City Doctoral Researchers Association v The Information Commissioner
Neutral citation number: [2026] UKFTT 00508 (GRC)
Case Reference: FT/EA/2025/0206
First-tier Tribunal
(General Regulatory Chamber)
Information Rights
Decided without a hearing
Decision given on: 1 April 2026
Before
JUDGE ARMSTRONG-HOLMES
Between
CITY DOCTORAL RESEARCHERS ASSOCIATION
Appellant
and
THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
Respondent
Decision: The appeal is struck out under Rule 8(3)(c).
REASONS
This is an application by the Respondent to strike out the Appellant’s appeal under Rule 8(3)(c) of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 on the basis that the appeal has no reasonable prospect of succeeding.
Chronology and Background
On 7th May 2024, the Appellant wrote to City St. George’s, University of London (“the University”) and requested information in the following terms:
“Please provide all the email exchanges from 1 October to 2 November 2023 between:
• [REDACTED – nine names and email addresses]
Discussing:
• [NAME REDACTED].
•Team Members ([NAMES REDACTED]);
• Senate Representation;
• PhD Reps / Representation;
• Post grad network;
• [NAME REDACTED]
Please also provide all the email exchanges from 16 November to 1 December 2023 between:
• [REDACTED – four names and email addresses]
discussing:
• [NAME REDACTED];
• Elected Delegates ([NAMES REDACTED]);
• PhD Reps / Representation;
• [NAME REDACTED]
Please also provide all the email exchanges from 1 October to 1 December 2023 between:
• [REDACTED – seven names and email addresses]
discussing:
• [NAME REDACTED]
• Team Members ([NAMES REDACTED])
• PhD Reps / Representation;
• [NAME REDACTED]
Please also provide all the email exchanges from 11 November 2022 to 1 November 2023 between:
• [REDACTED – nine names and email addresses]
discussing:
• [NAME REDACTED];
• [NAME REDACTED];
• [NAME REDACTED];
• Elected Delegates ([NAMES REDACTED]);
• PhD Reps / Representation;
• PGR Representative for Doctoral College Board of Studies;
• Postgraduate Research Senate;
• PhD Society;
• Post grad network.
Please also provide all the email exchanges from 12 January 2023 to 6 May 2024 between:
• [REDACTED – 12 names and email addresses]
discussing:
• [NAME REDACTED];
• The publication of "[NAME REDACTED]
• Unauthorised intellectual property, under the Copyright Design and Patents Act of 1988;
• Investigation;
• Research misconduct;
• Procedure for Dealing with Allegations of Research Misconduct;
• Research Good Practice Framework.
Please also provide all the email exchanges from 02 October 2023 to 13 May 2024 between:
• Appeals,
• Complaints and Enhancement;
• [REDACTED – six names and email addresses]
discussing:
• [NAME REDACTED];
•Investigation;
• Grievances;
• Student and Group Complaints (Stage 2 and Stage 3);
• PhD Reps / Representation;
• [NAME REDACTED]”
On 3rd June 2024, the University responded to the Appellant’s request in the following terms:
“City estimates that the costs of complying with your Request in full would exceed the ‘appropriate limit,’ as defined by the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and prescribed by the Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004.
We are not obliged to comply with a request for information if we estimate that the cost of complying with that request would exceed the appropriate limit. In City’s case, the appropriate limit is currently set at £450. This equates to 18 hours of City staff time (including any external contractors) spent on the activities described above, where a flat hourly rate of £25 per person per hour is applied.
We estimate that it would take at least 100+ hours to run the IT searches to determine whether the information is held, to locate and retrieve the information and to extract the requested information.
This letter acts as a Refusal Notice in respect of your Request and City will not be
processing your Request further.
Refining your request
To help bring the cost of responding to your Request within the £450 limit, you may wish to consider being more specific about the information that you wish to obtain access to. In addition, or alternatively, you may wish to consider narrowing the scope of the request by, for example, choosing the information which you are most interested in or that is most important to you.
It should be noted that much of the information relates to individuals and may be exempt under Freedom of Information Act 2000 Section 40(2).
Examples of the ways in which you might consider narrowing the scope of your Request include the following:
• consider restricting the timeframes,
• consider reducing the number of named individuals, and/or search terms.
Please note, however, that any refined or amended request received from you by City would be considered a new request and subject to new statutory timescales.
Please also be aware that we cannot guarantee, at this stage, that the estimated cost of compliance in respect of a refined or amended request will fall within the appropriate limit. In addition, we cannot guarantee that any relevant exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 will not apply to a reformulated request.
Finally, your information rights under the UK GDPR and Data Protection Act 2018 are unaffected by this response.”
