Kamaljit Aujlay v The Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors

This appeal concerns a decision of the Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors ("the Registrar") dated 2 October 2025 to remove the Appellant’s name from the Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors (the "Register") on the grounds that the Appellant was not a fit and proper person to be an Approved Driving Instructor ("ADI").

The decision was taken pursuant to section 128(2)(e) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (“the Act”), on the basis that the Registrar was no longer satisfied that the Appellant was a fit and proper person to have her name retained on the Register.

The Appellant appeals under section 131 of the Act. The Tribunal therefore stands in the shoes of the Registrar and must determine the matter afresh on the evidence before it.

The proceedings were held by video (CVP). The Appellant, her representative and the Registrar’s representative all attended by CVP. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to conduct the hearing in this way. Three witnesses for the Appellant attended (two of whom gave evidence) and one witness appeared for Respondent.

The Appellant has a lengthy professional history within the driver testing and instruction framework overseen by the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (“DVSA”). She first qualified as an ADI, going on to become an examiner and on retirement re-qualifying as an ADI. Her professional career includes long periods of service without disciplinary findings relevant to the present appeal.

The Appellant was first entered onto the Register of Approved Driving Instructors in 1991. Her registration lapsed in 2004, after which she subsequently re-qualified. She was re-entered onto the Register in August 2023. At the time of the decision under appeal, her current certificate was valid until 31 August 2027.

Between approximately 2002 and July 2023, the Appellant was employed by the DVSA as a driving examiner, working across several test centres in West London, including Southall Driving Test Centre. During that period, she conducted a large number of practical driving tests, including weekend and overtime shifts.

The events which ultimately led to the Registrar’s decision form part of a wider DVSA counter-fraud investigation into alleged irregularities in the booking and conduct of driving tests at Southall Driving Test Centre during the period 2021 to 2022.

On 21 August 2021, three practical driving test candidates attended Southall Driving Test Centre who were later identified as being related to a driving examiner colleague, Nadia Sher. The Appellant was rostered to work at Southall Driving Test Centre on that date. There is no evidence that the Appellant booked those candidates’ tests, arranged their allocation, tested them or was informed at the time that the candidates were related to a colleague.

No immediate action was taken against the Appellant at that stage. There is no contemporaneous record from August 2021 indicating that any concerns were raised with her, nor that she was interviewed or spoken to about those events at the time.

On Sunday 19 June 2022, the Appellant conducted a practical driving test at Southall Driving Test Centre at approximately 08:00 hours for a candidate later identified as “Aaron Junior T. Green” (referred to as Aaron Green Junior throughout this decision), who is the son of “Aaron Green” (referred to as Aaron Green Senior throughout this decision), a driving examiner colleague. The Appellant was at that time rostered to work an overtime shift. The Local Driving Test Manager (“LDTM”) was on leave that day.

The Appellant did not make any declaration to the LDTM in relation to that test. She maintains that she did not know, at the time she conducted the test, that the candidate was related to her colleague.

On 13 September 2021, the DVSA commenced a broader investigation—referred to within the evidence as “Operation Degas”—into alleged manipulation of the online booking system and improper conduct of driving tests at Southall Driving Test Centre. That investigation involved a number of candidates and examiners and was not confined solely to the Appellant.

As part of that broader investigation, certain driving test pass certificates were reviewed, and ultimately several candidates’ driving licences were revoked in October 2024.

The Appellant retired from her employment with the DVSA in July 2023. Following her retirement, she continued working as an Approved Driving Instructor in the same geographical area.

On 8 January 2025, the Appellant attended a voluntary interview under caution conducted by DVSA Counter-Fraud Investigators at Slough Driving Test Centre. During that interview, she was questioned about the tests conducted on 21 August 2021 and 19 June 2022.

During the interview, the Appellant denied knowingly conducting tests for friends or family members of colleagues. She explained that, had she been aware of such a connection, she would have declared it to the LDTM, and she provided an example of a previous occasion on which she had done so when she recognised a relative attending a test.

