Hakan Tuyunuklu v Mohammed Akmal

This is an appeal from a decision of the First-tier Tribunal to strike out an application made by the appellant Mr Hakan Tuyunuklu for a rent repayment order on the ground that he was in receipt of universal credit in respect of housing and so could not recover any rent. It has been determined under the Tribunal’s written representations procedure. Neither party has been legally represented.

The Housing and Planning Act 2016 enables tenants and local housing authorities to make an application for a rent repayment order against a landlord who has committed one or more of the offences listed in section 40. Section 44 provides that when the application is made by a tenant

Where – and insofar as - a tenant’s rent has been paid by universal credit, only the local housing authority can apply for a rent repayment order.

In January 2025 the appellant applied to the FTT for a rent repayment order against his landlord, the respondent Mr Mohammed Akmal. He alleged an offence of harassment, and sought the repayment of rent from 1 January 2024 to 9 December 2024.

This was not the first such application he had made. He had previously applied for a rent repayment order in respect of the period from 10 April 2023 to 9 April 2024. The FTT refused that application in a decision dated 2 December 2024; permission to appeal was refused by the FTT on 5 December 2024 and by the Upper Tribunal on 2 January 2025. Accordingly, the period in respect of which the present application sought a rent repayment overlapped with the earlier application.

The FTT conducted a hearing of the January 2025 application on 9 October 2025. In its decision of the same date the FTT explained that it had to address two preliminary issues. The first was the overlap; it decided that the present application could be considered only in respect of the period from 10 April 2024 onwards because a decision had already been made in respect of the earlier period. There is no permission to appeal that decision, which was undoubtedly correct.

The second preliminary issue arose from the fact that the applicant was in receipt of universal credit; at the hearing the FTT asked the appellant to explain why he was entitled to a rent repayment order in those circumstances.

In its decision of 9 October 2025 the FTT recorded that at the hearing the appellant accused the FTT of bias and asked the panel to recuse themselves, and then said that he was not prepared to remain at the hearing and left. It then analysed the two preliminary issues and said this:

In its refusal of permission to appeal the FTT said:

The appellant sought permission to appeal on the basis that he did not say that the whole of his rent was paid by universal credit. Only part of it had been so paid. He said that he told the FTT so, but was not given the opportunity to pause for a moment, ascertain the figures from his papers, and to explain that his application related only to the rent that he had paid from his own pocket. He argued that the FTT had been wrong to strike out his case, and that he had not had a fair hearing.

The Tribunal granted permission to appeal on those grounds.

The appellant said that he tried to explain to the FTT that only part of his rent was paid by universal credit. The transcript records the following exchange:

The appellant explained that he said, not “person’s just”, but “percentage” – and I can understand that that is likely to have been a mishearing of the recording. In the grounds of appeal he went on to say that the panel accused him of interrupting, when he was not doing, that he asked for an adjournment, and that the judge responded by concluding the hearing. He also complained that the panel refused to engage with the authority of Rakusen v Jepsen, which he maintained was authority for the proposition that a tenant in receipt of universal credit can nevertheless get a rent repayment order. He also felt that he should have been given notice of the requirement to provide a breakdown to show how much of his universal credit was paid towards his rent. The correct course, he said, would have been to adjourn the hearing to allow him to file the breakdown.

The figures he needed to produce were, he said, as follows: his monthly Universal Credit comprised:

The respondent in reply maintained that the hearing was fair, that the appellant chose to disengage, and that there is no basis for an appeal.

In considering the parties’ arguments I start from two propositions of law. The first is that Rakusen v Jepsen is not authority for the idea that a tenant whose rent has been paid by universal credit can nevertheless get it back through a rent repayment order. The Supreme Court did not say that. From references to AI in the transcript I wonder if the appellant was misled by an AI hallucination. Whatever the reason, his point about Rakusen v Jepsen is without foundation.

The second is that the appellant is of course right that if only part of his rent is paid by universal credit, it is only that part of it that he cannot recover by way of a rent repayment order. Section 44 makes that clear. It would be helpful to hear legal argument as to the position where the tenant pays the rest of his rent out of universal credit that is not allocated to housing (since the appellant says that is what he did). My immediate reaction is that in those circumstances it is only the housing element of the universal credit that the tenant cannot recover. But in any event the appeal cannot succeed for the following reasons.

In considering the appeal I have studied the transcript of the hearing which the appellant has supplied. It is clear to me, first, that the appellant did not say anything that conveyed to the FTT the fact that only part of his rent was paid by universal credit (and that information was not in his written application) and, secondly, that his conduct at the hearing was such that the judge very properly brought the hearing to an end. The lack of opportunity to explain himself was his own doing.

The appellant did indeed refer to a “percentage” in the remark quoted above (assuming in his favour that that is what he said). But that alone, even assuming the judge heard the words he was saying, did not really convey his message. Some minutes later he said – and again I accept that the transcript may not be entirely accurate: “Before there is a percentage of between the local authority and I need to make payment to, but percentage is different, but there is no rule as far as I know bringing me, barring me to bringing any claim regarding the Rent Repayment Order, just because I’m, I’m receiving universal credit.” Again, the message is not clear. He also said that in Rakusen v Jepson it was “held expressively that the tenant can bring Rent Repayment Order application even where the universal credit, the rent directed to landlord”, which of course the panel knew to be incorrect. I can see that he was trying to say that only part of his rent was paid by universal credit, but I can also see why the panel did not understand that that was what he was saying.

At the same time, in the last seven or so pages of the transcript after the issue of universal credit has been raised, the appellant argued with the judge and member about who was interrupting whom, accused them of bias, asked them to recuse themselves and have the matter heard by another judge, and accused them of regarding themselves as being above the law. The transcript cannot convey tone of voice but my impression is that the appellant was becoming verbally aggressive; at one point the member asked the judge if he should call security, so I take it that the panel was beginning to feel that the appellant might need to be removed from the hearing.

The appellant in his grounds of appeal has apologised for the accusation of bias. But that cannot change the fact that he made it impossible for the hearing to continue. After the appellant accused the panel of thinking they were above the law the judge announced that the hearing was concluded, and rightly so.

On that basis I draw two conclusions. First, the FTT did not make any error of law. It was not aware that only part of the rent was paid by universal credit, because the appellant had not said so in his application and did not tell them so at the hearing. I appreciate that he was trying to tell them so, but his explanation was impossible to understand. Instead of explaining clearly, he focused on trying to persuade the FTT that Rakusen v Jepsen was authority for something that it did not decide, and then on accusing the FTT of bias. Second, the appellant had a fair hearing. It was terminated as a result of his own conduct.

The appeal fails and the FTT’s decision stands.