The Appellant requested an internal review of that decision on 17th June 2024. The request for a review was accompanied by a number of points which the Appellant wished to make to support the disclosure of the requested information. This was as follows:
“We request a review of this decision on the following grounds:
Our request for internal review is grounded on the following critical points:
Separate Topics:
We respectfully decline the suggestion to narrow the scope of the request. Both
aspects of the inquiry are integral to Our mission of promoting transparency and
accountability within Our academic community. Therefore, we propose the following division:
• Request 1 - Publication of a Paper and Unauthorized Use of Intellectual Property:
This request pertains to specific academic concerns that should be addressed
independently. It is imperative to understand the findings of any investigations
related to these allegations to ensure transparency in academic integrity and uphold ethical standards within Our academic community. The resolution of these allegations could significantly impact scholarly practices and intellectual property rights across academic institutions. The request is pertinent to understanding and evaluating instances of Research Misconduct, Procedure for Dealing with Allegations of Research Misconduct, and the implementation of the Research Good Practice Framework at City. There are concerns that these frameworks may not have been fully adhered to or effectively implemented in addressing the issues raised. The transparency of these processes is essential to upholding academic standards and ensuring that instances of misconduct are handled with diligence and fairness.
• Request 2 - Investigation, Grievances, Student and Group Complaints, and
Student Representation:
This request covers a broader range of issues related to Doctoral Researchers affairs and representation, with the Postgrad Network appearing to emerge from the unauthorised use of intellectual property, stemming from Our work. There have been documented instances of manipulation, cherry-picking of representatives, undemocratic processes, hostilities, discrimination, and marginalisation. These practices appear to negate the universal rights and principles of fair representation and democratic governance within Our academic institutions. Given that these areas are intertwined but distinct from the first request, they should be treated separately.
By considering these requests separately, it will be possible to allocate resources
more efficiently and ensure that the appropriate limit is not inappropriately applied across the entire request. This approach could facilitate a more manageable and targeted response.
Cost Estimate: We acknowledge the financial constraints outlined under the £450 appropriate limit. However, we seek a more detailed breakdown of the estimated costs. Specifically:
• Task Breakdown: A detailed explanation of the tasks involved, such as running IT searches, locating and retrieving information, and extracting the requested data, would help us understand why the estimate is over 100 hours.
• Efficiency Measures: We request information on any efficiency measures that can be implemented to reduce the time and cost of fulfilling the request. For instance, if certain IT tools or search parameters could expedite the process, this should be considered.
• Previous Searches: If similar searches have been conducted in the past, these could potentially reduce the time needed for the current request. We ask for details on any relevant past searches that could be leveraged.
Understanding the basis for this estimate is essential for ensuring transparency and accountability in the allocation of resources. According to the Freedom of
Information Act 2000 and the Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004, the appropriate limit for responding to a request is 18 hours or £450. Given the distinct sphere of the two requests, each should be considered separately to ensure the appropriate limit is not inappropriately applied across the entire request. This separation will help ensure that each aspect of the request is adequately reviewed and responded to within the prescribed limits.
Public Interest: The public interest in disclosing the requested information is
substantial. The information pertains to the publication of a paper and the
unauthorised use of intellectual property, as well as investigations, grievances, and Doctoral Researchers’ representation. Transparency in these areas is crucial for several reasons:
• Academic Integrity: The disclosure of information related to the unauthorised use of intellectual property is essential to ensure academic integrity. The public has a right to know how such issues are handled to maintain trust in the academic
institution. Unauthorised use of intellectual property not only impacts the individual whose work was misused but also reflects poorly on City and its reputation. This incident highlights lapses in ensuring adherence to ethical standards and scholarly integrity among some members of the institution. Such breaches have far-reaching consequences, damaging the trust and credibility necessary for fostering an environment conducive to academic excellence and fair practice. Moreover, the misuse of intellectual property directly harms the future career prospects of the affected individual, undermining their professional reputation and potential academic advancements. The gravity of these consequences necessitates a transparent and thorough review of the investigation's findings to ensure accountability and prevent recurrence.
• Accountability: Information on investigations, grievances, and the handling of
complaints helps to hold City accountable for its processes and decisions.
Transparency in these matters promotes fair and just treatment of all parties
involved.
• Addressing Attacks, Demonisation, Discrimination, and Marginalisation (UK GDPR, Article 5): There have been documented instances where members of City Doctoral Researchers' Association, including Team Members and Elected Delegates, as well as those of City PhD Society, have faced attacks, demonisation,
discrimination, and marginalisation within Our academic community. Such actions contravene the principles of fairness, transparency, and non-discrimination under Article 5 of the UK GDPR, and violate the universal rights of Doctoral Researchers to participate in scholarly activities free from discrimination and bias.
• Importance of Representation and Fulfilment of Universal Rights (FOI Act 2000, Section 11): Effective representation of Doctoral Researchers through their
dedicated body (City Doctoral Researchers' Association, formerly known as City
PhD Society) is vital for ensuring that Our voices are adequately heard, Our concerns are addressed effectively, and Our universal rights within the academic
community are upheld, ensuring compliance with the transparency requirements set forth in Section 11 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
• Employment Rights and Fulfilment of City Grievance Policy (FOI Act 2000,
Section 10): Upholding employment rights and adherence to the City Grievance
Policy are essential for fostering a fair and equitable academic environment, as
mandated by Section 10 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Concerns have
arisen regarding the fulfilment of City Grievance Policy, particularly in relation to the Students’ Complaint process, Academic Services, and the Appeals, Complaints, and Enhancement team. There is concern that these entities lack a lawful basis for processing grievances, failing to adhere to the Acas statutory Code of Practice and employment law requirements, compromising the rights of Doctoral Researchers and others. It is imperative that the City Grievance Policy is applied consistently and transparently across all processes, ensuring that grievances are handled in accordance with legal standards and procedural fairness. Transparency and procedural fairness in handling grievances are essential not only to protect the rights of Doctoral Researchers but also to uphold the reputation and credibility of City University.
