Olusola Ogundele v Ofsted

The APPEAL

This appeal is by Mrs Olusola Ogundele (“the Appellant”) against a decision by Ofsted (“the Respondent”) dated 12 August 2025 to cancel her registration as a childminder on the Early Years Register and both the compulsory (Part A) and voluntary part (Part B) of the General Childcare Register under section 68 of the Childcare Act 2006 (“CA 2006”).

Attendance

The hearing of the appeal was conducted as a hybrid hearing, but the parties, the witnesses and the Tribunal Panel attended each day in person except for the final day where Tribunal Member Graham joined the hearing by CVP.

The Appellant represented herself. She was supported in the hearing by her husband, Mr Ogundele.

The Respondent was represented by Ms N Kohn (of Counsel). Also in attendance were Mr J Kellen (pupil barrister) and Mr M Hewit (paralegal). The Respondent’s witnesses were:

Evidence

We were provided with a bundle which was paginated in sections from A to K. Including index pages and cover sheets the bundle had 405 electronic pages.

We were provided with a supplemental bundle which was paginated in sections from L to O. Including index pages and cover sheets the bundle had 158 electronic pages.

In this decision, references to documents will be to the pagination numbers unless stated otherwise using “MB” to indicate the main bundle and “SB” to indicate the supplemental bundle.

We were provided with the following documents as late evidence:

There was no clear objection from the Appellant to this witness statement being admitted. In any event, we decided to admit the document as late evidence. It was relevant to the issues in dispute and whilst late, it caused no prejudice to the Appellant. The Appellant was able to give oral evidence on the matters raised in the statement. We were therefore satisfied that the overriding objective would be best served by admitting the document as late evidence.

We carefully considered all the written evidence submitted to the Tribunal in advance and the oral evidence given to us at the hearing even if we do not mention it. We used the hearing to amplify and update parts of the written evidence and only record such of the oral evidence as is necessary to explain our decision.

Preliminary Matters

We noted that the issue of reasonable adjustments had arisen in the Appellant’s most recent inspection from the Respondent but no request for adjustments had been made to the Tribunal. We therefore enquired with both parties whether any adjustments to the hearing were required. Neither party requested any adjustments.

Nevertheless, because the Appellant had a diagnosis of dyslexia, we ensured that each time she was referred to a document, she had sufficient time to read and understand that document. We informed the parties that they could request a break at any time by indicating to the Panel.

Background AND KEY CHRONOLOGY

The Appellant has been registered as a childminder since 2007, under registration number EY356520. She is registered on the Early Years Register and both the Compulsory (Part A) and Voluntary Part (Part B) of the General Childcare Register. Her inspection history was not in dispute and includes:

By a decision set down in the Notice of Decision dated 12 August 2025 (“the NoD”), the respondent determined to cancel the Appellant’s registration. The reasons for cancellation were that the Appellant no longer met the requirements for registration and the requirements imposed by regulations applicable to her registration.

On 18 March 2026, the Appellant made herself available for an inspection. Some of the Respondent’s previous concerns (i.e. those regarding her home environment and the lack of a paediatric first aid certificate) had been remedied. But the outcome of the inspection was a finding of Urgent Improvement.

Legal Framework

Part 3 of the CA 2006 sets out the legal framework for the registration and regulation of childcare providers.

Section 32 CA 2006 provides for the maintenance of two childcare registers. The first register (“the Early Years Register”) includes “other early years providers” registered to provide early years childcare for children (from birth to the age of five years) for which registration is compulsory. The second register is “the Childcare Register”. This is divided into two parts: a compulsory register for providers caring for children from the age of eight to five for which registration is compulsory (“the compulsory part”); and a register which contains those providers registered to provide childminding/childcare for children aged over eight years for which registration is voluntary (“the voluntary part”).

Section 68 of the CA 2006 provides both mandatory (s.68(1)) and discretionary (ss.68(2-5)) powers by which a person’s registration may be cancelled. Pursuant to s.68(2), and insofar as is relevant for this appeal, a person’s registration may be cancelled if it appears to the Chief Inspector:

Pursuant to s.73 CA 2006, where it is proposed to cancel registration (s.73(1)(e)), the Respondent must give a childminder notice of the intention (s.73(2)); any notice must include the reasons for proposing the step and inform the childminder of their rights (s.73(3)). Following any objection by the childminder which may be heard orally or in writing (ss.73(5) and (6)), the Respondent must issue a notice of the decision (s.73(7)).

Pursuant to ss.49 and 50 CA 2006, the Respondent has a duty to inspect early years provision in accordance with prescribed intervals and a discretion to inspect more frequently as appropriate – s.49(2)(b) and (c). This includes circumstances where there are no children on roll.

