Rizwan Butt v The Commissioners for HMRC

Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 00623 (TC)
Case Number: TC 09857
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
Taylor House, London
Appeal reference: TC/2022/11029
VALUE ADDED TAX – denial of input tax – missing trader intra community fraud (MTIC) – Kittel – trading in soft drinks – officer’s liability to pay company penalty – section 69C and section 69D of the VAT Act 1994 – knowledge or means of knowledge of connection to fraudulent evasion of VAT – appeal dismissed
Heard on: 13 – 16 January 2026
Judgment date: 23 April 2026
RIZWAN BUTT
Appellant
and
THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S
REVENUE AND CUSTOMS
Respondents
Before
TRIBUNAL MEMBER CATHERINE FARQUHARSON
Representation:
For the Appellant:
Mr Ian Spencer, Director of Ian Spencer & Associates Ltd, for the AppellantFor the Respondents:
Ms Joanna Vicary, counsel, instructed by HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office, for the Respondents.
DECISION
Introduction
This is a consolidated appeal in relation to HMRC’s decision to issue the Appellant, Mr Butt, with penalty notices under section 69D of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (“VATA 1994”) in respect of a series of transactions which took place in the periods 09/19 to 09/21. The total amount under appeal is £52,450.91 and relate to transactions which HMRC submit can be traced back to tax losses as a result of the fraudulent evasion of VAT, commonly referred to as missing trader intra-community (“MTIC”) fraud.
The decision notices under appeal are as follows:
Decision dated 25 November 2021 in the sum of £15,219.22 for period 09/19 .
Decision dated 9 March 2022 in the sum of £18,832.99 for period 12/19 and 3/20.
Decision dated 8 September 2022 in the sum of £10,249.50 for period 06/20, 09/20 and 12/20.
The decision dated 31 March 2023 in the sum of £8,149.20 for period 03/21, 06/21 and 09/21.
The section 69D penalties against Mr Butt follow decisions by HMRC to deny Quantum London Limited (“Quantum”), of which Mr Butt was a director, the recovery of input tax for the subject transactions. According to HMRC, Mr Butt knew or should have known that the transactions entered into by Quantum in the periods in question were connected to the fraudulent evasion of VAT.
Schedules of the denied transactions are contained within each of the denial letters and can be summarised as follows:
|
Period |
Supplier name(s) |
Number of transactions |
Goods |
Input tax denied |
|
09/19 |
K.A Top Traders Ltd |
24 |
Soft drinks |
£67,640.76 |
|
12/19 |
Alam Trading Ltd K.A Top Traders Ltd Maestro Trades Ltd |
3 15 5 |
Soft drinks Soft drinks Soft drinks |
£68,101.62 |
|
03/20 |
Alam Trading Ltd |
6 |
Soft drinks |
£15,600.62 |
|
06/20 |
Alam Trading Ltd |
5 |
Soft drinks |
£12,964.05 |
|
09/20 |
Alam Trading Ltd |
3 |
Soft drinks |
£7,778.43 |
|
12/20 |
Alam Trading Ltd Mega Foods UK Ltd |
2 4 |
Soft drinks Soft drinks |
£13,423.01 |
|
03/21 |
Metropac Ltd |
3 |
Soft drinks |
£8,547.66 |
|
06/21 |
Metropac Ltd |
4 |
Soft drinks |
£10,516.18 |
|
09/21 |
Metropac Ltd |
3 |
Soft drinks |
£8,101.76 |
HMRC accept that even though no formal appeal has been made to the underlying decisions to deny Quantum’s input tax, in order to demonstrate that the decisions under appeal (the director penalties) were correctly issued, they will need to demonstrate that the underlying input tax denials and company penalties under section 69C VATA were correctly made.
A summary of the decisions to deny Quantum’s claim for input tax (the Kittel denials), and the company and director penalties under section 69C and section 69D, are set out below:
|
Kittel denial |
Company penalty |
Director penalty |
|
9 September 2021 |
13October2021 |
25November2021 |
|
10January2022 |
21January2021 |
9March2022 |
|
8July2022 |
8August2022 |
8September2022 |
|
13March2023 |
13March2023 |
7
March2023 |
The grounds of appeal are stated to be as follows:
Mr Butt was unaware of the losses suffered by HMRC until a much later time and does not consider HMRC to have demonstrated that he was aware of those losses at the time the losses occurred.
Mr Butt was unaware of any deliberate actions taken by suppliers in the transaction chains to evade VAT and does not consider HMRC to have demonstrated that he was aware of those deliberate actions.
Mr Butt does not accept that he should have known there were losses, or that losses were likely within the transaction chains, and does not consider HMRC to have demonstrated that he should have known there were losses, or that they were likely.
If HMRC have not taken action against Quantum’s suppliers or customers, then it would be wrong for HMRC to take the same action against Quantum and Mr Butt, as they would in effect be cancelling their loss and profiting over and above the loss identified by that same amount.
Mr Butt does not accept that HMRC have accurately calculated any losses suffered and upon which the penalties raised against him are based.
A Fairford response was filed on behalf of Mr Butt, in which he accepts the accuracy of the transaction chains (set out below). However, the issues above remained in dispute.
The Law
The right to deduct and Kittel
Articles 167 and 168 of the Principal VAT Directive and sections 24 to 26 of VATA 1994 provide for the right to deduct input VAT. If a taxable person has incurred input tax that is properly allowable, they are entitled to set it against their output tax liability and, if the input tax credit due to them exceeds the output tax liability, receive a payment.
However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“the ECJ”), in the joined cases of Axel Kittel v Belgium and Belgium v Recolta Recycling SPRL (C-439/04 & 440/04) (“Kittel”) has confirmed that taxable persons who “knew or should have known” that the purchases in which input tax was incurred were connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT will not be entitled to deduct that input. At [56] of Kittel, the ECJ stated:
“[…] a taxable person who knew or should have known that, by his purchase, he was taking part in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT must, for the purposes of the Sixth Directive, be regarded as a participant in that fraud, irrespective of whether or not he profited by the resale of the goods.”
Conversely, the ECJ had stated at [51]:
“[…] traders who take every precaution which could reasonably be required of them to ensure that their transactions are not connected with fraud…must be able to rely on the legality of these transactions.”
The rationale for this approach was set out by the ECJ at [57-58], in which the Court explained in such a situation, the taxable person aids the perpetrators of the fraud and becomes their accomplice, and that in addition, such an interpretation, by making it more difficult to carry out fraudulent transactions, is apt to prevent them. At [59], the ECJ concluded:
“[..] it is for the referring court to refuse entitlement to the right to deduct where it is ascertained, having regard to objective factors, that the taxable person knew or should have known that, by his purchase, he was participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT, and to do so even where the transaction in question meets the objective criteria which form the basis of the concepts of “supply of goods effected by a taxable person acting as such” and “economic activity”. (emphasis added)
At [61], the ECJ proceeded to state that:
“[…] where it is ascertained, having regard to objective factors, that the supply is to a taxable person who knew or should have known that, by his purchase, he was participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT, it is for the national court to refuse that taxable person entitlement to the right to deduct.”
In Mobilx Limited (in Liquidation) v HMRC [2010] EWCA Civ 517, the Court of Appeal considered Kittel and stated (at [52], per Moses LJ):
“If a taxpayer has the means at his disposal of knowing that by his purchase he is participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT, he loses his right to deduct, not as a penalty for negligence, but because the objective criteria for the scope of that right are not met. It profits nothing to contend that, in domestic law, complicity in fraud denotes a more culpable state of mind then carelessness, in the light of the principle in Kittel. A trader who fails to deploy means of knowledge available to him does not satisfy the objective criteria which must be met before his right to deduct arises.” (emphasis added).
At [59], in relation to the “should have known” aspect of the test, Moses LJ stated:
“The test in Kittel is simple and should not be over-refined, it embraces not only those who know of the connection but those who “should have known. Thus, it includes those who should have known from the circumstances, which surround their transactions that they were connected to fraudulent evasion.”
At [64] of Mobilx, Moses LJ then said:
“If it is established that a trader should have known that by his purchase there was no reasonable explanation for the circumstances in which the transaction was undertaken other than that it was connected with fraud then such a trader was directly and knowingly involved in fraudulent evasion of VAT.”
The following passage at [82] is also pertinent:
“[…] Tribunals should not unduly focus on the question whether a trader has acted with due diligence. Even if a trader has asked appropriate questions, he is not entitled to ignore the circumstances in which his transactions take place if the only reasonable explanation for them is that his transactions have been or will be connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT […].”
As to the phrase “the only reasonable explanation”, the Upper Tribunal in the case of GSM Export (UK) Limited and Another v The Commissioners for HMRC [2014] UKUT 0529 (TCC) has confirmed that Mobilx does not purport to change the test in Kittel [19]:
“However, Mobilx does not purport to change the test in Kittel’s case. The requirement as to the taxpayer’s state of mind squarely remains “knew or should have known”. The reference to “the only reasonable explanation” is merely a way in which HMRC can demonstrate the extent of the taxpayers’ knowledge, that is to say, that he knew, or should have known, that the transaction was connected with fraud, as opposed to merely knowingly running some sort of risk that there might be such a connection.”
Further, in AC (Wholesale) Ltd v HMRC [2017] UKUT 191 (TCC), the Upper Tribunal considered that the ‘only reasonable explanation’ test is simply one way of showing that a person should have known that transactions were connected to fraud.
The Court of Appeal in Mobilx also affirmed guidance on the treatment of circumstantial evidence in cases of VAT fraud, repeating the words of Christopher Clarke J in Red12 v HMRC [2009] EWHC 2563:
Examining individual transactions on their merits does not, however, require them to be regarded in isolation without regard to their attendant circumstances and context. Nor does it require the tribunal to ignore compelling similarities between one transaction and another or preclude the drawing of inferences, where appropriate, from a pattern of transactions of which the individual transaction in question forms part, as to its true nature e.g. that it is part of a fraudulent scheme. The character of an individual transaction may be discerned from material other than the bare facts of the transaction itself, including circumstantial and “similar fact” evidence. That is not to alter its character by reference to earlier or later transactions but to discern it.
To look only at the purchase in respect of which input tax was sought to be deducted would be wholly artificial. A sale of 1,000 mobile telephones may be entirely regular, or entirely regular so far as the taxpayer is (or ought to be) aware. If so, the fact that there is fraud somewhere else in the chain cannot disentitle the taxpayer to a return of input tax. The same transaction may be viewed differently if it is the fourth in line of a chain of transactions all of which have identical percentage mark ups, made by a trader who has practically no capital as part of a huge and unexplained turnover with no left over stock, and mirrored by over 40 other similar chains in all of which the taxpayer has participated and in each of which there has been a defaulting trader. A tribunal could legitimately think it unlikely that the fact that all 46 of the transactions in issue can be traced to tax losses to HMRC is a result of innocent coincidence. Similarly, three suspicious involvements may pale into insignificance if the trader has been obviously honest in thousands.
Further in determining what it was that the taxpayer knew or ought to have known the tribunal is entitled to look at the totality of the deals effected by the taxpayer (and their characteristics), and at what the taxpayer did or omitted to do, and what it could have done, together with the surrounding circumstances in respect of all of them.”
Further, as was said in R v Exall (1866) 4 F&F 922, perPollock CB:
“One strand of the cord might be insufficient to sustain the weight, but three stranded together may be quite of sufficient strength. Thus, it may be in circumstantial evidence – there may be a combination of circumstances, no one of which would raise a reasonable conviction, or more than a mere suspicion: but the whole taken together may, create a strong conclusion of guilt, that is, with as much certainty as human affairs can require or admit of.”
A tax payer does not need to know specific details of the fraud being perpetuated. In Fonecomp Ltd v HMRC [2015] STC 2254, the Court of Appeal said this at [51]:
“…the holding of Moses LJ does not mean that the trader has to have the means of knowing how the fraud that actually took place occurred. He has simply to know, or have the means of knowing, that fraud has occurred, or will occur, at some point in some transaction to which his transaction is connected. The participant does not need to know how the fraud was carried out in order to have this knowledge. This is apparent from paras 56 and 61 of Kittel cited above. Paragraph 61of Kittel formulates the requirement of knowledge as knowledge on the part of the trader that 'by his purchase he was participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT'. It follows that the trader does not need to know the specific details of the fraud.”
Furthermore, it is dishonest for a person deliberately to shut their eyes to facts which they would prefer not to know. If he or she does so, they are taken to have actual knowledge of the facts to which they shut their eyes. Such knowledge has been described as "Nelsonian" or "blind- eye" knowledge". Lord Scott in Manifest Shipping Company Limited v. Uni-Polaris Shipping Company Limited and Others [2001] UKHL 1 said the following at [112]:
“‘Blind-eye’ knowledge approximates to knowledge. Nelson at the battle of Copenhagen made a deliberate decision to place the telescope to his blind eye in order to avoid seeing what he knew he would see if he placed it to his good eye. It is, I think, common ground - and if it is not, it should be - that an imputation of blind-eye knowledge requires an amalgam of suspicion that certain facts may exist and a decision to refrain from taking any step to confirm their existence. Lord Blackburn in Jones v. Gordon (1877) 2 App Cas 616, 629 distinguished a person who was "honestly blundering and careless" from a person who "refrained from asking questions, not because he was an honest blunderer or a stupid man, but because he thought in his own secret mind - I suspect there is something wrong, and if I ask questions and make farther inquiry, it will no longer be my suspecting it, but my knowing it, and then I shall not be able to recover". Lord Blackburn added "I think that is dishonesty".
