the Defendant’s legal representatives had notified the prosecution that the Defendant did not maintain the factual assertions that were due to be resolved at a

However, I observe that was a prosecution note reflecting the prosecution’s understanding of events, and not necessarily reflective of the final stance adopted by the Defendant.

All six defendants were sentenced on 9 June 2023.

A drugs expert’s report, prepared by a Mr Andrew Tennant, was uploaded to the DCS on behalf of the Defendant, setting out the expert’s views as to the type of drugs enterprise with which the case was concerned.

Relying on this report, the Appellant made representations on behalf of the Defendant as to role. The Defendant was subsequently sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment.

Mr Singh invited me to note that the Defendant entered a guilty plea at an early stage which was subject to a ‘basis of plea’ running to 22 written paragraphs.

He wished to draw a distinction between a “straightforward” guilty plea followed by sentence, and a guilty plea accompanied by a basis of plea argument. He cites the latter as a dispute requiring a resolution, which in turn requires work to support the basis of plea.

Mr Singh referenced witness evidence running to 699 pages and in excess of 9,000 pages of exhibits, both of which formed part of the consideration required in order to draft the 22 paragraph basis of plea.

Mr Singh thereafter took me to the prosecution’s response, which he submits went into great detail in rejecting the Defendant’s basis of plea. He says it was that rejection that led to the need to instruct a drugs conspiracies expert, Mr Tenant.

Mr Singh also relies on the fact that the Newton hearing was listed for 5 days, firstly scheduled for September 2022 and later moved to May 2023 (following the Bar strikes).

As at 2022, Mr Singh recalled how busy the crown courts were, with huge pressure for court dates, court room availability and judicial availability, partly caused by backlogs created by the Covid-19 Pandemic. He reflected that the court would not list a 5-day Newton hearing in these circumstances on a whim or at the behest of counsel.

Mr Singh submits that the basis of plea was “heavily contested” in the following areas:

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Citing the 22 paragraph basis of plea document, Mr Singh said that paragraphs 4-6, 9, 11-13, 15, 17, and 18-22 were all disputed by the Crown, as articulated in their 10-page response.

As to the Defendant giving no evidence or otherwise accepting the prosecution’s position as to sentencing, Mr Singh submits the Respondent misunderstands or miscomprehends the Defendant’s stance.

Mr Singh explained the context, in that the Defendant feared jeopardising the 33% sentencing discount he had already secured as a result of his early guilty plea. However, to characterise the Defendant’s stance as a full abandonment of his basis of plea would be wrong and misleading.

He says that in fact the Defendant maintained a number of arguments including that he did not play a leading role, that he did not make the sort of money the prosecution alleged, and maintained a divergent stance as to which dates the Defendant was engaged in the conspiracy.

As to what took place at the final hearing, Mr Singh submits that a judge cannot reject an argument without considering it, or cannot decide what weight to attach to a report without giving it due consideration first.

Mr Singh echoed Ms Weisman’s early indication that the parties and court should focus on her written submissions, not the Determining Officer’s written reasons. Thereafter Mr Singh provided his own analysis of Ms Weisman’s written submissions.

Mr Singh agreed the “Background” section of the written submissions, but took issue with how paragraph 11 of the same was worded. He sought to correct the record by citing the expert evidence was obtained after the Crown rejected the Defendant’s basis if plea.

In terms of the case law relied on by the Respondent, Mr Singh considers R v Hoda, R v Morfitt and R v Makengele all support the Appellant’s case, as examples of where the Costs Judge considered the question of whether greater preparation had been incurred over and above that which one would expect for a guilty plea with no basis pleaded. Mr Singh also cites all three cases as requiring the determination of disputed facts that were material to the sentencing outcome.

Ms Weisman helpfully began by confirming the travel expenses element of the appeal was no longer resisted and the LAA will now process the Appellant’s expenses in that regard.

She also confirmed the LAA were not pursuing an argument that the hearing of live evidence is a necessary prerequisite for a finding that a Newton hearing is deemed to have taken place.

Ms Weisman accepts there was a detailed basis of plea, and that there were a number of points in dispute. However, she cites that the 5-day Newton Hearing was in respect of the co-defendants too, not just the Defendant. As such, she submits the length of the hearing should not lead to any inference that the purpose of the hearing was to make findings of fact.

She also argued that much of the Appellant’s work was done before any Newton hearing was listed, and that it is important to look at what was done in the run up to the listed Newton hearing.

The Respondent’s position is that in advance of the sentencing hearing there was no disputed evidence, and that this is supported by the transcript.

Ms Weisman submits that it’s not a question of what or how much preparation was done, but rather a question of what factual dispute survived by the time of the Newton hearing such that a determination of that dispute was required.

Ms Weisman relies on the authorities CE filed with her written submissions regarding whether the level of role argument is an exercise in mitigation or findings of fact.

