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Najam Hussan Afzal v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors

United Kingdom First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) 15 April 2026 [2026] UKFTT 545 (GRC)

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Neutral citation number: [2026] UKFTT 00545 (GRC)

Case Reference: FT/D/2025/1237

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

GENERAL REGULATORY CHAMBER

(TRANSPORT)

Heard by Cloud Video Platform

On: 19 March 2026

Decision given on: 15 April 2026

Before

JUDGE MCMAHON

SPECIALIST MEMBER PEPPERELL

SPECIALIST MEMBER ROANTREE

Between

NAJAM HUSSAN AFZAL

Appellant

-and-

REGISTRAR OF APPROVED DRIVING INSTRUCTORS

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: The Appellant appeared on his own behalf, accompanied by his wife , Iram Khan.

For the Respondent: Mr. D. Russell.

Decision:

The appeal is Allowed. The Decision of the Respondent made
on 20 October 2025 is set aside.

REASONS

1.

This appeal was listed for hearing on 19 March 2026 for oral hearing by CVP The Appellant attended along with his wife. Both gave oral evidence. Oral evidence and submissions were given by the Respondent’s representative.

2.

The Appellant appealed against a decision of the Respondent dated 20 October 2025 to remove the Appellant’s name from Register (‘the Register’) of Approved Driving Instructors (‘ADIs’), on the basis that he was no longer a fit and proper person (‘FPP’) to have his name remain on the Register, pursuant to section 128(2)(e) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (‘the Act’), due to him having been convicted of two motoring offences (CU80 – on 7 February 2025 - and SP30 – on 10 October 2024) by way of a Fixed Penalty Notices, in respect of which a total of 6 penalty points were endorsed on the Appellant’s driving licence, for breach of requirements as to control of a motor vehicle, mobile telephones, etc., and excess speed.

3.

The Appellant submitted an appeal on 16 November 2025, against the Respondent’s said decision on the following grounds, in terms:

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that, in spite of a number of challenges faced by him (including illness -evidenced by his GP records - and family bereavements), he had done his best to meet the FPP standard, showing how those challenges affected him, his family and pupils;

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that he faced future financial hardship as result of the decision of the Respondent;

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that he had taken steps to ensure no recurrence;

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that he had spent years to become an ADI despite financial restrictions, worked hard to get to where he was now and so many people depended on him;

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that he and his family experienced mental anxiety as a result of the Respondent’s decision and found the whole matter overwhelming;

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that minimal account had been taken of his individual circumstances;

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that the decision of the Respondent was disproportionate, procedurally unfair and not in the public interest;

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that he remained a FPP in the circumstances despite the two motoring offences that were isolated events;

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that there had been full transparency and co-operation in his dealings with the Respondent;

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that the driver in question in connection with the CU80 offence had given him the wrong identity details;

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that the police had not been diligent in that regard;

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that he did reject a call on his mobile phone, that was located in a cradle phone holder, while giving a ‘refresher’ driving lesson;

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that he had challenged both offences in court;

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that he had many good character references [that were attached];

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that he had limited employment alternatives.

4.

In his representations to the Respondent dated 19 September and 13 October 2025, in respect of the Respondent’s intention to refuse his application to have his name removed from the Register, the Appellant, essentially, recited the circumstances surrounding both offences, noting that due to the circumstances, his penalty points for the CU80 offence were reduced from 6 points to 3 points; that he was not the driver of the vehicle on either occasion; that he apologised but maintained he had done nothing wrong; that he had been an ADI for 15 years - his sole livelihood. In his Notice of Appeal, the Appellant went into further detail, essentially stating that despite all the challenges faced by him, he had, at all times, done his best to meet the FPP standard; explained how circumstances had affected him, his family and pupils; that he had taken steps to prevent a recurrence; that he had spent years to become an ADI despite financial restrictions, having worked hard to get where he was, and that so many people depended on him and that he suffered mental anxiety, finding the experience overwhelming and faced future financial hardship if his name were to be removed from the Register.

5.

In his oral evidence, the Appellant, asked for one chance to remain on the Register; that he was really apologetic; had learned his lesson and had changed. He confirmed that he was not driving the vehicle at the time of the offences and did not have the correct details of the drivers. He confirmed he had been an ADI for 15 years. He stated that both he and his wife had been ill for the last few months and was faced with bills where his only income was from driving instruction. He reiterated the good driving test pass record achieved by his pupils and that he worked hard and was dedicated.

6.

In response to questions from the Tribunal expressing some concern at his record keeping, the Appellant stated that he now kept good records. He stated that, at the time of one of the offences, he was in his personal vehicle, not his instructor vehicle; that the person who was driving gave him the wrong personal details and he could not then trace him. He stated he knew him through the car wash as ‘Jay’. He stated that this person had driven his, the Appellant’s, vehicle to the filling station without his permission. He stated that his solicitor had advised him to accept 3 penalty points in case he received 6 penalty points. In respect of the second offence, that of speeding, the Appellant stated that this was a ‘refresher’ lesson and that the person in question was not a pupil, but that while he had checked his licence, he could not identify the driver. He confirmed he had been asked in correspondence to identify the driver, but he could not be traced and so he, the Appellant, was convicted and received another 3 penalty points.