• Public Confidence: Public Confidence and Public Interest (FOI Act 2000, Section 1): The two topics indicated in the FOI requests are not merely internal matters but also have implications for public confidence in City University's governance and ethical standards, which are fundamental under Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. City University's response thus far has not adequately addressed these concerns, leading to questions about its commitment to transparency and accountability. It is crucial to restore public trust by addressing documented incidents openly and comprehensively, thereby demonstrating a commitment to ethical conduct and fair treatment.
A thorough internal review is essential to restoring public confidence by demonstrating City University's commitment to transparency, accountability, and ethical conduct. It is imperative that the institution takes proactive steps to address documented incidents and ensure that all members of the academic community are treated fairly and with respect.
Statutory Considerations: While we acknowledge the application of exemptions under Section 40(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 concerning personal data, we reiterate that the public interest in accessing the requested information outweighs these considerations. We also wish to challenge the notion that any refined or amended request submitted to City would be considered a new request subject to new statutory timescales. The Freedom of Information Act 2000 stipulates that refinements or amendments to an initial request should be treated as part of the original request, provided they are within reasonable limits and do not substantially alter the nature of the request or incur significant additional costs. Furthermore, Article 15 of the UK GDPR guarantees individuals the right to access their personal data and request amendments or clarifications without resetting statutory timelines unreasonably. The exemptions protect the privacy of individuals, which we respect. However, we urge for transparency in how these exemptions are applied:
• For Request 1: We seek specific details on any redactions or withholdings made
under Section 40(2), ensuring that the application of these exemptions is justified and balanced with the need for transparency in academic integrity matters.
• For Request 2: Similarly, we request clear justification for any redactions or
withholdings related to personal data, ensuring that procedural fairness and institutional accountability are maintained.
In light of these legal obligations and concerns, we request a thorough internal
review of the FOI request.
We kindly request acknowledgment of receipt of this internal review request and an estimated timeline for its completion.
Should you require additional information or clarification to facilitate this review, please do not hesitate to contact us.”
The University acknowledged the Appellant’s request for an internal review on 8th July 2024, but an outcome to that review was not provided until 16th January 2025. In between that period, the Appellant made a section 50 FOIA complaint to the Information Commissioner (“the Commissioner”) on 20th November 2024. The complaint itself focused on the lack of any outcome to the internal review, and on 27th November 2024, the Commissioner refused the complaint as he considered that there had been an undue delay in the complaint being brought. However, upon considering the Appellant’s request for the Commissioner to reconsider his refusal, the complaint was eventually accepted for investigation on 5th December 2024.
On 3rd January 2025, the Appellant informed the Commissioner that the University had notified them that it intended to provide an outcome to the internal review by no later than 16th January 2025. The Commissioner was informed by the University that it had provided an outcome to the internal review on 16th January 2025. The University’s detailed response, addressing the points raised by the Appellant, was as follows:
“Having considered City’s handling of Your Request, and your concerns outlined above I consider that City was correct in issuing a Refusal Notice in respect of Your Request and confirming that City would not be processing your Request further. As was explained in Our Response, City estimates that the costs of complying with your Request in full would considerably exceed the ‘appropriate limit,’ as defined by the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and prescribed by the Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004. City is therefore under Section 12(1) of FOIA allowed to refuse to comply with Your Request as it estimates that the cost of compliance with your Request would exceed the appropriate limit.
As City explained, and you have acknowledged, the appropriate limit is currently set at £450. This equates to 18 hours of City staff time (including any external contractors) spent on the activities described above, where a flat hourly rate of £25 per person per hour is applied. City estimated that it would take at least 100+ hours to: run the IT searches to determine whether the information is held; to locate and retrieve the information; and to extract the requested specific information.
City is unable to confirm whether it holds the information you have requested as it would exceed the appropriate limit to determine whether City holds this information. We would need to retrieve the substantial number of email exchanges you have referred to and then search for the requested information within these, and the time required to undertake this exercise would itself exceed the appropriate limit.
I have noted that you have not sought to narrow the scope of Your Request as we had in Our Response proposed you might do.
I have also addressed below the concerns you have raised in relation to Our Response in your request for an internal review which I summarised above.
1. Separate Topics: You have suggested that if Your Request is considered as two
separate requests: Request 1 – Publication of a Paper and Unauthorised Use of
Intellectual Property; and Request 2 – Investigation, Grievances, Student and Group Complaints and Student Representation and these are considered separately, it will be possible to allocate resources more efficiently and ensure the appropriate limit is not inappropriately applied across the entire request. You consider this approach could facilitate a more manageable and targeted response. This separation explains your purpose for requesting the respective information. However, this does not impact the breadth of the request you have made and the need for City to run the searches to locate all of the emails to and from the long list of individuals you have identified (and related documents) in relation to the specific matters you have identified in your Request; and then to review these emails to locate, retrieve and extract the wide categories of information you have requested in your Request. I do not consider that assessing your Request as two separate Requests with the matters you have specified will impact on the time required for City to manage and respond to your Request.
