Jason Peter Goodacre v The Information Commissioner

These proceedings concern an application (the “Application”) under section 166(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA 2018”) for an order to progress the Applicant’s complaints against Bannatyne Gym (Mansfield) (“the Gym”) regarding the handling of his Data Subject Access Request (“DSAR”) requesting CCTV footage from cameras located near the Gym. The complaint was submitted to the Information Commissioner (“IC”) on 18 April 2025 and was dealt with under reference IC-379551-P5X0.

On 27 June 2025, the Applicant contacted the IC’s Public Advice and Data Protection Complaint Service (PADPCS) Helpline. The case officer explained the IC’s complaint-handling process, including the 21-week timeframe for handling a complaint, directed the Applicant to the online complaint form should he wish to submit a complaint, and advised that he needed to provide relevant evidence concerning his complaint.

On the same date, the Applicant sent a follow up email, following his conversation with the case officer. The case officer in response confirmed the case reference number that had been allocated to the complaint, requesting that the Applicant provide relevant evidence regarding his complaint.

On 22 August 2025, the Applicant again called the helpline requesting an update and enquired about the delays concerning the progression of his complaint.

On 12 September 2025, the Applicant called the helpline requesting his complaint be expedited.

On 19 September 2025, the Team Leader for the case officer wrote to the Applicant confirming that his case had been prioritised and had warned the Applicant that it might apply restrictions in terms of his contact with the IC due to his behaviour.

On 22 September 2025, the case officer wrote to the Applicant concerning his complaint. The case officer explained that the Applicant had not provided sufficient evidence of his correspondence with the Gym . The case officer further explained that the Applicant should allow a period of a month in order for the Gym to resolve the Applicant’s complaint. The case officer also advised that if the Applicant had not contacted the Gym in respect of his concerns, that he should do so in the first instance. Finally, subject to the above, the Applicant was advised that in order to consider matters further, the Applicant should provide further information regarding the DSAR he had made to the Gym.

The Appellant responded as follows:

“I’ve already done this but thank you for the information, I in fact took legal action to actually be ignored by Hannah Jenkins who was there legal advisor. They advised me that the CCTV had been deleted by February/march 2025. However the request was made clear multiple times by me and Tara Wallace. All evidenced also over the phone. These requests were first made in 2024 December then January, then through my solicitor and also then through myself again. I appreciate the facts received, however Bannatyne have purposely ignored my request because it would have shown my innocents. Ive been placed on tag regarding absolute lies and its myself who has been stalked. Very clued up with my rights and many legislations”

Between 22 September 2025 and 17 November 2025, the Applicant provided no further evidence and several telephone calls he made to the IC’s case advisers had to be terminated due to his behaviour. This led to the Applicant’s contact with the IC being restricted to contact in writing on 18 November 2025,

The Applicant applied to the Tribunal by way of form GRC1 dated 21 January 2026. He stated that the outcome he was seeking was as follows:

In his grounds for the Application, the Applicant stated:

The request in relation to the Police does not appear to form part of the Application, as it was not part of the IC’s investigation IC-379551-P5X0. The Appellant has provided no information in relation to this complaint.

The IC applied by way of form GRC5 dated 23 February 2026 to strike out the Application on the basis that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider it under Rule 8(2)(a) and/or that there is no reasonable prospect of it succeeding under Rule 8(3)(c) (the “strike-out application”).

The reasons which the IC gave for striking out the Application were set out in its Response, particularly at paragraphs 47 to 49. In summary, these were as follows: 

The IC also wrote to the Tribunal on 9 March 2026 with further information about matters raised by the Applicant in his Reply dated 24 February 2026. This gives more detail of the communication between the Applicant and the IC.

I directed on 26 March 2026 that the Applicant should provide representations in relation to the strike out application by 13 April 2026 under Rule 8(4)

The Applicant responded on the same day with his representations. The points made by the Applicant, in summary, were as follows:

Section 165 DPA 2018 sets out the right of data subjects to complain to the IC about infringement of their rights under the data protection legislation. Under section 166 DPA 2018 a data subject can make an application to this Tribunal for an order as follows: 

The Tribunal can only make an order under section 166(2) if one of the conditions at section 166(1)(a), (b) or (c) is met. There have been a number of appeal decisions which have considered the scope of section 166. It is clearly established that the Tribunal’s powers are limited to procedural issues, rather than the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint. 

Section 165 deals with the complainant’s right to make a complaint and states that: 

In the case of Killock v Information Commissioner [2022] 1 WLR 2241, the Upper Tribunal at paragraph 74 stated - "…It is plain from the statutory words that, on an application under section 166, the Tribunal will not be concerned and has no power to deal with the merits of the complaint or its outcome. We reach this conclusion on the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language but it is supported by the Explanatory Notes to the Act which regard the section 166 remedy as reflecting the provisions of article 78(2) which are procedural. Any attempt by a party to divert a tribunal from the procedural failings listed in section 166 towards a decision on the merits of the complaint must be firmly resisted by tribunals."

Mostyn J in the High Court in R (Delo) v Information Commissioner [2023] 1 WLR 1327, paragraph 57 - "The treatment of such complaints by the commissioner, as before, remains within his exclusive discretion. He decides the scale of an investigation of a complaint to the extent that he thinks appropriate. He decides therefore whether an investigation is to be short, narrow and light or whether it is to be long, wide and heavy. He decides what weight, if any, to give to the ability of a data subject to apply to a court against a data controller or processor under article 79. And then he decides whether he shall, or shall not, reach a conclusive determination...”. 