The burden of proving knowledge or means of knowledge rests on HMRC. The standard of proof is the civil standard of the balance of probabilities.
HMRC must prove that Mr Butt either (a) actually knew that he was participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT; or (b) that he had the means at his disposal of knowing that he was participating in such a transaction: see Mobilx, at [52].
It not sufficient for HMRC to show that the taxpayer knew or should have known that it was running the risk that by its purchase it might be taking part in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT: see Mobilx at [56]. Nor is it sufficient for HMRC to show that a taxpayer knew or should have known that such transactions might be connected with fraudulent evasion, or even that it was more likely than not (in other words, probable) that its transaction was so connected: see Mobilx at [56] and [60];
The Tribunal must focus only on what the taxpayer actually knew at the time of the relevant transaction and/or the means of knowledge it had at its disposal at that time. Whilst that can include obvious inferences from the facts and circumstances in which it has been trading (see Mobilx at [61]), it cannot, by definition, include information not known to it if it had no means at its disposal of knowing during the relevant period or matters known only with the benefit of hindsight: see Aria Technology Ltd v HMRC [2016] UKFTT 98 (TC) at [13].
Nor is it sufficient for HMRC to show that a reasonable explanation for the relevant transaction was that it was connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT, it must be the only reasonable explanation (see Mobilx at [75]).
The test is an objective one, so a naïve taxpayer will not have satisfied the objective criteria entitling it to a deduction, if it failed to deploy means of knowledge available to it (see Mobilx at [52]).
Penalties
Section 69C of the VAT Act 1994 states as follows:
A person (T) is liable to a penalty where—
T has entered into a transaction involving the making of a supply by or to T (“the transaction”), and
conditions A to C are satisfied.
Condition A is that the transaction was connected with the fraudulent evasion of VAT by another person (whether occurring before or after T entered into the transaction).
Condition B is that T knew or should have known that the transaction was connected with the fraudulent evasion of VAT by another person.
Condition C is that HMRC have issued a decision (“the denial decision”) in relation to the supply which—
prevents T from exercising or relying on a VAT right in relation to the supply,
is based on the facts which satisfy conditions A and B in relation to the transaction, and
applies a relevant principle of EU case law (whether or not in circumstances that are the same as the circumstances in which any relevant case was decided by the European Court of Justice).
In this section “VAT right” includes the right to deduct input tax, the right to apply a zero rate to international supplies and any other right connected with VAT in relation to a supply.
The relevant principles of EU case law for the purposes of this section are the principles established by the European Court of Justice in the following cases—
joined Cases C-439/04 and C-440/04 Axel Kittel v. Belgian State; Belgium v. Recolta Recycling (denial of right to deduct input tax), and
Case C-273/11 (b) Mecsek-Gabona Kft v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Dél-dunántúli Regionális Adó Főigazgatósága (denial of right to zero rate), as developed or extended by that Court (whether before or after the coming into force of this section) in other cases relating to the denial or refusal of a VAT right in order to prevent abuses of the VAT system.
The penalty payable under this section is 30% of the potential lost VAT.
The potential lost VAT is—
the additional VAT which becomes payable by T as a result of the denial decision,
the VAT which is not repaid to T as a result of that decision, or
in a case where as a result of that decision VAT is not repaid to T and additional VAT becomes payable by T, the aggregate of the VAT that is not repaid and the additional VAT.
Where T is liable to a penalty under this section the Commissioners may assess the amount of the penalty and notify it to T accordingly.
No assessment of a penalty under this section may be made more than two years after the denial decision is issued.
The assessment of a penalty under this section may be made immediately after the denial decision is made (and notice of the assessment may be given to T in the same document as the notice of the decision).
Where by reason of actions involved in making a claim to exercise or rely on a VAT right in relation to a supply T—
is liable to a penalty for an inaccuracy under paragraph 1 of Schedule 24 to the Finance Act 2007 for which T has been assessed (and the assessment has not been successfully appealed against by T or withdrawn), or
is convicted of an offence (whether under this Act or otherwise), those actions do not give rise to liability to a penalty under this section.]
Section 69D of the VAT Act 1994 states as follows:
69D Penalties under section 69C: officers' liability
Where—
a company is liable to a penalty under section 69C, and
the actions of the company which give rise to that liability were attributable to an officer of the company (“the officer”),the officer is liable to pay such portion of the penalty (which may be equal to or less than 100%) as HMRC may specify in a notice given to the officer (a “decision notice”).
Before giving the officer a decision notice HMRC must—
inform the officer that they are considering doing so, and
afford the officer the opportunity to make representations about whether a decision notice should be given or the portion that should be specified.
A decision notice—
may not be given before the amount of the penalty due from the company has been assessed (but it may be given immediately after that has happened), and
may not be given more than two years after the denial decision relevant to that penalty was issued.
Where the Commissioners have specified a portion of the penalty in a decision notice given to the officer—
section 70 applies to the specified portion as to a penalty under section 69C,
the officer must pay the specified portion before the end of the period of 30 days beginning with the day on which the notice is given,
section 76(9) applies as if the decision notice were an assessment notified under section 76, and
a further decision notice may be given in respect of a portion of any additional amount assessed in an additional assessment.
HMRC may not recover more than 100% of the penalty through issuing decision notices in relation to two or more persons.
A person is not liable to pay an amount by virtue of this section if the actions of the company concerned are attributable to the person by reference to conduct for which the person has been convicted of an offence. In this subsection “conduct” includes omissions.
In this section “company” means a body corporate or unincorporated association but does not include a partnership, a local authority or a local authority association.
In its application to a body corporate other than a limited liability partnership “officer” means—
a director (including a shadow director within the meaning of section 251 of the Companies Act 2006),
a manager, or
a secretary.
In in its application to a limited liability partnership “officer” means a member.
In its application in any other case, “officer” means—
a director,
a manager,
a secretary, or
any other person managing or purporting to manage any of the company's affairs.
The Evidence
Mr Spencer, director of Ian Spencer & Associates Ltd, appeared on behalf of Mr Butt. Ms Joanna Vicary of counsel appeared on behalf of HMRC. We are grateful to them for their helpful assistance during the hearing. They made fulsome submissions and have left no stone unturned. They have said everything that could possibly have been said on behalf of their clients.
The Tribunal received a great volume of documents for this appeal, with the substantive bundle consisting of 13,678 pages and an authorities bundle consisting of 432 pages. We received skeleton arguments from both parties. In addition, a response was filed by HMRC to the Respondent’s skeleton argument on matters of law. As HMRC’s response had been filed without the Tribunal’s permission, we indicated at the outset of the hearing that we would grant Mr Butt permission to respond to that document in writing. Mr Spencer, on behalf of Mr Butt, informed us that he did not wish to respond in writing. Notwithstanding this, to ensure that both parties had a full opportunity to advance their case, we indicated that Mr Spencer could respond to that document in his closing submissions if he wished.
Despite the great volume of documentation, the parties estimated that only half a day reading would be required. That period was later extended to one day. We indicated at the outset of the hearing that the Tribunal had read all the documents in the pre-reading list provided by HMRC, the skeleton arguments, and all the witness statements (see below). However, we would not be reading the entire substantive bundle, and to the extent that the parties consider materials in the bundle to be relevant to this appeal and the decision we have to take, that they should take us to them specifically and explain their relevance. This approach is consistent with the guidance given by the Upper Tribunal in Adelekun v HMRC [2020] UKUT 244 (TCC).
Mr Butt provided a witness statement. He was the director of Quantum between 9 March 2019 (incorporation) and 13 December 2021 (his disqualification as director). He gave oral evidence under oath and was cross-examined.
HMRC provided witness statements from the following witnesses, all being employees or officers of HMRC:
Carmelina Mankad;
Olutoyin Alabi;
Matthew Bycroft;
Lee Nevin (adopting the witness statement of Paul Johnson);
Rachel Royle;
Shahzad Kotia;
Rebecca Nunn;
Leah St Clair.
Officer Carmelina Mankad is the appointed officer for Quantum. She was allocated to the case on 10 August 2021 having taken over from another office (Officer Gary Saul) who had moved on to another business area. Officer Mankad’s written evidence sets out in detail HMRC’s dealings with Trade Lynx, Quantum and Mr Butt, the decisions to issue Kittel denials and to raise penalties, and Quantum’s transactions with other traders in the chain. The other Officers dealt with specific traders in the supply chain.
The Tribunal heard oral evidence under oath from all of HMRC’s witnesses. Each were cross-examined during the hearing.
The Tribunal has considered all the relevant evidence placed before it. Given the volume of evidence, it is impossible to refer to it all, even in a lengthy decision such as this. That does not mean that the Tribunal has not given it due consideration.
The Tribunal has found all facts on the balance of probabilities.
Background Facts
As stated above, Mr Butt was a director of Quantum between 8 March 2019 and 13December 2021. Mr Butt has also been the director of three additional companies:
Trade Lynx (London) Ltd between 9 August 2011 (incorporation) and 13 December 2021. The company is currently in liquidation, winding up having commenced on 4 September 2019.
Lion Foods Limited between 17 March 2017 and 2 April 2018. The company remains active.
Butt Properties Limited between 16 March 2017 and 14 September 2021. The company remains active.
By way of a Court order dated 23 November 2021, Mr Butt was disqualified from acting as a director for 10 years from 14 December 2021 as a result of his conduct whilst acting as a director for Trade Lynx. The case details attached to the order from the Insolvency Service summarises the conduct in issue as follows:
Between 7 May 2018 and 22 March 2019, Rizwan Mahmood Butt (Mr Butt) caused or allowed Trade Lynx (London) Ltd (TLL) to participate in transactions which related to the fraudulent evasion of VAT, such connections being something which he either knew or should have known about; and 2. Mr Butt caused or allowed TLL to wrongfully claim input VAT of £203,306 from HMRC on its 06/18, 09/18, 12/18 and 03/19 VAT returns.”
Trade Lynx (London) Ltd
Trade Lynx was incorporated on 9 August 2011 (company registration no. 07733900). The nature of its business, as listed in its Companies House records, was “non-specialised wholesale trade.” Its principal place of business (“PPOB”) was a residential address in Essex.
Trade Lynx was registered for VAT on 1 June 2012. It stated its business activities, within its VAT 1 Form, as “Importer of empty hamburger and empty plastic lunch boxes.”
The sole director on incorporation was Mr Butt (he resigned on 13 December 2021, shortly before his disqualification took effect).
On 8 March 2022, a first Gazette Notice for compulsory strike off was issued. This action was suspended on 1 April 2022.
On 9 September 2019, the company was deregistered for VAT at the request of its liquidator.
On 22 June 2020, a letter was issued denying Trade Lynx entitlement to the right to deduct input tax claimed in its VAT accounting periods 06/18 to 03/19 amounting to £204,977.56 in reliance on the Kittel principle. The decision has not been appealed and the resulting debt has not been paid.
On 24 July 2020, Trade Lynx was issued with a penalty under section 69C VATA in the sum of £61,019 (a revised denial letter and section 69C penalty notice was issued on 14 September 2020). This decision has not been challenged and the penalty has not been paid.
On 20 January 2021, Mr Butt was notified that he was to be made personally liable under section 69D VATA to the penalty issued to Trade Lynx (a corrected version of the liability notice was issued to Mr Butt on 31 March 2021). An appeal was made out of time. A hearing took place on 28 February 2023. Permission to pursue the appeal was refused on 13 March 2023.
Lion Foods Limited
Lion Foods was incorporated on 17 March 2017 (under company registration no. 10677684. Mr Butt was a director between 17 March 2017 and 2 April 2018.
The nature of this business, as listed in its Companies House records, was “wholesale of meat and meat products, wholesale of dairy products, eggs and edible oils and fats wholesale of fruit and vegetable juices, mineral water and soft drinks.” Its business activities as stated within its VAT 1 Form was “soft drinks (wholesale).”
On 1 May 2017, Mr Butt made an application for VAT registration. He later completed a form and submitted it to HMRC stating that the company supplied food items and packaging products to fried chicken shops and restaurants. Lion Foods was given a VAT registration number on 27 July 2017 with an effective date of registration of 1 May 2017.
Lion Foods was compulsorily deregistered for VAT on 30 August 2019.
Quantum London Limited
Quantum was incorporated on 8 March 2019 (under company registration no. 11870317). The nature of its business, as listed in its Companies House records, was “non-specialised wholesale trade.”
Quantum was registered for VAT on 22 May 2019. It stated its business activities in its VAT 1 Form as “import and export of soft drinks, mineral water, packaging and food items .” Its PPOB was the same residential address in Essex as had been listed for Trade Lynx. This PPOB is also the registered address on Companies House.