Whilst IT searches would be carried out to identify the relevant emails between those named individuals in the specified periods, I anticipate that most of City’s time would be incurred in staff time searching for the requested information within the relevant emails retrieved from the IT searches (as explained further below). On this basis, even with your separation of Your Request into two topics, I anticipate that the estimate provided in our Response that City would incur at least 100+ hours to set up the search parameters, run the IT searches to determine whether the information is held, and then to locate and retrieve the information and to extract the requested specific information, would remain the same. This does not include the application of any exemptions.
Costs Estimate: Whilst acknowledging the £450 financial limit you have sought a more detailed breakdown of the estimated costs. Specifically, you require a detailed explanation of the tasks involved; information on any efficiency measures that can be implemented to reduce the time and cost of fulfilling the request e.g. if certain IT tools or search parameters could expedite the process; and that we let you know if similar searches have been conducted in the past which could potentially reduce the time needed for the current request and, if so, you request details on any relevant past searches that could be leveraged. You consider that understanding the basis for the estimate is essential for ensuring transparency and accountability in the allocation of resources. You understand that the appropriate limit for responding to an information request is 18 hours or £450. However, you consider that the distinct sphere of the two requests, as specified in your request for internal review, should each be considered separately to ensure the appropriate limit is not inappropriately applied across the entire request. You consider this separation will help ensure that each aspect of the request is adequately reviewed and responded to within the prescribed limits.
As noted above City’s estimated costs and breakdown apply to the following actions:
setting up the parameters of the IT searches required to identify the relevant email exchanges between the many individuals you have named, within the time periods you have identified, to locate the emails relevant to Your Request; (2) running the IT searches to determine whether the information is held; (3) locating, retrieving and downloading the relevant emails and related documents; (4) staff searching for the requested information within the relevant emails retrieved from the IT searches to locate, retrieve and extract the requested information. City has not included any time for considering whether any of the information is protected by an exemption. I consider that the staff time for searching for the requested information within the relevant emails retrieved from the IT searches to locate, retrieve and extract the requested information would in itself far exceed the appropriate limit and agree with the estimate of the time likely to be incurred set out in Our Response.
As regards efficiency measures that can be implemented to reduce the time and cost of fulfilling the request, I confirm that City does use IT tools and search parameters to locate and expedite the process of identifying and locating the information requested under FOIA. In my experience of handling FOIA requests I do not consider that any additional IT tools could be used to search for the requested information within the relevant emails retrieved from the IT searches to locate, retrieve and extract the requested information. This exercise would need to be undertaken by City staff.
In relation to your question as to whether similar searches have been conducted in the past which could potentially reduce the time needed for the current request I can assure you that from City’s and my own experience over the years, City ensures that it conducts all searches for information in the most efficient manner possible using the technology and staff resources available to City.
Public Interest: As I have noted above, you have raised the issue of public interest. You consider the public interest in disclosing the requested information is substantial. You have stated that the information pertains to the publication of a paper and the unauthorised use of intellectual property, as well as investigations, grievances, and Doctoral Researchers’ representation. You consider transparency in these areas is crucial. As explained above, under Section 12(1) of FOIA City is allowed to refuse to comply with Your Request as it estimates that the cost of compliance with your Request would exceed the appropriate limit. City is not required to take account of any issues of public interest in its refusal where the costs limit will be exceeded.
Statutory Considerations: You have acknowledged the potential application of the Section 40(2) FOIA exemption to third party personal data (as we had noted in Our Response), but you consider that the public interest in accessing the requested information outweighs these considerations. Sections 40(2) and 40(3A) of FOIA provide that information is exempt from disclosure if its disclosure to a member of the public otherwise than under the Act would contravene any of the data protection principles contained in Article 5(1) of the UK General Data Protection Regulation (‘UK GDPR’). I am not able to assess the application of the Section 40(2) exemption to the information you have requested as City would need to have located the requested information to make the relevant assessment. However, if satisfied this exemption is absolute. This means that no public interest test is required to be conducted, although the public interest could be a required consideration in relation to the lawfulness of the processing of third party personal data under this exemption.
You also challenge the notion that any refined or amended request submitted to City would be considered a new request subject to new statutory timescales. You consider that FOIA stipulates that refinements or amendments to an initial request should be treated as part of the original request, provided they are within reasonable limits and do not substantially alter the nature of the request or incur significant additional costs. However, I note that ICO Guidance specifies any refined request becomes a new request. This means that the statutory time for compliance begins on the date of the receipt of that new request as City advised in Our Response.
You also refer to Article 15 of the UK GDPR guaranteeing individuals the right to request their personal data and request amendments or clarifications without
resetting statutory timelines unreasonably. You state that the exemptions protect the privacy of individuals which you respect. However, you urge transparency in how these exemptions are applied. As noted above, I am not able to assess the application of the Section 40(2) exemption to the information you have requested as City would need to have located the requested information to make the relevant assessment. However, I confirm it is City’s practice when applying exemptions and withholding or redacting information to do so with appropriate justifications and explanations.
I appreciate that this may not be the result that you were hoping for, but I am satisfied that Our Response meets the requirements of the FOIA.”