Mostyn J’s decision in Delo was upheld by the Court of Appeal ([2023] EWCA Civ 1141) – “For the reasons I have given I would uphold the conclusion of the judge at [85] that the legislative scheme requires the Commissioner to receive and consider a complaint and then provides the Commissioner with a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so, to what extent. I would further hold, in agreement with the judge, that having done that much the Commissioner is entitled to conclude that it is unnecessary to determine whether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view about the likelihood that this is so and to take no further action. By doing so the Commissioner discharges his duty to inform the complainant of the outcome of their complaint.” (paragraph 80, Warby LJ). 

The decision of the Upper Tribunal in Cortes v Information Commissioner (UA-2023-001298-GDPA) which applied both Killock and Delo confirmed that the nature of section 166 is that of a limited procedural provision only. “The Tribunal is tasked with specifying appropriate “steps to respond” and not with assessing the appropriateness of a response that has already been given (which would raise substantial regulatory questions susceptible only to the supervision of the High Court)….As such, the fallacy in the Applicant’s central argument is laid bare. If Professor Engelman is correct, then any data subject who is dissatisfied with the outcome of their complaint to the Commissioner could simply allege that it was reached after an inadequate investigation, and thereby launch a collateral attack on the outcome itself with the aim of the complaint decision being re-made with a different outcome. Such a scenario would be inconsistent with the purport of Article 78.2, the heading and text of section 166 and the thrust of the decisions and reasoning in both Killock and Veale and R (on the application of Delo). It would also make a nonsense of the jurisdictional demarcation line between the FTT under section 166 and the High Court on an application for judicial review.” (paragraph 33). 

The case of Dr Michael Guy Smith v Information Commissioner [2025] UKUT 74 (AAC), noted at paragraph 60 that “it is for the Tribunal to decide, applying an objective test, if an “appropriate step” has been omitted, but observe that, in practice, that is unlikely to be the case where an ‘outcome’ has been produced. That is for two main reasons: first, because section 166 is a procedural provision and, as the principal mechanisms for enforcing rights or challenging the Commissioner are either claims against the data controller or judicial review of the Commissioner, section 166 should not be used to obtain ‘by the back door’ a remedy normally only available in those proceedings; secondly, because, if the Commissioner has already produced an outcome then, given the very wide discretion that the Commissioner has, both as to what and how to investigate and as to outcome, the scope for the Tribunal to say that an appropriate step has been omitted is limited.” In considering this the Tribunal must, as set out in paragraph 85 of Killick “when deciding objectively whether any (further) appropriate step needs to be taken by the Commissioner, take into account and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator.”

Paragraph 85 of Killick reads as follows: “However, in considering appropriateness, the Tribunal will be bound to take into consideration and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator. The GRC is a specialist tribunal and may deploy (as in Platts) its non-legal members appointed to the Tribunal for their expertise. It is nevertheless our view that, in the sphere of complaints, the Commissioner has the institutional competence and is in the best position to decide what investigations she should undertake into any particular issue, and how she should conduct those investigations. As Mr Milford emphasised, her decisions about these matters will be informed not only by the nature of the complaint itself but also by a range of other factors such as her own regulatory priorities, other investigations in the same subject area and her judgment on how to deploy her limited resources most effectively. Any decision of a Tribunal which fails to recognise the wider regulatory context of a complaint and to demonstrate respect for the special position of the Commissioner may be susceptible to appeal in this Chamber.”

The first question is whether the IC provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint. The IC provided the Applicant with a response to his complaint on 22 May 2025 with a further response on 22 July 2025 following a review. I consider that the response dated 22 May 2025 was in fact an outcome to the complaint, because provided an answer to all outstanding issues and demonstrated that the IC had given consideration to whether there were other appropriate steps which could be taken to progress the Applicant’s complaint.

Even if I am wrong on this, I am satisfied that when taken together with the response dated 22 July 2025, these responses have provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint, provided an answer to all outstanding issues and demonstrated that the IC had given consideration to whether there were other appropriate steps which could be taken to progress the Applicant’s complaint. This is sufficient in my view to demonstrate that the IC has complied with the requirements of section 165(4). The fact that the Applicant does not agree with the outcome does not render it wrong in law.

It appears to me therefore that there are no further appropriate steps which the IC ought reasonably to take to progress the complaint.  In making this decision I have given significant weight to the view of the IC as the expert regulator that there are no further appropriate steps he should have taken.  

The outcome sought by the Applicant is, in effect, challenging the substantive outcome of the complaint to the IC. The Tribunal does not have power under section 166 to consider the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint. Section 166 is limited to narrow procedural issues and there is no further procedural failing in respect of which the Tribunal can make a decision.   In an application under section 166, the Tribunal has no power to direct the IC to investigate, in a particular way or at all, to take enforcement action to secure compliance with a request or determine whether or not there has been a breach of the UK GDPR. I also agree with the IC’s position that it is not a court or ombudsman and that orders for compliance need to be sought through civil action. Accordingly, I find that the Tribunal does not have the power to grant the outcomes sought. 

Because I consider that there was an outcome determining the complaint and that there were no further appropriate steps which should be taken, I find the complaint has already been determined and therefore the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over it.  I am also satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of the case, or any part of it, succeeding because the outcome sought by the Applicant is not something which is within the Tribunal’s power to grant.

The proceedings are therefore struck out under Rule 8(2)(a) because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with them and under Rule 8(3)(c) because there is no reasonable prospect of them succeeding.