Muawiyah Hafeez v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors

This appeal was listed for oral hearing by CVP on 1 April 2026 at 11.00. The Appellant gave oral evidence and oral submissions were received from his representative. Oral evidence and submissions were heard on behalf of the Respondent from its representative.

The Appellant appealed against a decision of the Respondent dated 17 October 2025 to remove his name from the Register (‘the Register’) of Approved Driving Instructors (‘ADIs’), pursuant to section 128(2)(e) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (‘the Act’) on the basis that, having taken account of the Appellant’s representations received by email on 8 October 2025, he was no longer a fit and proper person (‘FPP’) to have his name remain on the Register due to him having accepted that, on 2 August 2025, he had committed a motoring offence, namely, a breach of legislative requirements concerning control of a motor vehicle, mobile telephones and so on (CU80) for which he accepted a fixed penalty of an endorsement of 6 penalty points on his licence, pursuant to a Fixed Penalty Notice (‘FPN’) being issued to him.

‘CU80’ is a penalty code for breaching vehicle control requirements, specifically for using a handheld phone or device while driving. ‘Using’ includes texting, calling, browsing, taking photographs or checking notifications while driving, even if stationary at traffic lights or queuing in traffic. The Highway Code refers to it being illegal to hold or use a mobile phone or any device capable of sending or receiving data while driving. The importance of this is that holding or using a mobile phone or device while driving automatically attracts a fine and a driving licence endorsement of 6 penalty points. The evidence before the Tribunal from the Appellant was that he had pushed home the charging cable to his mobile phone that, he stated, had become loose, but not detached while the phone itself was being held in a phone-holder on the right hand side of the dashboard of his vehicle adjacent to the driver’s window.

The Appellant submitted an appeal dated 11 November 2025, against the Respondent’s said decision, maintaining that, on balance, due to mitigating factors, he remained a FPP to have his name remain on the Register. To a large degree, the Appellant reiterated his representations made to the Respondent upon him being advised of the Respondent’s intention to remove his name for the reason stated. The Appellant, through his solicitors, submitted a detailed written statement, elaborating on his said representations, together with a number of character references and a receipt for the purchase of another vehicle with an integrated Bluetooth facility. The Appellant, again, through his solicitors, submitted a detailed Skeleton Argument in advance of the hearing. This formed the basis of the oral submissions made at the hearing on behalf of the Appellant by his representative. In terms, it was submitted:

The Appellant’s representative, quite properly, did not pursue an argument that the decision under appeal represented an unlawful breach of the Appellant’s rights under Article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

In his oral submissions, the Appellant’s representative focussed on an argument that the decision under appeal was disproportionate in all the circumstances, particularly when it was acknowledged by the Respondent that there had been no real risk, submitting that removal of the name of an ADI from the Register was the most serious penalty that could be imposed on an ADI. He also submitted that there was no established definition of ‘fit and proper person’; that what had occurred was a momentary lapse on the part of the Appellant but accepting that the potential of financial hardship arising was not determinative.

In his oral evidence, the Appellant reiterated that he had merely been adjusting the cable going into his phone; that he accepted straight away having committed an offence; that, as he was getting married, he had not considered appealing the offence to the Magistrates’ Court, thinking it was sufficient that he need only report and explain the position to the Respondent; that he was alone driving his vehicle at the time of the offence; that the phone was located to his right and he re-connected the cable (that had not come out but was merely loose) with his right hand and that he had now changed to a car with a wireless facility. The Appellant accepted he should have ‘pulled over’ and fixed the cable, but that he had only taken two seconds to adjust the cable and was not ‘plugging in’ the cable. He accepted that an ADI was held to higher standards than those of an ordinary motorist.

The Respondent’s representative had no questions for the Appellant.

The Respondent’s representative summarised orally the Respondent’s case. He pointed out that the Appellant’s licence had been endorsed with 6 penalty points concerning control of a vehicle; that while he accepted the candour of the Appellant, the Appellant did not challenge the offence even though he stated in writing that he did not pick up and use the phone, emphasising that an ADI was held to higher standards than those of an ordinary motorist. He confirmed that the Respondent’s Guidance state that an ADI’s name was liable to be removed from the Register if he/she received 5 penalty points or more but the concept of being ‘fair and reasonable was also in the Guidance and an ADI’s name would not be automatically removed from the Register if he/she received 6 penalty points.

In response to questions from the Appellant’s representative, the Respondet’s representative agreed he was not aware of any instance where the Respondent had permitted the name of an ADI who had received 6 penalty points to have his/her name remain on the Register but was aware of instances were an appeal in such circumstances had been allowed by the Tribunal, as well as the Tribunal refusing such appeals. The Respondent’s representative stated that the Respondent had accepted that the Appellant had, ‘in some way’, used his phone, but that the Respondent had nothing to dispute the Appellant’s account.