7.

The Appellant’s wife confirmed, in oral evidence, that the Appellant had notified the Respondent of receiving 6 penalty points for the first offence (CU80) but, on the advice of his solicitor, on going to court, accepted 3 penalty points, rather than 6 penalty points.

8.

The Appellant confirmed that, on 4 September 2025, he had attended court in Bedford without a solicitor in respect of the 7 February 2025 offence (CU80).He stated that, while in the front passenger seat, he had cancelled a call on his mobile phone, for which he was convicted of the CU80 offence, but that the police did not take the driver’s details. He maintained he had checked the driver’s details but had not written them down; that the driver had shown him a photocard driving licence; that he, the Appellant, checked the photograph, the expiry date of the licence and the driver’s address, all of which were correct when he checked on-line. He stated that the police had observed him supervising the driver and that his mobile phone was in a cradle when he had cancelled the call. He stated he had genuinely believed the driver had provided correct details, but this had not proven to be correct. He stated that when he received a second letter, he did not tell the Respondent as there had, at that date, been no conviction but that he was keeping the Respondent updated. He repeated that he had been advised in court to accept 3 penalty points in respect of the CU80 offence, concerning the mobile phone, and that he thought he had notified this to the Respondent.

9.

The Respondent’s representative had no questions for the Appellant.

10.

The Appellant’s wife submitted that the situation was confusing: that the Appellant had notified the Respondent of receiving 6 penalty points concerning the mobile phone issue but that, the matter had been re-opened on the Appellant making a Statutory Declaration and had been advised to accept 3 penalty points instead as he could not identify the driver. She referred to personal difficulties all of this had caused the family and became somewhat emotional; that the Appellant had accepted the 3 penalty points as he ‘had had enough’; that he had learned a lesson and had implemented new steps and that if the Appellant’s name were removed from the Register, the family would ‘really struggle’.

11.

The Respondent had furnished a Response to the appeal dated 17 February 2026. This stated that the Appellant’s name had first been entered onto the Register in November 2011 and would have expired, in the ordinary course, on 30 November 2027. The Response confirmed that, initially, DVLA had advised the Respondent that the Appellant had been convicted of a motoring offence (MS90) (failure to identify a driver) on 20 December 2024 and was given 6 penalty points. It was on that basis that the Respondent had decided that the Appellant was not a FPP to have his name remain on the Register. However, upon the Appellant querying this with DVLA, that offence was removed from the Appellant’s DVLA record but now recorded that the Appellant had been convicted of a CU80 motoring offence and was given 3 penalty points and now, on that new basis, together with the Appellant receiving a further 3 penalty points for a separate motoring offence (SP30), the Respondent, on that basis, confirmed its original decision that the Appellant was no longer a FPP to have his name remain on the Register. In addition, the Respondent’s reasons for its decision included, in terms, that account had to be taken not only of the Appellant’s driving instructional ability, but, in addition, his character, behaviour and standard of conduct that, for an ADI, was expected to be at a higher level than that of an ordinary motorist; that driving instruction was a responsible and demanding task that should only be entrusted to those with high standards and a keen sense for road safety and, in committing the said motoring offences, the Appellant did not display those high standards; that government had increased the penalties for motoring offences as those offences contributed to a significant number of road casualties; that the Respondent could not condone the commission of motoring offences of this nature as, to do so, would, effectively, sanction such behaviour that would be offensive to other ADIs, and aspiring ADIs, who had been scrupulous in observing the law, to ignore the said offences that were stated to be recent and relevant.

12.

In his oral evidence to the Tribunal, the Respondent’s representative reiterated these reasons in summary.

13.

In response to questions from the Tribunal, the Respondent’s representative stated that no decision had been made until after the court proceedings where the Appellant had challenged the offences, but that the Respondent had been considering removing the Appellant’s name from the Register on the basis of him receiving just 3 penalty points, emphasising that offences involving mobile phones were regarded as serious as the Appellant was not in proper control of the vehicle. He confirmed that no offence involving a mobile phone was created if the phone was in a cradle, unless there was loss of control of the vehicle.

14.

The Appellant had no questions for the Respondent’s representative.

15.

The Respondent’s representative had no closing remarks to make.

16.

The Appellant, in closing remarks, emphasised he had learned a lesson and wanted one chance to remain on the Register, referring to his health and driving instruction being his only livelihood.

17.