On 23rd January 2025, having received the response from the University, and having been contacted by the Commissioner, the Appellant confirmed that they wished to continue their complaint.
On 26th January 2025, the Commissioner wrote to the Appellant and the University to confirm that he would be investigating whether the University was entitled to rely upon section 12(1) FOAI to refuse the information request. The Commissioner stated the following to the University:
“Section 12 of FOIA – cost limit Section 12(1) allows a public authority to refuse to comply with a request for information if the authority estimates that the cost of compliance would exceed the ‘appropriate limit’, as defined by the Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004 (the Regulations).
Section 12(2) allows a public authority to refuse to confirm or deny whether it holds information of the nature requested if simply to do so would in itself exceed the appropriate limit.
The appropriate limit for central government departments is £600 and £450 for all other public authorities.
The Regulations allow a public authority to charge the following activities at a flat rate of £25 per hour of staff time:
• determining whether the information is held; locating the information, or a document
which may
• contain the information;
• retrieving the information, or a document which may contain the information; and
• extracting the information from a document containing it.
In order to assist with our determination in this case please answer the following
questions.
With reference to the four activities set out above, please provide a detailed estimate of the time/cost taken to provide the information falling within the scope of this request. (Or confirming whether information falling within the scope of the request is held).
When providing these calculations please include a description of the nature the type of work that would need to be undertaken (e.g. searching X number of files– 1 hour).
In providing this estimate please be aware that a number of Information Tribunals have made it clear that an estimate for the purposes of section 12 has to be ‘reasonable’ which means that it is not sufficient for a public authority to simply assert that the appropriate limit has been met; rather the estimate should be realistic, sensible and supported by cogent evidence.
Please clarify whether a sampling exercise has been undertaken in order to determine this estimate.
Please also confirm that the estimate has been based upon the quickest method of gathering the requested information, for example, where possible databases would be used rather than searching manual files.
Section 16 places a duty on a public authority to provide advice and assistance to someone making an information request, including helping an applicant refine a request so that it can be answered within the appropriate costs limit. Therefore, please clarify the nature of any advice and assistance given to the applicant in this case and if no advice and assistance was provided please explain why not.”
The University provided its submissions in response to the Commissioner’s questions on 9th April 2025, which were as follows:
In response to Question 1:
“To determine whether the requested information is held, a sample exercise using Microsoft Purview was conducted. The exercise involved searching across the following mailboxes mentioned in the request:
• [NAME REDACTED] <[EMAIL REDACTED] >;
• [NAME REDACTED] <[EMAIL REDACTED] > ;
• [NAME REDACTED] <[EMAIL REDACTED] >; and
• [NAME REDACTED];;
• [EMAIL REDACTED];
The search of the above mailboxes was conducted using the following keywords aligned with the request:
• [NAME REDACTED] / General Secretary;
• Team Members ([NAMES REDACTED]) ;
• Senate Representation;
• PhD Reps / Representation;
• Post grad network;
• City Doctoral Researchers’ Association
From the above mailboxes the search returned 6,559 emails.. As each email varied in size we considered a proportionate average time to review each email would be approximately 2 minutes. Thus resulting in a total of 219 hours.
The sample exercise indicates that a more comprehensive search to confirm whether the requested information is held would require significantly more time. The five mailboxes reviewed represents a small portion of the relevant email accounts as mentioned within the request, from this sample it is predicted that searching all of the mailboxes outlined in the request would likely involve reviewing thousands of emails. This would far exceed the 18 hour cost limit set out in section 12 of the FOIA.”
In response to Question 2:
“We can confirm that the initial estimate provided in our response was conducted by previous members of the Information Assurance team who no longer work at the University. Therefore, this exercise was conducted by myself in order to comply and confirm the initial response. I can confirm that Microsoft Purview has been used to gather the information required to carry out the sample exercise.”
In response to Question 3:
“I can confirm that the quickest method was used. An extensive sampling exercise using Microsoft Purview / e-discovery searches has been undertaken by myself to determine the estimate provided. This exercise involved the searching of 5 relevant mailboxes from the wide range of mailboxes/accounts outlined by the applicant's request”
In response to Question 4:
“To advise and assist the requestor in refining their request, the requestor was asked to consider:
• Specifically stating what information he/she wished to obtain
• Narrowing the scope of the request by restricting the timeframes, reducing the number of named individuals and/or search terms.
In accordance with Section 16 FOIA, advice and assistance was offered to the requestor in both our initial response as well as out response to the internal review received.”
The Commissioner issued his Decision Notice (IC-348482-F8V4) on 30th April 2025, concluding that:
“…the University was entitled to rely on section 12(1) of FOIA to refuse the request. The Commissioner also finds that the University complied with its section 16 obligation to offer advice and assistance.”.
The Commissioner concluded his that he did not require the University to take any further steps.