Investigator notes from that interview record that the Appellant was co-operative and answered questions politely. They also record the investigators’ professional opinion that it was “implausible” that the Appellant did not recognise a candidate with the same surname as a colleague.

The investigation did not result in criminal proceedings against the Appellant. There is no evidence before the Tribunal of any criminal charge, conviction, or disciplinary finding made against her arising from the investigation.

On 3 September 2025, the Registrar wrote to the Appellant informing her that, in light of the investigation material, he was considering removing her name from the Register on the basis that she may have ceased to be a fit and proper person within the meaning of section 128(2)(e) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. She was invited to make written representations within 28 days.

On 28 September 2025, the Appellant submitted detailed written representations. In those representations, she denied knowingly breaching DT1 Section 7.10 (the guidance driving examiners follow when carrying out driving tests), denied any intentional misconduct, and emphasised her long service, previous compliance with declaration requirements, and lack of dishonest intent. She submitted that removal from the Register would be disproportionate.

On 2 October 2025, the Registrar issued his decision letter. He concluded that the Appellant had ceased to be a fit and proper person and directed that her name be removed from the Register. The Registrar relied on the findings of the internal investigation, the revocation of candidates’ licences, and concerns about public confidence in the Register.

The decision was not to take immediate effect, in order to allow the Appellant to exercise her right of appeal.

The Appellant lodged a Notice of Appeal within the statutory time limit, challenging both the factual basis and the proportionality of the Registrar’s decision.

On 12 February 2026, the Registrar served a Statement of Case pursuant to Rule 23 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009. That statement set out the Registrar’s reasons for his decision but also included an allegation that the Appellant had admitted sending “inappropriate and graphic images”, an allegation which the Appellant states is entirely incorrect and unrelated to the matters under appeal.

On 19 February 2026, the Appellant served a supplemental witness statement responding specifically to that allegation. She denied having made any such admission and raised concerns about the accuracy and fairness of the Registrar’s statement. Through her legal representatives, the Appellant requested clarification of the evidential basis for that allegation and sought confirmation as to whether the Registrar intended to attend the hearing to give evidence, given the disputes of fact (this is addressed below).

The appeal subsequently came before this Tribunal for determination.

The Appellant attended the hearing, she called three witnesses: namely Mr Aaron Green Junior, Mr Aaron Green Senior and Mr Mohinder Raj Sharma (it was agreed that Mr Sharma did not need to give evidence and his evidence was accepted). The Registrar also called one witness: Mr Stirling (the Investigative Officer). Their evidence is recorded in the record of proceedings; it is not set out again here.

Conditions for entry and retention on the Register require the applicant to be and continue to be a “fit” and “proper” person" to have his name on the Register – see sections 125(3) and 127(3)(e) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (the "Act"). The Registrar has the burden of showing that a person does not meet the statutory requirement to be a fit and proper person, and the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.

The powers of the Tribunal in determining this appeal are set out in section 131 of the Act. The Tribunal may make such order as it thinks fit (section 131(3)). The Tribunal stands in the shoes of the Registrar and takes a fresh decision on the evidence available to it, giving appropriate weight to the Registrar's decision as the person tasked by Parliament with making such decisions (in accordance with R. (Hope and Glory Public House Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates Court & Ors 

In Harris v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors

The Registrar’s case is that the Appellant breached DT1 Section 7.10, the Civil Service Code, and internal DVSA conduct requirements by conducting driving tests for friends or family members of DVSA colleagues without declaring those connections to the Local Driving Test Manager.

In summary, the Registrar relied on the following matters:

The Registrar submits that, taken together, these matters demonstrate conduct incompatible with continued inclusion on the Register, and that to permit retention would undermine public confidence.

The Appellant denies knowingly testing any friend or family member of a colleague. She denies collusion, dishonesty, manipulation of bookings, or any intent to benefit herself or others.

