Robert Clayton v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors

This appeal was listed for oral hearing by CVP on 1 April 2026 by CVP at 10.00. The Appellant did not attend, nor contact the Tribunal to either seek to withdraw his appeal or seek a postponement or adjournment or to say he could not attend. He also failed to answer a number of telephone calls made to him by the clerk, merely cutting off the calls. He eventually, long after the Tribunal had decided to proceed in his absence at 10.10, contacted the Tribunal clerk by email to confirm that he knew his hearing was listed for hearing but that he was engaged in training with a view to becoming a HGV driver but, again, did not seek an adjournment. The Tribunal decided that it could make a decision in the Appellant’s absence and that it was in the interests of justice to do so. The Respondent’s representative attended and made oral submissions.

The Appellant appealed against a decision of the Respondent dated 27 October 2025 to remove the Appellant’s name from the Register (‘the Register’) of Approved Driving Instructors (‘ADIs’), pursuant to section 128(2)(e) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (‘the Act’) on the basis that, having taken account of representations made by the Appellant by email on 6 October 2025, he had ceased to be a fit and proper person (‘FPP’) to have his name remain on the Register due to four complaints received from, or on behalf of, former pupils, over a two year period, that he had taken fees from them for driving lessons that he had not delivered and had not refunded those fees when requested to do so. In addition, arising out of those complaints, his employment as an examiner with the Driving and Vehicle Standards Agency (‘DVSA’) had been terminated as his conduct was found not to have met the required standards of honesty and integrity and he had committed fraud.

The Appellant submitted an undated appeal against the Respondent’s said decision on the following grounds, in terms:

The Appellant made representations to the Respondent dated 6 October 2025 that, essentially, only addressed the fourth complaint, that from Ms. Hedger.

Significantly, the Appellant had engaged in the precise same unacceptable course of conduct in December 2021, October 2022 and October 2025, in relation to three other former pupils, respect of which the Respondent issued a warning letter to the Appellant.

The Respondent, in his detailed Response dated 13 March 2026, elaborated on the circumstances on the immediate last four complaints and the Appellant’s responses thereto, that, essentially, avoided the issue in each case. The basis of the Respondent’s decision was that the Appellant had ceased to be a FPP, as required by s.125(2)(e) of the Act, by reason of the four most recent complaints for the reasons outlined and his subsequent dismissal from employment with the DVSA as a result.

The Respondent’s Response gave reasons for removing the Appellant’s name from the Register, namely, in terms:

The Respondent’s representative, in oral submissions, reiterated the contents of the Decision letter and the Respondent’s Response document.

The Respondent’s representative stated that the Appellant had not challenged his dismissal from employment with the DVSA and that while he had stated that the issues raised by two [not all four] of the instant, latest complainants had been resolved, this was not the case, even to date. He confirmed that the sum of money in question was £600.00. He stated that the Respondent had given the Appellant the benefit of the doubt in relation to the previous three complaints of the same nature and merely issued a warning letter. He confirmed that the previous complaints had nothing to do with the ‘Trust Deed’ issue and that the Appellant had simply not done what he said he would do. The Respondent’s representative confirmed that the conduct of the Appellant in question was covered in the ADI Code of Practice but that the Respondet did not know the contents of any contract between the Appellant and each of his pupils.

The Respondent’s representative confirmed that he had no further submissions to make to the Tribunal.

An appeal to this Tribunal against the Respondent’s decision proceeds as an appeal by way ofre-hearing, that is, the Tribunal makes a fresh decision on the evidence before it. The Tribunal must givesuch weight as it considers appropriate to the Respondent’s reasons for its decision as the Respondent is the regulatory authority tasked by Parliament with making such decisions. The Tribunal does not conduct a proceduralreview of the Respondent’s decision-making process.

As a matter of law, the standing of the Respondent could be substantially diminished, and the public’s confidenceundermined, if it were known that a person whose name was included in the Register when they had demonstrated behaviours substantially material to the question of fitness. This can be in respect of behaviourpertaining to matters of responsibility, trustworthiness and prudence;indeed, it would be unfair to others who have been scrupulous in their behaviour, and in observingthe law, if such matters were ignored or overlooked.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Harris v. Registrar of Approved Driving
Instructors [2010] EWCA Civ 808 confirmed that:

In reaching the Decision, the Tribunal took into account all of the evidence and submissions received, written and oral, and considered all of the circumstances relevant to this appeal. The Tribunal was particularly conscious of the Appellant’s long history of unacceptable conduct towards his pupils, that is, taking fees off them for lessons that he did not provide, nor refund those fees, together with him having previously been given a warning by the Respondent concerning such unacceptable behaviour. The Tribunal was very concerned at the message this behaviour sent to pupils and, further, to the potential impact it had on the good name of the Respondent and the potential it had to undermine public confidence if the Appellant’s name was allowed to remain on the Register.

The Tribunal must bear in mind the importance which attaches to the integrity ofthe Register. For the public to have trust init, the Respondent must act in a way that encourages belief that those on it have high standards. Allowing those who do not meet those standards would undermine the trust placed in it with serious consequences for those who do maintain the necessary high standards.These are matters of wider and public interest, which attract significant weight even where the Appellant’s name being removed from the Register, potentially may have significant consequences for him.

The Tribunal particularly considered the question of whether it was proportionate to dismiss this appeal. On the balance of probabilities, the Tribunal concluded that, in view of the gravity of the particular course of conduct, it was dictated that removal of the Appellant’s name from the Register was entirely proportionate in all the circumstances.

While all the evidence, and submissions, both written and oral, from, and on behalf of, the parties, was considered by the Tribunal, it did not alter the Tribunal’s decision to dismiss this appeal as the written and oral evidence and submissions before the Tribunal were not of sufficient persuasive value to do otherwise.

Taking all these factors into account and, noting that the Tribunal needs to maintain publictrust in the Register and to prioritise consumer protection over the interests of the Appellant as an individual driving instructor, the Tribunal concluded that the Appellant, at the time of this appeal, was not a fit and proper person tohave his name remain on the Register.

Accordingly, the appeal isdismissed.