In his Response document, the Respondent emphasised that the Appellant had accepted a FPN for a serious motoring offence that resulted in his driving licence being endorsed with 6 penalty points and, therefore, was no longer a FPP to have his name remain on the Register; that teaching (generally) young people to drive was a responsible and demanding task [taken to be referring to the need for an ADI to maintain high professional standards, a submission that was accepted by the Tribunal] that should only be entrusted to those with high standards and a keen sense of road safety, something not demonstrated by the Appellant in receiving 6 penalty points for a motoring offence, in which penalties had recently been increased due to a significant number of casualties occurring; that conditions for remaining on the Register extended beyond instructional ability alone, requiring an ADI to be a FPP, having regard to his/her character, behaviour and standards of conduct above those of an ordinary motorist; that offences of this nature could not be condoned as, to do so, would, effectively, sanction such behaviour if those who transgressed were allowed to have their names remain on the Register that allows them to teach others to drive and would be offensive to other ADIs, or aspiring ADIs, who had been scrupulous in observing the law, to ignore this offence and that the Appellant had not displayed the level of responsibility or commitment to improving road safety expected of an ADI in committing this offence.

The Respondent’s representative had no closing submissions to make.

The Appellant’s representative, in closing, stated that there were no passengers in the Appellant’s vehicle when the offence was committed; that the phone was to his right side; that the phone cable had become dislodged (but had not fallen) and that the Appellant’s evidence was consistent. The Appellant’s representative cited three appeal decisions that had been allowed, he submitted, in similar circumstances. He emphasised again the question of proportionality and that what had occurred was a momentary lapse.

The Appellant confirmed he had nothing further to add.

Every piece of evidence and submissions, both written and oral from, and on behalf of the parties, was considered by the Tribunal, resulting in the Tribunal taking an exceptional course to allow this appeal, on balance of probabilities. Each appeal is considered on its own merits, previous Tribunal decisions not being binding authorities.

The Appellant submitted that there was precedent where an appeal by an ADI was allowed and their name not removed from the Register despite incurring penalty points for using a mobile phone while driving. However, while the Tribunal approached its Decision in this appeal, having regard to the question of proportionality, precedents of another First-tier Tribunal that may have gone in favour of some other Appellants(s) were not binding on this Tribunal and, in any event, there are very many other precedents that went the other way where the circumstances and facts were similar to those in this appeal. Further, in one of the specific Tribunal decisions relied upon by the Appellant, the Tribunal there made it very clear that it was taking an exceptional course due to special circumstances.

While the Appellant did not challenge the FPN in the local Magistrates’ Court, the Tribunal, on the balance of probabilities, found the Appellant to be credible, forthright, honest, sincere and heartfelt, and accepted that he was only adjusting the cable into his phone and was not using his phone. The importance of this was that it is not a criminal offence to hold a mobile phone and does not automatically attract 6 penalty points. There was no evidence before the Tribunal that, at the time of issue of the FPN, the Appellant had been using his mobile phone (albeit even holding his mobile phone was foolish and not at all to be recommended).

While it is not the role of the Tribunal, on appeal, to review the decision-making processes of the Respondent, the Respondent could, and should, in all the circumstances, have accepted that were exceptional mitigating circumstances, and could, and should, have, in the alternative, issued a warning to the Appellant, rather than make a decision to remove his name from the Register.

The basis of the Respondent’s decision was that the Appellant did not fulfil the
criteria to be a ‘fit and proper person’, as required by the relevant provisions in the Act.

Conditions require that an ADI (the Appellant in this case) to be a ‘fit and proper person’. This requires account to be taken of anAppellant’s character, behaviour and standards of conduct. This involves consideration of allmaterial matters, including convictions for offences including, as in this case, a motoring offence, and other relevant behaviour, placing all matters incontext, and balancing positive and negative features as appropriate. The Respondent may take theview that a person no longer meets this requirement where there has been a change incircumstances.

An appeal to this Tribunal against the Respondent’s decision proceeds as an appeal by way ofre-hearing, that is, the Tribunal makes a fresh decision on the evidence before it. The Tribunal must givesuch weight as it considers appropriate to the Respondent’s reasons for its decision as the Respondent is the regulatory authority tasked by Parliament with making such decisions.

The Appellant, in essence, correctly submitted in both his written and oral evidence that all of the circumstances had to examined and that the penalty imposed on him in respect of a motoring offence did not, and should not, result in automatic removal of his name from the Register.

The Tribunal found that, while the Appellant did not challenge the alleged offence in the local Magistrates’ Court, the commission of the alleged offence was not, in fact, made out. The Tribunal also accepted that the Appellant was remorseful and what occurred would not recur. It was accepted that the Appellant loved his career as an ADI and that he was an otherwise diligent ADI. The Tribunal accepted that the Appellant understood the standards expected of an ADI.

While the Tribunal was conscious of, and was bound by, the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Harris v. Registrar of Approved Driving
Instructors [2010] EWCA Civ 808 that stated, inter alia -

In reaching its Decision, the Tribunal took into account all of the evidence and submissions received, both written and oral, and considered all of the circumstances relevant to this appeal.

The Tribunal also considered the wider context of the Appellant’s professional conduct.

The decision of the Tribunal in this appeal does not take away from the importance which attaches to the integrity ofthe Register. For the public to have trust init, the Respondent must act in a way that encourages belief that those on it have high standards. Allowing those who do not meet those standards would undermine the trust placed in it with serious consequences for those who do maintain the necessary high standards.These are matters of wider, and public interest, which attract significant weight.

Accordingly, the appeal isallowed.