She submits that the Registrar’s decision rests on inference rather than evidence, that material errors undermined the fairness of the process, and that removal from the Register is wholly disproportionate.

We have considered an “amended bundle” of evidence containing 150 electronic pages and an additional 8 pages. This included:

A further 7 pages of documents were served by the Appellant a number of days before the hearing. The Registrar indicated that he had no objection to them being admitted but noted that they had not been served in accordance with directions. In light of the fact that there was no objection, they were admitted into evidence. There was no prejudice to any party in doing so.

The Tribunal were greatly assisted by a detailed skeleton argument served on behalf of the Respondent.

During the course of the hearing, several documents were admitted into evidence, including Aaron Green Junior’s provisional licence and evidence that he has appealed the revocation of his licence.

The Appellant attended the Tribunal and was questioned at length. Aaron Green Senior and his son, Aaron Green Junior also gave oral evidence. Mr Stirling gave evidence on behalf of the Registrar. The evidence of Mr Sharma was agreed and in light of the fact none of the parties or the Tribunal had questions for him, he was not required to give evidence, albeit the Tribunal noted that he had attended the Tribunal and was willing to answer questions if necessary.

It was clarified at the beginning of the hearing that the allegation that the Appellant admitted sending “inappropriate and graphic images” in the initial Registrar’s Rule 23 Statement, had been an error (the incorrect template had been used). It had been removed from the bundle and was not relied upon by the Respondent. We therefore put this out of our minds.

We start off by noting the suggestion that the matters under consideration disclose a “pattern” of behaviour, such that one instance might be a mistake, two a coincidence, and three a pattern.

During Mr Stirling’s evidence, he conceded that the incident of 21 August 2021 is not connected to this Appellant.

We agree. The material before us does not support such a finding. The alleged incidents of 21 August 2021 and 19 June 2022 are approximately one year apart, arise in different factual contexts, and involve different colleagues. We are unable to identify any clear evidential basis upon which the Appellant could be properly linked to the other candidates. In the absence of such evidence, the Tribunal is left with no more than an associative grouping arising out of the scope of the investigation itself. That is not a sufficient basis upon which to draw adverse findings against the Appellant. We therefore find that, save for the specific case of Aaron Green Junior (in respect of whom separate findings have been made), the matters concerning other candidates have no evidential relevance to the assessment of the Appellant’s conduct, knowledge, or fitness, and we attach no weight to them in determining this appeal.

In the absence of proved misconduct across multiple occasions, there is no proper foundation upon which to characterise the Appellant’s conduct as disclosing a pattern. We therefore reject the notion that the Appellant’s conduct can properly be described as a “pattern of behaviour”.

A further matter relied upon by the Registrar is the revocation of candidates’ driving licences following the DVSA investigation.

Again, we note that the Respondent no longer relies on the incident dated 21 August 2021, and we therefore disregard any licence revocations said to arise from that date. Our consideration under this heading is accordingly confined to the revocation of the licence of Aaron Green Junior, which followed the practical test conducted on 19 June 2022.

It is not in dispute that Mr Green Junior’s driving licence was revoked administratively by the DVSA. However, a matter of significance emerged during the hearing. The Respondent’s position, both in the decision under appeal and as repeated in the investigation material and in Mr Stirling’s evidence, was that no statutory appeal had been brought by any of the candidates whose licences were revoked.

That position was shown to be inaccurate. In his oral evidence, Mr Green Junior stated that he has appealed the revocation of his driving licence and that he is currently awaiting a hearing date. During the hearing, the Respondent made further enquiries and helpfully confirmed that an extant appeal is indeed outstanding. Mr Green Junior also sent through proof of his appeal.

The existence of an appeal is a relevant factual correction. It underlines that the revocation of Mr Green Junior’s licence is not a settled or finally determined matter, and that the validity of the revocation itself remains under challenge within the appropriate statutory framework.