Ms Weisman accepts that at the hearing the ‘role’ argument survived, and that the expert report covered role. However, the Respondent’s case is that the judge attached no weight to the report and that the report was based on existing evidence, so could not of itself be new evidence.

Where Ms Weisman’s submissions otherwise reflected the content of the Respondent's written submissions dated 11 March 2026 (and authored by Ms Weisman), those submissions have been taken into account in my decision below.

Further, the written submissions being a document in the possession of both parties, there is no utility in widely reproducing the same in this judgment.

Mr Singh observed that at paragraph 28 of the Respondent’s written submissions, they accept that “a formal listing for a Newton hearing and the submission of a disputed basis of plea may be persuasive in favour [of] the Appellant..”

In relation to paragraph 29 of the Respondent’s written submissions, he counters the inference one might draw from the sentencing judge’s comments by observing that the following of sentencing guidelines is mandatory, and within those guidelines is a major difference in punishment as between conviction on the basis of a leading role versus a significant role.

As to paragraph 31, Mr Singh submits that it was a fact a Newton hearing was listed twice and stood down twice, and never as a result of the Defendant’s actions.

Mr Singh says the court can have no doubt that the work was done, that it was substantial (requiring some 5 months of considering evidence before the basis of plea could be entered to accompany the guilty plea entered 5 months earlier).

The Defendant didn’t want to give evidence because of the perceived risk to the discount he had already secured with his early guilty plea. That necessarily placed an extra level of importance on the evidence available.

Otherwise, Mr Singh considers Ms Weisman’s case examples to be either fact sensitive or do not assist the Respondent. Finally, he explained his reference to the R v Barton case was to demonstrate distinction with the index matter.

Mr Singh submits that “the Lord Chancellor is dancing on a pin”, and that the work done goes far beyond preparation for a guilty plea and sentencing hearing.

He says it matters not if the judge was dismissive of the drugs expert evidence. The point is that the report was needed because the crown disputed basis of plea.

This appeal has already been successful to the extent that the grounds included an appeal against the Determining Officer's refusal to pay claims for travel expenses. The written submissions dated 11 March 2026 confirm that the travel expenses claim has now been settled.

The balance of the appeal is maintained in that the Appellant seeks payment of a trial fee based on a Newton hearing having taken place, whereas the Respondent maintains a guilty plea fee is the appropriate remuneration.

The prosecution cited a total of 92 events, supported by 318 pages of statements. However, the accumulation of evidence was such that by the time the Defendant’s basis of plea had been entered the pages of statements exceeded 600.

Further evidence was served in support of the prosecution response to bases of plea. Exhibits to support the prosecution case served by or shortly after the PTPH amounted to 8419 pages, and once further material was served including “EncroChat” messages, the number of pages of Exhibits exceeded 9,000 (excluding unused material).

The fact that the Defendant’s litigator expressed in terms that the Defendant didn’t want to proceed with a Newton hearing does not mean that a Newton hearing did not take place.

Further, context is important. Multiple delays to the court timetable and progress had led to frustration. The Defendant remained in custody during that period, and had become worried after learning about the experiences of other inmates who said they had lost credit by giving evidence in Newton hearings.

However, it is clear that the Defendant wished to challenge the prosecution’s assertions that he had held a leading role, and that he was involved throughout the whole conspiracy.

The ‘Prosecution Response to Bases of Plea’ dated 18 May 2022 places a large focus on the Defendant and his co-defendant uncle.

In terms of the Defendant, it recorded that:

The prosecution identified an entry marked “B1 was paid £500 wages” dated 11 October 2019 in a financial spreadsheet. The spreadsheet included reference to drugs debts owed to the organised crime group (OCG) that could be linked to co-defendant Robert Wesley, who was said to have acted as de facto ‘accountant’ in relation to the OCG’s drug-dealing.

The prosecution did not accept that the entry dated 11 October 2019 referred to the payment of wages to the Defendant for legitimate work.

The prosecution refused to accept that the Defendant became involved in the offending as a result of any coercion or emotional pressure, but rather that he made “a free choice to become involved in the supply of drugs and that he was motivated by financial gain”.

Whilst accepting that Kamaljit Singh Chahal was the leader of the OCG, the prosecution sought to assign “a managerial-type role in the group” to the Defendant’s involvement, and thus also held a leading role.

Further, the prosecution did not accept that the Defendant tried to extricate himself from the drug-dealing in March 2020, and that any assertion he “remained at arm’s length from the drugs” was simply inconsistent with the prosecution case about the level at which he operated in the group.

The prosecution sought to argue that the Defendant fell into the category of those who take the risks involved in being in possession of large quantities of drugs, under the instruction of someone in a leading role.