The Appeal
The Appellant’s Notice of Appeal in respect of that Decision Notice was submitted to the Tribunal by email on 30th May 2025. The grounds of appeal are stated to be as follows:
Breach of Statutory Deadlines and Case Law: The third party failed to respond to the request within the 20-working-day statutory deadline required by section 10(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. While FOIA allows for limited extensions in certain circumstances, these extensions must still be reasonable and, according to the Respondent's Code of Practice, should not normally exceed a total of 40 working days. In IC-221204-J5M2, the Respondent found that delays exceeding these timeframes constituted breaches of FOIAs procedural requirements, specifically sections 17(3) and 17(5), and criticized the authority for not responding within the statutory and recommended periods.
Sections 12 and 16 Applied Unreasonably: The cost estimate under s12 was insufficiently justified, relying on a partial sample without demonstrating its representativeness or providing a detailed breakdown. The refusal to engage meaningfully with the proposal to split the request, fell short of the duty under s.16. Respondent's guidance and case law make clear that public authorities must work with requesters to help bring requests within the cost limit, not simply reject them on cost grounds.
Public Interest: The requested information related to compliance with statutory obligations—matters of clear public interest. In IC-221204-J5M2, the Respondent found as found that transparency about how public bodies make decisions outweighed the "effective conduct of public affairs" exemption, especially since the decision was already made and arguments for withholding were generic. The Respondent stressed that public interest assessments must be case-specific and that broad or administrative justifications do not override the public interest in transparency regarding statutory compliance. Under FOIA, disclosure is favored where it enhances understanding of how public bodies perform their legal duties.
Inconsistent Treatment of Request Refinement and Statutory Timelines: The decision is wrong because, under FOIA and Respondent's guidance, only a substantially revised or clarified request—especially after advice and assistance—should be treated as a new request that restarts the 20-working-day deadline. Minor clarifications should not be used to delay disclosure. The third party's approach, and the Respondent's acceptance of it, risks frustrating access to information and undermines the principles of transparency and fairness in FOIA.”
In responding to each of the four grounds advanced by the Appellant, the Commissioner’s Response deals firstly with the second ground of appeal, as it relates specifically to the application of section 12(1) FOIA, and the advice and assistance provided by the University under section 16 FOIA. The Commissioner submits as follows:
Response to Ground 2
Section 12(1) FOIA
The Commissioner’s guidance in relation to section 12 FOIA confirms that if it becomes apparent to a public authority that it is going to exceed the appropriate cost limit, it can stop undertaking searches and is not obliged to continue with them.
As per the University’s response to the Commissioner, it undertook a search of 5 mailboxes using 6 key words aligned with the request, resulting in a return of 6,559 emails. The University estimated that it would take 2 minutes to review each email and therefore would take 219 hours to review them all. The Commissioner therefore submits that the University was entitled to stop its searches when it did.
219 hours is over 12 times the 18-hour cost limit set out under section 12 FOIA. When looking at the wording of the request, a large number of inboxes and search terms would need to be searched for, in addition to those used for the sample exercise. This would only serve to increase the cost of complying with the request.
The Appellant has advanced no other grounds in relation to the University’s application of section 12(1) FOIA to refuse the request and has not challenged the estimated time of 2 minutes to review each email.
In accordance with the First-tier Tribunal in the case of Randall v Information Commissioner & Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency [EA/2007/0004], the Commissioner considers that any estimate must be “sensible, realistic and supported by cogent evidence.”.
The University has provided what would be described as a reasonable estimate that is “sensible, realistic and supported by cogent evidence”, when looking at the initial response, outcome of its internal review, and its submissions to the Commissioner during his investigation.
That the Commissioner correctly concluded that the University was entitled to rely upon section 12(1) FOIA to refuse the request.
Section 16 FOIA
The University complied with its obligations under section 16 FOIA in its initial response to the Appellant, under the sub-heading ‘Refining your request’.
Instead of narrowing the scope of their request, as advised by the University, the Appellant stated in their request for an internal review that their request should be split into two requests and the University should compile the requested information into two specific categories: ‘Publication of a Paper and Unauthorised Use of Intellectual Property’ (Request 1) and ‘Investigation, Grievances, Student and Group Complaints, and Student Representation (Request 2).
The University did engage meaningfully with the Appellant’s proposal to split the request into two requests. The University explained to the Appellant at the outcome of its internal review, under the subheading ‘Separate topics’, that splitting the request into two requests would not bring either request below the cost limit, as the same initial searches would be required to obtain the requested information before it could be separated into the two proposed specific categories.
Given that the initial search made by the University was over 12 times the 18-hour cost limit set out under section 12 FOIA, the University is correct to state that splitting the request into two would not bring either request below the cost limit. In any event, even if the University did attempt the Appellant’s suggestion, it is clear when looking at the wording of the original request (i.e. all email exchanges), that there would likely be requested information which would not fall within either of the two specific categories set out by the Appellant.
The University complied with its obligations under section 16 FOIA to offer advice and assistance. However, it does not appear that the Appellant has used this advice and assistance to make a refined request to the University.
Response to Ground 1
That the Appellant’s grounds in relation to section 10 FOIA and section 17 FOIA are incorrect in relation to this request.
Under section 10(1) FOIA, the University had 20 working days to comply with this request. The Appellant made their request on 7th May 2024 and the University responded on 3rd June 2024, thereby complying with its statutory obligation under section 10(1) FOIA.