The powers of the Tribunal are limited by section 74 CA 2006. The Tribunal must either confirm the suspension or direct that it shall not have or shall cease to have effect (s.74(4)). If the Tribunal determines not to cancel a childminder’s registration, it may choose to impose conditions on his or her registration – s.74(5)(a).

The legal burden of proof at an appeal lies with the Respondent; the Respondent must establish the facts upon which it relies to support cancellation, and it must demonstrate that the decision to cancel the Appellant’s registration is proportionate and necessary.

The standard of proof is the same as in civil proceedings, it is for the Appellant to discharge on the balance of probabilities.

The Tribunal must make its decision based on all the evidence available to it as at the date of the hearing. The Tribunal is not restricted to evidence available to the Respondent when the Notice of Decision was issued. The Tribunal is in effect looking at the decision afresh, it is not reviewing the Respondent’s decision-making process.

The Issues

The issues for determination by the Tribunal were those set out in the Scott Schedule which appears at MB/K399. At the start of the hearing, we clarified the issues with the parties. The Respondent accepted that Issue Five fell away completely, and Issue Two fell away as a standalone issue. Albeit the Respondent submitted that the facts pertaining to Issue two remained relevant to the issue of suitability. Accordingly, the issues to be decided were as follows:

Findings of Fact

Issues One and Four overlap and therefore it is convenient to consider them together.

It was not in dispute that the Appellant had very recently (on 18 March 2026) made herself available for an inspection. But it was the Respondent’s case that notwithstanding this:

The Appellant’s position can be summarised as follows:

The Appellant’s evidence was set out in her first and second witness statement. In the Appellant’s first witness statement, she stated:

In the Appellant’s second witness statement, she stated:

In cross examination Ms Kohn took the Appellant through the chronology of contact attempts set out in the Notice of Decision (MB/H72). Of particular note were the following:

When the majority of these dates and contact attempts were put to the Appellant, the Appellant claimed to have no or very limited memory of them.

When asked to confirm which family member it was that had sadly passed away, the Appellant was unable to provide precise details. She had to visibly pause in an attempt to remember. During the hearing we were told that up to 5 different family members had died including the Appellant’s mother, her auntie, her mother’s twin (who was a different person to her auntie), her mother and also her father in-law. Yet the Appellant was unable to provide the most basic details as to the circumstances of their passing e.g. the years in which they died.

The Respondent relied on the evidence from Mrs Geoghegan (paragraph’s 11 to 51 of her witness statement) which set out the multiple attempts that Mrs Geoghegan made to contact the Appellant. Starting at paragraph 25 of her witness statement, Mrs Geoghegan explained that the Appellant was scheduled for a reinspection around a year after the inspection in April 2024. Mrs Geoghegan made the following contact attempts:

Mrs Geoghegan explained in her second witness statement (paragraphs 3 to 15) the following:

Mrs Geoghegan explained in her third witness statement (paragraphs 3 to 15) the following:

The correspondence between the parties as set out by Mrs Geoghegan in her three witness statements (and summarised above) was not challenged or disputed by the Appellant. Similarly, the chronology set out in the NOD was not challenged. The Appellant claimed not to be able to remember many of the contact attempts, but she did not suggest that they did not happen. Furthermore, Mrs Geoghegan’s evidence was corroborated by the documents (i.e. the copy e-mails and contact attempt records) that were exhibited to her witness statements. We therefore accepted Mrs Geoghegan’s evidence and the chronology set out in the NOD as an accurate chronology of events.

In response to the above chronology and Mrs Geoghegan’s evidence, the Appellant’s oral evidence was that:

It was put to the Appellant by Ms Kohn that her account was not plausible because what the chronology showed is that the Appellant has an extensive history of ignoring contact attempts until the 11th hour when a consequence is imminent; only at that point would the Appellant engage. The Appellant did not accept this contention and maintained that she either did not receive the call attempt or did not see the relevant e-mail.

The Respondent also relied on the evidence from Mrs Bennett. In Mrs Bennett’s final supplemental witness statement, she explained that when the Respondent makes an outbound call it would come from either an inspector’s mobile device or from the Respondent’s Microsoft Teams phone system. In either case, the number does not show as a private or withheld number; it shows either as the inspector’s mobile number or the central Ofsted number. In oral evidence, Mrs Bennett clarified that the Respondent has been using Microsoft Teams for all outbound calls since 2021. The Appellant did not challenge this evidence in cross examination. Mrs Bennett’s supplemental statement was supported by screenshots of the calls in operation with the numbers showing and so we accepted her evidence.

