Maros Kravec v Salford City Council

This is an appeal from a decision of the First-tier Tribunal in an appeal from civil penalties imposed upon the appellant, Mr Maros Kravec, by the respondent local housing authority, the Salford City Council. The appeal has been determined under the Tribunal’s written representations procedure. Although permission has been granted on a number of grounds, the appellant’s inevitable success on one ground means that the matter has to be remitted to the FTT for a fresh decision, and so only that one ground is discussed here.

The Housing and Planning Act 2004 provides in section 249A that a local housing authority may impose a financial penalty on a person if satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the person’s conduct amounts to a ‘relevant housing offence’ in respect of premises in England. The imposition of such a penalty is an alternative to prosecution – the authority cannot do both – and is sometimes referred to as a “civil penalty”. Relevant housing offences are listed in section 249A(2) and include the offence under section 72(1) of being in control of or managing an HMO which is required to be licensed but is not so licensed, and under section 234(3) of the 2004 Act, of failing to comply with the Management Regulations.

A person served with a final notice of a civil penalty may appeal to the FTT.

By a number of applications to the FTT in 2022 and 2023 the appellant appealed five civil penalties imposed on him in varying amounts by the respondent. The penalties related to three properties in Salford, of each of which the appellant is the registered proprietor. The FTT directed that the applications be heard together, and they were heard in February 2025.

The appellant and one of the witnesses he wished to call live in the Czech Republic, and two other witnesses (his father Michal Kravec and his brother Michal Kravec) live in the Slovakia.

It is not always, nor automatically, possible to give evidence by video link from abroad – an important consideration that was not well-known before video hearings became common during the pandemic and is still rather a specialist point. Essentially it is not possible to give evidence by video from another jurisdiction without the consent of the relevant authorities in that jurisdiction. However, it is not always necessary to seek express consent, because some jurisdictions have made it know that they have no objection to evidence being given from their territory in that way. The Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office maintains a list setting out the position in various jurisdictions, which is available online. The list says this:

The FTT’s Presidential Guidance Note 1 of 2024, “Giving Evidence from Abroad”, dated 14 August 2024 (replacing an earlier version published in 2022), contains a link to the FCDO list and explains that where a country has given unconditional consent in that way the person wishing to give such evidence must make an application to the FTT, which has a discretion whether or not to allow him or her to do so.

On 23 August 2023 the FTT’s case officer wrote to the appellant’s then representatives as follows:

It is not known why the judge decided as he or she did, when no application had been made. It is not possible to see whether the judge was unaware of the fact that the Czech Republic has given permission in the terms set out in the FCDO list, or whether the judge was exercising a discretion to refuse permission. The appellant wrote back to the FTT explaining that the only way he could participate was by video link.

On 13 October 2023 the FTT wrote to the appellant (who was now unrepresented):

That judge who gave that “verdict” was clearly unaware of the Czech Republic’s position. On 25 October 2024 the FTT wrote to the appellant in the following terms:

A case management hearing took place in September 2024. The Tribunal has no information about what happened at that hearing. On 12 December 2024 the FTT gave directions, including the following:

It may be that at the case management hearing, the possibility of the witnesses giving evidence from Poland was discussed; I do not know why. At any rate the appellant made an application on 31 January 2025 explaining that it was impossible for him and his witnesses to give evidence from Poland since none of them was resident there, and asking for their witness statements to be admitted as their evidence.

The FTT heard the appeals in February 2025 and gave its written decision on 17 April 2025. The appellant was represented by counsel at the hearing. The FTT recorded the fact that the appellant and his witnesses live abroad. It made no mention of the FTT’s own correspondence stating that he could not give evidence from the Czech Republic. It referred to the FTT’s Guidance and stated that there would have been no difficulty in giving evidence from the Czech Republic. However, the FTT also pointed out that the appellant has a degree in English law, and inferred that he could have researched the position himself. It observed that he had made no attempt to obtain express permission from the Czech Republic or from Slovakia. It concluded that he had chosen to make himself and his witnesses unavailable for the hearing and for cross-examination, and while it admitted the witness statements from the appellant and his witnesses it concluded that little weight could be attached to them. That meant, of course, that the local housing authority’s evidence was preferred to that of the appellant.

The FTT went on to find that the appellant was a person managing the properties, despite having let them to a third party who was the landlord under the agreements that made them houses in multiple occupation. It found that the relevant offences had been committed and increased the financial penalties imposed by the respondent.

The appellant sought permission to appeal on multiple grounds, first on the basis that the FTT was wrong to attach little weight to his and his witnesses’ evidence, and also challenging the FTT’s other findings. The FTT accepted one ground of appeal and reduced one penalty, as a result of which the total of the penalties came to £86,500. It refused permission to appeal on any other ground, stating that it was “unfortunate” that the Tribunal in December 2024 stated the position incorrectly but repeating its view that the appellant should either have found out the correct position himself or should have sought individual permission from the two jurisdictions concerned.

The appellant renewed his application for permission to this Tribunal. The appellant’s first ground of appeal was, again, that the FTT was wrong in giving only little weight to his and his witnesses’ written evidence. In granting permission the Tribunal said this:

Accordingly, the point is not quite as the appellant put it. The Tribunal has given permission to appeal on the ground that the hearing was unfair as a result of the appellant’s and his witnesses not giving video evidence, which in turn was a result of the incorrect information the FTT chose to give and the directions it gave. I refer to this ground below as the first ground. Permission was granted on six other grounds, on the basis that had the appellant been able to give evidence by video the FTT’s findings might have been different.

The respondent’s position so far as first ground is concerned is that the appeal should fail for the same reasons as the FTT gave: the appellant should have worked out the position himself, or applied for individual permission from the Czech Republic and Slovakia.He was represented by counsel at the hearing in February 2025 and it was not suggested at the hearing that he had ben misled. But if the appeal succeeds the respondent suggests that the FTT’s decision be set aside and the matter remitted to the FTT, without any decision on the remaining grounds of appeal which challenge substantive points in the FTT’s decision.

That is indeed the only possible outcome of the appeal, for the reasons the Tribunal gave when granting permission. The FTT in August took it upon itself to tell the appellant he could not give evidence from the Czech Republic. It gave no reasons for that decision. What was said at the case management hearing I do not know, but on two further occasions the FTT told the appellant in clear terms that he could not give evidence from the Czech Republic. True, if he had read the 2024 Guidance and followed the link he would have been able to correct the FTT’s error. To criticise the appellant for not putting the FTT right is to penalise him for complying with the FTT’s direction. Counsel representing the appellant at the hearing before the FTT also missed the point, but to pass the responsibility for the FTT’s mistake to the appellant by expecting him to correct it is unfair, particularly in light of the dramatic consequences of that mistake.

As a result of the FTT’s mistake the appellant and his witnesses gave evidence in writing, and little weight was given to that untested evidence. Inevitably written evidence is given less weight than live evidence; but worse still, in the present case, the FTT drew an adverse inference from the appellant’s failure to correct the FTT’s mistake and concluded that he had deliberately avoided giving live evidence. There was no proper basis for that conclusion. Inevitably in those circumstance the appellant did not get a fair hearing.

The FTT’s decision is set aside. The matter is remitted to the FTT to be re-heard by a different panel.

That being the case I do not need to consider the other grounds of appeal. The appellant’s case on all the issues on which he disagrees with the FTT will be heard when the matter is heard and decided afresh.