At incorporation, there were two directors, Rizwan Butt (the Appellant) and Azhar Butt. Azhar Butt resigned on 11 March 2019. Thereafter, Nadyia Butt was appointed on 16 November 2019. Her appointment was terminated on 14 September 2021.
Mr Butt was a director of Quantum until his disqualification on 13 December 2021. There are no directors of Quantum currently listed at Companies House. It is common ground that Mr Butt was the sole person acting in the company and took all decisions regarding the suppliers used and the customers supplied.
On 8 March 2022, a first Gazette Notice for compulsory strike off was issued. This action was suspended on 1 April 2022.
HMRC’s involvement with Trade Lynx
On 12 September 2012, HMRC undertook its first visit to Trade Lynx. Mr Butt confirmed during this visit that the company had started trading in July 2012. He stated that he did not arrange transportation of goods purchased, as it was all arranged by the supplier who would be given the name of the customer. Mr Butt was informed of the risks of the industry and MTIC fraud. He was handed various fact sheets.
On 13 September 2012, Trade Lynx was issued with its first MTIC awareness letter which indicated that this type of fraud was rife within the wholesale of commodities. The letter provided information on how to validate the VAT status of trading partners and made reference to Notice 726 – Joint and Several liability (“Notice 726”).
On 30 May 2013, another visit was undertaken with Trade Lynx as it had sold goods to another trader that was part of a supply chain under investigation. Mr Butt explained how he started the business and provided details of his main suppliers. He explained that his suppliers delivered directly to his customers. He was informed that he should keep better records and was again handed Notice 726.
On 7 June 2013, a further MTIC awareness letter was sent to Trade Lynx which indicated that alternative banking platforms were often used by those involved in MTIC fraud. Further details on MTIC fraud and what checks might be useful were provided within the letter.
On 12 November 2013, Trade Lynx was issued with a tax loss letter notifying it that its purchases from Grove Green Limited in the 12/12 VAT period had been traced to transaction chains commencing with a VAT loss exceeding £2,633.
On 3 December 2013, Trade Lynx was issued with a tax loss letter notifying it that its purchases from Tradeway Supplies Limited in the 06/13 VAT period had been traced to transaction chains commencing with a VAT loss exceeding £23,198.
On 10 December 2013, another visit was undertaken with Trade Lynx. Records were discussed, the need for due diligence was raised, and Mr Butt was informed that he should undertake a detailed review of the checks and documents obtained. He was referred to the recent tax loss letters and again to Notice 726.
On 2 July 2013, 17 July 2013, 24 July 2013 and 26 July 2013, Trade Lynx was issued with veto letters notifying it that its suppliers Universal Food & Packaging, Whitmount Limited, Grove Green Limited and Hook Sinker Limited had all been deregistered for VAT.
On 10 March 2014, Trade Lynx was issued with a veto letter notifying it that another of its suppliers, Tradeway Supplies Limited, had been deregistered for VAT.
On 14 March 2014, Trade Lynx was issued with a tax loss letter notifying it that its purchases from Hook Sinker Limited in the 03/13 and 06/13 VAT periods had been traced to transaction chains commencing with a VAT loss exceeding £30,800.
On 19 March 2014, Trade Lynx was issued with a veto letter notifying it that its supplier Melon Limited had been deregistered for VAT.
On 16 May 2014, Trade Lynx was issued with a veto letter notifying it that its supplier Guru Krupa Limited had been deregistered for VAT.
On 23 October 2014, Trade Lynx was issued with a tax loss letter notifying it that its purchases from Degroot Trading Limited in the 06/13 VAT period had been traced to transaction chains commencing with a VAT loss exceeding £75,055.
On 5 December 2014, a visit was undertaken to Trade Lynx to discuss customers and suppliers, as well as the recent tax loss letter.
On 27 March 2015, a visit was undertaken to Trade Lynx as part of the monitoring of the company with the aim of obtaining documents for transactions undertaken in January and February 2015.
On 13 May 2015, a visit was undertaken to Trade Lynx. Once again, customers and suppliers were discussed and Mr Butt was reminded that due diligence checks needed to be undertaken.
On 31 July 2015, Trade Lynx was issued with a veto letter notifying it that its supplier Natural Drinks (UK) Limited had been deregistered for VAT.
On 18 August 2015, another visit was undertaken to Trade Lynx. It was confirmed that the business had increased its turnover in the most recent VAT period, the company had a new German supplier and three new customers. Records were requested so that the 06/15 return could be reviewed.
On 19 November 2015, a visit was undertaken to Trade Lynx. Again, the business was discussed and Mr Butt was advised to carry out checks on his suppliers and customers regularly.
On 8 March 2019, Quantum was incorporated and Mr Butt was named as a director (the chronology of HMRC’s involvement with Quantum is set out below).
On 20 August 2019 HMRC, wrote to Trade Lynx to seek to arrange a visit to verify several sales. This meeting did not take place as HMRC received a response from the liquidator, indicating that they had received instructions from Mr Butt to place Trade Lynx into liquidation.
On 9 September 2019, Trade Lynx was deregistered for VAT at the request of its liquidator.
On 8 October 2019, a visit was undertaken to speak to the liquidators and to request various documentation. This documentation was received from the liquidators on 19 November 2019.
On 22 June 2020, a Kittel denial letter was issued to Trade Lynx denying its entitlement to the right to deduct input tax claimed in its VAT accounting periods 06/18 to 03/19 totalling £204,977.56.
On 24 July 2020, a section 69C penalty was issued to the company in the sum of £61,019 (a revised denial letter and section 69C penalty letter was issued on 14 September 2020).
On 20 January 2021, Mr Butt was notified that he was to be made personally liable under section 69D VATA to the penalty issued to Trade Lynx (a corrected version of the liability notice was issued on 31 March 2021). An appeal was issued out of time, but permission to pursue the appeal was refused.
Pursuant to a court order dated 23 November 2021, Mr Butt was disqualified from acting as a director for 10 years from 14 December 2021 for conduct whilst acting as a director for Trade Lynx.
HMRC’s involvement with Quantum
As stated above, Quantum was incorporated on 8 March 2019 (a few months prior to Trade Lynx being placed into liquidation). Mr Butt has been the director of Quantum at all material times, and it is not disputed that he was the sole person acting within the company and making all decisions regarding suppliers and the customers.
On 25 July 2019, a visit was undertaken to Quantum as its VRN had been verified by another company. It was confirmed that Quantum bought and sold soft drinks, and that Mr Butt sourced his suppliers and customers through his previous business (Trade Lynx). It was confirmed that delivery prices were always included in the price and that his suppliers delivered directly to his customers. Mr Butt was again given information about MTIC fraud and tax loss chains, and advised about the measures he could take to protect his business from VAT fraud.
On 30 July 2019, an MTIC awareness letter was issued to Quantum. This described MTIC fraud, indicated what a company might look out for, and referenced the need for due diligence.
In August 2019, HMRC were informed by the liquidator of Trade Lynx that they had received instructions from Mr Butt to place the company into liquidation. On 9 September 2019 Trade Lynx was deregistered for VAT (see the chronology above concerning Trade Lynx).
On 20 December 2019, following a VAT verification request made by Quantum for one of its suppliers, Maestro Trades Limited, HMRC wrote to Quantum to confirm that it was currently unable to verify Maestro. It later transpired that Quantum proceeded to trade with Maestro, notwithstanding the fact that HMRC had informed Quantum that it was unable to verify Maestro’s VAT registration details.
On 4 February 2020, an unannounced visit was undertaken to Quantum. It had been noted that Mr Butt had been involved with Trade Lynx and that company had been involved in transactions resulting in tax losses. No one was at the PPOB and a letter was left. Mr Butt later contacted HMRC and a visit was arranged for 5 March 2020.
In the meantime, on 24 February 2020, a veto letter was issued to Quantum indicating that its supplier Maestro Trades Limited had been deregistered.
On 5 March 2020, the agreed visit took place at the PPOB which was Mr Butt’s home address. It was stated that Quantum purchased from a French company (SEDB Sarl) and sold to an Italian company (Rotana SRLS). There had, however, also been UK trade carried out. Mr Butt was asked how he became aware of Alam Trading Limited, one of its suppliers, and he indicated that the company had reached out to Quantum.
Mr Butt explained how a typical transaction worked and confirmed that his suppliers would deliver directly to his customers. He stated that there were no contracts or agreements, and that the onus was on the supplier to insure the goods for loss/ damage. He stated that his customer would pay him before he would pay the supplier. It was noted that the company had no website or social media presence, and Mr Butt indicated that everything was done by word of mouth. Due diligence was again discussed and Mr Butt was issued with Notice 726, and in particular, taken to section 6.
On 23 March 2020, a veto letter was issued to Quantum indicating that its supplier K.A. Top Traders had been deregistered for VAT.
On 6 May 2020, a letter was sent to Quantum noting that it had been identified as a business that may be at risk of involvement in supply chains connected to fraud and was to be included on HMRC’s monitoring project. That would involve it being visited regularly and it providing records on a monthly basis. Quantum was again referred to Notice 726 and the “How to Spot Missing Trader VAT Fraud” leaflet.
On 1 July 2020, Quantum was issued with a tax loss letter notifying it that 13 of its purchases from K.A. Top Traders Limited in VAT periods 06/19 and 09/19 had been traced to transaction chains commencing with a VAT loss exceeding £37,984.
On 19 January 2021, Quantum was issued with a tax loss letter notifying it that three of its purchases from Alam Trading Limited in VAT periods 12/19 had been traced to transaction chains commencing with a VAT loss which exceeded £7,751.
On 21 April 2021, Quantum was issued with a tax loss letter notifying it that four of its purchases from Alam Trading Limited in VAT periods 03/20 had been traced to transaction chains commencing with a VAT loss which exceeded £10,415.
On 27 April 2021, a telephone call was undertaken with Mr Butt and the tax loss letters relating to Alam Trading Limited discussed. He stated that he had spoken to Alam Trading Limited and had stopped trading with them. Mr Butt said that he would provide the names of his new suppliers and that he had carried out due diligence on these suppliers who were in any event well established in the industry.
On 15 June 2021, Quantum was issued with a tax loss letter notifying it that 29 of its purchases from KA Top Traders Limited in September, October and November 2019 had been traced to transaction chains commencing with a VAT loss which exceeded £85,678.
On 2 September 2021, a telephone conference was undertaken with Quantum as Officer Mankad had taken over the monitoring of the company. Questions were asked about how the business operated and due diligence was discussed. Mr Butt acknowledged at the meeting that Quantum did not add any value to the goods or transactions. He indicated that following tax loss letters he was no longer dealing with Alam Trading Limited or K.A. Top Traders Limited. He indicated that he had a robust due diligence process in place, meeting directors and customers in person and that his business was based on connections and links. He confirmed that he had previously been told about Notice 726 and had been given recommendations as to due diligence checks. Full details of all the interventions that could be undertaken (deregistration, input tax denial, penalties) were given to Mr Butt and the relevant legislation that related to these interventions was provided by email directly after the meeting.
On 22 September 2021, HMRC issued a Kittel denial letter denying Quantum entitlement to the right to deduct input tax claimed in its VAT accounting period 09/19 totalling £67,640.76.
On 13 October 2021, a penalty under section 69C VATA was issued to Quantum in the sum of £15,219.22. At the same time, Mr Butt was issued with a letter notifying him that HMRC were considering making him personally liable for the penalty and giving him the opportunity to make representations.
No representations were received in the relevant timeframe and, as such, on 25 November 2021 Mr Butt was notified that he was to be made personally liable for the penalty issued to Quantum under section 69D VATA.
On 9 December 2021, a video meeting was undertaken with Mr Butt and he was asked about his supplier Maestro Trade Limited. He could not remember how he found the company nor who his contact was. As for his other supplier, Alam Trading Limited, he indicated that Quantum had been approached by that company and that he had met a company representative several times. Queries were also raised regarding Mr Butt’s EU suppliers and why almost all orders from EU suppliers were delivered to Germany. Mr Butt stated that his brother was a German citizen but lived in the UK. Mr Butt indicated that he did not understand why he had been denied input tax. In response, officers referred him to the discussions he had had during his meeting with Officer Mankad on 2 September 2021 and her email of the same date. Mr Butt’s disqualification was also discussed.
On 13 December 2021, Quantum was issued with a tax loss letter notifying it that five of its purchases from Maestro Trades Limited in VAT periods 12/19 and 03/20 had been traced to transaction chains commencing with a VAT loss which exceeded £13,372.
On 24 December 2021, Quantum was issued with a 7-day deregistration warning letter as attempts to contact the company had been unsuccessful and it was not clear whether it continued to trade given that the sole remaining director, Mr Butt, had resigned on 13 December 2021.
On 7 January 2022, a Kittel denial letter was issued denying Quantum entitlement to the right to deduct input tax claimed in its VAT accounting periods 12/19 and 03/20 totalling £83,701. A notice of assessment was issued dated 10 January 2022.
On 10 January 2022, Quantum was deregistered for VAT.
On 21 January 2022, Quantum was issued with a penalty under section 69C VATA in the sum of £18,832.99. At the same time Mr Butt was issued with a letter notifying him that HMRC were considering making him personally liable for the penalty and giving him the opportunity to make representations.