The prosecution did not accept that Mr Chahal received “limited financial reward” for his involvement in the supply of drugs, and argued:

The prosecution case was ultimately that the Defendant “had a leading role in the offending”, and that:

In his sentencing remarks, Mr Recorder Michael Auty, KC recorded that:

Recorder Auty acknowledged the requirement to balance harm caused against culpability, and acknowledged that:

The Recorder thereafter recognised that for some of the defendants, a sentence of 20 years or might be applicable, whilst citing the various authorities concerning consideration of role.

The Recorder’s focus then turned to harm, observing that “16. The harm, be it actual, intended of reasonably foreseeable, in this case is immense; close, in fact, to being incalculable.”

Then having cited the estimated quantities of cocaine, heroin and cannabis involved in the conspiracy, Recorder Auty observed:

The Recorder then proceeded to identify the following aggravating factors as: The duration of the conspiracy; The amounts of drugs being traded (usually multi-kilo quantities); The sophistication of the enterprise; The use of EncroChat devices; The proximity to the source of importation; The persistence of the enterprise, particularly after the defendants were told to stop using the EncroChat devices.

In order to highlight the consequences of any finding that the Defendant had played a leading role in the conspiracy, it is worth reflecting on Recorder Auty’s remarks at paragraph 25:

In relation to the Defendant, and noting the prosecution was pressing for a finding of leading role whereas the Appellant pressed for a finding of significant role, the Recorder found that the Defendant was “undoubtedly involved in “organising buying or selling on a commercial scale,” had substantial links to and influence over others in a chain and enjoyed an expectation of substantial gain or other advantage from his involvement..”.

Whilst much was made by the Respondent of the Recorder’s decision to remark that he “was less concerned with seeking to put any particular defendant in any specific category and far more concerned with ensuring that the sentence I impose is just and fair in all the circumstances”, the reality is sentencing is intrinsically linked with culpability such that I find category of offending did ultimately form part of the Recorder’s decision making process.

Further, whilst the Recorder may have been unimpressed by the expert evidence of drugs conspiracy expert Andrew Tennant, that does not mean his evidence was dismissed or completely disregarded. Had it been I consider that would have been recorded.

Ultimately, Recorder Auty adopted the position that he accepted the Defendant’s role was subordinate to his uncle’s, and that he had been persuaded that the starting point should not be leading role for sentencing purposes.

The Recorder took into account the Defendant’s maturity, the length of offending in which the Defendant had been involved, and seriousness (nature and degree). He also recorded his “public duty [to] consider all the available evidence, not merely that which advances [a party’s] interests, when coming to a final determination as to the appropriate sentence…”.

It is often argued in remuneration appeals addressing sentencing that there is a distinction to be drawn between pleas in mitigation that impact sentence, and findings of fact.

It is incredibly helpful when not only are the sentencing marks available for consideration, but where they have been expressed in such clear terms as to identify that from a starting point of 26 years, a deduction of 2 years was made for matters in mitigation, and a deduction of 3 years was made to reflect a finding of a lesser role. This led to a starting point of 21 years such that following credit for early guilty pleas the Defendant received a sentence of 14 years.

Consistent with similar appeals concerning Newton hearings, I consider that where the sentencing court determines issues of fact rather than assessing pleas in mitigation only, the criteria for a Newton hearing has been met.

The Recorder necessarily had to consider and determine the duration of the conspiracy, the amounts of drugs involved, the sophistication and persistence of the enterprise, the use of EncroChat devices, and proximity to the source of importation.

The Recorder also had to determine the point in time the Defendant became involved, when he ceased to be involved, whether he had engaged in a “managerial-type role in the OCG” (and whether that equated to a leading or less role), his own use of the EncroChat system and what the EncroChat messages revealed in terms of answering those questions.

R v Shehu [2023] EWHC 3483 (SCCO) whilst not binding on me provides a helpful analysis in contrasting a finding of fact with instances where undisputed facts might still lead to a range of different interpretations or the drawing of inference which in turn impact the sentence passed. The difficulty the Respondent has is they have failed to articulate which facts were undisputed and/or failed to demonstrate that the key questions the Recorder posed for himself did not require findings of fact in order to determine sentence.

Further, whilst various decisions are cited at paragraph 22 of the Respondent’s written submissions dated 11 March 2026, that does not mean all drug related conspiracies in which role and extent of seriousness are considered amount to pleas in mitigation only.

In my view, the index matter is more analogous with R v Badibanga [2025] EWHC 89 (SCCO) and R v Williams [2024] EWHC 3159 (SCCO) than those cases cited at paragraph 22 of the Respondent’s written submissions.

Thus whilst this appeal was already successful in terms of the claim for travel expenses, the appeal further succeeds such that the Appellant shall be remunerated on the basis of a trial fee, not a guilty plea fee.

The Appellant seeks appeal costs of £1,250 and accepted Ms Weisman’s interjection that VAT was not sought where Mr Singh was effectively billing himself for this appeal. Ms Weisman suggested £600 was reasonable.

I allow £900 plus the £100 appeal fee.