Submissions were made as to whether the Respondent ought to have been aware, prior to the hearing, that an appeal had been lodged. We do not consider that issue to be material to our task. The Tribunal’s role is not to determine whether the Respondent acted reasonably in its internal case handling, but to assess what weight, if any, can properly be attached to the fact of licence revocation when determining the present appeal.

We accept that the Registrar was entitled to take the fact of revocation into account to the limited extent that it formed part of the procedural background to the investigation. However, the fact that Mr Green Junior has appealed the revocation reinforces the need for care in identifying what that revocation can properly establish for the purposes of the present proceedings.

First, and most importantly, the revocation of a candidate’s driving licence — whether appealed or not — is not a finding of misconduct by the Appellant. It is a regulatory action taken in respect of the candidate, under a separate statutory regime, and directed to the validity of the test outcome. The decision to revoke a licence does not involve any determination of the examiner’s knowledge, intent, or conduct, nor does it require proof that the examiner knowingly breached conflict-of-interest rules.

Secondly, the fact that Mr Green Junior has appealed the revocation further demonstrates why no inference can be drawn adverse to the Appellant from the existence of the revocation itself. An appealed decision is, by definition, contested. Whether the appeal ultimately succeeds or fails, the outcome of that separate process cannot resolve, and is not directed to resolving, the question we must determine: namely whether the Appellant knew or suspected that she was testing a relative of a colleague on 19 June 2022.

The evidence before us shows that, at the time the revocation decision was made, no finding had been reached that the Appellant acted dishonestly, deliberately, or with knowledge of a conflict of interest. The investigation material records denials of knowledge by the Appellant, and the Registrar has not suggested that the revocation decision itself contained findings adverse to her credibility or integrity.

We therefore reject any suggestion — whether express or implicit — that the revocation of Mr Green Junior’s driving licence can be treated as corroborative proof that the Appellant knowingly tested a friend or family member. To do so would involve impermissible circularity, particularly where the revocation decision is itself the subject of a pending appeal.

Even viewed at their highest, the revocation (now appealed) demonstrates no more than that the DVSA took a precautionary regulatory step in relation to the validity of a test outcome. It does not establish culpability on the part of the Appellant, and it carries little weight in determining the issues of knowledge, misconduct, fitness, and proportionality which arise for decision in this appeal.

The central factual issue under this heading is whether, at the time of the relevant practical driving tests, the Appellant knew (or ought properly to be treated as having known or suspected) that certain candidates were friends or relatives of DVSA colleagues, such that she was required to declare a conflict to the Local Driving Test Manager (“LDTM”) in accordance with DT1.

We address together the Respondent’s submissions concerning (i) the coincidence of the candidate’s name with that of the Appellant’s colleague, (ii) the contention that the Appellant’s account is “implausible”, including by reference to alleged resemblance and mannerisms, (iii) the suggestion that the Appellant’s own interview answers undermine her credibility, and (iv) the alternative case that she acted recklessly even if she lacked actual knowledge.

The Registrar’s case on “knowledge” is essentially inferential. The Registrar accepts that the Appellant has not been convicted of any offence, but concludes that, in the case of the test conducted on 19 June 2022, where the candidate had the same first name and surname as a work colleague, the Appellant was not unaware of who the candidate was. The Respondent submits (at paragraph 15 of the skeleton argument) that the Appellant’s account is unsustainable because:

We attach weight to the point that Aaron Green Junior’s name, as it appeared in the contemporaneous material and as discussed in evidence, was not identical in full to his father’s name. The candidate was recorded as “Aaron Junior T. Green” (this being the name on the provisional driving licence examined as part of the identity check), whereas the colleague is known as “Aaron Green”. While the similarity of the forename and surname plainly exists, the presence of the additional middle initial and middle name is a relevant factual feature when assessing whether the journal entry should, without more, have signalled a familial relationship.