By way of a letter dated 31 January 2022 Mr Butt made representations as to why he should not be made liable to a penalty, stating that HMRC had failed to evidence their case. On 8 February 2022, HMRC responded rebutting those points.
On 9 March 2022, Mr Butt was notified that he was to be made personally liable for the penalty issued to Quantum under section 69D VATA.
On 8 April 2022, Quantum was issued with a tax loss letter notifying it that 10 of its purchases from Alam Trading Limited between April 2020 and December 2020 had been traced to transaction chains commencing with a VAT loss which exceeded £25,928.
On 21 June 2022, Quantum was issued with a tax loss letter notifying it that four of its purchases from Mega Foods Limited in October, November and December 2020 had been traced to transaction chains commencing with a VAT loss which exceeded £8,237.
On 8 July 2022, a Kittel denial letter was issued denying Quantum entitlement to the right to deduct input tax claimed in its VAT accounting periods 06/20 to 12/20 totalling £34,165.
On 8 August 2022, Quantum was issued with a penalty under section 69C VATA in the sum of £10,249.50. At the same time Mr Butt was issued with a letter notifying him that HMRC were considering making him personally liable for the penalty and giving him the opportunity to make representations.
No representations were made and as such on 8 September 2022 Mr Butt was notified that he was to be made personally liable for the penalty issued to Quantum under section 69D VATA.
On 13 March 2023, a Kittel denial letter was issued denying Quantum entitlement to the right to deduct input tax claimed in its VAT accounting periods 03/21 to 09/21 totalling £27,165.60.
On 13 March 2023, Quantum was also issued with a penalty under section 69C VATA in the sum of £8,149.20. On 14 March 2023 time Mr Butt was issued with a letter notifying him that HMRC were considering making him personally liable for the penalty and giving him the opportunity to make representations in this regard.
On 17 March 2023, Mr Butt made representations as to why he believed that he should not be made liable for the penalty, stating that he was not aware of any tax losses in the relevant periods. These representations were not considered sufficient by HMRC.
On 31 March 2023 Mr Butt was notified that he was to be made personally liable for the penalty issued to Quantum under section 69D VATA.
Connection with fraudulent default
The decisions under appeal concern transactions which relate to Quantum’s purchases from several suppliers. It is accepted that the transaction chains set out by HMRC are accurate and that there were tax losses in those chains (see Mr Butt’s Fairford response). However, Mr Butt submits that this is insufficient for the Kittel principle to be invoked, and that HMRC had not established that the losses were a result of “deliberate actions” or “deliberate evasion” on the part of defaulting trader.
The transaction chains are as follows:
K A Top Traders Limited → Quantum → Customer
Guston Services Limited → Alam Trading Limited → Quantum → Customer
Carmella Sp.Z.o.o → Alam Trading Limited → Quantum → Customer
Maestro Trades Limited → Quantum → Customer
Winona Global Limited → Alam Trading Limited → Quantum → Customer
Brands Nexus Limited → Alam Trading Limited → Quantum → Customer
Mirandina Limited → Mega Foods UK Limited → Quantum → Customer
AK International Supplies Limited → Metropac Limited → Quantum → Customer
Thirsty Food Limited → Metropac Limited → Quantum → Customer
MJD Wholesale Limited → Metropac Limited → Quantum → Customer
On Point Reviews → Metropac Limited → Quantum → Customer
The following is a summary of HMRC’s position as to the status or role played by the traders involved:
|
Defaulting trader |
Evidence |
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K.A. Top Traders Limited |
This trader was dealt with in the evidence of Officer Matthew Bycroft. K.A. Top Traders supplied Quantum directly in 39 transactions that are the subject of this appeal in VAT periods 09/19 and 12/19. The Officer’s evidence was that K.A. Top Traders submitted nil VAT returns for its entire period of registration despite there being evidence of trading. He concluded that “KA was making payments to businesses outside the UK for the purchase of goods whilst receiving monies from businesses within the UK for the onward sale of those goods. By not declaring the tax liabilities due on these transactions, by rendering NIL returns, K.A. Top Traders was acting as a fraudulent defaulter.” Officer Bycroft stated in oral evidence that bank statements obtained for K.A. Top Traders show large receipts of over £524,000 from December 2018 (account opening) to 2 February 2020 (account closure), with many including the word “invoice” and from UK businesses, including Quantum, showing clear evidence of trade for which only nil VAT returns were provided. Officer Bycroft maintained his view in oral evidence that KA Top Traders was acting as a fraudulent defaulter. |
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Guston Services Limited |
This trader was dealt with in the evidence of Officer Paul Johnson, whose evidence has been adopted by Officer Lee Nevin. Guston supplied Alam Trading Limited, who in turn supplied Quantum in eight transactions in VAT periods 12/19 and 03/20 (two transactions in 12/19 and six transactions in 03/20). All its submitted VAT returns at that point were nil returns. When HMRC contacted Guston, no response was received and it was deregistered for VAT. An assessment for disallowed input tax and for output tax not declared was issued to Guston totalling £354,292 on 27 October 2020. The assessment has not been paid or challenged. Following his investigations, Officer Johnson concluded that: “There is no doubt in my mind that Guston is a blocking buffer engaged in fraudulent activities designed to secure a tax advantage for other traders or individuals. Its main role was to block the activities of tracing the deals to an ultimate defaulting trader.” Officer Nevin adopted this view and did not depart from it in his oral evidence. |
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Carmella Sp. Z.o.o |
This trader was dealt with in the evidence of Officer Mankad. Carmella is a Polish company and supplied Alam Trading Limited, who in turn supplied Quantum, in one transaction in VAT period 12/19. Its business activity was declared as the wholesale of computers, computer peripheral equipment and software. The company submitted nil VAT returns but there was evidence of trade in 2018 and 2019. According to the Polish authorities, the company has not submitted any tax returns since the beginning of 2019, nor declared intra-community supplies. Summonses issued to Carmella were returned as uncollected. Carmella was deregistered for VAT on 27 February 2020 due to failure to submit tax returns. Officer Mankad’s evidence is that Carmella deliberately failed to declare VAT and failed to submit VAT returns which occasioned tax losses. She has maintained this view in her oral evidence. |
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Maestro Trades Limited |
This trader is dealt with in the evidence of Officer Olutoyin Alabi. Maestro supplied Quantum directly in five transactions in VAT period 12/19. It did not submit any returns during its entire period of VAT registration and was identified as trading in chains involving tax losses. No response was received when HMRC attempted to contact Maestro and its director. It was deregistered from VAT on 31 January 2020. No assessments were issued to Maestro but evidence has been obtained to show that Maestro undertook transactions whilst registered for VAT and failed to declare the output tax due on its sales, amounting to at least £13,732. It was struck off in December 2020. Following investigations, Officer Alabi concluded that Maestro was: ‘fraudulent with no intention, at any time, of ever paying the VAT due.’ Officer Alabi maintained this view in her oral evidence. In her oral evidence, Officer Alabi was also asked about when Maestro was registered for VAT. In her statement, the effective date of registration was stated to be 6 November 2019. Officer Alabi confirmed that she had recently checked HMRC’s records and that the date in her statement (6 November 2019) was correct. However, the VAT certificate for Maestro, which appeared in the pack of “due diligence” documents provided by Mr Butt with his witness statement, showed a different VAT registration date of 13 December 2018. Officer Alabi stated that she first saw the VAT certificate provided with Mr Butt’s witness statement a few days before this hearing when it had been forwarded to her by HMRC’s legal team. Officer Alabi stated in oral evidence that HMRC have conducted further checks and have no record at all of this different registration date for Maestro (13 December 2018). Her conclusion is that the VAT certificate provided by Mr Butt is a forged document. In cross-examination, Officer Alabi was asked whether she knew who had created the VAT certificate attached to Mr Butt’s statement. She stated that she wouldn’t know, but it was certainly not a document produced by HMRC. In response to questions from the Tribunal, Officer Alabi stated that she had checked HMRC’s internal records which confirmed the registration date of 6 November 2019. |
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Winona Global Limited |
This trader is dealt with in the evidence of Officer Shahzad Kotia. Winona supplied Alam Trading Limited, who in turn supplied Quantum. Alam Trading had been purchasing from the company between May 2020 and September 2020. Despite Winona being registered for VAT between 31 May 2019 and 16 August 2021, it submitted only one (repayment) VAT return for period 02/21. HMRC’s attempts to speak to the director were unsuccessful. On 28 October 2021, Winona was issued with a notice of assessment in the sum of £20,452.27, which has not been challenge or paid. Winona was dissolved via compulsory strike off on 21 February 2023. Officer Kotia’s conclusion was that Winona was “a fraudulently defaulting trader and is facilitating MTIC activity in a bigger supply chain. I was never able to speak to the director throughout the investigation. No evidence of trade was provided from the company throughout the investigation despite requests for the same. VAT returns were incorrect or missing and evidence of supplies not declared was obtained by HMRC. The company abruptly ended contact with HMRC.” The Officer has maintained that view in her oral evidence. |
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Brands Nexus Limited |
This trader is dealt with in the evidence of Officer Rachel Royle. Brands Nexus supplied Alam Trading Limited, who in turn supplied Quantum, in two transactions in VAT period 12/20. Brands Nexus failed to submit its first VAT return. It was also noted that the director was a German national who could not be traced as resident in the United Kingdom. A deregistration notification was sent to Brands Nexus on 22 February 2021. No contact was received from Brands Nexus in response to this. On 16 November 2021 Brands Nexus was issued with an assessment in the sum of £4,860, which it has not challenged or paid. Officer Royle has concluded that “Brands Nexus Ltd was a fraudulent defaulting trader….the company did not submit any VAT returns to HMRC, despite trading during this period, which has resulted in an under declaration of their output tax. Additionally, the company has not made any contact with HMRC nor has it appealed the decision to deregister, the assessment, or sought to make any payments towards the outstanding debt.” The Officer maintained that view in her oral evidence. |
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Mirandina Limited |
This trader is dealt with in the evidence of Officer Carmelina Mankad. Mirandina supplied Mega Foods UK Limited who in turn supplied Quantum in four transactions in VAT period 12/20. Mirandina did not submit any VAT returns during its period of registration. When contacted by HMRC, the director and her son gave contradictory statements as to the purpose of the business and the trade it undertook, neither of which accorded with the fact that they appeared to be selling soft drinks (the son in fact said that the business offered transport services). On 29 July 2022, Mirandina was issued with an assessment in the sum of £573,358 and shortly thereafter a decision to deregister Mirandina was taken. On 27 February 2023, a penalty assessment in the sum of £172,007.40 was also raised. Mirandina has not challenged the decisions nor paid the sums due. Officer Mankad has concluded that: “Based on the evidence held by HMRC such as sale invoices issued by Mirandina, imports made by Mirandina and no VAT returns, it is reasonable to conclude that the assessed amount of £573,358 was a tax loss derived from Mirandina’s fraudulent evasion of VAT for a period between 01 May 2020 and 30 April 2021. A VAT assessment was raised including for the VAT charged by Mirandina from sales to Mega Foods, transactions connected with four of the listed purchases made by Quantum London.” Officer Mankad maintained this view in her oral evidence. She stated that Mirandina failed to render any VAT returns, both the director and her son had been spoken to, and their narrative of the business would constantly change. |
|
AK International Supplies Limited |
This trader is dealt with in the evidence of Officer Camelina Mankad. AK supplied Metropac Limited who in turn supplied Quantum in four transactions in VAT periods 03/21 to 09/21. AK came to the attention of HMRC as it was supplying a company suspected of involvement in supply chain fraud. Initial contact was made via telephone and documents were requested by email. The company failed to provide the documents requested, despite a formal Schedule 36 notice. AK submitted regular VAT returns but they are considered to have been inaccurate. On 3 May 2022, AK was issued with an assessment in the sum of £651,320.00, followed by a penalty assessment for £421,729.02. These have not been challenged or paid. In total, according to HMRC, AK have failed to pay assessments totalling £1,834,863.62 in respect of PAYE, VAT, CT and Customs Duty. It was wound up following a Court order dated 1 March 2023. Officer Mankad has concluded that “based on the evidence held by HMRC it is reasonable to conclude that the assessed amount of £651,320 was a tax loss derived from AK’s fraudulent evasion of VAT for a period between 1 February 2020 and 31 January 2022.” She has maintained that view in her oral evidence. |
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Thirsty Foods Limited |