We decided that the Appellant had knowingly failed to make herself available for inspection consistently and repeatedly over the period December 2021 to 18 March 2024 and then again from 6 January 2026 to 18 March 2026. Our reasons are as follows:

Further to the above, we were not persuaded that the Appellant would willingly engage with the Respondent in any future inspection. At paragraph 17 of Mrs Geoghegean’s third witness statement she explained the during the inspection on 18 March 2026, the Appellant had expressed reluctance about being involved in a further future inspection. She stated:

The Appellant did not challenge Mrs Geoghegan’s evidence or suggest it was untrue and so we accepted it. The Appellant did give oral evidence that she would be willing to engage fully with the Respondent in any further inspection. This was in contrast to what she had told Mrs Geoghegan in our judgment further undermined her reliability as a witness. In light of the Appellant’s history as set out above and given her previous comments to Mrs Geoghegan during the inspection on 18 March 2026, we rejected the Appellant’s oral evidence.

With respect to the Respondent’s deferral process, we decided that the Appellant had failed, in all instances but the exchange on 20 January 2026 (see paragraph 8.10(h) above) to make a deferral request as she was required to do and that she failed to engage meaningfully with the Respondent’s request for further information necessary to meet the criteria for an inspection to be deferred. The exchange on 20 January 2026 stood out as different because in that case Mrs Geoghegan proactively offered to make a deferral request on the Appellant’s behalf and advised what information was required to make that request; the Appellant complied and, in that case, provided the required information.

The government has published guidance on inspections and visits: deferring, pausing and gathering additional evidence (“the Inspections Guidance”). This was in the bundle at page J377 and referred to in the Respondent’s Counsel’s skeleton argument. That guidance states:

Accordingly, where an inspection deferral was sought, the Appellant was required to make a deferral request to the inspection support administrator or the inspector. In our judgment, the Appellant did not do this and therefore did not engage fully with the deferral process. As is made clear in the above chronology on multiple occasions, the Appellant informed Mrs Geoghegan (i.e. the inspector) that she was unwell and so unavailable for the planned inspection, but at no point did she make a proactive deferral request. In our judgment, it was not sufficient for the Appellant to simply inform Mrs Geoghegan that she was unwell; she needed to make an express request for a deferral and did not do this. The Inspection Guidance does not state that it is sufficient for the provider to say they are unwell or unavailable, but they must make a request for a deferral. This was not done by the Appellant. Further, the Appellant was less than forthcoming when she was requested by Mrs Geoghegan to provide further information regarding her various health conditions (we consider the request for a health declaration form further below). Ms Kohn confirmed during the hearing that the Respondent accepted in each case that the Appellant was genuinely unwell; she had provided sick notes from her GP. But as was explained by Mrs Geoghegan, when the Appellant was requested to provide further information, that information was not always forthcoming. We accepted that evidence.

It was not in dispute that:

In her first witness statement, the Appellant stated that:

This was incorrect, as was explained by Mrs Geoghegan at paragraph 19 of her second witness statement. The first aid training certificate that was exhibited to the Appellant’s statement was an emergency paediatric first aid training certificate. Mrs Geoghegan explained that the emergency certificate is not a full and relevant qualification as required by the ‘Statutory framework for the early years foundation stage’ (“EYFS”). Annex A of the EYFS provides the criteria for effective Paediatric First Aid (“PFA”) training and distinguishes the difference between an emergency and full PFA training. An emergency PFA course is a 6-hour course which covers some basic first aid training where the full PFAC is a minimum of 12 hours and covers a full complement of first aid training. This was not disputed by the Appellant.

At paragraph 8 of Mrs Geoghegan’s third witness statement, she explained that on 4 March 2026 she received an e-mail from the Appellant. That e-mail stated:

Mrs Geoghegan’s evidence was not challenged and corroborated by the e-mail exhibited to her statement and so we accepted it.

In her second witness statement the Appellant stated:

The Appellant’s second witness statement was inconsistent with the account she gave to Mrs Geoghegan in her e-mail on 4 March. We were not therefore persuaded by the Appellant’s evidence. Further, or in the alternative we reject the Appellant’s evidence as set out in her second witness statement. The Appellant was aware no later than 19 April 2024 that she no longer had the required PFAC, but she did not remedy that until 9 March 2026. She did not therefore complete the PFAC as soon as she became aware of the issue, she waited almost two years to do so.

Mrs Bennett explained at paragraph 6 of her witness statement, that the requirements of the EYFS, apply at all times while registered, and not only in cases where children are being cared for by the Appellant. She further explained in her oral evidence that this means that the Appellant was required to have a current PFAC at all times, irrespective of whether she had children on roll or not. This was because children may be cared for at any time when a provider is registered. This evidence was not challenged and so we accepted it.

It was not in dispute that as at the date of the hearing, the Appellant had not provided the Respondent with a completed HDF.