The Respondent submits that “Aaron Green” is a unique or unusual name, such that recognition of a familial relationship was obvious. In support of that submission, reliance was placed on the fact that neither the Appellant nor Aaron Green Senior were able to positively assert that they had ever examined another Aaron Green, nor had their colleagues done so. However, the evidence was more nuanced. Both explained, fairly and accurately, that they could not speak on behalf of colleagues and could not recall every candidate encountered over many years of service. At its highest, their evidence was that they could not positively recall encountering another individual with that precise combination of names.

The Appellant explained that she conducted in excess of 2,000 tests each year, amounting to approximately 40,000 tests over a 20 year career and that it was not realistic to expect her to recall the names of individual candidates over that period. We accept that evidence. An inability to recall whether she had or had not previously tested another candidate named Aaron Green is materially different from asserting that the name was inherently distractive or that it should, without more, have triggered suspicion.

We accept the Appellant’s evidence that, in a large and busy urban test centre, common forenames and surnames routinely recur, and that examiners frequently encounter candidates whose names overlap with those of colleagues or other staff. There is no policy requiring escalation on the basis of name similarity alone.

We next turn to the Respondent’s reliance on alleged physical resemblance and mannerisms. Mr Stirling’s position was that having met and interviewed both father and son, they were “strikingly similar” in appearance, voice and mannerisms, such that the Appellant would have recognised the familial connection had she been alert to it. He explained that their appearances looked different on the date of the hearing, to when he had interviewed them. We do not accept that submission. Mr Stirling’s assessment was based on a single interview with each individual (Aaron Green Senior interviewed on 4 December 2024; Aaron Green Junior interviewed on 18 March 2025). He confirmed that he had not met either of them prior to those interviews and had not seen them again thereafter.

The relevant incident occurred on 19 June 2022, some two and a half years before Aaron Green Senior’s interview and nearly three years before Aaron Green Junior’s interview. No contemporaneous photographs or other reliable evidence from 2022 were before the Tribunal. Indeed, the resemblance point had not been raised prior to oral evidence, and the witnesses had therefore had no opportunity to address it with any supporting material.

There was consequently no evidence before Mr Stirling or the Tribunal as to how either father or son appeared at the material time. In the absence of contemporaneous evidence, there was no proper basis upon which to assess whether any resemblance then existed which the Appellant ought to have noticed. We therefore consider that the “resemblance” analysis advanced by the Respondent is necessarily affected by hindsight and by the passage of time.

In any event, based on our own observations during the hearing, we did not consider that Aaron Green Senior and Aaron Green Junior presented as “strikingly similar” in demeanour or manner. On the contrary, we found that they differed in material respects: Aaron Green Junior presented as notably laid back, whereas Aaron Green Senior was more animated and expressive. We did not regard their mannerisms as similar. We therefore reject the Respondent’s submission insofar as it invites the Tribunal to infer knowledge or recklessness from alleged physical resemblance or demeanour.

We next consider the existence of multiple safeguards operating well before the Appellant’s involvement on the day of the test. These included the centralised booking system, deployment and journal preparation, and managerial oversight by the Local Driving Test Manager or covering Area Manager. It was common ground that the journal entry was visible within those systems and that no flag, declaration or intervention was made by any other person.

The Appellant was positioned at the final stage of that process. In circumstances where no upstream safeguard was triggered by individuals with greater systemic visibility, we do not consider it reasonable to infer knowledge or recklessness on the Appellant’s part from a name coincidence alone.

We also consider the relevant background context. The (accepted) evidence was that Aaron Green Senior had previously complied with the correct procedures when his daughter undertook a driving test, including disclosure and managerial involvement. That background materially undermines any inference that he would knowingly depart from the rules in relation to another child and correspondingly reduces any basis for concluding that the Appellant should have suspected concealment or misconduct.

We make clear findings as to knowledge and contact between father and son at the relevant time. We accept the evidence that Aaron Green Senior and Aaron Green Junior were not in contact at the time of the June 2022 test, that Aaron Green Senior did not know his son was taking a test on that date, and that Aaron Green Junior did not know (and had no reason to know) whether his father was working at that particular test centre on that particular day (or at all), and therefore had no reason to disclose any relationship to the Appellant.  Their evidence was consistent.