This trader is dealt with in the evidence of Officer Rebecca Nunn. Thirsty supplied Metropac Limited who in turn supplied Quantum in two transactions in VAT periods 03/21 and 06/21. Thirsty came to the attention of HMRC as it was supplying a company suspected of involvement in supply chain fraud. Thirsty failed to file returns for VAT periods 3/21, 6/21 and others. As no returns had been filed since 1 January 2021, on 9 May 2022, a 7-day warning letter was sent to ascertain whether the company was still trading. No response was received. On 24 May 2022 Thirsty was deregistered for VAT. On the same date contact was received from the company’s agent confirming that Thirsty had not traded in the periods for which it had not submitted returns. On 27 May 2022 a request was issued for business records, but no response was received despite a Schedule 36 notice. In late 2022, Thirsty was issued with an assessment in the sum of £311,637 and a penalty for £133,447.26. A personal liability notice in the sum of £63,556.50 was later issued to the director. No challenge was made to these decisions and the sums remain unpaid. Officer Nunn has concluded that Thirsty was a fraudulent defaulting trader and has maintained that view in her oral evidence. |
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MJD Wholesale Limited |
This trader is dealt with in the evidence of Officer Mankad. MJD supplied Metropac Limited who in turn supplied Quantum in one transaction in VAT period 06/21. MJD submitted VAT returns for periods 03/21 to 09/21, with the returns for 06/21 and 09/21 being nil returns. No assessments were issued to MJD as, by the time the transactions it had been involved in had been discovered, the company had been dissolved. Nevertheless, evidence has been obtained by HMRC to show that MJD undertook various transactions whilst registered for VAT and failed to declare the output tax due on its sales, amounting to at least £24,196.39. MJD was dissolved via voluntary strike off on 21 December 2021 and deregistered for VAT on the same date. Officer Mankad concluded that “MJD deliberately submitted nil VAT returns to avoid to account for the VAT it charged its UK customers. This led to tax losses. In conclusion MJD is a fraudulent defaulter.” She has maintained that view in her oral evidence. |
|
On Point Reviews Limited |
This trader is dealt with in the evidence of Officer Mankad. On Point supplied Metropac Limited who in turn supplied Quantum in two transactions in VAT periods 06/21 and 09/21. On Point came to the attention of HMRC as it was supplying a company that was suspected of involvement in supply chain fraud. On Point filed VAT returns during its period of registration but all returns were nil returns. It has not responded to HMRC’s letters. In June 2022, it was issued with an assessment in the sum of £17,778. A further notice of assessment was issued in September 2022 in the sum of £32,403, and yet a further assessment in the sum of £351,267 in October 2022. In February 2023, it was issued with a penalty in the sum of £273,986.19, and the director was issued with a personal liability notice in the sum of £273,986.19. These have not been challenged and the sums due have not been paid. Officer Mankad has concluded that “based on the evidence held by HMRC such as sale invoices issued by On Point to two UK customers, imports made by On Point and nil VAT returns, it was reasonable to conclude that On Point is a fraudulent defaulter and the tax loss incurred to the public purse was equal or higher than the assessed amount of £401,000. The tax loss was derived from On Point’s fraudulent evasion of VAT for a period between 01 April 2020 and 31 March 2022.” She has maintained that view in her oral evidence. |
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Other traders |
Evidence |
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Alam Trading Limited |
This trader was dealt with in the evidence of Officer Leah Jayne St Clair. Alam Trading was a direct supplier to Quantum in nine transactions in the VAT periods 12/19 and 03/20 and had been identified by HMRC as a buffer company in transaction chains. Alam Trading came to the attention of HMRC as it appeared to be trading in chains where there was a suspicion of supply chain fraud. Correspondence took place between HMRC and Alam in order for HMRC to review its transactions and business. During this time the company was visited regularly and given advice on how to avoid being involved in supply chain fraud, with several tax loss letters having been issued. However, HMRC’s case is that the company demonstrated real improvement and in July 2022, the investigation into Alam was closed. We note that this was over two, nearly three years, after those transactions in which Alam Trading was supplying Quantum in the VAT periods 12/19 and 03/20 which are under appeal. Officer St Clair concluded that whilst “Alam started out not performing due diligence on their customers and suppliers, and there were definite tax losses found in the supply chain but after education was provided it was clear from the records [that] the business was making changes to improve the checks completed and protect the integrity of their supply chain showing a definite change in behaviour.” When questioned as to why Alam Trading had been removed from investigation and not issued penalties, Officer St Clair maintained in her oral evidence that HMRC had seen improvement in the way Alam Trading operated, that it had not received much education prior to HMRC intervention, but thereafter it had improved, and that HMRC do not “go for the jugular” and that in HMRC’s view, there were insufficient grounds for them to conclude that Alam Trading had the knowledge or means of knowledge for any penalty. |
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Mega Foods UK Limited |
This trader was dealt with in the evidence of Officer Mankad. Mega Foods was a buffer company in transaction chains commencing with Mirandina and was a direct supplier to Quantum in four transactions in VAT periods 12/20. Mega Foods submitted all its VAT returns during its period of registration but came to the attention of HMRC as it made sales of EU label soft drinks to Quantum and it appeared to be trading in chains where supply chain fraud was suspected. HMRC found tax losses on supply chains with Mega Foods and the company was put on supply chain investigation. During this time, the company was visited regularly and given advice on how to avoid being involved in supply chain fraud. Mega Foods ceased trading on 31 March 2023 and was deregistered for VAT on 1 April 2023. A tax loss letter was issued for VAT periods 06/20 to 12/21 as it had been involved in 103 transactions that commenced with a defaulting trader resulting in tax losses over £192,513.08. A VAT assessment of £19,488.00 was raised in December 2022. Followed by a penalty in the sum of £3,069.36, which has not been challenged. Officer Mankad has concluded that “based on the evidence held by HMRC, it is reasonable to conclude that Mega Foods acted as a buffer on the supply chains between defaulters and Quantum. Mega Foods’ transactions with both its suppliers and its customer Quantum follow none of the normal commercial practices for contracting, negotiating, transport and insurance that other companies would use. Had (the director) paid attention to the addresses where the goods had been shipped by his suppliers, he could easily cut out Quantum to sell directly to its customers for a better profit.” Officer Mankad maintained this view in her oral evidence. |
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Metropac Limited |
This trader was dealt with in the evidence of Officer Mankad. Metropac was a buffer company in transaction chains and was a direct supplier to Quantum in 10 transactions in VAT periods 03/21 to 09/21. Metropac obtained its supplies from AK, Thirsty, MJD and On Point (all listed above). Metropac came to the attention of HMRC as it was a direct supplier to Quantum. Following an initial visit, given the types of goods that it was trading in, Metropac was put on supply chain investigation. It was issued with a tax loss letter in November 2022 noting that during VAT periods 12/19 to 06/22, it had been involved in 210 transactions that commenced with a defaulting trader resulting in tax loses over £517,719.71. Officer Mankad has concluded that Metropac was a buffer between Quantum and defaulting suppliers, and “it is reasonable to conclude that Metropac transactions with Quantum and with its corresponding suppliers did not follow normal commercial practices for contracting, negotiating, transport and insurance and rather show contrivance.” She has maintained that view in her oral evidence. |
Knowledge or means of knowledge
It is HMRC’s case that Quantum and Mr Butt (as a director of Quantum) knew, or should have known, that the transactions that were entered into with Alam, K.A. Top Traders, Maestro, Mega Foods and Metropac were connected to the fraudulent evasion of VAT.
Mr Butt disputes this. In the skeleton argument filed on his behalf, his case is put as follows:
That as director of Quantum, he was unaware that HMRC had suffered and was continuing to suffer losses at the time the losses occurred.
That as director of Quantum, he should not have known there were losses or that losses were likely within the transaction chains at the time the losses occurred.
That as director of Quantum, when the company was engaged in trade with the suppliers identified by HMRC as being responsible for tax losses, he did not take any deliberate part in the actions taken by those traders.
That as director of Quantum, when the company was engaged in trade with the suppliers identified by HMRC as being responsible for tax losses, he was not aware and could not have been aware of any deliberate actions taken by those traders to evade VAT.
HMRC’s Submissions
HMRC submit the following as indications by which the Tribunal can determine that Mr Butt knew, or should have known, that the transactions entered into by Quantum in the periods under appeal, involving the traders identified by HMRC as having been involved in tax losses, were connected with the fraudulent evasion of tax.
Knowledge of the existence and prevalence of VAT fraud
It is common ground that Mr Butt, when he was the director of Trade Lynx and then of Quantum, had been the subject of numerous visits from HMRC Officers between 2012 and 2020 during which he received education and warnings that the wholesale of fast-moving consumer goods posed a risk of supply chain fraud.
He was referred to appropriate educational materials, including in particular, Notice 726, and the “How to Spot Missing Trader Fraud” leaflet. These materials were provided to Mr Butt on several occasions over the course of approximately 8 years.
These visits from HMRC are summarised below:
|
Date |
CompanyVisited by Officers |
|
12.09.2012 |
TradeLynx |
|
30.05.2013 |
TradeLynx |
|
3.10.2013 |
Trade Lynx |
|
10.12.2013 |
TradeLynx |
|
05.12.2014 |
TradeLynx |
|
27.03.2015 |
TradeLynx |
|
13.05.2015 |
TradeLynx |
|
18.08.2015 |
TradeLynx |
|
19.11.2015 |
TradeLynx |
|
25.07.2019 |
Quantum |
|
08.10.2019 |
TradeLynx |
|
04.02.2020 |
Quantum |
|
05.03.2020 |
Quantum |
Trade Lynx, Quantum, and Mr Butt as the director of both companies, had also been repeatedly informed that they had traded in tax loss chains. Veto letters had also been issued on many occasions in respect of traders the companies had entered into transactions with. The tax loss letters issued were as follows:
|
Date |
Company |
Period |
TaxLoss |
|
12.11.2013 |
TradeLynx |
12/12 |
£2,633 |
|
03.12.2013 |
TradeLynx |
06/13 |
£23,198 |
|
14.03.2014 |
TradeLynx |
03/13–06/13 |
£30,800 |
|
23.10.2014 |
TradeLynx |
06/13 |
£70,055 |
|
01.07.2020 |
Quantum |
06/19-09/19 |
£37,984 |
|
19.01.2021 |
Quantum |
12/19 |
£7,751 |
|
21.04.2021 |
Quantum |
03/20 |
£10,415 |
|
15.06.2021 |
Quantum |
12/19 |
£85,678 |
|
13.12.2021 |
Quantum |
12/19-03/20 |
£13,372 |
|
08.04.2022 |
Quantum |
06/20-12/20 |
£25,928 |
|
21.06.2022 |
Quantum |
12/20 |
£8,237 |
|
06.01.2023 |
Quantum |
03/21-09/21 |
£27,165 |
HMRC submit that notwithstanding these notifications, Trade Lynx, Quantum and thereby Mr Butt continued to trade in the same manner without making any material adjustment to their procedures or checks in order to protect against VAT fraud.
Pattern of Trading
It is not in dispute that Quantum delivered directly to its customers, with the supplier making the arrangements for the delivery. In certain cases, Quantum’s details were not even on the shipping documents. Mr Butt was also aware, and indicated to HMRC officers during a visit on 2 September 2021, that his company did not add any value to the transaction chains.
HMRC submit that this is highly suggestive of contrivance in the transaction chains as there appears to be little commercial value to Quantum being in the transaction chains as the customer could simply purchase from Quantum’s supplier directly in these circumstances (and the supplier could also cut out Quantum and sell to the customer).
HMRC further submit that there is no evidence that Quantum or Mr Butt played any active part or showed any interest in negotiating the prices that were either paid or charged for the goods bought and sold. They point to Mr Butt’s emails with Alam Trading showing no negotiation on the price list, the order placed with Mega Foods without pricing details, and a general absence of evidence of negotiating or questioning when suppliers raised their price.
There were also no contracts, nor any provision made for inspection of goods, or consideration of how to deal with any commercial issues that may arise as one would expect. Mr Butt also appeared not to know when Quantum took ownership of the goods and did not take any steps to enquire about insurance with his suppliers who were also tasked with delivering the goods. HMRC state that this failure is all the more striking given the extent of the education provided to him, which specifically highlighted that an absence of insurance could be an indicator of VAT fraud.
HMRC contend that this, and the fact that all parties appeared to be unconcerned with the condition of the goods or the terms on which they were sold, which would leave the business with no form of redress if issues arise, suggest that the transactions were contrived and were not genuine arm’s length commercial transactions.
Back-to-back deals
In addition, HMRC state that Quantum always appeared to be able to immediately source the exact amount and type of goods that his customer wanted from his supplier. The ease of obtaining the exact goods that were required appears to suggest contrivance rather than genuine commercial deals. With a single exception, all transactions had been bought and sold in the exact same quantities throughout the chain.
It is said by HMRC that during the visit on 2 September 2021, Mr Butt appeared to state that he was ‘pre-ordering’ goods. It is not clear what is meant by that.
Due Diligence
It is also HMRC’s case that the commercial checks carried out by Quantum and Mr Butt on Quantum’s trading partners were superficial and inadequate. HMRC point to the following deficiencies:
KA Top Trader’s credit limit on 31 July 2019 was nil (Quantum was trading with KA during July 2019).
Whilst Quantum verified the status of the VAT number for its UK suppliers Alam, Mega Foods and Metropac with HMRC, it did not do the same for K.A. Top Traders or Maestro. There is no evidence it checked the VAT status of its EU suppliers.
The address shown on KA Top Trader’s VAT certificate was a serviced office.
Prices charged by KA Top Traders were higher than those charged by another of Quantum’s suppliers during the same period, e.g. KA Top Traders charged £4.85 for a case of Pepsi during October and November 2019, whilst the other supplier in the EU ‘SEDB’ (not a defaulter) charged €4.48 during the same timeframe.