Conditions to have an ADI’s name remain on the Register do require that account to be taken of anapplicant’s character, behaviour and standards of conduct. This involves consideration of allmaterial matters, including convictions, and other relevant behaviour, placing all matters incontext, and balancing positive and negative features as appropriate.

18.

An appeal to this Tribunal against the Respondent’s decision proceeds as an appeal by way ofre-hearing, that is, the Tribunal makes a fresh decision on the evidence before it. The Tribunal must givesuch weight as it considers appropriate to the Respondent’s reasons for its decision as the Respondent is the regulatory authority tasked by Parliament with making such decisions. The Tribunal does not conduct a proceduralreview of the Respondent’s decision-making process.

19.

As a matter of law, the standing of the Respondent could be substantially diminished, and the public’s confidenceundermined, if it were known that a person whose name was included in the Register when they had demonstrated behaviours or been convicted in relation to an offence, substantially material to the question of fitness. This can be in respect of behaviourpertaining to motoring matters and other matters of responsibility, trustworthiness and prudence;indeed, it would, indeed, be unfair to others who have been scrupulous in their behaviour, and in observingthe law, if such matters were ignored or overlooked.

20.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Harris v. Registrar of Approved Driving
Instructors [2010] EWCA Civ 808 confirmed that -

“..... the condition is not simply that the applicant is a fit and proper person to be a driving instructor;it is that he is a fit and proper person to have his name entered in the Register. Registration carrieswith it an official seal of approval ..... the maintenance of public confidence in the Register is important. For that purpose, the Registrar must be in a position to carry out his function of scrutinyeffectively, including consideration of the implications of any

convictions of an applicant or aRegistered Approved Driving Instructor. That is why there are stringent disclosure requirements.”

21.

In reaching the Decision, the Tribunal took into account all of the evidence and submissions received, written and oral, and considered all of the circumstances relevant to this appeal.

22.

The Tribunal, after careful consideration, decided to take an exceptional course, on a very fine balance, and allow this appeal for the following reasons:

1)

the Appellant accepted the imposition of 3 penalty points in respect of the excess speed offence, in circumstances where he was not present in court, but his solicitor had negotiated an alternative disposal of 3 penalty points instead of 6 penalty points, at a time when the Appellant was dealing with the aftermath of the murder of his cousin, was in a vulnerable state, and felt unable to continue fighting the matter even though he continued to maintain he was not the driver;

2)

the Respondent wrongly treated this SP30 conviction, in the circumstances, as though it was a clear and reliable indicator of poor driving standards on the part of the Appellant;

3)

this conviction did not, of itself, demonstrate dangerous driving, deliberate misconduct or disregard for road safety and there was a paucity of evidence concerning the precise circumstances at the time: the Tribunal accepted, on the balance of probabilities, that the offence arose from vulnerability rather than culpability;

4)

it was entirely understandable that the Respondent took a stringent stance on the CU80 offence since mobile phone offences are properly considered serious for ADIs;

5)

however, CU80 has two limbs, but one is materially more serious than the other: only the limb that encompasses using a mobile phone carries 6 penalty points, otherwise, not being in proper control of the vehicle carries 3 penalty points, that was imposed on the Appellant, circumstances that were entirely consistent with the Appellant’s oral evidence;

6)

if the driver was fully licensed, then the Appellant was not supervising a driving pupil for the purposes of the more serious offence, but the Respondent appears to have treated this offence as the more serious limb of the offence, a position rejected by the Tribunal;

7)

the regulatory risk is substantially mitigated now since the Appellant has vastly improved his system, particularly in respect of record-keeping, thus substantially addressing the procedural failures that contributed to both convictions, were the Appellant accepted that his record-keeping, at the material time, fell below the required standard;

8)

the Appellant has a long-established positive professional record, with 15 years of unblemished service: the two isolated incidents that resulted in convictions for motoring offences are exceptional and limited in their significance when properly understood;

9)

both incidents occurred during a period of profound family strain, bereavement and health difficulties, affecting, as found by the Tribunal, the Appellant’s emotional resilience and administrative functioning at the time;

10)

the Tribunal found the Appellant and his wife to be credible;

11)

the Tribunal found that to remove the Appellant’s name from the Register would not be proportionate in all the circumstances when the matters are understood in their full context.

23.

Nevertheless, the Appellant is clearly warned that this is an exceptional step taken by the Tribunal and it is highly unlikely that an appeal by him in the future, in similar circumstances would succeed.

24.

Further, notwithstanding the Decision made by the Tribunal, the Tribunal attaches significant importance to the integrity ofthe Register. For the public to have trust init, the Respondent must act in a way that encourages belief that those on it have high standards. Allowing those who do not meet those standards would undermine the trust placed in it with serious consequences for those who do maintain the necessary high standards.These are matters of wider, and public interest, which attract significant weight even where, as would have been the case here, having his name removed from the Register being would have had significant consequences for the Appellant.

25.

Accordingly, the appeal isallowed.