We have considered with care that, at the time of the practical driving test, the candidate’s provisional driving licence recorded an address which was that of his father. We do not find that this undermines the evidence that they were not in contact at that time. The evidence before us was that the address on the provisional licence had been obtained at an earlier stage, when the candidate was still a minor, and that it reflected his father’s address at that time. We accept that evidence as credible.

There was no evidence that the Appellant was aware of Aaron Green Senior’s address, nor would the mere presence of a parental address on a provisional licence reasonably indicate to an examiner that the candidate was the child of a current colleague working at the test centre (indeed the Respondent did not suggest otherwise). The address did not suggest a live familial connection relevant to conflict-of-interest considerations. In circumstances where we have accepted that the candidate and his father were not in contact at the material time, that the father did not know the candidate was taking a test, and that the candidate did not know whether his father was working at that centre, we do not consider that the address on the provisional licence materially assisted the Appellant in identifying any conflict or in undermining the assertion that Aaron Green Senior and Aaron Green Junior were not in contact at the time of the exam. We therefore attach no weight to this factor in assessing the Appellant’s knowledge, suspicion, or alleged recklessness.

The Respondent places particular reliance on passages of the Appellant’s interview, including her reference to a “little smirk” and the phrase “not another Aaron Green”. The Respondent submits that the Appellant’s account was internally inconsistent, relying in particular on selected passages from her interview under caution and her description of feeling angry, surprised, and unwilling to “muddy the waters”. We do not accept that characterisation. When the Appellant’s evidence is read fairly and in context, it is consistent in its core respects. From the outset, and throughout the investigation, interview, written representations, and her oral evidence before us, the Appellant’s position remained the same: that she did not know the candidate was the son of her colleague, had no reason to suspect a familial relationship at the time of the test, and would have withdrawn immediately had she been aware of such a relationship. The passages relied upon by the Respondent do not undermine that position. Expressions of surprise, anger, or distress at being drawn into an investigation years later are not inconsistent with a lack of prior knowledge; they are entirely consistent with a witness reacting to the serious implications of hindsight information. Similarly, the Appellant’s acknowledgement that she may have recognised a name coincidence doesnot amount to recognition of a familial connection, still less to an admission of knowledge or recklessness. We are satisfied that the Respondent’s submission rests on an unduly fragmented reading of the evidence, rather than on genuine contradiction. Taken as a whole, the Appellant’s account was coherent, measured and stable over time, and we do not regard it as inconsistent in a way that undermines her credibility.

We note and attach weight to the fact that the Appellant was being asked about whether she noticed the name, several years after the incident. We accept that it would be incredibly difficult for her to remember exactly what her thoughts were at that time. She explains that she could not recall what happened after the exam, but she may have smirked and thought “oh not another Aaron Green” because he is quite a character (in response to questions about whether she mentioned the name to anyone in the office). This was guesswork, she reiterated several times that she could not actually remember. We accept that it would be neither realistic nor fair to expect detailed recollection of a date two and a half years ago, this is especially so as at that time, the Appellant was working overtime in order to cover the post-covid backlog. We do not regard the Appellant’s inability to recall specific details as undermining her credibility. On the contrary, it is consistent with the ordinary limitations of human memory, particularly where the incident only later acquired significance as a result of information that came to light long after the event. We therefore approach the Appellant’s recollection with appropriate caution, but without drawing adverse inferences from the mere fact that her memory was necessarily incomplete after such a lapse of time.

Overall, we found the Appellant to be a credible witness. She gave her evidence carefully and consistently. She did not exaggerate. She readily accepted the importance of the policy and acknowledged that, had she known of the relationship, she would not have conducted the test and would have referred the matter to management. Her emotional response was, in our assessment, consistent with distress at being implicated in matters she said were entirely unknown to her. Further her evidence was corroborated by that of Aaron Green Junior and Aaron Green Senior.