Alam Trading’s credit limit in January 2019 was £1,000 and in January 2020 was £2,000 (Quantum was trading with Alam during this timeframe).
Prices charged by Alam Trading were higher than those charged by another of Quantum’s suppliers during the same period, e.g. Alam charged £4.85 for a case of Pepsi during November 2019 – January 2020 whilst the other supplier (‘SEDB’) charged €4.48 during the same timeframe.
Mega Foods did not have insurance for its goods in transit.
Prices charged by Mega Foods were higher than those charged by another of Quantum’s suppliers during the same period, e.g. Mega Foods charged £4.85 for a case of Pepsi during October 2020 - November 2020 whilst the other supplier (‘SEDB’) charged €4.57 during the same timeframe.
Maestro’s credit limit was nil and it operated from a residential address.
Prices charged by Maestro were higher than those charged by another of Quantum’s suppliers during the same period, e.g. Maestro charged £4.85 for a case of Pepsi or 7UP during November 2019 whilst the other supplier (‘SEDB’) charged €4.58 during October 2019.
Metropac had no insurance for goods.
On 18 November 2019, Mr Butt emailed HMRC asking to validate the VAT number of Maestro. On 22 November 2019, HMRC replied informing Mr Butt that they were ‘currently awaiting further verification regarding this trader.’ Notwithstanding this, between 20 November 2019 and 5 December 2019, Quantum proceeded to trade with Maestro. On 20 December 2019, HMRC informed Mr Butt that they were unable to validate the VAT registration of Maestro. On 3 March 2020, Mr Butt submitted Quantum’s VAT return seeking to reclaim VAT on the above transactions with Maestro.
HMRC point to the extensive education which Mr Butt has received as to VAT fraud, from 2012 when he was initially director of Trade Lynx, and later, as the director of Quantum. Given the extensive education he had received, and the numerous veto and tax loss letters throughout the years, it was incumbent upon Mr Butt to take every precaution which could reasonably be required to ensure that Quantum’s transactions were not connected with fraud. It is against this background that the commercial checks carried out by Quantum and Mr Butt fall to be evaluated.
HMRC submit that it must have been clear to Mr Butt that the checks undertaken were insufficient to satisfy him that Quantum’s counterparties were legitimate and trustworthy. HMRC invite the Tribunal to infer that the natural and logical inference to be drawn from Quantum’s lack of meaningful due diligence was therefore because Mr Butt knew that Quantum’s suppliers would not stand up to scrutiny and that the transactions were connected with fraud.
HMRC’s alternative case is that Quantum and Mr Butt should have known that the transactions were connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT, particularly in light of the extensive education and intervention that Mr Butt and Quantum had received from HMRC. Despite repeated visits, the provision of educational material, and advice from HMRC Officers over several years as to what type of checks should be undertaken, as well as veto and tax loss letters, the due diligence undertaken by Quantum/ Mr Butt did not improve and were not sufficient to protect it from exposure to fraudulent supply chains.
HMRC also contend that on review of the due diligence materials provided by Quantum, these were fairly basic, consisting of generic type material which simply establishes that a legal entity exists at a point in time (e.g. VAT and Companies House certificates), but do not seek to identify and test any actual risks. For example, Quantum and Mr Butt did not obtain any references, or carry out background checks or credit checks on any of the entities they were trading with. When potential issues are identified from basic due diligence, no steps were taken to further investigate or probe those issues.
VAT Notice 726
Notice 726 has been provided to Mr Butt on several occasions since HMRC undertook their first visit in 2012. Notice 726 is headed “Joint and several liability for unpaid VAT” and explains that a trader may be held jointly and severally liable for the unpaid VAT of another VAT-registered business when it sells or buys specified goods.
Of particular relevance is section 6, which is headed: “Dealing with other businesses, how to make sure the integrity of your supply chain.”
Checks to undertake to help make sure the integrity of your supply chain
The following are examples of indicators that could alert you to the risk:
that VAT would go unpaid
of a connection with missing trader fraud
Legitimacy of customers or suppliers.
For example:
what is your customer’s or supplier’s history in the trade?
has a buyer and seller contacted you within a short space of time with offers to buy or sell goods of same specifications and quantity?
has your supplier referred you to a customer who is willing to buy goods of the same quantity and specifications being offered by the supplier?
does your supplier offer deals that carry no commercial risk for you , for example, no requirement to pay for goods until payment received from customer?
do deals with your customer or supplier involve consistent or predetermined profit margins, irrespective of the date, quantities or specifications of the specified goods traded?
does your supplier (or another business in the transaction chain) require you to make third party payments or payments to an offshore bank account?
are the goods adequately insured?
are they high value deals offered with no formal contractual arrangements?
are they high value deals offered by a newly established supplier with minimal trading history, low credit rating?
can a brand-new business obtain specified goods cheaper than a long established one?
has HMRC specifically notified you that previous deals involving your supplier had been traced to a VAT loss or had involved carousel movements of goods?
has HMRC specifically notified you that HMRC date stamps have been present on goods offered for sale by your supplier, or that there is evidence of HMRC date stamps being removed from packaging, this would strongly suggest that the goods had been subject to carousel movement, which should alert you to a significant risk that the transactions entered into with that supplier may be connected with the non-payment of VAT
has HMRC specifically notified you that other Missing Trader VAT fraud characteristics (such as third-party payments) have occurred in transaction chains involving your supplier?
Commercial viability of the transaction.
For example:
is there a market for this type of goods, such as superseded or outdated mobile phone models or non-UK specific models?
what research have you done to test whether these goods are available as described and in the quantities being offered?
is it commercially viable for the price of the goods to increase within the short duration of the supply chain?
have normal commercial practices been adopted in negotiating prices?
is there a commercial reason for any third party payments?
are normal commercial arrangements in place for the financing of the goods?
Viability of the goods as described by your supplier.
For example:
do the goods exist?
have they been previously supplied to you?
are they in good condition and not damaged?
do the quantities of the goods concerned appear credible?
do the goods have UK specifications yet are to be exported?
is your supplier unwilling to provide IMEI or other serial numbers?
what recourse is there if the goods are not as described?
Make sure that sufficient checks are carried out in each of these categories to make sure that you’re not caught in a fraudulent supply chain.
Checks carried out by existing businesses
The following are examples of specific checks carried out by businesses that took part in the consultation exercise in 2003 when these rules were introduced. These may also help you to decide what checks you should carry out, but this list is not exhaustive and you should decide what checks you need to carry out before dealing with a supplier or customer:
obtain copies of certificates of incorporation and VAT registration certificates
verify VAT registration details with HMRC
obtain signed letters of introduction on headed paper
obtain some form of written and signed trade references
obtain credit checks or other background checks from an independent third party
insist on personal contact with a senior officer of the prospective supplier, making an initial visit to their premises whenever possible
obtain the prospective supplier’s bank details, to check whether:
payments would be made to a third party
in the case of an import, the supplier and their bank shared the same country of residence
check details provided against other sources, for example website, letterheads, BT landline records
Paperwork in addition to invoices may be received in relation to the supplies you buy and sell. This documentation should be kept to support your view of a transaction’s legitimacy. The following are examples of additional paperwork that some businesses keep:
purchase orders
pro-forma invoices
delivery notes
Convention Merchandises Routiers (CMRs) or airway bills
allocation notification
inspection reports
This is not an exhaustive list, but does show some of the more common subsidiary documentation.
What HMRC looks out for when considering the extent of your checks
In each case, HMRC will be seeking to identify what actions or precautions you took in response to any indicators of risk. This will focus on the due diligence checks you undertook and, most importantly, the actions taken by you in response to the results of those checks. In each case, HMRC will consider:
what due diligence checks were performed, this includes any checks designed to address the specific risks of a specific case
to what extent were your checks appropriate, adequate and timely in relation to addressing the risks identified
what the results of the checks indicated
whether you took appropriate action in response to the results of the checks
If you have genuinely done everything you can to check the integrity of the supply chain, can demonstrate you have done so, have taken heed of any indications that VAT may go unpaid and have no other reason to suspect VAT would go unpaid, the joint and several liability rules will not be applied.
These are only guidelines for the kind of checks you could make to help you avoid participating in a fraudulent supply chain. The checks you will need to make, and the extent of them, will vary depending on the individual circumstances of your trade and it’s for you to consider what questions you need to ask to protect yourself in the particular circumstances of your individual transactions.”
“How to spot missing trader VAT fraud” leaflet
The “How to spot missing trader VAT fraud” leaflet has also been provided to Mr Butt on several occasions since 2012. The document explains the concept of missing trader fraud, which involves a ‘defaulting’ trader who deliberately fails to pay its VAT liability for taxable supplies made in the UK. The leaflet explains that those supplies may pass through a number of intermediary traders before they are either sold to an end user in the UK or outside the UK. The leaflet explains that in some cases, the organisers of the fraud will use non-tax loss chains alongside tax loss chains in order to disguise the VAT losses as part of an overall scheme to defraud HMRC.
In respect of how VAT fraud could affect a business, the leaflet explains that:
“If you knew or should have known that your transaction was connected with fraud then HMRC may refuse your VAT claim in respect of that transaction. In determining whether you knew or should have known HMRC will consider all of the circumstances relating to the transaction, including whether you took reasonable steps to verify the integrity of your supply chain.”
In respect of how a business could avoid becoming embroiled in missing trader fraud, the leaflet states:
“It is in your interest to check carefully who you are dealing with. It is good commercial practice for businesses to carry out checks to establish the credibility and legitimacy of their customers, suppliers and supplies. These checks may need to be more extensive in business sectors that are commercially risky or vulnerable to fraud and other criminality. HMRC does not expect you to go beyond what is reasonable. However, HMRC would expect you to make a judgement on the integrity of your supply chain and the suppliers, customers and goods or services within it.”
Under the heading “What kind of checks can I undertake to help ensure the integrity of my supply chain?”, the leaflet provides examples of indicators that could alert a business to the risk of a connection with missing trader fraud:
Legitimacy of customers or suppliers. For example:
•
What is your customer’s/supplier’s history in the trade?•
Have you been contacted within a short space of time by a prospective buyerand seller offering to buy/sell goods of the same specifications and quantity?
•
Has your supplier referred you to a customer who is willing to buy goods of thesame quantity and specifications being offered by the supplier?
•
Does your supplier offer deals that carry no commercial risk for you –e.g. no requirement to pay for the goods or services until payment is received
from the customer?
•
Are you being offered deals that involve consistent or pre-determined profitmargins, irrespective of the date, quantities or specifications of the goods or
services being traded? Have normal commercial practices been adopted in
negotiating prices?
•
Are you being asked to make payments to third parties other than your supplieror payments to an offshore bank account?
•
Are the goods adequately insured?•
Are high value deals being offered with no formal contractual arrangements?•
Are high value deals being offered by a newly established supplier with minimal trading history, low credit rating etc?•
Is a small, newly-established business offering to supply you with goods cheaperthan a long-established supplier?
•
Has HMRC specifically notified you that previous deals involving your supplierwere connected to fraudulent VAT losses?
Viability of the goods as described by your supplier. For example:
•
Can you be sure the goods exist in the quantity and specification being offered?•
Are they in good condition and not damaged?•
Why are large quantities of goods with non-UK specifications being offered forsupply to you in the UK?
•
What recourse is there if the goods are not as described?The leaflet goes on to provide a non-exhaustive list of specific checks which could be carried out by existing businesses to protect them from being involved in fraudulent VAT chains:
•
obtain copies of Certificates of Incorporation and VAT registration certificates•
verify VAT registration details with HMRC•
obtain signed letters of introduction on headed paper•
obtain some form of written and signed trade references•
obtain credit checks or other background checks from an independent third party•
insist on personal contact with a senior officer of the prospective supplier,making an initial visit to their premises if possible
•
obtain the prospective supplier’s bank details to check whether (a) paymentswould be made to a third party and (b) in the case of an import, the supplier and their bank share the same country of residence
•
check details provided against other sources e.g. website, letterheads, BT landline records.Paperwork in addition to invoices may also be received in relation to supplies and the leaflet advises that those should be kept to support a business’s view of a transaction’s legitimacy, including:
•
purchase orders•
pro-forma invoices•
delivery notes•
CMRs (Convention Merchandises Routiers) or airway bills•
allocation notification•
inspection reports.Further, under the heading, “What will HMRC look out for when considering the extent of my checks?” the leaflet states:
“In each case HMRC will seek to identify what actions or precautions you took in response to any indicators of risk. This will focus on the due diligence checks you undertook and the actions taken by you in response to the results of those checks. In each case HMRC will consider:
•
the due diligence checks that were performed, including any checks designed to address the specific risks of a particular transaction•
the extent to which your checks were appropriate, adequate and timely in relation to addressing the risks identified•
the results of those checks and what action was taken, if any, in response.”Mr Butt’s submissions
Mr Butt denies that he (as director of Quantum) knew or should have known that there would be tax losses in the supply chains in which they were involved. He submits that:
He was unaware of the losses suffered by HMRC until a much later time and does not consider HMRC to have demonstrated that he was aware of those losses at the time the losses occurred.