The relevant chronology in respect of the HDF is as follows:

In her oral evidence, the Appellant claimed either that she had not received the HDF previously or that she could not remember receiving the HDF. Given Mrs Geoghegan’s evidence as set out above, we reject the Appellant’s evidence. We preferred Mrs Geoghegan’s evidence over the Appellant's evidence. Mrs Geoghegan’s evidence was corroborated by the e-mails exhibited to her statement. It was simply not credible for the Appellant to suggest she never received the HDF; she received it on multiple occasions. It is similarly not credible for the Appellant to claim she has no memory of receiving the HDF. In our judgment, the Appellant received the HDF (multiple times), she knew she had received it, but she chose not to complete it.

It was not in dispute that during the inspection on 18 March 2026, the Appellant claimed, for the first time, that she had been unable to complete the HDF due to financial hardship. In her second witness statement the Appellant stated: “Regarding the financial hardship associated with completing the Health Declaration Form (HDF), I have given Ofsted consent to contact my GP for my health records”.

The Panel asked the Appellant to provide details of the conversation she had with her doctors’ surgery. The Appellant’s evidence was unconvincing and unreliable; it lacked detail and specifics. The Appellant explained that she had been told that her doctor would charge somewhere between £120 and £150 to complete the HDF. But the Appellant was unable to confirm when exactly this conversation took place. The Appellant offered no documentary evidence to corroborate her oral testimony (e.g. an e-mail from her doctors or a statement of charges). The Appellant had taken no steps to enquire whether the alleged charge could be waived due to financial hardship. Further, the Appellant offered no evidence (other than her witness evidence) that she was experiencing financial hardship (e.g. an income and liabilities statement). Accordingly, on the available evidence, we were not persuaded that the Appellant had been unable to complete the HDF for financial reasons.

Mrs Geoghegan and Mrs Bennett’s consistent evidence was that the Respondent required the Appellant to complete a HDF because of the number of illnesses she had suffered from which had resulted in deferrals to her inspection. The Respondent needed to be satisfied that the Appellant was fit and well enough to care for children as this may have impacted on her suitability. Of particular note is what the Appellant told Mrs Geoghegan about her health during the 18 March 2026 inspection. Mrs Geoghegan explains this at paragraph 22 of her third witness statement. She stated:

The Appellant did not challenge Mrs Geoghegan on this evidence and therefore we accepted it.

In her oral evidence, Mrs Bennett explained that the reason why the Respondent needs the Appellant to complete the HDF and the reason why it is relevant to the Respondent’s assessment of suitability is because the Respondent needs to assess whether the Appellant is safe to look after children. Mrs Bennett gave the example that if the Appellant is still experiencing arm pain, then this may impact her ability to lift and carry children which may have a serious consequence if she ever needed to evacuate the children in her care in an emergency.

Analysis

Section 68(2)(a) CA 2006, permits the Chief Inspector to cancel a provider’s registration if it appears to him that “the prescribed requirements for registration which apply in relation to the person's registration under that Chapter have ceased, or will cease, to be satisfied.”

The prescribed requirements in the CA 2006 include matters set out in the Childcare (Early Years Register) Regulations 2008 (“the EYR Regulations”) and the Childcare (General Childcare Register) Regulations 2008 (“GCR Regulations”).

Part 1 Schedule 2 EYR Regulations 2008 state at Paragraph 1 that an applicant must be “suitable to provide early years provision”.

Part 1 Schedule 2 and Part 1 Schedule 5 of the GCR Regulations 2008 similarly stipulate that an applicant for registration on part A (compulsory part) of the General Childcare Register and part B (voluntary part) must be “suitable to provide childcare”.

In our judgment, the Appellant is not suitable to provide early years provision and is not suitable to provide childcare. Our reasons are as follows:

For these reasons we decided that the Appellant is not suitable to be registered to provide early years provision and/or childcare. Accordingly, we decided that cancellation of the Appellant’s registration is necessary.

We also decided that cancellation of the Appellant’s registration was proportionate. The Appellant’s evidence was that she was not currently looking after any children and had not done so for almost three years. This was not therefore a case where a decision to cancel would shut down a busy business. Put another way, the Appellant was not currently relying on her childminding business to support herself financially.

The Appellant explained that she was currently in her second year of a nursing degree. We asked her whether a decision to cancel her registration would impact on her future studies or employability options and the Appellant confirmed that it would. But the Appellant was unable to explain how or why with any specificity and had provided no documentary evidence to support her position.

Whilst we accepted that there may be a potential impact on the Appellant’s future, in our judgment the balance fell in favour of cancellation. The Appellant is not suitable to be registered and to allow her to remain registered would create the risk of harm to any children in her care. We therefore decided that cancellation was not only necessary but also proportionate.

For these reasons we decided to confirm the Respondent’s decision dated 12 August 2025.

Decision

The appeal against the Respondent’s decision dated 12 August 2025, to cancel the Appellant’s registration is refused.

The decision to cancel the Appellant’s registration is confirmed.