Aaron Green Junior’s witness statement addresses the June 2022 test from the perspective of the candidate. It supports the Appellant’s case that there was no disclosure of the familial relationship to the examiner at the time and no interaction beyond normal test procedure. Aaron Green Senior’s witness statement addresses the matter from the perspective of the colleague said to be connected. It supports the Appellant’s case that there was no facilitation or forewarning by him to the Appellant that his son was attending for a test, and that there was no realistic basis upon which the Appellant could have known that the candidate was his son. Indeed, he himself did not know that he was attending, as they were not in contact at that point due to legal proceedings. Taken together, these statements are important because they address the two most obvious routes by which knowledge might otherwise have arisen: (i) disclosure by the candidate during the test process; and (ii) forewarning or involvement by the colleague. Both are, on the face of those witness statements, negated.

Taking all these matters together—(i) the limitations of the “resemblance” evidence; (ii) the absence of evidence as to appearance at the material time; (iii) the commonality and non-identical nature of the candidate’s full name; (iv) the absence of any rule requiring escalation on name similarity alone; (v) the operation of upstream safeguards which were not triggered by anyone else; (vi) the background of prior compliance by Aaron Green Senior in relation to his daughter; (vii) the Appellant’s lengthy professional history with the DVSA and (viii) the absence of mutual knowledge between father and son—we do not accept that the Respondent has shown, on the balance of probabilities, that the Appellant knew or suspected the relevant familial relationship at the material time, nor that she acted recklessly in conducting the test.

In any event, even if we were wrong on our findings as to “knowledge” and the Appellant’s conduct could properly be characterised as an inadvertent oversight, we would not consider removal from the Register to be a proportionate regulatory response on the evidence before us.

Removal is a severe measure with immediate professional consequences: once removed, it becomes unlawful for the Appellant to give driving tuition for payment or reward. In her representations to the Registrar, the Appellant expressly submitted that there was no evidence of intentional misconduct, dishonesty or wilful breach, and that removal was “a severe outcome, suitable only for deliberate or serious misconduct”. Where the Registrar’s concern rests materially on inference (in particular, surname-based inference), and where (as we have found) the factual predicate of knowing misconduct is not established, the public-confidence rationale cannot properly justify the most draconian outcome.

The Registrar’s decision to remove the Appellant from the Register is founded squarely on the conclusion that she knowingly breached DT1 by testing friends or family members without declaration, and that this in turn meant that she had ceased to be a fit and proper person within the meaning of section 128(2)(e) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.

For the reasons set out above, we have found that the Registrar has not established, on the balance of probabilities, that the Appellant knew or suspected that she was testing friends or relatives of colleagues on either 21 August 2021 or 19 June 2022. The factual premise upon which the Registrar’s conclusion rests is therefore not made out.

In those circumstances, the regulatory consequence said to flow from that premise cannot be sustained. The removal of an Approved Driving Instructor from the Register is a serious and career-ending measure. It is not a sanction to be imposed where the underlying finding of knowing misconduct has not been proved to the requisite standard.

We have separately considered whether, even absent proof of knowledge, there is any other basis upon which the Appellant could properly be said to have ceased to be a fit and proper person. We find none. The Appellant’s evidence, which is consistent across time and corroborated in material respects, is that she understood the conflict-of-interest rules, took them seriously, and had withdrawn and reported matters in the past where she was aware of a connection.

We also take into account the Appellant’s long service with the DVSA, her unblemished record over many years, and the absence of any finding of dishonesty, intention to deceive, or wilful disregard of professional standards. While fitness and propriety is not assessed solely by reference to past service, such matters form part of the overall evaluative judgment where character and integrity are in issue.

In the absence of proved knowing misconduct/recklessness and having rejected the allegation of a pattern of behaviour, we conclude that the Registrar’s decision to remove the Appellant from the Register was not justified on the evidence before us.

It follows that the Appellant has not been shown to have ceased to be a fit and proper person within the meaning of section 128(2)(e) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.