In its response of 3rd June 2024, the University stated “This letter acts as a Refusal Notice in respect of your request” and refused the request under section 12(1) FOIA. The University therefore complied with its statutory obligations under section 17(5) FOIA.
Under FOIA, there is no obligation for public authorities to provide a complaints process (commonly referred to as undertaking an internal review). However, it is good practice (under the section 45 FOI Code of Practice) and most public authorities choose to do so. It states within the Code that a review must take no longer than 20 working days in most cases, or 40 in exceptional circumstances.
Although there has been a failure to adhere to the FOI Code of Practice by the University, this cannot lead to a formal finding of a breach under FOIA in his Decision Notice in the same way that a breach of section 10 FOIA or section 17 FOIA can. However, the failure was recognised by the Commissioner in the ‘Other matters’ section of his Decision Notice.
Response to Ground 3
The Decision Notice referred to by the Appellant in this ground of appeal (IC-221204-J5M2) involved consideration of section 36 FOIA (Prejudice to the effective conduct of public affairs), which is an exemption under Part II of FOIA and therefore subject to the public interest test.
The Decision Notice under appeal in this instance relates to the application of section 12 FOIA, which is not an exemption under Part II of FOIA, and is therefore not subject to the public interest test.
Response to Ground 4
In the Appellant’s request for the University to undertake an internal review of its response, it proposed that the request should be split into two requests. However, as set out in the Commissioner’s response to Ground 2, the University explained in the outcome of its internal review why this approach would not bring the costs of complying with the request to below the 18-hour cost limit.
There was no revised or clarified request that was treated as a new request by the University, and there is consequently no basis of this ground of appeal.
The application to strike out the appeal
As part of his Response to the Notice of Appeal, the Commissioner submits that the Appellant has advanced no argument of substance, or provided any evidence, which challenges the Commissioner’s finding that the University is entitled to rely on section 12(1) FOIA to refuse the request. It is submitted that the Appellant has therefore failed to set out any cogent argument as to why the Commissioner’s Decision Notice is not in accordance with the law and/or why the Commissioner ought to have exercised any discretion differently. For these reasons, and the arguments set out in the Response to the grounds of appeal advanced by the Appellant in the Notice of Appeal, the Commissioner submits that the appeal should be struck out under rule 8(3)(c) of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009, on the basis that no part of the Appellant’s case has any reasonable prospect of success.
Discussion and Conclusions
The Appellant has never provided a Reply to the Commissioner’s Response under Rule 24, though this is not obligatory under the Rules, as Rule 24 simply provides an Appellant with an opportunity to reply to a response. However, Rule 8(4) requires the Appellant to have been given an opportunity to make representations in relation to the proposed striking out before the Tribunal may strike out the appeal under Rule 8(3)(c).
On 8th August 2025, the Tribunal’s Registrar directed the Appellant to confirm no later than 18th August 2025 whether the appeal was being withdrawn or “To make representations as to why the appeal should not be struck out as having no reasonable prospect of success.”. Those case management directions were given in order to progress the appeal and to provide the Appellant with an opportunity to make representations in relation to the proposed striking out of the appeal.
On 22nd August 2025, the Appellant applied for reconsideration of the Registrar’s directions of 8th August 2025 under Rule 4(3). Judge Harris considered that matter afresh and confirmed and upheld the Registrar’s directions on 2nd December 2025. However, to date, the Appellant has still not provided the Tribunal with any representations in response to the Commissioner’s application to strike out the proceedings. I am satisfied that the Appellant has been given an opportunity to do so as required by Rule 8(4) however. Indeed, the Appellant has had a more than significant period of time in which to make any representations opposing an application which was submitted to the Tribunal on 14th July 2025.
Before I consider whether to strike out the appeal under Rule 8(3)(c), I must first remind myself of the law in relation to requests for information which are refused under section 12(1) FOIA.
Under section 1(1) FOIA, a person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled: (a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request; and (b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him. However, under section 12 FOIA, a public authority is not required to comply with section 1(1) FOIA where the cost of complying with the request would exceed the appropriate limit. Section 12 FOIA provides as follows:
Section 12 (Exemption where cost of compliance exceeds appropriate limit)
Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the authority estimates that the cost of complying with the request would exceed the appropriate limit.
Subsection (1) does not exempt the public authority from its obligation to comply with paragraph (a) of section 1(1) unless the estimated cost of complying with that paragraph alone would exceed the appropriate limit.
In subsections (1) and (2) “the appropriate limit” means such amount as may be prescribed, and different amounts may be prescribed in relation to different cases.
The [Secretary of State] may by regulations provide that, in such circumstances as may be prescribed, where two or more requests for information are made to a public authority—
by one person, or
by different persons who appear to the public authority to be acting in concert or in pursuance of a campaign,
the estimated cost of complying with any of the requests is to be taken to be the estimated total cost of complying with all of them.
The [Secretary of State] may by regulations make provision for the purposes of this section as to the costs to be estimated and as to the manner in which they are to be estimated.
As the University is not listed in Part I of Schedule 1 FOIA, Regulation 3(3) of The Freedom of Information and Data protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004 (“the Regulations”) provides that the ‘appropriate limit’ for this public authority is £450.