He was unaware of any deliberate actions taken by suppliers in the transaction chains to evade VAT and does not consider HMRC to have demonstrated that he was aware of those deliberate actions.
Mr Butt does not accept that he should have known there were losses, or that losses were likely within the transaction chains, and does not consider HMRC to have demonstrated that he should have known there were losses or that they were likely.
Mr Butt further submits that if HMRC have not taken action against Quantum’s suppliers or customers, then it would be wrong for HMRC to now take the same action against Quantum and Mr Butt, as they would, he submits, in effect be cancelling their loss and profiting over and above the loss identified by that same amount.
In addition, Mr Butt does not accept that HMRC have accurately calculated any losses suffered and upon which the penalties raised against him are based.
As stated above, Mr Butt provided a witness statement and gave oral evidence. Attached to his witness statement were documents consisting of the checks which Mr Butt had undertaken on five of the suppliers involved in the chains under appeal, namely KA Top Traders, Maestro Foods, Metropac, Alam Trading and Mega Foods. Mr Butt states that these were the only documents he still had access to. We will address these documents below.
Discussion and findings
All of HMRC’s witnesses were cross-examined by Mr Spencer, in some cases, at some length. The evidence of the HMRC witnesses in respect of each supplier in the chain have been summarised above. We have set out additional aspects of their evidence below.
Mr Butt also gave oral evidence and was cross-examined at length by Ms Vicary. We summarise Mr Butt’s evidence in chief as follows:
Mr Butt was the director of Quantum between March 2019 until December 2021. Quantum operated a wholesale business of buying and selling soft drinks, buying in bulk and selling them to other wholesalers and large cash & carriers.
Prior to becoming the director of Quantum, Mr Butt was also the director of Trade Lynx London Limited, between August 2011 until December 2021.
Mr Butt was the sole person acting in Quantum and took all decisions regarding the suppliers used, and the customers supplied.
The operating model for Quantum (and Trade Lynx) was that he would receive an enquiry from a prospective customer setting out what goods they wished to buy, querying whether he would be able to supply those goods, when he could deliver and at what price. Mr Butt would then contact his suppliers and ask them whether they could supply the goods required by his customers, when this could be achieved and at what price.
The goods purchased by Quantum would be delivered directly by the supplier to the customer, and the customer would make payment after delivery. Mr Butt would then pay his suppliers once the goods were delivered to his clients in good condition without any missing cases or damage.
If there were problems with the goods supplied, it was understood that the responsibility would lie with Quantum and it would then take up the issue with the supplier. In his written evidence, Mr Butt stated that his recollection was that there were never any issues with the goods sold to his customers and he never had to take up any issues. He corrected this at the start of his oral evidence, stating that there were in fact occasions when goods were delivered to customers damaged or missing, that he had gone to visit the customers, and that the goods were then returned to the supplier, but he could not remember who they were.
During his oral evidence, Mr Butt stated that all his files were now with Officer Mankad and that he has not had access to them since 2021. He stated that if HMRC were to check his files, they could see that there were credit notes from suppliers for missing or damages goods.
As a company director, Mr Butt understood the explanations and information provided by HMRC to him to ensure that the suppliers he was dealing with were not engaged in fraudulent transactions.
Mr Butt took actions to ensure that he completed sufficient due diligence on the businesses he was undertaking trade with to satisfy himself of the requirements explained by HMRC during their meetings and in the documents that they’d sent him.
At no time over the period following HMRC’s first visit to him (when he was director of Trade Lynx) was Mr Butt aware that HMRC had expressed any dissatisfaction with his understanding of the issue or the due diligence checks undertaken.
When undertaking due diligence checks on his suppliers, he would initially meet with the directors and ask for proof of identity, such as a passport or driving licence (of which he would keep a copy). He would also seek information about their company, for example, a copy of the company’s VAT registration certificate, against which he would check the name and address against what he had been told and the description of trading activities to make sure the company did what it said it would. He would cross reference the details on the VAT certificate with details held by Companies House.
Mr Butt would also send all the acquired information to HMRC’s “Validation department” to cross check and validate all the information (this was later confirmed in cross examination to be the HMRC VAT checking service, Mr Butt producing one letter from HMRC dated 19 May 2015 to Trade Lynx, in which the VAT registration for one trader, not involved in the chains under appeal, was confirmed as valid at the time).
He would undertake credit checks to see if his suppliers were solvent and had a trading history. When satisfied with this he would then confirm with HMRC that the company VAT registration remained valid, and he would periodically undertake this check whilst he continued to trade with the supplier.
Mr Butt was cross-examined at length by Ms Vicary. The key parts of his oral evidence, in relation to his time as director of Trade Lynx and Quantum, and HMRC’s involvement with the companies, are as follows:
Quantum traded from an address in Essex which Mr Butt confirmed was also his home address. He confirmed that Quantum did not have a warehouse, that he undertook all business from his home, and Quantum did not physically receive any of the goods (e.g. crates of soft drinks) that it purchased.
Mr Butt confirmed that he had also been a director of Trade Lynx which also traded in soft drinks.
Mr Butt confirmed that he had been disqualified as a director for a 10-year period from 14 December 2021 to 13 December 2031 pursuant to a court order dated 23 November 2021 (the maximum period for disqualification being 14 years).
Mr Butt explained that he had given an undertaking accepting the conduct forming the basis of the disqualification, namely, that between 7 May 2018 and 22 March 2019, he caused or allowed Trade Lynx to participate in transactions which related to the fraudulent evasion of VAT, such connections being something which he either knew or should have known about; and further, that he caused or allowed Trade Lynx to wrongfully claim input VAT of £203,396 from HMRC on its 06/18, 09/18, 12/18 and 03/19 VAT returns.
Mr Butt accepted that the first visit he had received from HMRC was on 12 September 2012 and that he was present at that visit, that on 13 September 2012, HMRC issued him with an MTIC awareness letter with links to Notice 726 and advice for spotting MTIC fraud, and thereafter, there were at least nine further visits from HMRC to Trade Lynx.
Mr Butt accepted that he had been informed and knew that MTIC fraud was widespread in the wholesale of soft drinks, that he had received Notice 726 on several occasions, and that he was aware of what Notice 726 contained including the checks recommended at section 6.
Mr Butt stated that his suppliers would deliver goods to his customers and that the cost of delivery would be included in the pricing.
Mr Butt accepted that he did not “add value” to the deals but did not accept that there was anything untoward about this.
Mr Butt stated that there were no written contacts or agreements with his suppliers. He accepted that he did not ask for insurance policy documents or any other confirmation that his suppliers had insurance.
Mr Butt exhibited a number of documents to his witness statement which showed the checks he had undertaken on five of its suppliers, KA Top Traders, Maestro Trades, Metropac, Alam Trading and Mega Foods.
At certain points in his oral evidence, Mr Butt referred to documents which he said were held by HMC and which he could not access. When we asked Mr Butt whether he had asked HMRC for the release of the documents said to be held by HMRC after he’d engaged Mr Spencer as his representative (that engagement having commenced in 2021), Mr Butt stated that he had not.
As the hearing progressed, Mr Butt also referred to documents which he stated had been passed on to Mr Spencer, or which Mr Butt had found overnight, none of which had been adduced as evidence into these proceedings despite the Tribunal’s clear directions (made by consent) that by no later than 1 February 2024, HMRC shall serve all evidence on which they relied, and on 1 May 2024, Mr Butt shall then serve all evidence on which he relied.
When asked why he had not provided these additional documents at the same time as his witness statement in 2024, or indeed provided them in the approximately 20 months between the date for the filing of his evidence and this hearing, Mr Butt, who has been represented by Mr Spencer for the purpose of these appeals since at least 2021, stated that he thought he had lost the documents and that it was only after he’d commenced his oral evidence, and reflected overnight, that he’d realised he had access to the documents.
Mr Spencer did not apply to admit the additional documents. The Tribunal raised the issue with Mr Spencer after Mr Butt had given his oral evidence and before closing submissions, asking him how he wished us to deal with the additional documents which Mr Butt had referred to in his oral evidence (but which were not attached to his witness statement and which we had not seen). We asked Mr Spencer to take instructions from Mr Butt.
Mr Spencer eventually stated that he wished to apply to admit nine additional documents. Mr Spencer’s submissions in summary were as follows:
Some documents support Mr Butt’s oral evidence, but some may not be relevant. Of the documents, three show discussions about pricing, which undermines HMRC’s point that pricing and arrangements were contrived.
It is accepted that Mr Spencer was appointed as agent shortly before 2021 and that this application has come very late in the day. The only explanation for the delay is that Mr Butt was not aware of the importance of these documents until he was questioned, and Ms Vicary’s questions about his email address had reminded him that he had access to the documents.
It is accepted that admitting the evidence would prejudice timetable for this hearing and HMRC’s ability to test the evidence. HMRC would need time to prepare, and additional hearing days would be required, but in interest of justice, the documents should be admitted.
The application was opposed by Ms Vicary, who submitted as follows:
She queried the veracity of the documents, which were hard copies of emails and could easily be edited. The emails also refer to attachments which Mr Butt had not produced.
The documents in any event would appear to have limited probative value and were not going to assist the Tribunal decide the relevant issues.
The three emails referring to pricing do not show any “negotiation” of price, they simply state “here is my pricing” and do not show any negotiations. These emails are clearly so irrelevant that Mr Butt only remembered them halfway through his evidence.
The application has been made extremely late in the day (the final day of the hearing). Directions were given on 15 November 2023, two years ago, for the filing of Mr Butt’s evidence by no later than 1 May 2024. Mr Butt has not provided a good reason for why his application has been made so belatedly, particularly bearing in mind that these are documents which he has always had access to (emails held by him personally).
In terms of prejudice to Mr Butt, the emails are not going to be determinative of his appeal. There are three emails in which prices are discussed, assuming they are genuine, but what they simply show is that there are three deals were the pricing was agreed. They do not shed light on all the other transactions for which there is a dearth of evidence.
There would be prejudice generally to the timetable for this trial. This hearing has been listed since 21 October 2024 and it is now day four (the final day). If these documents are to be admitted, HMRC would need to verify their authenticity, cross reference them to deals, Ms Vicary would have to cross-examine Mr Butt again and an additional day or days would be required. The hearing would have to be adjourned part-heard and relisted, resulting in further delay.
The Tribunal reflected carefully on the parties’ submissions. We gave an ex-tempore judgment refusing the application by Mr Butt to adduce additional documents. Ultimately, we were not persuaded that the emails would be determinative one way or another as to the issues that we have to determine. The application has also been brought extremely late in the day (on the final day of this appeal), in circumstances when the parties had agreed directions for the filing of evidence in November 2023. If Mr Butt had wanted to rely on the additional documents, he could and should have provided them by the date set out in the directions, or if not, well in advance of this hearing (the emails have always been in his possession and he could/ should have produced them months ago). It is also important to note that Mr Butt lodged his appeal in March 2022 and has engaged Mr Spencer as his agent and representative since 2021. Admitting the evidence would also greatly prejudice the timetable for this appeal. HMRC would need to be given the chance to consider the additional documents and recall witnesses, resulting in an adjournment, further delay and costs. It would be contrary to the overriding objective of enabling the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly to admit this very late evidence of limited probative value.
Connection with fraudulent default
The transaction chains as set out by HMRC are not in dispute. These are detailed in the annexes to the decisions under appeal (and summarised above).
Having carefully reflected on the written and oral evidence of the HMRC’s officers and the parties’ submissions, we find that the following traders were fraudulent defaulters in the transaction chains involving Quantum which are the subject of this appeal: KA Top Traders, Guston Services, Carmella, Maestro Trades, Winona Global, Brands Nexus, Mirandina, AK International, Thirsty Foods, MJD Wholesale, and On Point.
We also find that Alam Trading, Mega Foods and Metropac were buffer companies in fraudulent transaction chains involving Quantum which are the subject of this appeal.
Knowledge or means of knowledge
HMRC contend that Mr Butt knew, or should have known, that the transactions involved were connected with the fraudulent evasion of VAT by other traders. He was cross-examined at length about HMRC’s extensive involvement with him and Quantum (and before that, with Trade Lynx). He was also cross-examined about his due diligence checks in respect of several suppliers which HMRC had identified as fraudulent traders.
As held in Manifest Shipping Company Limited v. Uni-Polaris Shipping Company Limited and Others (quoted above), it is dishonest for a person deliberately to shut their eyes to facts which they would prefer not to know. If he or she does so, they are taken to have actual knowledge of the facts to which they shut their eyes. Such knowledge has been described as "Nelsonian” or “blind-eye” knowledge", which approximates to knowledge.
This requires an amalgam of suspicion that certain facts may exist and a decision by that person to refrain from taking any steps to confirm their existence, "not because he was an honest blunderer or a stupid man, but because he thought in his own secret mind - I suspect there is something wrong, and if I ask questions and make farther inquiry, it will no longer be my suspecting it, but my knowing it, and then I shall not be able to recover”.
We find that Mr Butt had “blind-eye” knowledge that the transactions under appeal were connected with the fraudulent evasion of VAT. We have reached this finding on the basis of the cumulative circumstances surrounding Quantum’s transactions, what Mr Butt (as director) did or omitted to do, what he could have done, together with the history of HMRC’s high level of involvement with Mr Butt and Quantum, and before then, with Trade Lynx, since 2012.
In reaching our finding that Mr Butt had “blind-eye” knowledge, we have taken into account the following, in particular:
The very extensive history of education provided to Mr Butt by HMRC, which commenced in 2012 when he was a director of Trade Lynx and which carried through when he became a director of Quantum. There is no doubt that Mr Butt has had a sustained and long-standing history of education from HMRC. He was visited 13 times between September 2012 and March 2020, during which MTIC fraud in the industry he was trading in was explained to him. He was provided with Notice 726, drawn to section 6, and was also given the “How to Spot MTIC fraud” leaflet on numerous occasions, the contents of which were discussed with him by HMRC officers and which Mr Butt accepted he understood.
Mr Butt had been repeatedly informed since November 2013 that he had traded in tax loss chains. The evidence shows that 12 tax loss letters were sent to him between November 2013 and January 2023. During this period, he had also been sent numerous veto letters.
Notwithstanding the high level of education received from HMRC and having been informed via tax loss letters that he’d been involved in tax loss chains in the course of several years, Mr Butt continued to trade in the same manner. Notably, the checks that he was undertaking did not materially improve. We find that the checks he undertook remained basic and superficial. No real attempts were made by Mr Butt to verify the bona fides of the businesses he was going into trade with and to probe the results of any preliminary basic checks. We agree that the checks appeared to be a tick-box exercise. We are struck in this regard by the fact that:
Mr Butt was not in the least concerned about the fact that KA Top Traders and Maestro Trades, both direct suppliers and which we have found are defaulting traders, were newly incorporated companies, with no discernible trading history or experience in the industry. Despite these factors, Mr Butt did not take up trade references for them (or indeed for any of the direct suppliers which are the subject of this appeal) before entering into trade with them.
KA Top Traders, Maestro Trades and Alam Trading, a buffer company, were all trading from residential addresses. The fact that these companies appeared to be trading from residential addresses, but also meant to be arranging shipping of goods directly to Quantum’s customers, should have raised questions in Mr Butt’s mind as to whether these were genuine traders.
Mr Butt did not undertake credit checks on KA Top Traders and Maestro Trades, or indeed, on any of the other direct suppliers which are the subject of this appeal. KA Top Trader’s credit limit was nil at the time Quantum traded with it in July 2019. Maestro’s credit limit was also nil when Quantum commenced purchasing from them in November 2019.
The introductory letters from KA Top Traders and Maestro curiously do not contain any detail as to what goods those businesses were said to be offering. Furthermore, the letter from Maestro states that it was an “established” company with an “excellent track record”. It would have been immediately apparent from a company check that Maestro had been recently incorporated, with no accounts and a credit limit of nil, all of which sit oddly with its assertion of being an established company.
The document which the director of Maestro provided to verify his identity was a Wescot debt collection letter referring to a debt which that individual owed in respect of a credit card. This letter alone should have rang alarm bells for Mr Butt as to whether it would be prudent to enter into trade with Maestro, which as noted above, was also a newly incorporated company with no discernible trading history or experience in the industry. Remarkably, this letter did not cause Mr Butt any concern and he proceeded to enter into transactions with Maestro. We agree with Ms Vicary that this debt collection letter would rank as one of the poorest forms of due diligence a trader could supply.
We accept Officer Alabi’s evidence that the VAT certificate for Maestro has been forged or manipulated to show the date of registration of VAT as 13 December 2018. We cannot determine who created this document, but if the document had been manipulated by someone acting on behalf of Maestro, it goes to highlight the real risks which Mr Butt was exposing himself to by deciding to enter into trade with newly incorporated suppliers, with no trading history and less than reliable credentials, which he had not bothered to probe to ensure the integrity of his supply chain.
Mr Butt was using a service called “Company Check” but the results of those checks were rudimentary and could have been obtained from Companies House in any event (one would have been able to obtain further details in fact from Companies House). In any event, the “Company Check” results would have shown that K.A. Top Traders and Maestro were newly incorporated with no accounts.
The only evidenced occasion on which Mr Butt uses the HMRC VAT validation service was in respect of Maestro. It is striking that on this occasion when he does use the VAT validation service, notwithstanding that HMRC had replied on 22 November 2019 informing Mr Butt that they were currently awaiting further verification regarding Maestro, between 20 November 2019 and 5 December 2019, Quantum traded with Maestro. On 20 December 2019, HMRC informed Mr Butt that they were unable to validate the VAT registration of Maestro.
The totality of Mr Butt’s own evidence as to the due diligence checks undertaken of his suppliers indicate that those checks were basic and superficial, and were not designed to test the bona fides of those suppliers, notwithstanding the extensive education which HMRC had provided to Mr Butt and him being aware that his companies had been involved on numerous occasions in tax loss chains since 2013.
It is accepted that Quantum’s suppliers would deliver directly to its customer, with the supplier making the arrangements for the delivery. At times, Quantum’s details were not even on the shipping documents. We agree that this is highly suggestive of contrivance in the transaction chains as there appears to be little commercial value to Quantum being in the transaction chains. The customer could simply purchase from Quantum’s supplier directly. Mr Butt himself accepts that his company did not add any value to the transaction chain (this was said by him to an HMRC officer during a visit on 2 September 2021).
Furthermore, save for a document from Metropac which showed that it had commercial insurance in place, provided as part of due diligence, we have not seen any documents for any of Quantum’s suppliers confirming that they had insurance. Indeed, Mr Butt accepted in evidence that he did not ask any of his suppliers for insurance policy documents or the like to confirm that they had insurance in place for the goods purchased by Quantum, and which the suppliers were said to be shipping to his customers. This is all the more surprising given the extent of the education provided to Mr Butt, which specifically highlighted that an absence of insurance could be an indicator of VAT fraud.
Mr Butt accepts that there are no written agreements or contracts with his suppliers. The absence of written agreements or contracts setting out basic terms of trade is surprising, and indicates to us that Mr Butt was not unduly troubled by the terms on which he was trading with the suppliers. Mr Butt also did not know when Quantum would take ownership of the goods. The lack of evidence as to discussions and agreement with his suppliers about these essential terms of trade points to these transactions being contrived. We find that Mr Butt simply shut his eyes to that fact.
Mr Butt has also been disqualified as a director for a lengthy period of 10 years for his conduct as a director of Trade Lynx between May 2018 and March 2019 in causing or allowing Trade Lynx to participate in transactions relating to fraudulent evasion of VAT which he either knew or should have known about. This is conduct which he accepted and which led to the court order for his disqualification. That conduct falls within a window proximate to the VAT periods under appeal and mirrors the pattern of trade he has been carrying out as a director of Quantum.
The cumulative effect of these factors is compelling. For all these reasons, we find that Mr Butt (as the director of Quantum) had “blind-eye” knowledge that Quantum’s transactions were connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT.
Even if we are incorrect in our findings that Mr Butt had blind-eye knowledge, the various factors that we have discussed clearly demonstrate that Mr Butt had the means of knowledge to alert him to the connection of these transactions to VAT fraud, and he would have been aware that there was no other reasonable explanation for the transactions. We therefore find, as an alternative, that Mr Butt should have been aware of the connection of these transactions to the fraudulent evasion of VAT.
Other matters raised in the appeal
We agree with Ms Vicary that the fact that HMRC may not have taken action against Quantum’s suppliers or customers does not assist Mr Butt. It is not necessary for HMRC to pursue other parties in the supply chain. Pursuant to the Kittel principle, the only relevant question is whether the taxpayer in issue has lost his right to deduct. In this case, that question is answered in the affirmative.
The issue of “non-discrimination has also been addressed by the Upper Tribunal in HMRC v S&I Electronics Plc [2012] UKUT 87 (TCC). HMRC in that case had denied the input tax to the brokers but not to the buffers within the relevant chains. The Upper Tribunal considered the argument that the decisions were tainted by a discriminatory policy for which there was no objective justification. The Upper Tribunal [at 33 – 37] rejected that argument and concluded that ‘the principle of non-discrimination is not engaged.’
The argument that HMRC would be ‘profiting over and above the loss’ in the event that HMRC takes action against Quantum’s suppliers or its customers is also not sustainable.
We refer to what has already been said about regarding the Kittel principle. HMRC are not ‘capped’ to the amount of input tax they are able to deny. There is also no principle which states that HMRC must deny at a single point in the chain. Per the Court of Appeal in Mobilx:
“65…It is true that there may well be no correlation between the amount of output tax which the fraudulent trader has defrauded HMRC and the amount of input tax which another trader has been denied. But the principle is concerned with identifying the objective criteria which must be met before the right to deduct input tax arises. Those criteria are not met, as I have emphasised, where the trader is regarded as a participant in the fraud. No penalty is imposed; his transaction falls outwith the scope of VAT and, accordingly, he is denied the right to deduct input tax by reason of his participation.”
This argument was also addressed in CallTel Telecom Ltd (No 2) [2009] EWHC 1081 (Ch) and rejected:
The principle for which the Appellants contend is, as it seems to me, a quite different one. It is that the right to repayment of input tax can continue to be exercised, notwithstanding knowledge of the fraud of the importer, to the extent that the claim for repayment exceeds the loss to the Revenue.
The possibility for such an excess arises in the following way. In a non-fraudulent chain HMRC ought to recover the VAT on the importer's selling price, and VAT on the markups of the various intermediate traders. They would then repay the total of that VAT to the exporter. By contrast, in a fraudulent chain HMRC only recover VAT on the markups. Nevertheless, if they withhold repayment of VAT to the exporter, it can be said that HMRC are better off than they would have been in the case of the non-fraudulent chain, by an amount equal to the VAT on the markups, and that this sum, at least, should be repaid to the Appellants.
In my judgment there is no principle which requires HMRC to acknowledge a claim to repayment to the extent that the claim exceeds HMRC's tax loss. Firstly, as Mr Cordara emphasised in other connections, the correct unit of fiscal analysis is not the entire chain but the individual transaction. This proposition was emphasised in both Optigen and Kittel (supra). The question is accordingly whether the taxpayer has or does not have the right to deduct or reclaim his input tax in respect of an individual transaction. Consideration of this question does not justify recourse to the overall fiscal impact on HMRC of all the transactions in the chain.
Secondly, none of the statements in Kittel suggest that the right is lost only to the extent that tax is lost elsewhere in the chain. It is true that measures adopted by Member States to combat MTIC fraud must be proportionate: see e.g. Netto (supra) at [18]-[23]. Thus irrebuttable presumptions of illegality, for example, are not permitted: Garage Molenheide Joined Cases C-286/94; C-340/95; C-401/95 and C-47/96: [1998] STC 126 at [52]. But, once it is established that a taxpayer has, by his purchase, participated in the fraudulent evasion of VAT, it seems to me to be impossible to argue that, by withholding repayment of VAT in respect of that very purchase the taxpayer is being subjected to a disproportionate remedy. In fact, to use the VAT legislation to achieve any benefit from such a purchase seems to me to be wrong in principle.
Thirdly, although fiscal neutrality is a fundamental feature of the system of VAT, and the right of any trader to deduct input tax is an important feature of the system of ensuring fiscal neutrality (see e.g. Kittel at [48]), the fiscal neutrality of an individual transaction will, as Kittel shows, have to give way to the objective of combating fraud.
It seems to me that the objective of not recognising the right to repayment is not simply to ensure that the exchequer is not harmed by fraud: the objective includes combating fraud and discouraging taxpayers from entering into transactions of this nature. In that context, considerations of fiscal neutrality of the impugned transaction are, it seems to me, beside the point.
For those principal reasons I reject the grounds of appeal concerned with penalty and excess recovery.”
The penalties
Section 69D VATA provides that a company officer should be considered liable for the company penalty when:
the company which they were working for at the time of the transaction is liable to a penalty because it knew or should have known that its transactions were connected with VAT fraud pursuant to section 69C; and
the actions of the company which give rise to that liability were attributable to the company officer.
We find that the penalties issued to Quantum under section 69C VATA, and the penalties issued to Mr Butt as the director of Quantum, were correctly issued pursuant to the relevant provisions of VATA.
It is not disputed that Mr Butt was the sole person acting in Quantum and took all decisions regarding the suppliers used and the customers supplied. Given that the actions of Quantum in undertaking the transactions which are the subject of this appeal can be attributed to Mr Butt as the sole director of Quantum, he should be held liable for the penalties issued to Quantum under section 69D VATA.
We have considered the calculations set out in Officer Mankad’s evidence as to the penalties payable. We reject Mr Butt’s submissions that those calculations are incorrect. His arguments as to non-discrimination and HMRC “profiting over and above the loss” in the event that action is taken against Quantum’s suppliers or its customers are not sustainable.
Conclusion
For the reasons set out above, the appeal is dismissed.
Right to apply for permission to appeal
This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
TRIBUNAL JUDGE JENNIFER LEE
TRIBUNAL MEMBER FARQUHARSON
Release date:
23 April 2026