Not all costs which may be incurred in complying with a request may be taken into account. Regulation 4(3) of the Regulations provides that “a public authority may, for the purpose of its estimate, take account only of the costs it reasonably expects to incur in relation to the request in-
determining whether it holds the information,
locating the information, or a document which may contain the information,
retrieving the information, or a document which may contain the information, and
extracting information from a document containing it.”
Regulation 4(4) provides that such costs are to be estimated at a rate of £25 per hour.
Applying these Regulations to the University, it follows that it would be entitled to refuse a request for information if complying with the request would result in it spending more than 18 hours (i.e. £450 divided by £25) on any of the tasks identified in Regulation 4(3). In this instance, the University has stated that it estimates that complying with the request would take in excess of 219 hours to perform these tasks. The sample exercise that it carried out was limited in size and scope, but it nonetheless returned a sizeable 6,559 emails. Having identified 2 minutes as an average time to review each of those emails, considering that each email varied in size, this resulted in the 219 hours identified by the University. Had the University complied with the information request, the number of emails which are likely to have been identified, and the number of hours involved is likely to have been significantly greater. Even if the time to review each email was halved to 1 minute in that sample exercise, the time that would be required to review the 6559 emails would be over 109 hours. That would still be greatly in excess of the 18 hours provided for by the Regulation in the case of the University. I am however satisfied that the estimate provided by the university to review each email, when considering that the length of each email is likely to vary significantly, is sensible and realistic. Each email would need to be read by the reviewer and consideration then given to whether any of the exemptions under Part II FOIA would apply to any of the information contained within the email. That is not necessarily something which can be identified at first glance, and may still require consultation with other departments to determine the nature of any content. However, as I have already discussed, even if this was reduced to one minute, then it would still yield results far in excess of the appropriate limit of 18 hours (£450).
The Appellant submits in his grounds of appeal that section 12 was applied unreasonably and that it was insufficiently justified. This does not appear to be the case at all, as the University’s sample exercise, when applied to the full search terms and email addresses detailed within the Appellant’s request would undoubtedly yield far greater results than the limited sample that was used to evidence the extent of the work that would be involved in complying with the request. The purpose of section 12 FOIA is of course to enable a public authority to refuse to comply with an information request which would place an overly burdensome weight upon it if it were to comply with that request. To some extent there is therefore some overlap with requests which are considered to be vexatious under section 14(1) FOIA. Both provisions exist so as to protect public authorities from overly burdensome requests which would, if they were not refused, result in significant time and effort being expended on providing information, which might otherwise be better spent on delivering the public service(s) that it was set up to provide.
The explanation provided by the University on 16th January 2025, by way of an outcome to the internal review, as to why the Appellant’s suggested splitting of the request into two parts would not bring the time required anywhere below the £450 limit / 18 hours was accepted by the Commissioner, and was as follows:
“This separation explains your purpose for requesting the respective information. However, this does not impact the breadth of the request you have made and the need for City to run the searches to locate all of the emails to and from the long list of individuals you have identified (and related documents) in relation to the specific matters you have identified in your Request; and then to review these emails to locate, retrieve and extract the wide categories of information you have requested in your Request. I do not consider that assessing your Request as two separate Requests with the matters you have specified will impact on the time required for City to manage and respond to your Request.”
I have considered the Appellant’s suggestion by reference to the evidence which has been provided, and I am satisfied that the suggested splitting up of the request would not yield results which would bring the work involved to a level below the appropriate limit. The request is of such a broad nature and the sample exercise conducted by the University demonstrates that the results obtained would be so large that it would be impossible for the University to comply with the request without exceeding the appropriate limit of 18 hours (£450).
As has been identified by the Commissioner, section 12(1) FOIA does not require any balancing of the public interests under section 2 FOIA. If the costs of the University complying with the request exceeds the £450 limit. The evidence here, as I have already stated, suggests that complying with the request would far exceed this limit.
I am satisfied that the University has complied with its obligations under section 10 and section 17 FOIA, and I am additionally satisfied that the University provided advice and assistance within the meaning of section 16 FOIA when it provided its initial response to the Appellant on 3rd June 2025 under the heading ‘Refining your request’ (see paragraph 3 above). It is noteworthy that the Appellant’s response was to decline the suggestion to narrow the scope of the request as follows:
“We respectfully decline the suggestion to narrow the scope of the request. Both
aspects of the inquiry are integral to Our mission of promoting transparency and
accountability within Our academic community.”
I have considered all of the available evidence in this matter, including the Appellant’s grounds of appeal and the Commissioner’s Response. I must therefore consider whether “there is no reasonable prospect of the appellant’s case, or part of it, succeeding”, before I may strike out the appeal under Rule 8(3)(c). For the reasons set out in the preceding paragraphs, I do not consider that there has been any breach of section 10, 16 or 17 FOIA, and therefore any appeal on those grounds is, in my view, bound to fail, and has no reasonable prospect of succeeding. The remaining question is therefore whether the appeal in respect of the Commissioner’s decision that the University was entitled to rely on section 12(1) FOIA has any reasonable prospect of succeeding on appeal. For the reasons set out above, I conclude that there is no reasonable prospect of the Appellant’s case succeeding.
Signed:
Date:Judge Armstrong-Holmes
1st April 2026Amended on 2 April 2026